use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
+use crate::blinded_path::message::{MessageContext, OffersContext};
use crate::blinded_path::{BlindedPath, NodeIdLookUp};
use crate::blinded_path::message::ForwardNode;
use crate::blinded_path::payment::{Bolt12OfferContext, Bolt12RefundContext, PaymentConstraints, PaymentContext, ReceiveTlvs};
use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, WithChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
use crate::events;
-use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
+use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason, ReplayEvent};
// Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
// construct one themselves.
use crate::ln::inbound_payment;
use crate::ln::types::{ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
use crate::ln::channel::{self, Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
-pub use crate::ln::channel::{InboundHTLCDetails, InboundHTLCStateDetails, OutboundHTLCDetails, OutboundHTLCStateDetails};
+use crate::ln::channel_state::ChannelDetails;
use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
#[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
#[cfg(test)]
use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
-use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
+use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, ExplicitSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder, UnsignedBolt12Invoice};
use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
use crate::offers::offer::{Offer, OfferBuilder};
use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
+use crate::onion_message::async_payments::{AsyncPaymentsMessage, HeldHtlcAvailable, ReleaseHeldHtlc, AsyncPaymentsMessageHandler};
use crate::onion_message::messenger::{new_pending_onion_message, Destination, MessageRouter, PendingOnionMessage, Responder, ResponseInstruction};
use crate::onion_message::offers::{OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler};
use crate::sign::{EntropySource, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
use core::ops::Deref;
// Re-export this for use in the public API.
-pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
+pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
// Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
prev_short_channel_id: u64,
prev_htlc_id: u64,
+ prev_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
prev_channel_id: ChannelId,
prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
prev_user_channel_id: u128,
blinded_failure: Option<BlindedFailure>,
channel_id: ChannelId,
- // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
+ // These fields are consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
// channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
outpoint: OutPoint,
+ counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
}
enum OnionPayload {
},
(2, OutboundRoute) => {
(0, session_priv, required),
- };
+ },
);
err: msg,
action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
},
- ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
+ ChannelError::Close((msg, _reason)) => LightningError {
err: msg.clone(),
action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
/// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
/// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
/// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Debug)]
pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
/// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
CommitmentFirst,
},
}
+/// A pointer to a channel that is unblocked when an event is surfaced
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub(crate) struct EventUnblockedChannel {
+ counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
+ funding_txo: OutPoint,
+ channel_id: ChannelId,
+ blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
+}
+
+impl Writeable for EventUnblockedChannel {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
+ self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
+ self.funding_txo.write(writer)?;
+ self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
+ self.blocking_action.write(writer)
+ }
+}
+
+impl MaybeReadable for EventUnblockedChannel {
+ fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
+ let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let funding_txo = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let blocking_action = match RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::read(reader)? {
+ Some(blocking_action) => blocking_action,
+ None => return Ok(None),
+ };
+ Ok(Some(EventUnblockedChannel {
+ counterparty_node_id,
+ funding_txo,
+ channel_id,
+ blocking_action,
+ }))
+ }
+}
+
#[derive(Debug)]
pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
/// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
/// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
/// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
/// event can be generated.
- PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
+ PaymentClaimed {
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash,
+ /// A pending MPP claim which hasn't yet completed.
+ ///
+ /// Not written to disk.
+ pending_mpp_claim: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId, u64, PendingMPPClaimPointer)>,
+ },
/// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
/// operation of another channel.
///
/// outbound edge.
EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
event: events::Event,
- downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
+ downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<EventUnblockedChannel>,
},
/// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
/// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
}
impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
- (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
+ (0, PaymentClaimed) => {
+ (0, payment_hash, required),
+ (9999999999, pending_mpp_claim, (static_value, None)),
+ },
// Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
// *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
(1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
(0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
(2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
- (4, blocking_action, required),
+ (4, blocking_action, upgradable_required),
// Note that by the time we get past the required read above, downstream_funding_outpoint will be
// filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
(5, downstream_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(downstream_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
// monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
// support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
// downgrades to prior versions.
- (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
+ (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, upgradable_option),
},
);
// Note that by the time we get past the required read above, channel_funding_outpoint will be
// filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
(3, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(channel_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
- };
+ }
);
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub(crate) struct PendingMPPClaim {
+ channels_without_preimage: Vec<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, u64)>,
+ channels_with_preimage: Vec<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId)>,
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub(crate) struct PendingMPPClaimPointer(Arc<Mutex<PendingMPPClaim>>);
+
+impl PartialEq for PendingMPPClaimPointer {
+ fn eq(&self, o: &Self) -> bool { Arc::ptr_eq(&self.0, &o.0) }
+}
+impl Eq for PendingMPPClaimPointer {}
+
+impl core::fmt::Debug for PendingMPPClaimPointer {
+ fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> Result<(), core::fmt::Error> {
+ self.0.lock().unwrap().fmt(f)
+ }
+}
+
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
/// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
/// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
/// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
htlc_id: u64,
},
+ /// We claimed an MPP payment across multiple channels. We have to block removing the payment
+ /// preimage from any monitor until the last monitor is updated to contain the payment
+ /// preimage. Otherwise we may not be able to replay the preimage on the monitor(s) that
+ /// weren't updated on startup.
+ ///
+ /// This variant is *not* written to disk, instead being inferred from [`ChannelMonitor`]
+ /// state.
+ ClaimedMPPPayment {
+ pending_claim: PendingMPPClaimPointer,
+ }
}
impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
}
}
-impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
- (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
-;);
+impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
+ (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) },
+ unread_variants: ClaimedMPPPayment
+);
+impl Readable for Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction> {
+ fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ Ok(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::read(reader)?)
+ }
+}
/// State we hold per-peer.
pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
/// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
+/// The number of blocks of historical feerate estimates we keep around and consider when deciding
+/// to force-close a channel for having too-low fees. Also the number of blocks we have to see
+/// after startup before we consider force-closing channels for having too-low fees.
+pub(super) const FEERATE_TRACKING_BLOCKS: usize = 144;
+
/// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
/// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
///
/// }
///
/// // On the event processing thread once the peer has responded
-/// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
-/// Event::FundingGenerationReady {
-/// temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, channel_value_satoshis, output_script,
-/// user_channel_id, ..
-/// } => {
-/// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
-/// let funding_transaction = wallet.create_funding_transaction(
-/// channel_value_satoshis, output_script
-/// );
-/// match channel_manager.funding_transaction_generated(
-/// &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction
-/// ) {
-/// Ok(()) => println!("Funding channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
-/// Err(e) => println!("Error funding channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
-/// }
-/// },
-/// Event::ChannelPending { channel_id, user_channel_id, former_temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
-/// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
-/// println!(
-/// "Channel {} now {} pending (funding transaction has been broadcasted)", channel_id,
-/// former_temporary_channel_id.unwrap()
-/// );
-/// },
-/// Event::ChannelReady { channel_id, user_channel_id, .. } => {
-/// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
-/// println!("Channel {} ready", channel_id);
-/// },
-/// // ...
-/// # _ => {},
+/// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| {
+/// match event {
+/// Event::FundingGenerationReady {
+/// temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, channel_value_satoshis, output_script,
+/// user_channel_id, ..
+/// } => {
+/// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
+/// let funding_transaction = wallet.create_funding_transaction(
+/// channel_value_satoshis, output_script
+/// );
+/// match channel_manager.funding_transaction_generated(
+/// &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction
+/// ) {
+/// Ok(()) => println!("Funding channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
+/// Err(e) => println!("Error funding channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
+/// }
+/// },
+/// Event::ChannelPending { channel_id, user_channel_id, former_temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
+/// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
+/// println!(
+/// "Channel {} now {} pending (funding transaction has been broadcasted)", channel_id,
+/// former_temporary_channel_id.unwrap()
+/// );
+/// },
+/// Event::ChannelReady { channel_id, user_channel_id, .. } => {
+/// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
+/// println!("Channel {} ready", channel_id);
+/// },
+/// // ...
+/// # _ => {},
+/// }
+/// Ok(())
/// });
/// # }
/// ```
/// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
/// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
/// # let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
-/// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
-/// Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
-/// if !is_trusted(counterparty_node_id) {
-/// match channel_manager.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(
-/// &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, error_message.to_string()
-/// ) {
-/// Ok(()) => println!("Rejecting channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
-/// Err(e) => println!("Error rejecting channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
+/// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| {
+/// match event {
+/// Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
+/// if !is_trusted(counterparty_node_id) {
+/// match channel_manager.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(
+/// &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, error_message.to_string()
+/// ) {
+/// Ok(()) => println!("Rejecting channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
+/// Err(e) => println!("Error rejecting channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
+/// }
+/// return Ok(());
/// }
-/// return;
-/// }
///
-/// let user_channel_id = 43;
-/// match channel_manager.accept_inbound_channel(
-/// &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, user_channel_id
-/// ) {
-/// Ok(()) => println!("Accepting channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
-/// Err(e) => println!("Error accepting channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
-/// }
-/// },
-/// // ...
-/// # _ => {},
+/// let user_channel_id = 43;
+/// match channel_manager.accept_inbound_channel(
+/// &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, user_channel_id
+/// ) {
+/// Ok(()) => println!("Accepting channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
+/// Err(e) => println!("Error accepting channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
+/// }
+/// },
+/// // ...
+/// # _ => {},
+/// }
+/// Ok(())
/// });
/// # }
/// ```
/// }
///
/// // On the event processing thread
-/// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
-/// Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id, user_channel_id, .. } => {
-/// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
-/// println!("Channel {} closed", channel_id);
-/// },
-/// // ...
-/// # _ => {},
+/// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| {
+/// match event {
+/// Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id, user_channel_id, .. } => {
+/// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
+/// println!("Channel {} closed", channel_id);
+/// },
+/// // ...
+/// # _ => {},
+/// }
+/// Ok(())
/// });
/// # }
/// ```
/// };
///
/// // On the event processing thread
-/// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
-/// Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
-/// PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
-/// assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
-/// println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
-/// channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
-/// },
-/// PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
-/// println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
+/// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| {
+/// match event {
+/// Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
+/// PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
+/// assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
+/// println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
+/// channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
+/// },
+/// PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
+/// println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
+/// },
+/// PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(payment_preimage) => {
+/// assert_ne!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
+/// println!("Claiming spontaneous payment {}", payment_hash);
+/// channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
+/// },
+/// // ...
+/// # _ => {},
/// },
-/// PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(payment_preimage) => {
-/// assert_ne!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
-/// println!("Claiming spontaneous payment {}", payment_hash);
-/// channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
+/// Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
+/// assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
+/// println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
/// },
/// // ...
-/// # _ => {},
-/// },
-/// Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
-/// assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
-/// println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
-/// },
-/// // ...
-/// # _ => {},
+/// # _ => {},
+/// }
+/// Ok(())
/// });
/// # }
/// ```
/// );
///
/// // On the event processing thread
-/// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
-/// Event::PaymentSent { payment_hash, .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_hash),
-/// Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_hash),
-/// // ...
-/// # _ => {},
+/// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| {
+/// match event {
+/// Event::PaymentSent { payment_hash, .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_hash),
+/// Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_hash),
+/// // ...
+/// # _ => {},
+/// }
+/// Ok(())
/// });
/// # }
/// ```
/// #
/// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
/// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
+/// # let absolute_expiry = None;
/// let offer = channel_manager
-/// .create_offer_builder()?
+/// .create_offer_builder(absolute_expiry)?
/// # ;
/// # // Needed for compiling for c_bindings
/// # let builder: lightning::offers::offer::OfferBuilder<_, _> = offer.into();
/// let bech32_offer = offer.to_string();
///
/// // On the event processing thread
-/// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
-/// Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
-/// PaymentPurpose::Bolt12OfferPayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
-/// println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
-/// channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
+/// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| {
+/// match event {
+/// Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
+/// PaymentPurpose::Bolt12OfferPayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
+/// println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
+/// channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
+/// },
+/// PaymentPurpose::Bolt12OfferPayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
+/// println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
+/// }
+/// # _ => {},
/// },
-/// PaymentPurpose::Bolt12OfferPayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
-/// println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
+/// Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
+/// println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
/// },
/// // ...
-/// # _ => {},
-/// },
-/// Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
-/// println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
-/// },
-/// // ...
-/// # _ => {},
+/// # _ => {},
+/// }
+/// Ok(())
/// });
/// # Ok(())
/// # }
/// );
///
/// // On the event processing thread
-/// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
-/// Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(payment_id), .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_id),
-/// Event::PaymentFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
-/// Event::InvoiceRequestFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
-/// // ...
-/// # _ => {},
+/// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| {
+/// match event {
+/// Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(payment_id), .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_id),
+/// Event::PaymentFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
+/// Event::InvoiceRequestFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
+/// // ...
+/// # _ => {},
+/// }
+/// Ok(())
/// });
/// # }
/// ```
/// );
///
/// // On the event processing thread
-/// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
-/// Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(payment_id), .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_id),
-/// Event::PaymentFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
-/// // ...
-/// # _ => {},
+/// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| {
+/// match event {
+/// Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(payment_id), .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_id),
+/// Event::PaymentFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
+/// // ...
+/// # _ => {},
+/// }
+/// Ok(())
/// });
/// # Ok(())
/// # }
/// };
///
/// // On the event processing thread
-/// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
-/// Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
-/// PaymentPurpose::Bolt12RefundPayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
-/// assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
-/// println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
-/// channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
-/// },
-/// PaymentPurpose::Bolt12RefundPayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
-/// println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
-/// },
-/// // ...
-/// # _ => {},
+/// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| {
+/// match event {
+/// Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
+/// PaymentPurpose::Bolt12RefundPayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
+/// assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
+/// println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
+/// channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
+/// },
+/// PaymentPurpose::Bolt12RefundPayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
+/// println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
+/// },
+/// // ...
+/// # _ => {},
/// },
/// Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
/// assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
/// },
/// // ...
/// # _ => {},
+/// }
+/// Ok(())
/// });
/// # }
/// ```
/// Tracks the message events that are to be broadcasted when we are connected to some peer.
pending_broadcast_messages: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
+ /// We only want to force-close our channels on peers based on stale feerates when we're
+ /// confident the feerate on the channel is *really* stale, not just became stale recently.
+ /// Thus, we store the fee estimates we had as of the last [`FEERATE_TRACKING_BLOCKS`] blocks
+ /// (after startup completed) here, and only force-close when channels have a lower feerate
+ /// than we predicted any time in the last [`FEERATE_TRACKING_BLOCKS`] blocks.
+ ///
+ /// We only keep this in memory as we assume any feerates we receive immediately after startup
+ /// may be bunk (as they often are if Bitcoin Core crashes) and want to delay taking any
+ /// actions for a day anyway.
+ ///
+ /// The first element in the pair is the
+ /// [`ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee`] estimate, the second the
+ /// [`ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee`] estimate.
+ last_days_feerates: Mutex<VecDeque<(u32, u32)>>,
+
entropy_source: ES,
node_signer: NS,
signer_provider: SP,
/// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
-/// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
-pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
- /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
- pub fee_base_msat: u32,
- /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
- pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
- /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
- /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
- /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
- pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
-}
-
-/// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
-/// to better separate parameters.
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
-pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
- /// The node_id of our counterparty
- pub node_id: PublicKey,
- /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
- /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
- /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
- pub features: InitFeatures,
- /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
- /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
- /// claiming at least this value on chain.
- ///
- /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
- ///
- /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
- pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
- /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
- /// payments to us through this channel.
- pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
- /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
- /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
- /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
- pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
- /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
- pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
-}
-
-/// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
-pub struct ChannelDetails {
- /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
- /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
- /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
- /// lifetime of the channel.
- pub channel_id: ChannelId,
- /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
- pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
- /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
- /// our counterparty already.
- pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
- /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
- ///
- /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
- pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
- /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
- /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
- ///
- /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
- /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
- ///
- /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
- /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
- ///
- /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
- /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
- /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
- /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
- /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
- pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
- /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
- /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
- /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
- /// `Some(0)`).
- ///
- /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
- ///
- /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
- /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
- pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
- /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
- /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
- /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
- /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
- ///
- /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
- /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
- ///
- /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
- pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
- /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
- pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
- /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
- /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
- /// this value on chain.
- ///
- /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
- ///
- /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
- ///
- /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
- pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
- /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
- /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
- /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
- /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
- /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
- ///
- /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
- /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
- /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
- pub user_channel_id: u128,
- /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
- /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
- ///
- /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
- pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
- /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
- /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
- /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
- ///
- /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
- /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
- /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
- /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
- ///
- /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
- pub balance_msat: u64,
- /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
- /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
- /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
- /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
- ///
- /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
- ///
- /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
- /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
- /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
- pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
- /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
- /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
- /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
- /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
- ///
- /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
- /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
- pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
- /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
- /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
- /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
- /// route which is valid.
- pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
- /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
- /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
- /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
- /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
- /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
- ///
- /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
- /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
- /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
- pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
- /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
- /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
- /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
- /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
- /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
- ///
- /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
- ///
- /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
- /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
- /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
- pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
- /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
- ///
- /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
- pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
- /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
- /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
- /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
- /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
- /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
- ///
- /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
- pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
- /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
- pub is_outbound: bool,
- /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
- /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
- /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
- /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
- /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
- ///
- /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
- pub is_channel_ready: bool,
- /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
- /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
- pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
- /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
- /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
- ///
- /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
- pub is_usable: bool,
- /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
- pub is_public: bool,
- /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
- /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
- pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
- /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
- pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
- /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
- ///
- /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
- pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
- /// Pending inbound HTLCs.
- ///
- /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
- pub pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCDetails>,
- /// Pending outbound HTLCs.
- ///
- /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
- pub pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCDetails>,
-}
-
-impl ChannelDetails {
- /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
- /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
- /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
- ///
- /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
- /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
- pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
- self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
- }
-
- /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
- /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
- /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
- ///
- /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
- /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
- pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
- self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
- }
-
- fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
- context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
- fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
- ) -> Self
- where
- SP::Target: SignerProvider,
- F::Target: FeeEstimator
- {
- let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
- let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
- context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
- ChannelDetails {
- channel_id: context.channel_id(),
- counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
- node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- features: latest_features,
- unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
- forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
- // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
- // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
- // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
- // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
- // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
- outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
- Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
- outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
- },
- funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
- // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
- // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
- channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
- short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
- outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
- inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
- channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
- feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
- unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
- balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
- inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
- outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
- next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
- next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
- user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
- confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
- confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
- force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
- is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
- is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
- is_usable: context.is_live(),
- is_public: context.should_announce(),
- inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
- inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
- config: Some(context.config()),
- channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
- pending_inbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_inbound_htlc_details(),
- pending_outbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_outbound_htlc_details(),
- }
- }
-}
-
-#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
-/// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
-/// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
-/// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
-/// the channel will be removed shortly.
-/// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
-/// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
-pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
- /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
- NotShuttingDown,
- /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
- ShutdownInitiated,
- /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
- /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
- ResolvingHTLCs,
- /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
- NegotiatingClosingFee,
- /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
- /// to drop the channel.
- ShutdownComplete,
-}
+/// The maximum expiration from the current time where an [`Offer`] or [`Refund`] is considered
+/// short-lived, while anything with a greater expiration is considered long-lived.
+///
+/// Using [`ChannelManager::create_offer_builder`] or [`ChannelManager::create_refund_builder`],
+/// will included a [`BlindedPath`] created using:
+/// - [`MessageRouter::create_compact_blinded_paths`] when short-lived, and
+/// - [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] when long-lived.
+///
+/// Using compact [`BlindedPath`]s may provide better privacy as the [`MessageRouter`] could select
+/// more hops. However, since they use short channel ids instead of pubkeys, they are more likely to
+/// become invalid over time as channels are closed. Thus, they are only suitable for short-term use.
+pub const MAX_SHORT_LIVED_RELATIVE_EXPIRY: Duration = Duration::from_secs(60 * 60 * 24);
/// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
/// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
(false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
},
- ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
+ ChannelError::Close((msg, reason)) => {
let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context, None);
log_error!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
- let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason);
let err =
MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $channel_update);
macro_rules! process_events_body {
($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
+ let mut handling_failed = false;
let mut processed_all_events = false;
- while !processed_all_events {
+ while !handling_failed && !processed_all_events {
if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
return;
}
}
let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
- let num_events = pending_events.len();
if !pending_events.is_empty() {
result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
}
let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
+ let mut num_handled_events = 0;
for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
$event_to_handle = event;
- $handle_event;
- if let Some(action) = action_opt {
- post_event_actions.push(action);
+ match $handle_event {
+ Ok(()) => {
+ if let Some(action) = action_opt {
+ post_event_actions.push(action);
+ }
+ num_handled_events += 1;
+ }
+ Err(_e) => {
+ // If we encounter an error we stop handling events and make sure to replay
+ // any unhandled events on the next invocation.
+ handling_failed = true;
+ break;
+ }
}
}
{
let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- pending_events.drain(..num_events);
+ pending_events.drain(..num_handled_events);
processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
// Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
// updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
pending_broadcast_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
+ last_days_feerates: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
+
entropy_source,
node_signer,
signer_provider,
let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
- self.best_block.read().unwrap().height, outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
+ self.best_block.read().unwrap().height, outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id, &*self.logger)
{
Ok(res) => res,
Err(e) => {
}
} else {
let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
- shutdown_result = Some(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
+ shutdown_result = Some(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed { broadcasted_latest_txn: Some(false) }));
}
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
} else {
- ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
+ ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed { broadcasted_latest_txn: Some(broadcast) }
};
let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id), None);
if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
// peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
// otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
- if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
+ if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.channel_flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
return Err(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
} else {
return Err(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
short_channel_id,
timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
- flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
+ message_flags: 1, // Only must_be_one
+ channel_flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
}
- pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
+ /// Pays the [`Bolt12Invoice`] associated with the `payment_id` encoded in its `payer_metadata`.
+ ///
+ /// The invoice's `payer_metadata` is used to authenticate that the invoice was indeed requested
+ /// before attempting a payment. [`Bolt12PaymentError::UnexpectedInvoice`] is returned if this
+ /// fails or if the encoded `payment_id` is not recognized. The latter may happen once the
+ /// payment is no longer tracked because the payment was attempted after:
+ /// - an invoice for the `payment_id` was already paid,
+ /// - one full [timer tick] has elapsed since initially requesting the invoice when paying an
+ /// offer, or
+ /// - the refund corresponding to the invoice has already expired.
+ ///
+ /// To retry the payment, request another invoice using a new `payment_id`.
+ ///
+ /// Attempting to pay the same invoice twice while the first payment is still pending will
+ /// result in a [`Bolt12PaymentError::DuplicateInvoice`].
+ ///
+ /// Otherwise, either [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`] are used to indicate
+ /// whether or not the payment was successful.
+ ///
+ /// [timer tick]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
+ pub fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
+ let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
+ let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
+ match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
+ Ok(payment_id) => self.send_payment_for_verified_bolt12_invoice(invoice, payment_id),
+ Err(()) => Err(Bolt12PaymentError::UnexpectedInvoice),
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn send_payment_for_verified_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
self.pending_outbound_payments
.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
- || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
- best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
+ || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, &self,
+ &self.secp_ctx, best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
|args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
)
}
Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan)) => {
macro_rules! close_chan { ($err: expr, $api_err: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
let counterparty;
- let err = if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = $err {
+ let err = if let ChannelError::Close((msg, reason)) = $err {
let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
counterparty = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
- let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
let shutdown_res = $chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason);
MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, None)
} else { unreachable!(); };
match find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction) {
Ok(found_funding_txo) => funding_txo = found_funding_txo,
Err(err) => {
- let chan_err = ChannelError::Close(err.to_owned());
+ let chan_err = ChannelError::close(err.to_owned());
let api_err = APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err.to_owned() };
return close_chan!(chan_err, api_err, chan);
},
let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
payment.prev_short_channel_id,
+ payment.prev_counterparty_node_id,
payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
payment.prev_channel_id,
payment.prev_user_channel_id,
user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
channel_id: payment.prev_channel_id,
+ counterparty_node_id: payment.prev_counterparty_node_id,
htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
phantom_shared_secret: None,
// Process all of the forwards and failures for the channel in which the HTLCs were
// proposed to as a batch.
- let pending_forwards = (incoming_scid, incoming_funding_txo, incoming_channel_id,
- incoming_user_channel_id, htlc_forwards.drain(..).collect());
+ let pending_forwards = (
+ incoming_scid, Some(incoming_counterparty_node_id), incoming_funding_txo,
+ incoming_channel_id, incoming_user_channel_id, htlc_forwards.drain(..).collect()
+ );
self.forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(&mut [pending_forwards]);
for (htlc_fail, htlc_destination) in htlc_fails.drain(..) {
let failure = match htlc_fail {
let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
- let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
+ let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, Option<PublicKey>, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
{
let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
if short_chan_id != 0 {
let mut forwarding_counterparty = None;
macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
- () => {
- for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
+ ($forward_infos: expr) => {
+ for forward_info in $forward_infos {
match forward_info {
HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
- prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
+ prev_user_channel_id, prev_counterparty_node_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
outgoing_cltv_value, ..
}
user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
channel_id: prev_channel_id,
outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
+ counterparty_node_id: prev_counterparty_node_id,
htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
{
- Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
+ Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((
+ prev_short_channel_id, prev_counterparty_node_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
+ prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)]
+ )),
Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
}
},
let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
None => {
- forwarding_channel_not_found!();
+ forwarding_channel_not_found!(pending_forwards.drain(..));
continue;
}
};
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
- forwarding_channel_not_found!();
+ forwarding_channel_not_found!(pending_forwards.drain(..));
continue;
}
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
- let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
- for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
- let queue_fail_htlc_res = match forward_info {
- HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
- prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
- prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
- incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
- routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
- onion_packet, blinded, ..
- }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
+ let mut draining_pending_forwards = pending_forwards.drain(..);
+ while let Some(forward_info) = draining_pending_forwards.next() {
+ let queue_fail_htlc_res = match forward_info {
+ HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
+ prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
+ prev_user_channel_id, prev_counterparty_node_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
+ incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
+ routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
+ ref onion_packet, blinded, ..
+ }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
+ },
+ }) => {
+ let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
+ short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
+ user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
+ counterparty_node_id: prev_counterparty_node_id,
+ channel_id: prev_channel_id,
+ outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
+ htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
+ incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
+ // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
+ phantom_shared_secret: None,
+ blinded_failure: blinded.map(|b| b.failure),
+ });
+ let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| {
+ let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh(
+ Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None
+ ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
+ onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
+ &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss
+ ).ok()
+ });
+
+ // Forward the HTLC over the most appropriate channel with the corresponding peer,
+ // applying non-strict forwarding.
+ // The channel with the least amount of outbound liquidity will be used to maximize the
+ // probability of being able to successfully forward a subsequent HTLC.
+ let maybe_optimal_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.values_mut().filter_map(|phase| match phase {
+ ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
+ let balances = chan.context.get_available_balances(&self.fee_estimator);
+ if outgoing_amt_msat <= balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat &&
+ outgoing_amt_msat >= balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat &&
+ chan.context.is_usable() {
+ Some((chan, balances))
+ } else {
+ None
+ }
},
- }) => {
- let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, Some(payment_hash));
- log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
- let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
- short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
- user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
- channel_id: prev_channel_id,
- outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
- htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
- incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
- // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
- phantom_shared_secret: None,
- blinded_failure: blinded.map(|b| b.failure),
- });
- let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| {
- let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh(
- Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None
- ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
- onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
- &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss
- ).ok()
- });
- if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
- payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
- onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator,
- &&logger)
- {
- if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
- log_trace!(logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
+ _ => None,
+ }).min_by_key(|(_, balances)| balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat).map(|(c, _)| c);
+ let optimal_channel = match maybe_optimal_channel {
+ Some(chan) => chan,
+ None => {
+ // Fall back to the specified channel to return an appropriate error.
+ if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
+ chan
} else {
- panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
+ forwarding_channel_not_found!(core::iter::once(forward_info).chain(draining_pending_forwards));
+ break;
}
+ }
+ };
+
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &optimal_channel.context, Some(payment_hash));
+ let channel_description = if optimal_channel.context.get_short_channel_id() == Some(short_chan_id) {
+ "specified"
+ } else {
+ "alternate"
+ };
+ log_trace!(logger, "Forwarding HTLC from SCID {} with payment_hash {} and next hop SCID {} over {} channel {} with corresponding peer {}",
+ prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id, channel_description, optimal_channel.context.channel_id(), &counterparty_node_id);
+ if let Err(e) = optimal_channel.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
+ payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
+ onion_packet.clone(), skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator,
+ &&logger)
+ {
+ if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
+ log_trace!(logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {} to peer {}: {}", &payment_hash, &counterparty_node_id, msg);
+ } else {
+ panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
+ }
+
+ if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
));
- continue;
+ } else {
+ forwarding_channel_not_found!(core::iter::once(forward_info).chain(draining_pending_forwards));
+ break;
}
- None
- },
- HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
- panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
- },
- HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
+ }
+ None
+ },
+ HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
+ panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
+ },
+ HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
+ if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
- Some((chan.queue_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &&logger), htlc_id))
- },
- HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
+ Some((chan.queue_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), &&logger), htlc_id))
+ } else {
+ forwarding_channel_not_found!(core::iter::once(forward_info).chain(draining_pending_forwards));
+ break;
+ }
+ },
+ HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
+ if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
log_trace!(logger, "Failing malformed HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
let res = chan.queue_fail_malformed_htlc(
htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion, &&logger
);
Some((res, htlc_id))
- },
- };
- if let Some((queue_fail_htlc_res, htlc_id)) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
- if let Err(e) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
- if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
+ } else {
+ forwarding_channel_not_found!(core::iter::once(forward_info).chain(draining_pending_forwards));
+ break;
+ }
+ },
+ };
+ if let Some((queue_fail_htlc_res, htlc_id)) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
+ if let Err(e) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
+ if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
+ if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
log_trace!(logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
- } else {
- panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_{{malformed_}}htlc() were not met");
}
- // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
- // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
- // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
- continue;
+ } else {
+ panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_{{malformed_}}htlc() were not met");
}
+ // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
+ // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
+ // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
+ continue;
}
}
- } else {
- forwarding_channel_not_found!();
- continue;
}
} else {
'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
match forward_info {
HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
- prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
+ prev_user_channel_id, prev_counterparty_node_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
skimmed_fee_msat, ..
}
prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
+ counterparty_node_id: prev_counterparty_node_id,
channel_id: prev_channel_id,
outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
+ counterparty_node_id: $htlc.prev_hop.counterparty_node_id,
channel_id: prev_channel_id,
outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
log_error!(logger,
"Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
- shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
+ shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed { broadcasted_latest_txn: Some(false) }));
pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
node_id: counterparty_node_id,
action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
- let mut sources = {
+ let sources = {
let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
return;
}
if valid_mpp {
- for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
- let prev_hop_chan_id = htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
- if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
+ let pending_mpp_claim_ptr_opt = if sources.len() > 1 {
+ let channels_without_preimage = sources.iter().filter_map(|htlc| {
+ if let Some(cp_id) = htlc.prev_hop.counterparty_node_id {
+ let prev_hop = &htlc.prev_hop;
+ Some((cp_id, prev_hop.outpoint, prev_hop.channel_id, prev_hop.htlc_id))
+ } else {
+ None
+ }
+ }).collect();
+ Some(Arc::new(Mutex::new(PendingMPPClaim {
+ channels_without_preimage,
+ channels_with_preimage: Vec::new(),
+ })))
+ } else {
+ None
+ };
+ for htlc in sources {
+ let this_mpp_claim = pending_mpp_claim_ptr_opt.as_ref().and_then(|pending_mpp_claim|
+ if let Some(cp_id) = htlc.prev_hop.counterparty_node_id {
+ let claim_ptr = PendingMPPClaimPointer(Arc::clone(pending_mpp_claim));
+ Some((cp_id, htlc.prev_hop.channel_id, htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, claim_ptr))
+ } else {
+ None
+ }
+ );
+ let raa_blocker = pending_mpp_claim_ptr_opt.as_ref().map(|pending_claim| {
+ RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::ClaimedMPPPayment {
+ pending_claim: PendingMPPClaimPointer(Arc::clone(pending_claim)),
+ }
+ });
+ self.claim_funds_from_hop(
htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
|_, definitely_duplicate| {
debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
- Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
+ (Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, pending_mpp_claim: this_mpp_claim }), raa_blocker)
}
- ) {
- if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
- // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
- // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
- let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop_chan_id), Some(payment_hash));
- log_error!(logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
- } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
- }
+ );
}
- }
- if !valid_mpp {
- for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
+ } else {
+ for htlc in sources {
let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
}
}
- fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
- prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
- -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
+ fn claim_funds_from_hop<
+ ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> (Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>, Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>)
+ >(
+ &self, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
+ completion_action: ComplFunc,
+ ) {
//TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
// If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
match fulfill_res {
UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
- if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
+ let (action_opt, raa_blocker_opt) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false);
+ if let Some(action) = action_opt {
log_trace!(logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
chan_id, action);
peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
}
+ if let Some(raa_blocker) = raa_blocker_opt {
+ peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(chan_id).or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(raa_blocker);
+ }
if !during_init {
handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
}
}
UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
- let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
+ let (action_opt, raa_blocker_opt) = completion_action(None, true);
+ if let Some(raa_blocker) = raa_blocker_opt {
+ debug_assert!(peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.get(&chan_id).unwrap().contains(&raa_blocker));
+ }
+ let action = if let Some(action) = action_opt {
action
} else {
- return Ok(());
+ return;
};
+
mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
log_trace!(logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
} else {
debug_assert!(false,
"Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
- return Ok(());
+ return;
};
if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
}
}
}
- return Ok(());
+ return;
}
}
}
// `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
// generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
// `PaymentForwarded`).
- self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
- Ok(())
+ let (action_opt, raa_blocker_opt) = completion_action(None, false);
+
+ if let Some(raa_blocker) = raa_blocker_opt {
+ let counterparty_node_id = prev_hop.counterparty_node_id.or_else(||
+ // prev_hop.counterparty_node_id is always available for payments received after
+ // LDK 0.0.123, but for those received on 0.0.123 and claimed later, we need to
+ // look up the counterparty in the `action_opt`, if possible.
+ action_opt.as_ref().and_then(|action|
+ if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { pending_mpp_claim, .. } = action {
+ pending_mpp_claim.as_ref().map(|(node_id, _, _, _)| *node_id)
+ } else { None }
+ )
+ );
+ if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id {
+ // TODO: Avoid always blocking the world for the write lock here.
+ let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
+ let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id).or_insert_with(||
+ Mutex::new(PeerState {
+ channel_by_id: new_hash_map(),
+ inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
+ latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
+ pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
+ in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
+ monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
+ actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
+ is_connected: false,
+ }));
+ let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+
+ peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
+ .entry(prev_hop.channel_id)
+ .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
+ .push(raa_blocker);
+ } else {
+ debug_assert!(false,
+ "RAA ChannelMonitorUpdate blockers are only set with PaymentClaimed completion actions, so we should always have a counterparty node id");
+ }
+ }
+
+ self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(action_opt);
}
fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
- let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
+ self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
|htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
let chan_to_release =
if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
- Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, next_channel_id, completed_blocker))
+ Some(EventUnblockedChannel {
+ counterparty_node_id: node_id,
+ funding_txo: next_channel_outpoint,
+ channel_id: next_channel_id,
+ blocking_action: completed_blocker
+ })
} else {
// We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
// `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
}
}), "{:?}", *background_events);
}
- None
+ (None, None)
} else if definitely_duplicate {
if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
- Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
- downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
- downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
- downstream_channel_id: other_chan.2,
- blocking_action: other_chan.3,
- })
- } else { None }
+ (Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
+ downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.counterparty_node_id,
+ downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.funding_txo,
+ downstream_channel_id: other_chan.channel_id,
+ blocking_action: other_chan.blocking_action,
+ }), None)
+ } else { (None, None) }
} else {
let total_fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
} else { None };
debug_assert!(skimmed_fee_msat <= total_fee_earned_msat,
"skimmed_fee_msat must always be included in total_fee_earned_msat");
- Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
+ (Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
prev_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
},
downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
- })
+ }), None)
}
});
- if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
- let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
- let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
- }
},
}
}
debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
+ let mut freed_channels = Vec::new();
+
for action in actions.into_iter() {
match action {
- MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
+ MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, pending_mpp_claim } => {
+ if let Some((counterparty_node_id, chan_id, htlc_id, claim_ptr)) = pending_mpp_claim {
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id).map(|peer_state_mutex| {
+ let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let blockers_entry = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(chan_id);
+ if let btree_map::Entry::Occupied(mut blockers) = blockers_entry {
+ blockers.get_mut().retain(|blocker|
+ if let &RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::ClaimedMPPPayment { pending_claim } = &blocker {
+ if *pending_claim == claim_ptr {
+ let mut pending_claim_state_lock = pending_claim.0.lock().unwrap();
+ let pending_claim_state = &mut *pending_claim_state_lock;
+ pending_claim_state.channels_without_preimage.retain(|(cp, outp, cid, hid)| {
+ if *cp == counterparty_node_id && *cid == chan_id && *hid == htlc_id {
+ pending_claim_state.channels_with_preimage.push((*cp, *outp, *cid));
+ false
+ } else { true }
+ });
+ if pending_claim_state.channels_without_preimage.is_empty() {
+ for (cp, outp, cid) in pending_claim_state.channels_with_preimage.iter() {
+ freed_channels.push((*cp, *outp, *cid, blocker.clone()));
+ }
+ }
+ !pending_claim_state.channels_without_preimage.is_empty()
+ } else { true }
+ } else { true }
+ );
+ if blockers.get().is_empty() {
+ blockers.remove();
+ }
+ }
+ });
+ }
+
let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
amount_msat,
event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
} => {
self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
- if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
- self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, Some(blocker));
+ if let Some(unblocked) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
+ self.handle_monitor_update_release(
+ unblocked.counterparty_node_id, unblocked.funding_txo,
+ unblocked.channel_id, Some(unblocked.blocking_action),
+ );
}
},
MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
},
}
}
+
+ for (node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker) in freed_channels {
+ self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, Some(blocker));
+ }
}
/// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, pending_update_adds: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
- -> (Option<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)>, Option<(u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>)>) {
+ -> (Option<(u64, Option<PublicKey>, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)>, Option<(u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>)>) {
let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None);
log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {} pending update_add_htlcs, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
&channel.context.channel_id(),
let mut htlc_forwards = None;
if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
- htlc_forwards = Some((short_channel_id, channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
- channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
+ htlc_forwards = Some((
+ short_channel_id, Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
+ channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.channel_id(),
+ channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards
+ ));
}
let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = None;
if !pending_update_adds.is_empty() {
log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
remaining_in_flight);
- if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
+ if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || remaining_in_flight != 0 {
return;
}
handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
},
Some(mut phase) => {
let err_msg = format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
- let err = ChannelError::Close(err_msg);
+ let err = ChannelError::close(err_msg);
return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut phase, &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
},
None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
// `update_maps_on_chan_removal`), we'll remove the existing channel
// from `outpoint_to_peer`. Thus, we must first unset the funding outpoint
// on the channel.
- let err = ChannelError::Close($err.to_owned());
+ let err = ChannelError::close($err.to_owned());
chan.unset_funding_info(msg.temporary_channel_id);
return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, chan, &funded_channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL).1);
} } }
} else { unreachable!(); }
Ok(())
} else {
- let e = ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned());
+ let e = ChannelError::close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned());
// We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no
// updates should be made on it. Previously, full_stack_target
// found an (unreachable) panic when the monitor update contained
Ok(())
} else {
- try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
+ try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
"Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
}
},
(tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
} else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
} else {
- return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
+ return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
"Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
}
},
}
try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, &self.fee_estimator), chan_phase_entry);
} else {
- return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
+ return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
"Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
}
},
next_user_channel_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
res
} else {
- return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
+ return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
"Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
}
},
if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
} else {
- return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
+ return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
"Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
}
},
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
- let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
+ let chan_err = ChannelError::close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
}
if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
} else {
- return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
+ return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
"Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
}
Ok(())
}
Ok(())
} else {
- return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
+ return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
"Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
}
},
}
#[inline]
- fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
+ fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Option<PublicKey>, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
let push_forward_event = self.forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(per_source_pending_forwards);
if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
}
#[inline]
- fn forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) -> bool {
+ fn forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Option<PublicKey>, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) -> bool {
let mut push_forward_event = false;
- for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
+ for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_counterparty_node_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
- prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
+ prev_short_channel_id, prev_counterparty_node_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
+ prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info
+ }));
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
intercept_id
}, None));
entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
- prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
+ prev_short_channel_id, prev_counterparty_node_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
+ prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info
+ });
},
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_channel_id), Some(forward_info.payment_hash));
let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
+ counterparty_node_id: prev_counterparty_node_id,
outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
channel_id: prev_channel_id,
htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
// payments are being processed.
push_forward_event |= forward_htlcs_empty && decode_update_add_htlcs_empty;
entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
- prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
+ prev_short_channel_id, prev_counterparty_node_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
+ prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info
+ })));
}
}
}
}
htlcs_to_fail
} else {
- return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
+ return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
"Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
}
},
let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
} else {
- return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
+ return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
"Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
}
},
update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
});
} else {
- return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
+ return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
"Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
}
},
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
}
let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
- let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
+ let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.channel_flags & 1 == 0;
if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
} else {
}
}
} else {
- return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
+ return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
"Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
}
},
}
need_lnd_workaround
} else {
- return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
+ return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
"Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
}
},
let reason = if let MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { reason, .. } = monitor_event {
reason
} else {
- ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
+ ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed { broadcasted_latest_txn: Some(true) }
};
failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason.clone()));
if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
match phase {
ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
- if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
- node_id,
- updates,
- });
+ let cu_msg = msgs.commitment_update.map(|updates| events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
+ node_id,
+ updates,
+ });
+ let raa_msg = msgs.revoke_and_ack.map(|msg| events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
+ node_id,
+ msg,
+ });
+ match (cu_msg, raa_msg) {
+ (Some(cu), Some(raa)) if msgs.order == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
+ pending_msg_events.push(cu);
+ pending_msg_events.push(raa);
+ },
+ (Some(cu), Some(raa)) if msgs.order == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
+ pending_msg_events.push(raa);
+ pending_msg_events.push(cu);
+ },
+ (Some(cu), _) => pending_msg_events.push(cu),
+ (_, Some(raa)) => pending_msg_events.push(raa),
+ (_, _) => {},
}
if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
macro_rules! create_offer_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
/// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
- /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
- /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
+ /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer's
+ /// expiration will be `absolute_expiry` if `Some`, otherwise it will not expire.
///
/// # Privacy
///
- /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the offer.
- /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
- /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
- /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
- /// order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
+ /// Uses [`MessageRouter`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the offer based on the given
+ /// `absolute_expiry` according to [`MAX_SHORT_LIVED_RELATIVE_EXPIRY`]. See those docs for
+ /// privacy implications as well as those of the parameterized [`Router`], which implements
+ /// [`MessageRouter`].
///
/// Also, uses a derived signing pubkey in the offer for recipient privacy.
///
///
/// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
/// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
- pub fn create_offer_builder(&$self) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
+ pub fn create_offer_builder(
+ &$self, absolute_expiry: Option<Duration>
+ ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
- let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
+ let path = $self.create_blinded_paths_using_absolute_expiry(OffersContext::Unknown {}, absolute_expiry)
+ .and_then(|paths| paths.into_iter().next().ok_or(()))
+ .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
+
let builder = OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(
node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx
)
.chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
.path(path);
+ let builder = match absolute_expiry {
+ None => builder,
+ Some(absolute_expiry) => builder.absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry),
+ };
+
Ok(builder.into())
}
} }
///
/// # Privacy
///
- /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the refund.
- /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
- /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
- /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
- /// order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
+ /// Uses [`MessageRouter`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the refund based on the given
+ /// `absolute_expiry` according to [`MAX_SHORT_LIVED_RELATIVE_EXPIRY`]. See those docs for
+ /// privacy implications as well as those of the parameterized [`Router`], which implements
+ /// [`MessageRouter`].
///
/// Also, uses a derived payer id in the refund for payer privacy.
///
let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
- let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
+ let context = OffersContext::OutboundPayment { payment_id };
+ let path = $self.create_blinded_paths_using_absolute_expiry(context, Some(absolute_expiry))
+ .and_then(|paths| paths.into_iter().next().ok_or(()))
+ .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
+
let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
)?
}
} }
+/// Defines the maximum number of [`OffersMessage`] including different reply paths to be sent
+/// along different paths.
+/// Sending multiple requests increases the chances of successful delivery in case some
+/// paths are unavailable. However, only one invoice for a given [`PaymentId`] will be paid,
+/// even if multiple invoices are received.
+const OFFERS_MESSAGE_REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
+
impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
where
M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
///
/// # Privacy
///
- /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
- /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
- /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
- /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
+ /// For payer privacy, uses a derived payer id and uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`]
+ /// to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path. For further privacy implications, see the
+ /// docs of the parameterized [`Router`], which implements [`MessageRouter`].
///
/// # Limitations
///
Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
};
let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
- let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
+
+ let context = OffersContext::OutboundPayment { payment_id };
+ let reply_paths = self.create_blinded_paths(context).map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
if !offer.paths().is_empty() {
- // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
- // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
- // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
- const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
- for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
+ reply_paths
+ .iter()
+ .flat_map(|reply_path| offer.paths().iter().map(move |path| (path, reply_path)))
+ .take(OFFERS_MESSAGE_REQUEST_LIMIT)
+ .for_each(|(path, reply_path)| {
+ let message = new_pending_onion_message(
+ OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
+ Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
+ Some(reply_path.clone()),
+ );
+ pending_offers_messages.push(message);
+ });
+ } else if let Some(signing_pubkey) = offer.signing_pubkey() {
+ for reply_path in reply_paths {
let message = new_pending_onion_message(
OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
- Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
- Some(reply_path.clone()),
+ Destination::Node(signing_pubkey),
+ Some(reply_path),
);
pending_offers_messages.push(message);
}
- } else if let Some(signing_pubkey) = offer.signing_pubkey() {
- let message = new_pending_onion_message(
- OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
- Destination::Node(signing_pubkey),
- Some(reply_path),
- );
- pending_offers_messages.push(message);
} else {
debug_assert!(false);
return Err(Bolt12SemanticError::MissingSigningPubkey);
)?;
let builder: InvoiceBuilder<DerivedSigningPubkey> = builder.into();
let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
- let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path()
+ let reply_paths = self.create_blinded_paths(OffersContext::Unknown {})
.map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
if refund.paths().is_empty() {
- let message = new_pending_onion_message(
- OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
- Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
- Some(reply_path),
- );
- pending_offers_messages.push(message);
- } else {
- for path in refund.paths() {
+ for reply_path in reply_paths {
let message = new_pending_onion_message(
OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
- Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
- Some(reply_path.clone()),
+ Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
+ Some(reply_path),
);
pending_offers_messages.push(message);
}
+ } else {
+ reply_paths
+ .iter()
+ .flat_map(|reply_path| refund.paths().iter().map(move |path| (path, reply_path)))
+ .take(OFFERS_MESSAGE_REQUEST_LIMIT)
+ .for_each(|(path, reply_path)| {
+ let message = new_pending_onion_message(
+ OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
+ Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
+ Some(reply_path.clone()),
+ );
+ pending_offers_messages.push(message);
+ });
}
Ok(invoice)
inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
}
- /// Creates a blinded path by delegating to [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`].
+ /// Creates a collection of blinded paths by delegating to [`MessageRouter`] based on
+ /// the path's intended lifetime.
///
- /// Errors if the `MessageRouter` errors or returns an empty `Vec`.
- fn create_blinded_path(&self) -> Result<BlindedPath, ()> {
+ /// Whether or not the path is compact depends on whether the path is short-lived or long-lived,
+ /// respectively, based on the given `absolute_expiry` as seconds since the Unix epoch. See
+ /// [`MAX_SHORT_LIVED_RELATIVE_EXPIRY`].
+ fn create_blinded_paths_using_absolute_expiry(
+ &self, context: OffersContext, absolute_expiry: Option<Duration>,
+ ) -> Result<Vec<BlindedPath>, ()> {
+ let now = self.duration_since_epoch();
+ let max_short_lived_absolute_expiry = now.saturating_add(MAX_SHORT_LIVED_RELATIVE_EXPIRY);
+
+ if absolute_expiry.unwrap_or(Duration::MAX) <= max_short_lived_absolute_expiry {
+ self.create_compact_blinded_paths(context)
+ } else {
+ self.create_blinded_paths(context)
+ }
+ }
+
+ pub(super) fn duration_since_epoch(&self) -> Duration {
+ #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
+ let now = Duration::from_secs(
+ self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
+ );
+ #[cfg(feature = "std")]
+ let now = std::time::SystemTime::now()
+ .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
+ .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
+
+ now
+ }
+
+ /// Creates a collection of blinded paths by delegating to
+ /// [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`].
+ ///
+ /// Errors if the `MessageRouter` errors.
+ fn create_blinded_paths(&self, context: OffersContext) -> Result<Vec<BlindedPath>, ()> {
let recipient = self.get_our_node_id();
let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
let peers = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()
.iter()
.map(|(node_id, peer_state)| (node_id, peer_state.lock().unwrap()))
+ .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.is_connected)
+ .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.latest_features.supports_onion_messages())
+ .map(|(node_id, _)| *node_id)
+ .collect::<Vec<_>>();
+
+ self.router
+ .create_blinded_paths(recipient, MessageContext::Offers(context), peers, secp_ctx)
+ .and_then(|paths| (!paths.is_empty()).then(|| paths).ok_or(()))
+ }
+
+ /// Creates a collection of blinded paths by delegating to
+ /// [`MessageRouter::create_compact_blinded_paths`].
+ ///
+ /// Errors if the `MessageRouter` errors.
+ fn create_compact_blinded_paths(&self, context: OffersContext) -> Result<Vec<BlindedPath>, ()> {
+ let recipient = self.get_our_node_id();
+ let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
+
+ let peers = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()
+ .iter()
+ .map(|(node_id, peer_state)| (node_id, peer_state.lock().unwrap()))
+ .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.is_connected)
.filter(|(_, peer)| peer.latest_features.supports_onion_messages())
.map(|(node_id, peer)| ForwardNode {
node_id: *node_id,
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
self.router
- .create_blinded_paths(recipient, peers, secp_ctx)
- .and_then(|paths| paths.into_iter().next().ok_or(()))
+ .create_compact_blinded_paths(recipient, MessageContext::Offers(context), peers, secp_ctx)
+ .and_then(|paths| (!paths.is_empty()).then(|| paths).ok_or(()))
}
/// Creates multi-hop blinded payment paths for the given `amount_msats` by delegating to
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
- let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
+ let event_handler = |event: events::Event| Ok(events.borrow_mut().push(event));
self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
events.into_inner()
}
/// using the given event handler.
///
/// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
- pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
+ pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future<Output = Result<(), ReplayEvent>>, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
&self, handler: H
) {
let mut ev;
self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
*self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
- self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None)));
+ let mut min_anchor_feerate = None;
+ let mut min_non_anchor_feerate = None;
+ if self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Relaxed) {
+ // If we're past the startup phase, update our feerate cache
+ let mut last_days_feerates = self.last_days_feerates.lock().unwrap();
+ if last_days_feerates.len() >= FEERATE_TRACKING_BLOCKS {
+ last_days_feerates.pop_front();
+ }
+ let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator
+ .bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee);
+ let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator
+ .bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee);
+ last_days_feerates.push_back((anchor_feerate, non_anchor_feerate));
+ if last_days_feerates.len() >= FEERATE_TRACKING_BLOCKS {
+ min_anchor_feerate = last_days_feerates.iter().map(|(f, _)| f).min().copied();
+ min_non_anchor_feerate = last_days_feerates.iter().map(|(_, f)| f).min().copied();
+ }
+ }
+
+ self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| {
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None);
+ if channel.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
+ if let Some(feerate) = min_anchor_feerate {
+ channel.check_for_stale_feerate(&logger, feerate)?;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if let Some(feerate) = min_non_anchor_feerate {
+ channel.check_for_stale_feerate(&logger, feerate)?;
+ }
+ }
+ channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None))
+ });
macro_rules! max_time {
($timestamp: expr) => {
htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
phantom_shared_secret: None,
+ counterparty_node_id: htlc.prev_counterparty_node_id,
outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
channel_id: htlc.prev_channel_id,
blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
}
#[cfg(splicing)]
- fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
+ fn handle_splice_init(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceInit) {
let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
"Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
// Quiescence
&events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
// Splicing
- &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
+ &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceInit { .. } => false,
&events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
&events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
// Interactive Transaction Construction
R::Target: Router,
L::Target: Logger,
{
- fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage, responder: Option<Responder>) -> ResponseInstruction<OffersMessage> {
+ fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage, context: OffersContext, responder: Option<Responder>) -> ResponseInstruction<OffersMessage> {
let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
+ let abandon_if_payment = |context| {
+ match context {
+ OffersContext::OutboundPayment { payment_id } => self.abandon_payment(payment_id),
+ _ => {},
+ }
+ };
+
match message {
OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
let responder = match responder {
};
match response {
- Ok(invoice) => return responder.respond(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
- Err(error) => return responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
+ Ok(invoice) => responder.respond(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
+ Err(error) => responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
}
},
OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
- let response = invoice
- .verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx)
- .map_err(|()| InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned()))
- .and_then(|payment_id| {
+ let result = match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
+ Ok(payment_id) => {
let features = self.bolt12_invoice_features();
if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&features) {
Err(InvoiceError::from(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures))
+ } else if self.default_configuration.manually_handle_bolt12_invoices {
+ let event = Event::InvoiceReceived { payment_id, invoice, responder };
+ self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
+ return ResponseInstruction::NoResponse;
} else {
- self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id)
+ self.send_payment_for_verified_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id)
.map_err(|e| {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))
})
}
- });
+ },
+ Err(()) => Err(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned())),
+ };
- match (responder, response) {
- (Some(responder), Err(e)) => responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e)),
- (None, Err(_)) => {
- log_trace!(
- self.logger,
- "A response was generated, but there is no reply_path specified for sending the response."
- );
- return ResponseInstruction::NoResponse;
- }
- _ => return ResponseInstruction::NoResponse,
+ match result {
+ Ok(_) => ResponseInstruction::NoResponse,
+ Err(err) => match responder {
+ Some(responder) => {
+ abandon_if_payment(context);
+ responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(err))
+ },
+ None => {
+ abandon_if_payment(context);
+ log_trace!(
+ self.logger,
+ "An error response was generated, but there is no reply_path specified \
+ for sending the response. Error: {}",
+ err
+ );
+ return ResponseInstruction::NoResponse;
+ },
+ },
+ }
+ },
+ #[cfg(async_payments)]
+ OffersMessage::StaticInvoice(_invoice) => {
+ match responder {
+ Some(responder) => {
+ responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
+ InvoiceError::from_string("Static invoices not yet supported".to_string())
+ ))
+ },
+ None => return ResponseInstruction::NoResponse,
}
},
OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
+ abandon_if_payment(context);
log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
- return ResponseInstruction::NoResponse;
+ ResponseInstruction::NoResponse
},
}
}
}
}
+impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
+AsyncPaymentsMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
+where
+ M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
+ T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
+ ES::Target: EntropySource,
+ NS::Target: NodeSigner,
+ SP::Target: SignerProvider,
+ F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+ R::Target: Router,
+ L::Target: Logger,
+{
+ fn held_htlc_available(
+ &self, _message: HeldHtlcAvailable, _responder: Option<Responder>
+ ) -> ResponseInstruction<ReleaseHeldHtlc> {
+ ResponseInstruction::NoResponse
+ }
+
+ fn release_held_htlc(&self, _message: ReleaseHeldHtlc) {}
+
+ fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<AsyncPaymentsMessage>> {
+ Vec::new()
+ }
+}
+
impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
NodeIdLookUp for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
where
const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
-impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
- (2, fee_base_msat, required),
- (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
- (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
-});
-
-impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
- (2, node_id, required),
- (4, features, required),
- (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
- (8, forwarding_info, option),
- (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
- (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
-});
-
-impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
- // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
- // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
- let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
- let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
- write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
- (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
- (2, self.channel_id, required),
- (3, self.channel_type, option),
- (4, self.counterparty, required),
- (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
- (6, self.funding_txo, option),
- (7, self.config, option),
- (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
- (9, self.confirmations, option),
- (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
- (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
- (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
- (16, self.balance_msat, required),
- (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
- (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
- (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
- (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
- (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
- (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
- (26, self.is_outbound, required),
- (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
- (30, self.is_usable, required),
- (32, self.is_public, required),
- (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
- (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
- (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
- (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
- (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
- (43, self.pending_inbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
- (45, self.pending_outbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
- });
- Ok(())
- }
-}
-
-impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
- fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
- (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
- (2, channel_id, required),
- (3, channel_type, option),
- (4, counterparty, required),
- (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
- (6, funding_txo, option),
- (7, config, option),
- (8, short_channel_id, option),
- (9, confirmations, option),
- (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
- (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
- (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
- (16, balance_msat, required),
- (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
- // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
- // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
- (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
- (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
- (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
- (22, confirmations_required, option),
- (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
- (26, is_outbound, required),
- (28, is_channel_ready, required),
- (30, is_usable, required),
- (32, is_public, required),
- (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
- (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
- (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
- (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
- (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
- (43, pending_inbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
- (45, pending_outbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
- });
-
- // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
- // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
- let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
- let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
- ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
-
- Ok(Self {
- inbound_scid_alias,
- channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
- channel_type,
- counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
- outbound_scid_alias,
- funding_txo,
- config,
- short_channel_id,
- channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
- unspendable_punishment_reserve,
- user_channel_id,
- balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
- outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
- next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
- next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
- inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
- confirmations_required,
- confirmations,
- force_close_spend_delay,
- is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
- is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
- is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
- is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
- inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
- inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
- feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
- channel_shutdown_state,
- pending_inbound_htlcs: pending_inbound_htlcs.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
- pending_outbound_htlcs: pending_outbound_htlcs.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
- })
- }
-}
-
impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
(2, channels, required_vec),
(4, phantom_scid, required),
(4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
(5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
},
-;);
+);
impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
(0, routing, required),
}
}
-impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
+impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_legacy!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
(0, Forward),
(1, Fail),
);
impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
(0, FromIntroductionNode) => {},
- (2, FromBlindedNode) => {}, ;
+ (2, FromBlindedNode) => {},
);
impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
// Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 2 above, outpoint will be
// filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
(9, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
+ (11, counterparty_node_id, option),
});
impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
// Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 6 above, prev_funding_outpoint will be
// filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
(7, prev_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(prev_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
+ (9, prev_counterparty_node_id, option),
});
impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
}
}
-impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
- (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
- (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
- (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
- (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
- (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
-);
-
/// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
///
/// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
for action in actions.iter() {
if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
- Some((blocked_node_id, _blocked_channel_outpoint, blocked_channel_id, blocking_action)), ..
+ Some(EventUnblockedChannel {
+ counterparty_node_id: blocked_node_id,
+ funding_txo: _,
+ channel_id: blocked_channel_id,
+ blocking_action,
+ }), ..
} = action {
if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(blocked_node_id) {
log_trace!(logger,
node_signer: args.node_signer,
signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
+ last_days_feerates: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
+
logger: args.logger,
default_configuration: args.default_config,
};
// update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
// (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
- let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
- let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
+ let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.channel_flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
+ let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.channel_flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
// First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
// persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
nodes[0].node.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, true).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed { broadcasted_latest_txn: Some(true) }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
// Confirm that the channel_update was not sent immediately to node[1] but was cached.
let node_1_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed { broadcasted_latest_txn: Some(true) }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
{
// Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed { broadcasted_latest_txn: Some(true) }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
{
let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff