use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
-use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::{genesis_block, ChainHash};
+use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
+use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
+use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
use crate::chain;
use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
// Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
// construct one themselves.
-use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
-use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
-use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
+use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
+use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
+use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
#[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
-use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
+use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
#[cfg(test)]
use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
-use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
+use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
-use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
+use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder};
+use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
+use crate::offers::merkle::SignError;
+use crate::offers::offer::{DerivedMetadata, Offer, OfferBuilder};
+use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
+use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
+use crate::onion_message::{Destination, OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
+use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
use crate::util::errors::APIError;
-use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
+use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
use crate::io;
use crate::prelude::*;
use core::ops::Deref;
// Re-export this for use in the public API.
-pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
+pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
+ /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
+ custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
},
ReceiveKeysend {
/// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
+ /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
+ custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
},
}
}
/// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
-#[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
// Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
short_channel_id: u64,
+ user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
htlc_id: u64,
incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
}
-/// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
+impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
+ fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
+ events::ClaimedHTLC {
+ channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
+ user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
+ cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
+ value_msat: val.value,
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
+/// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
///
/// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
#[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
-pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
+pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
+
+impl PaymentId {
+ /// Number of bytes in the id.
+ pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
+}
impl Writeable for PaymentId {
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
}
}
+impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
+ fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
+ crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
+ }
+}
+
/// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
///
/// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
}
}
-#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
/// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
/// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
#[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
OutboundRoute {
}
}
-struct ReceiveError {
+struct InboundOnionErr {
err_code: u16,
err_data: Vec<u8>,
msg: &'static str,
pub enum FailureCode {
/// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
/// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
- TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
+ TemporaryNodeFailure,
/// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
/// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
- RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
+ RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
/// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
/// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
/// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
/// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
- IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
+ IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
+ /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
+ /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
+ ///
+ /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
+ /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
+ InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
+}
+
+impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
+ fn into(self) -> u16 {
+ match self {
+ FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
+ FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
+ FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
+ FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
+ }
+ }
}
/// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
err: msgs::LightningError,
- chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
+ chan_id: Option<(ChannelId, u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
+ channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
}
impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
#[inline]
- fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
+ fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
Self {
err: LightningError {
err: err.clone(),
},
chan_id: None,
shutdown_finish: None,
+ channel_capacity: None,
}
}
#[inline]
fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
- Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
+ Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
}
#[inline]
- fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
+ fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
+ let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
+ let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
+ // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
+ // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
+ // commitment upon reconnecting.
+ msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
+ } else {
+ msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
+ };
Self {
- err: LightningError {
- err: err.clone(),
- action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
- msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
- channel_id,
- data: err
- },
- },
- },
+ err: LightningError { err, action },
chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
+ channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
}
}
#[inline]
- fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
+ fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
Self {
err: match err {
ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
},
chan_id: None,
shutdown_finish: None,
+ channel_capacity: None,
}
}
+
+ fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
+ self.chan_id.is_some()
+ }
}
/// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
amount_msat: u64,
payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
+ htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
+ sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
}
impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
(0, amount_msat, required),
(2, payment_purpose, required),
(4, receiver_node_id, required),
+ (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
+ (7, sender_intended_value, option),
});
struct ClaimablePayment {
/// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
/// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
/// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
+#[derive(Debug)]
enum BackgroundEvent {
/// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
/// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
funding_txo: OutPoint,
update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
},
+ /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
+ /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
+ /// on a channel.
+ MonitorUpdatesComplete {
+ counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
+ channel_id: ChannelId,
+ },
}
#[derive(Debug)]
event: events::Event,
downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
},
+ /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
+ /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
+ /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
+ ///
+ /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
+ /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
+ /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
+ /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
+ /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
+ ///
+ /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
+ /// stored for later processing.
+ FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
+ downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
+ downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
+ blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
+ },
}
impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
(0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
+ // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
+ // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
+ (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
+ (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
+ (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
+ (4, blocking_action, required),
+ },
(2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
(0, event, upgradable_required),
// LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
/// durably to disk.
ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
/// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
- channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ channel_id: ChannelId,
/// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
htlc_id: u64,
},
}
impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
- #[allow(unused)]
fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
/// State we hold per-peer.
-pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
- /// `channel_id` -> `Channel`.
- ///
- /// Holds all funded channels where the peer is the counterparty.
- pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
- /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `OutboundV1Channel`.
- ///
- /// Holds all outbound V1 channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once an outbound channel has
- /// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in
- /// `channel_by_id`.
- pub(super) outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], OutboundV1Channel<Signer>>,
- /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundV1Channel`.
- ///
- /// Holds all inbound V1 channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once an inbound channel has
- /// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in
- /// `channel_by_id`.
- pub(super) inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], InboundV1Channel<Signer>>,
+pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
+ /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
+ ///
+ /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
+ pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
+ /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
+ ///
+ /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
+ /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
+ /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
+ /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
+ pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
/// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
latest_features: InitFeatures,
/// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
/// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
/// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
/// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
- monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
+ monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
/// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
/// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
/// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
/// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
- actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
+ actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
/// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
/// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
/// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
is_connected: bool,
}
-impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
+impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
/// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
/// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
/// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
return false
}
- self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
+ self.channel_by_id.iter().filter(|(_, phase)| matches!(phase, ChannelPhase::Funded(_))).count() == 0
+ && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
&& self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
}
- // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including pending channels.
+ // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
- self.channel_by_id.len() +
- self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.len() +
- self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.len()
+ self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
}
// Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
- fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
+ fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
- self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
- self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
+ self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
}
}
+/// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
+/// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
+pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
+ /// The original OpenChannel message.
+ pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
+ /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
+ pub ticks_remaining: i32,
+}
+
+/// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
+/// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
+const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
+
/// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
/// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
///
/// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
/// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
///
-/// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
+/// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
+#[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
Arc<M>,
Arc<T>,
Arc<DefaultRouter<
Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
Arc<L>,
- Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
+ Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
>>,
/// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
/// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
///
-/// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
+/// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
+#[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
ChannelManager<
&'a M,
&'e DefaultRouter<
&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
&'g L,
- &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
+ &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
>,
&'g L
>;
-macro_rules! define_test_pub_trait { ($vis: vis) => {
-/// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`] used in testing.
-$vis trait AChannelManager {
+/// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
+///
+/// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
+/// languages.
+pub trait AChannelManager {
+ /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
+ /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
+ /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
+ /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
+ /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
+ /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
+ /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
+ /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
+ /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
+ /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
+ /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
+ /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
+ /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
+ /// A type implementing [`Router`].
type Router: Router + ?Sized;
+ /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
+ /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
+ /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
+ /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
}
-} }
-#[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
-define_test_pub_trait!(pub);
-#[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
-define_test_pub_trait!(pub(crate));
+
impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
where
/// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
///
/// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
-/// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
-/// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
-/// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
-/// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
-/// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
-/// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
+/// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
+/// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
+/// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
+/// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
+/// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
+/// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
+/// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
+/// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
///
/// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
/// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
//
// Lock order tree:
//
+// `pending_offers_messages`
+//
// `total_consistency_lock`
// |
// |__`forward_htlcs`
// | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
// |
// |__`per_peer_state`
-// | |
-// | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
-// | |
-// | |__`claimable_payments`
-// | |
-// | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
-// | |
-// | |__`peer_state`
-// | |
-// | |__`id_to_peer`
-// | |
-// | |__`short_to_chan_info`
-// | |
-// | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
-// | |
-// | |__`best_block`
-// | |
-// | |__`pending_events`
-// | |
-// | |__`pending_background_events`
+// |
+// |__`pending_inbound_payments`
+// |
+// |__`claimable_payments`
+// |
+// |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
+// |
+// |__`peer_state`
+// |
+// |__`id_to_peer`
+// |
+// |__`short_to_chan_info`
+// |
+// |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
+// |
+// |__`best_block`
+// |
+// |__`pending_events`
+// |
+// |__`pending_background_events`
//
pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
where
L::Target: Logger,
{
default_configuration: UserConfig,
- genesis_hash: BlockHash,
+ chain_hash: ChainHash,
fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
chain_monitor: M,
tx_broadcaster: T,
/// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
///
/// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
- id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
+ id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<ChannelId, PublicKey>>,
/// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
///
///
/// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
#[cfg(test)]
- pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
+ pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
#[cfg(not(test))]
- short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
+ short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
///
/// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
#[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
- per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
+ per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
- pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
+ pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
/// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
/// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
/// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
///
/// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
+ #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
+ #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
+ pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
+
/// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
/// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
/// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
+ /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
+ /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
+ ///
+ /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
+ /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
+ funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
- persistence_notifier: Notifier,
+ event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
+ needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
+
+ pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
entropy_source: ES,
node_signer: NS,
#[must_use]
enum NotifyOption {
DoPersist,
- SkipPersist,
+ SkipPersistHandleEvents,
+ SkipPersistNoEvents,
}
/// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
/// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
/// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
/// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
-struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
- persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
+struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
+ event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
+ needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
should_persist: F,
// We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
_read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
}
impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
- fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
+ /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
+ /// events to handle.
+ ///
+ /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
+ /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
+ /// isn't ideal.
+ fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
+ Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
+ }
+
+ fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
+ -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
- let _ = cm.get_cm().process_background_events(); // We always persist
+ let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
PersistenceNotifierGuard {
- persistence_notifier: &cm.get_cm().persistence_notifier,
- should_persist: || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist },
+ event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
+ needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
+ should_persist: move || {
+ // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
+ // processing and return that.
+ let notify = persist_check();
+ match (notify, force_notify) {
+ (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
+ (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
+ (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
+ (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
+ _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
+ }
+ },
_read_guard: read_guard,
}
-
}
/// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
- /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first.
- fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
- let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
+ /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
+ /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
+ fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
+ (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
+ let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
PersistenceNotifierGuard {
- persistence_notifier: notifier,
+ event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
+ needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
should_persist: persist_check,
_read_guard: read_guard,
}
}
}
-impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
+impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
fn drop(&mut self) {
- if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
- self.persistence_notifier.notify();
+ match (self.should_persist)() {
+ NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
+ self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
+ self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
+ },
+ NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
+ self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
+ NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
}
}
}
/// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
-/// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
-/// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
-/// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
-pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
-
/// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
/// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
/// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
/// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
/// lifetime of the channel.
- pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ pub channel_id: ChannelId,
/// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
/// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
///
/// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
- /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
- /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
- /// 0.0.113.
+ /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
+ /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
+ /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
+ /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
+ /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
+ ///
+ /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
+ /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
+ /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
pub user_channel_id: u128,
/// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
/// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
}
- fn from_channel_context<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, F: Deref>(
- context: &ChannelContext<Signer>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
+ fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
+ context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
) -> Self
- where F::Target: FeeEstimator
+ where
+ SP::Target: SignerProvider,
+ F::Target: FeeEstimator
{
let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
/// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
#[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
+ /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
+ AwaitingInvoice {
+ /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
+ /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
+ payment_id: PaymentId,
+ },
/// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
Pending {
+ /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
+ /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
+ payment_id: PaymentId,
/// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
/// abandoned.
payment_hash: PaymentHash,
/// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
/// payment is removed from tracking.
Fulfilled {
+ /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
+ /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
+ payment_id: PaymentId,
/// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
/// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
/// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
/// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
Abandoned {
+ /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
+ /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
+ payment_id: PaymentId,
/// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
payment_hash: PaymentHash,
},
match $internal {
Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
- Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
+ Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
- $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
+ $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
if let Some(update) = update_option {
msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
msg: update
if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
$self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
channel_id, user_channel_id,
- reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
+ reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
+ counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
+ channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
}, None));
}
}
}
/// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
-macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
- ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
+macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
+ ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
match $err {
ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
- (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
+ (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
},
ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
- (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
+ (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
},
ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
- log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
- update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$channel.context);
+ log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
- (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.context.get_user_id(),
- shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
+ let user_id = $channel.context.get_user_id();
+ let channel_capacity_satoshis = $channel.context.get_value_satoshis();
+
+ (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, user_id,
+ shutdown_res, $channel_update, channel_capacity_satoshis))
},
}
};
- ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_context: expr, $channel_id: expr, PREFUNDED) => {
- match $err {
- // We should only ever have `ChannelError::Close` when prefunded channels error.
- // In any case, just close the channel.
- ChannelError::Warn(msg) | ChannelError::Ignore(msg) | ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
- log_error!($self.logger, "Closing prefunded channel {} due to an error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
- update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$channel_context);
- let shutdown_res = $channel_context.force_shutdown(false);
- (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel_context.get_user_id(),
- shutdown_res, None))
+ ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
+ convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
+ };
+ ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
+ convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
+ };
+ ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
+ match $channel_phase {
+ ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
+ convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
+ },
+ ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
+ convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
+ },
+ ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
+ convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
},
}
- }
+ };
}
-macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
+macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
match $res {
Ok(res) => res,
Err(e) => {
- let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
+ let key = *$entry.key();
+ let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
if drop {
$entry.remove_entry();
}
}
}
-macro_rules! try_v1_outbound_chan_entry {
- ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
- match $res {
- Ok(res) => res,
- Err(e) => {
- let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut().context, $entry.key(), PREFUNDED);
- if drop {
- $entry.remove_entry();
- }
- return Err(res);
- }
- }
- }
-}
-
-macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
+macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
match $res {
Ok(res) => res,
Err(e) => {
- let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
+ let key = *$entry.key();
+ let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
if drop {
$entry.remove_entry();
}
}
}
-macro_rules! remove_channel {
+macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
{
let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
- update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context);
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
channel
}
}
macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
- &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
+ &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
$self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
}
let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
+ let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
+ // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
+ // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
+ if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
+ let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
+ let mut batch_completed = false;
+ if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
+ let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
+ *chan_id == channel_id &&
+ *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
+ ));
+ if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
+ channel_state.2 = true;
+ } else {
+ debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
+ }
+ batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
+ } else {
+ debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
+ }
+
+ // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
+ // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
+ if batch_completed {
+ let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
+ let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
+ for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
+ if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
+ let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
+ batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
+ chan.set_batch_ready();
+ let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
+ log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
+ $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
$self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
}
macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
- ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $remove: expr, $completed: expr) => { {
- // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
- // any case so that it won't deadlock.
- debug_assert_ne!($self.id_to_peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
+ ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
match $update_res {
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
+ let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
+ log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err_str);
+ panic!("{}", err_str);
+ },
ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
- log_bytes!($chan.context.channel_id()[..]));
- Ok(false)
- },
- ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
- log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
- log_bytes!($chan.context.channel_id()[..]));
- update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$chan.context);
- let res = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
- "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.context.channel_id(),
- $chan.context.get_user_id(), $chan.context.force_shutdown(false),
- $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
- $remove;
- res
+ &$chan.context.channel_id());
+ false
},
ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
$completed;
- Ok(true)
+ true
},
}
} };
- ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR, $remove: expr) => {
- handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
- $per_peer_state_lock, $chan, _internal, $remove,
+ ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
+ handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
};
- ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
- handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
- };
- ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
+ ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
.or_insert_with(Vec::new);
// During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
in_flight_updates.len() - 1
});
let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
- handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
- $per_peer_state_lock, $chan, _internal, $remove,
+ handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
{
let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
}
})
} };
- ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
- handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $funding_txo, $update, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
- }
}
macro_rules! process_events_body {
return;
}
- let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
+ let mut result;
{
// We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
// Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
// ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
- if $self.process_background_events() == NotifyOption::DoPersist { result = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
+ result = $self.process_background_events();
// TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
// ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
processed_all_events = false;
}
- if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
- $self.persistence_notifier.notify();
+ match result {
+ NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
+ $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
+ $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
+ },
+ NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
+ $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
+ NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
}
}
}
let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
ChannelManager {
default_configuration: config.clone(),
- genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
+ chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
chain_monitor,
tx_broadcaster,
pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
- persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
+ event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
+ needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
+ funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
+
+ pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
entropy_source,
node_signer,
if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
outbound_scid_alias += 1;
} else {
- outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
+ outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
}
if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
break;
/// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
/// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
/// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
- pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
+ pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
}
},
}
};
- let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
+ let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
- match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
+ match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
if cfg!(fuzzing) {
return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
panic!("RNG is bad???");
}
},
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
}
peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
Ok(temporary_channel_id)
}
- fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
+ fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
// Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
// Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
// a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
- let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
- peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
- res.push(details);
- }
+ res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
+ .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
+ // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
+ ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
+ _ => None,
+ })
+ .filter(f)
+ .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
+ ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
+ peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
+ })
+ );
}
}
res
for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
- let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
- peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
- res.push(details);
- }
- for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
- let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
- peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
- res.push(details);
- }
- for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
- let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
+ for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
+ let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
res.push(details);
}
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
+ let context_to_details = |context| {
+ ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
+ };
return peer_state.channel_by_id
.iter()
- .map(|(_, channel)|
- ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
- features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator))
+ .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
+ .map(context_to_details)
.collect();
}
vec![]
/// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
- .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
+ .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
+ PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
+ Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
+ },
+ // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
+ PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
+ Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
+ },
PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
+ payment_id: *payment_id,
payment_hash: *payment_hash,
total_msat: *total_msat,
})
},
PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
- Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
+ Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
},
PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
- Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
+ Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
},
PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
})
}
/// Helper function that issues the channel close events
- fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
+ fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<SP>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
Some(transaction) => {
pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
channel_id: context.channel_id(),
user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
- reason: closure_reason
+ reason: closure_reason,
+ counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
+ channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
}, None));
}
- fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
- let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
+ let shutdown_result;
+ loop {
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
- let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
- let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
- let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
- .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
- failed_htlcs = htlcs;
-
- // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
- // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
- // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
- node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
- msg: shutdown_msg,
- });
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
+ if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
+ let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
+ let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
+ let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs, local_shutdown_result) =
+ chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
+ failed_htlcs = htlcs;
+ shutdown_result = local_shutdown_result;
+ debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
- // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
- if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
- break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
- peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry).map(|_| ());
- }
+ // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
+ // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
+ // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
+ node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
+ msg: shutdown_msg,
+ });
- if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
- let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
- if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
- msg: channel_update
- });
+ debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
+ "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
+
+ // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
+ if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
+ handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
+ peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if chan.is_shutdown() {
+ if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
+ if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ msg: channel_update
+ });
+ }
+ self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
+ }
}
- self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
+ break;
}
- break Ok(());
},
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
+ // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
+ // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
+ //
+ // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
+ mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
+ mem::drop(per_peer_state);
+ return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
+ },
}
- };
+ }
for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
}
- let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
+ if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
+ self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
+ }
+
Ok(())
}
/// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
/// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
///
- /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
- /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
- /// estimate.
+ /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
+ /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
+ /// fee estimate.
/// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
- /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
+ /// transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
/// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
/// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
///
/// channel.
///
/// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
- /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
- /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
+ /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
+ /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
/// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
- pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
}
/// the channel being closed or not:
/// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
/// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
- /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
- /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
+ /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
+ /// fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
/// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
/// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
/// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
/// channel.
///
/// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
- /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
- /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
+ /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
/// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
- pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
}
- #[inline]
- fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
- let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
- for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
+ fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
+ debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
+ #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
+ for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
+ debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
+ }
+
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
+ for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
}
- if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
+ if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
// There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
// force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
// the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
// ignore the result here.
let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
}
+ let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
+ if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
+ let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
+ let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
+ for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
+ if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
+ let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
+ self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure);
+ shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
+ }
+ }
+ has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
+ }
+ debug_assert!(
+ has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
+ "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
+ );
+ }
+ for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
+ self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
+ }
}
/// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
/// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
- fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
+ fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
-> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
.ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
- let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
- let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
} else {
ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
};
- if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
- log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
- self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
- let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
- self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
- (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
- } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
- log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
- self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
- let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
- self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
- // Prefunded channel has no update
- (None, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
- } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
- log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
- self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
- let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
- self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
- // Prefunded channel has no update
- (None, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
+ if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
+ log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
+ self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_phase_entry.get().context(), closure_reason);
+ let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
+ mem::drop(peer_state);
+ mem::drop(per_peer_state);
+ match chan_phase {
+ ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
+ self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
+ (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
+ },
+ ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
+ self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
+ // Unfunded channel has no update
+ (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
+ },
+ }
+ } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
+ log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
+ // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
+ // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
+ // events anyway.
+ (None, *peer_node_id)
} else {
- return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
+ return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
}
};
if let Some(update) = update_opt {
- let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
- msg: update
- });
+ // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
+ // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
+ .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
+ if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
+ let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ msg: update
+ });
+ }
}
Ok(counterparty_node_id)
}
- fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
node_id: counterparty_node_id,
- action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
- msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
+ action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
+ msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
},
}
);
/// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
/// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
/// channel.
- pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
+ pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
-> Result<(), APIError> {
self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
}
///
/// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
/// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
- pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
+ pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
-> Result<(), APIError> {
self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
}
}
}
+ fn construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
+ &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32],
+ new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32],
+ next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
+ ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
+ debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
+ let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
+ version: 0,
+ public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
+ hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
+ hmac: hop_hmac,
+ };
+
+ let (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match hop_data {
+ msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } =>
+ (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value),
+ msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } | msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. } =>
+ return Err(InboundOnionErr {
+ msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node",
+ err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
+ err_data: Vec::new(),
+ }),
+ };
+
+ Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
+ routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
+ onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
+ short_channel_id,
+ },
+ payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
+ incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
+ incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
+ outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward,
+ outgoing_cltv_value,
+ skimmed_fee_msat: None,
+ })
+ }
+
fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(
- &self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
+ &self, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
- ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError> {
+ ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
+ let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata) = match hop_data {
+ msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
+ payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, ..
+ } =>
+ (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata),
+ msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive {
+ amt_msat, total_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_secret, ..
+ } => {
+ let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData { payment_secret, total_msat };
+ (Some(payment_data), None, Vec::new(), amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, None)
+ }
+ msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { .. } => {
+ return Err(InboundOnionErr {
+ err_code: 0x4000|22,
+ err_data: Vec::new(),
+ msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
+ })
+ },
+ };
// final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
- if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
- return Err(ReceiveError {
+ if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
+ return Err(InboundOnionErr {
msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
err_code: 18,
err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
// payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
// channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
- if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
+ if cltv_expiry <= current_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 {
let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
- return Err(ReceiveError {
+ return Err(InboundOnionErr {
err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
});
}
- if (!allow_underpay && hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat) ||
- (allow_underpay && hop_data.amt_to_forward >
+ if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) ||
+ (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat >
amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
{
- return Err(ReceiveError {
+ return Err(InboundOnionErr {
err_code: 19,
err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
});
}
- let routing = match hop_data.format {
- msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
- return Err(ReceiveError {
+ let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
+ // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
+ // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
+ // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
+ // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
+ // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
+ let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
+ if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
+ return Err(InboundOnionErr {
err_code: 0x4000|22,
err_data: Vec::new(),
- msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
+ msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
});
- },
- msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage, payment_metadata } => {
- if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
- // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
- // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
- // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
- // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
- // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
- let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
- if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
- return Err(ReceiveError {
- err_code: 0x4000|22,
- err_data: Vec::new(),
- msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
- });
- }
- if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
- return Err(ReceiveError {
- err_code: 0x4000|22,
- err_data: Vec::new(),
- msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
- });
- }
- PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
- payment_data,
- payment_preimage,
- payment_metadata,
- incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
- }
- } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
- PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
- payment_data: data,
- payment_metadata,
- incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
- phantom_shared_secret,
- }
- } else {
- return Err(ReceiveError {
- err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
- err_data: Vec::new(),
- msg: "We require payment_secrets",
- });
- }
- },
+ }
+ if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
+ return Err(InboundOnionErr {
+ err_code: 0x4000|22,
+ err_data: Vec::new(),
+ msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
+ });
+ }
+ PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
+ payment_data,
+ payment_preimage,
+ payment_metadata,
+ incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
+ custom_tlvs,
+ }
+ } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
+ PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
+ payment_data: data,
+ payment_metadata,
+ incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
+ phantom_shared_secret,
+ custom_tlvs,
+ }
+ } else {
+ return Err(InboundOnionErr {
+ err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
+ err_data: Vec::new(),
+ msg: "We require payment_secrets",
+ });
};
Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
routing,
payment_hash,
incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
- outgoing_amt_msat: hop_data.amt_to_forward,
- outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
+ outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat,
+ outgoing_cltv_value,
skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
})
}
}
}
- let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
+ let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
+ shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac,
+ msg.payment_hash, &self.node_signer
+ ) {
Ok(res) => res,
Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
};
let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop {
onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
- next_hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData {
- format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id }, amt_to_forward,
- outgoing_cltv_value,
+ next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward {
+ short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
}, ..
} => {
- let next_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
+ let next_packet_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
- (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_pk))
+ (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_packet_pk))
},
// We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the
// inbound channel's state.
onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
- onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
- next_hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData { format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. }, .. }, ..
- } => {
+ onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } |
+ onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. }, .. } =>
+ {
return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
}
};
// Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
// phantom or an intercept.
if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
- fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
- fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)
+ fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
+ fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
{
None
} else {
}
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
+ let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
+ |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
+ ).flatten() {
None => {
// Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
// have no consistency guarantees.
// delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
},
- Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
+ Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
}
},
onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
- debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
- let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
- version: 0,
- public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
- hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
- hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
- };
-
- let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
- msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
- msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
- return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
- },
- };
-
- PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
- routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
- onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
- short_channel_id,
- },
- payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
- incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
- incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
- outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
- outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
- skimmed_fee_msat: None,
- })
+ match self.construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
+ new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
+ Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
+ Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
+ }
}
}
}
///
/// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
/// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
- fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
+ fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
if !chan.context.should_announce() {
return Err(LightningError {
err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
}
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
}
///
/// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
/// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
- fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
+ fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
Some(id) => id,
self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
}
- fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
+ fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
};
let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
- chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
+ chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
short_channel_id,
timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
- self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes)
+ self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
+ path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
+ session_priv_bytes
+ })
}
- fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ let SendAlongPathArgs {
+ path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
+ session_priv_bytes
+ } = args;
// The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
+ log_trace!(self.logger,
+ "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
+ payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
.ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
- if !chan.get().context.is_live() {
- return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
- }
- let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
- let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
- htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
- path: path.clone(),
- session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
- first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
- payment_id,
- }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
- match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
- Some(monitor_update) => {
- match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
- Err(e) => break Err(e),
- Ok(false) => {
- // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
- // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
- // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
- // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
- // which we do in the send_payment check for
- // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
- return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
+ if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
+ match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
+ ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
+ if !chan.context.is_live() {
+ return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
+ }
+ let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
+ let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
+ htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
+ path: path.clone(),
+ session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
+ first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
+ payment_id,
+ }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
+ match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
+ Some(monitor_update) => {
+ match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
+ false => {
+ // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
+ // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
+ // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
+ // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
+ // which we do in the send_payment check for
+ // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
+ return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
+ },
+ true => {},
+ }
},
- Ok(true) => {},
+ None => {},
}
},
- None => { },
- }
+ _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
+ };
} else {
// The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
// `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
/// In general, a path may raise:
/// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
/// node public key) is specified.
- /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
- /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
- /// failure).
+ /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
+ /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
/// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
/// relevant updates.
///
let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
self.pending_outbound_payments
- .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
- |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
- self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
+ .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
+ &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
+ |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
}
/// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
.send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
&self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
&self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
- &self.pending_events,
- |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
- self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
+ &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
}
#[cfg(test)]
pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
- self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
- |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
- self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
+ self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
+ keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
+ best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
}
#[cfg(test)]
self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
}
+ pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
+ let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
+ self.pending_outbound_payments
+ .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
+ invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
+ || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
+ best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
+ |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
+ )
+ }
- /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
+ /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
/// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
/// retries are exhausted.
///
+ /// # Event Generation
+ ///
/// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
/// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
///
/// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
/// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
///
- /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
- /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
+ /// # Requested Invoices
///
- /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
- /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
+ /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
+ /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
+ /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
+ /// once the invoice has been received.
+ ///
+ /// # Restart Behavior
+ ///
+ /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
+ /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
+ /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
+ ///
+ /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
- &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
- |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
- self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
+ &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
}
/// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
|| self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
- &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
- |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
- self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
+ &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
}
/// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
- self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
- |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
- self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
+ self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
+ &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
+ |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
}
/// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
}
- /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
- /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
- fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&OutboundV1Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
- &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
- ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
- let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
- let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
- .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
+ /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
+ /// amount to the given `node_id`.
+ ///
+ /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
+ pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
+ &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
+ liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
+ ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
+ let payment_params =
+ PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
+
+ let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
+
+ self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
+ }
+
+ /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
+ /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
+ ///
+ /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
+ /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
+ /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
+ /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
+ ///
+ /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
+ /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
+ /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
+ /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
+ /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
+ /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
+ pub fn send_preflight_probes(
+ &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
+ ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
+ let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
+
+ let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
+ let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
+ let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
+ let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
+
+ let route = self
+ .router
+ .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
+ .map_err(|e| {
+ log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
+ ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
+ })?;
- let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
- let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
- Some(chan) => {
- let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
+ let mut used_liquidity_map = HashMap::with_capacity(first_hops.len());
- let funding_res = chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
- .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
- let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
- let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
- let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
- (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None))
- } else { unreachable!(); });
- match funding_res {
- Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
- Err((chan, err)) => {
+ let mut res = Vec::new();
+
+ for mut path in route.paths {
+ // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
+ // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
+ while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
+ if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
+ // We found a potentially announced last hop.
+ break;
+ } else {
+ // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
+ log_debug!(
+ self.logger,
+ "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
+ last_path_hop.short_channel_id
+ );
+ let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
+ path.hops.pop();
+ if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
+ new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if path.hops.len() < 2 {
+ log_debug!(
+ self.logger,
+ "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
+ );
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
+ if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
+ h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
+ }) {
+ let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
+ let used_liquidity =
+ used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
+
+ if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
+ < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
+ {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
+ continue;
+ } else {
+ *used_liquidity += path_value;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
+ log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
+ ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
+ })?);
+ }
+
+ Ok(res)
+ }
+
+ /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
+ /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
+ fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
+ &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
+ mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
+ ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
+ .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
+
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
+ Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) => {
+ let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
+
+ let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &self.logger)
+ .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
+ let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
+ let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
+ let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
+ let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
+ (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
+ } else { unreachable!(); });
+ match funding_res {
+ Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
+ Err((chan, err)) => {
mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
mem::drop(per_peer_state);
},
}
},
- None => {
- return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
+ Some(phase) => {
+ peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
err: format!(
- "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
- log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
+ "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
+ temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
})
},
+ None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
+ "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
+ temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
+ }),
};
peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
}
- e.insert(chan);
+ e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
}
}
Ok(())
}
#[cfg(test)]
- pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
- self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
+ pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
})
}
///
/// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
/// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
- pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
+ }
+
+ /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
+ ///
+ /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
+ /// each individual channel and transaction output.
+ ///
+ /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
+ /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
+ /// signature for each channel.
+ ///
+ /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
+ pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
+ let mut result = Ok(());
- for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
- if inp.witness.is_empty() {
- return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
- err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
- });
+ if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
+ for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
+ if inp.witness.is_empty() {
+ result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
+ err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
+ }));
+ }
}
}
+ if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
+ result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
+ err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
+ }));
+ }
{
let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
// Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
// node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
// module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
- return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
+ result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
- });
+ }));
}
}
- self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
- if tx.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
- return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
- err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
- });
- }
- let mut output_index = None;
- let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
- for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
- if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
- if output_index.is_some() {
+ let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
+ let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
+ let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
+ Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
+ } else {
+ None
+ };
+ let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
+ match states.entry(txid) {
+ btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
+ result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
+ err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
+ }));
+ None
+ },
+ btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
+ }
+ });
+ for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
+ result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
+ temporary_channel_id,
+ counterparty_node_id,
+ funding_transaction.clone(),
+ is_batch_funding,
+ |chan, tx| {
+ let mut output_index = None;
+ let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
+ for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
+ if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
+ if output_index.is_some() {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
+ err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
+ });
+ }
+ output_index = Some(idx as u16);
+ }
+ }
+ if output_index.is_none() {
return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
- err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
+ err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
});
}
- output_index = Some(idx as u16);
+ let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
+ if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
+ funding_batch_state.push((outpoint.to_channel_id(), *counterparty_node_id, false));
+ }
+ Ok(outpoint)
+ })
+ );
+ }
+ if let Err(ref e) = result {
+ // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
+ let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
+ let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
+ channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
+ .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
+ .into_iter().flatten()
+ .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
+ );
+ channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
+ .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
+ );
+ let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
+ {
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
+ per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
+ .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
+ .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
+ .map(|mut chan| {
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
+ self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() });
+ shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
+ });
}
}
- if output_index.is_none() {
- return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
- err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
- });
+ for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
+ self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
}
- Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
- })
+ }
+ result
}
/// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
/// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
/// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
- &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
+ &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
) -> Result<(), APIError> {
if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
for channel_id in channel_ids {
- if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
+ if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
- err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
+ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
});
- }
+ };
}
for channel_id in channel_ids {
- let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
- let mut config = channel.context.config();
- config.apply(config_update);
- if !channel.context.update_config(&config) {
+ if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
+ let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
+ config.apply(config_update);
+ if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
+ if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
+ } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
+ node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ msg,
+ });
+ }
+ }
continue;
- }
- if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
- } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
- node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- msg,
+ } else {
+ // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
+ debug_assert!(false);
+ return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
+ err: format!(
+ "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
+ channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
});
- }
+ };
}
Ok(())
}
/// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
/// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
pub fn update_channel_config(
- &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
+ &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
) -> Result<(), APIError> {
return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
}
/// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
// TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
// `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
- pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
let next_hop_scid = {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
- Some(chan) => {
+ Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
if !chan.context.is_usable() {
return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
- err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
+ err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
})
}
chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
},
+ Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
+ err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
+ next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
+ }),
None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
- err: format!("Funded channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}. Channel may still be opening.",
- log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
+ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
+ next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
})
}
};
if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
+ user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
+ user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
}
if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
- if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
+ if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
- let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
+ let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
+ phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
+ payment_hash, &self.node_signer
+ ) {
Ok(res) => res,
Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None)
{
Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
- Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
+ Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
}
},
_ => panic!(),
}
}
}
- let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
- Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
+ let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
+ let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
+ Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
None => {
forwarding_channel_not_found!();
continue;
}
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
- forwarding_channel_not_found!();
- continue;
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
- match forward_info {
- HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
- prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
- forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
- incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
- routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
- },
- }) => {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
- let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
- short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
- outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
- htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
- incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
- // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
- phantom_shared_secret: None,
- });
- if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
- payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
- onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator,
- &self.logger)
- {
- if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
- } else {
- panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
- }
- let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
- failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
- HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
- HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
- ));
- continue;
- }
- },
- HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
- panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
+ if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
+ for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
+ match forward_info {
+ HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
+ prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
+ forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
+ incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
+ routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
},
- HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
- if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
- htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
- ) {
- if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
- } else {
- panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
- }
- // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
- // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
- // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
- continue;
+ }) => {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
+ let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
+ short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
+ user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
+ outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
+ htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
+ incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
+ // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
+ phantom_shared_secret: None,
+ });
+ if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
+ payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
+ onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator,
+ &self.logger)
+ {
+ if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
+ } else {
+ panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
}
- },
- }
+ let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
+ failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
+ HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
+ HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
+ ));
+ continue;
+ }
+ },
+ HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
+ panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
+ },
+ HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
+ if let Err(e) = chan.queue_fail_htlc(
+ htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
+ ) {
+ if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
+ } else {
+ panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
+ }
+ // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
+ // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
+ // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
+ continue;
+ }
+ },
}
}
+ } else {
+ forwarding_channel_not_found!();
+ continue;
}
} else {
'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
}
}) => {
let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
- PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
+ PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
- let onion_fields =
- RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret), payment_metadata };
+ let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
+ payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
(incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
},
- PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
+ PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
- payment_metadata
+ payment_metadata,
+ custom_tlvs,
};
(incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
payment_data, None, onion_fields)
let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
+ user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
);
failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
+ user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
});
if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_keysend(!is_keysend));
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
}
if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
}
if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
- log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
+ &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
}
if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
} else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
- log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
+ &payment_hash);
fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
} else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
#[allow(unused_assignments)] {
let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
Ok(result) => result,
Err(()) => {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
}
};
let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
- log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
+ &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
}
}
},
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
}
let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
} else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
- log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
+ &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
} else {
let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
|| self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
- &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
- |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
- self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
+ &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
let mut background_events = Vec::new();
mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
if background_events.is_empty() {
- return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
+ return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
}
for event in background_events.drain(..) {
},
BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
let mut updated_chan = false;
- let res = {
+ {
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- updated_chan = true;
- handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
- peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
+ if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
+ updated_chan = true;
+ handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
+ peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
+ } else {
+ debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
+ }
},
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Ok(()),
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
}
- } else { Ok(()) }
- };
+ }
+ }
if !updated_chan {
// TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
}
- // TODO: If this channel has since closed, we're likely providing a payment
- // preimage update, which we must ensure is durable! We currently don't,
- // however, ensure that.
- if res.is_err() {
- log_error!(self.logger,
- "Failed to provide ChannelMonitorUpdate to closed channel! This likely lost us a payment preimage!");
+ },
+ BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
+ handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
+ } else {
+ let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
+ .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
+ mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
+ mem::drop(per_peer_state);
+ self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
+ }
}
- let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
},
}
}
let _ = self.process_background_events();
}
- fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
- if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
+ fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
+ if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
// If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
- log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
- return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
+ if new_feerate != chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
+ chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
+ }
+ return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
}
if !chan.context.is_live() {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
- log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
- return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
+ chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
+ return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
}
log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
- log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
+ &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
NotifyOption::DoPersist
/// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
/// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
- PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
- let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
+ PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
+ let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
- let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
+ let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
+ let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
+ for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
+ |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
+ ) {
+ let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
+ anchor_feerate
+ } else {
+ non_anchor_feerate
+ };
let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
}
/// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
/// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
/// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
+ /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
+ /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
+ /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
+ /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
+ /// minus two hours in `no-std`.
///
/// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
/// estimate fetches.
/// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
/// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
- PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
- let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
+ PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
+ let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
- let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
+ let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
+ let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
+ let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
+
+ let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
+ chan_id: &ChannelId,
+ context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
+ unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
+ pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
+ counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
+ | {
+ context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
+ if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
+ log_error!(self.logger,
+ "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
+ self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
+ shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
+ pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
+ node_id: counterparty_node_id,
+ action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
+ msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
+ channel_id: *chan_id,
+ data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
+ },
+ },
+ });
+ false
+ } else {
+ true
+ }
+ };
+
{
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
- peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
- let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
- if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
-
- if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
- let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
- handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
- if needs_close { return false; }
- }
-
- match chan.channel_update_status() {
- ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
- ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
- ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
- => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
- ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
- => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
- ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
- n += 1;
- if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
- chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
- if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
- msg: update
- });
- }
- should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
+ peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
+ match phase {
+ ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
+ let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
+ anchor_feerate
} else {
- chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
+ non_anchor_feerate
+ };
+ let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
+ if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
+
+ if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
+ let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
+ handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
+ if needs_close { return false; }
}
- },
- ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
- n += 1;
- if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
- chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
- if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
- msg: update
- });
- }
- should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
- } else {
- chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
+
+ match chan.channel_update_status() {
+ ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
+ ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
+ ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
+ => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
+ ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
+ => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
+ ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
+ n += 1;
+ if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
+ chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
+ if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ msg: update
+ });
+ }
+ should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
+ } else {
+ chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
+ }
+ },
+ ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
+ n += 1;
+ if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
+ chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
+ if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ msg: update
+ });
+ }
+ should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
+ } else {
+ chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
+ }
+ },
+ _ => {},
}
+
+ chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
+
+ if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
+ counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
+ pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
+ node_id: counterparty_node_id,
+ action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
+ msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
+ channel_id: *chan_id,
+ data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
+ },
+ },
+ });
+ }
+
+ true
+ },
+ ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
+ process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
+ pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
+ },
+ ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
+ process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
+ pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
},
- _ => {},
}
+ });
- chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
-
- if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
- counterparty_node_id, log_bytes!(*chan_id));
- pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
- node_id: counterparty_node_id,
- action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
- msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
- channel_id: *chan_id,
- data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
+ for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
+ if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
+ log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
+ events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
+ node_id: counterparty_node_id,
+ action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
+ msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
},
- },
- });
+ }
+ );
}
+ }
+ peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
- true
- });
if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
}
let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
}
- self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
+ for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
+ self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
+ }
+
+ #[cfg(feature = "std")]
+ let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
+ .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
+ .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
+ #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
+ let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
+ self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
+ );
+
+ self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
+ duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
+ );
// Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
// channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
/// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
match failure_code {
- FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
- FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
+ FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
+ FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
- HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
+ HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
+ },
+ FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
+ let fail_data = match data {
+ Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
+ None => Vec::new(),
+ };
+ HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
}
}
}
///
/// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
/// forwarding
- fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
+ fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
// We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
// guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
// we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
/// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
/// that we want to return and a channel.
- fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
+ fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
// failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
// be surfaced to the user.
fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
- &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
) {
let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
- self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
+ if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
+ self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
+ } else {
+ // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
+ debug_assert!(false);
+ (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
+ }
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
}
// This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
// `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
// this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
+ #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
}
&self.pending_events, &self.logger)
{ self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
},
- HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
+ HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, .. }) => {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", &payment_hash, onion_error);
let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
let mut push_forward_ev = false;
/// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
/// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
///
+ /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
+ /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
+ /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
+ ///
/// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
/// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
/// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
/// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
/// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
/// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
+ /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
+ self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
+ }
+
+ /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
+ /// even type numbers.
+ ///
+ /// # Note
+ ///
+ /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
+ /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
+ ///
+ /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
+ pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
+ self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
+ }
+
+ fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
}
}
+ let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
+ let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
- payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id,
+ payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
});
if dup_purpose.is_some() {
debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
- log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
+ &payment_hash);
+ }
+
+ if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
+ if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
+ log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
+ &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
+ claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
+ mem::drop(claimable_payments);
+ for htlc in payment.htlcs {
+ let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
+ let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
+ let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
+ }
+ return;
+ }
}
+
payment.htlcs
} else { return; }
};
for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
- |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
- {
+ |_, definitely_duplicate| {
+ debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
+ Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
+ }
+ ) {
if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
// We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
// HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
}
}
- fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
+ fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
-> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
//TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
// `BackgroundEvent`s.
let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
+ // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
+ // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
+ debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
+ debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
+
{
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
- let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id();
- let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
-
- if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
- if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
- log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
- peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
- }
- if !during_init {
- let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
- peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
- if let Err(e) = res {
- // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
- // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
- // update over and over again until morale improves.
- log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
- return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
+ if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
+ if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
+ let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
+ let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
+
+ match fulfill_res {
+ UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
+ if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
+ chan_id, action);
+ peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
+ }
+ if !during_init {
+ handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
+ peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
+ } else {
+ // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
+ // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
+ // monitor update as a background event.
+ self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
+ BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
+ counterparty_node_id,
+ funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
+ update: monitor_update.clone(),
+ });
+ }
+ }
+ UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
+ let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
+ action
+ } else {
+ return Ok(());
+ };
+ mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
+
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
+ chan_id, action);
+ let (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker) =
+ if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
+ downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
+ downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
+ blocking_action: blocker,
+ } = action {
+ (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)
+ } else {
+ debug_assert!(false,
+ "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
+ return Ok(());
+ };
+ if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
+ let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
+ if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
+ .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
+ .get_mut(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
+ {
+ let mut found_blocker = false;
+ blockers.retain(|iter| {
+ // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
+ // which case we need to only remove the one
+ // blocker which was added duplicatively.
+ let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
+ if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
+ *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
+ });
+ debug_assert!(found_blocker);
+ }
+ } else {
+ debug_assert!(false);
+ }
}
- } else {
- // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
- // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
- // monitor update as a background event.
- self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
- BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
- counterparty_node_id,
- funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
- update: monitor_update.clone(),
- });
}
}
return Ok(());
// `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
// generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
// `PaymentForwarded`).
- self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
+ self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
Ok(())
}
self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
}
- fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
+ fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
+ forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, startup_replay: bool,
+ next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint
+ ) {
match source {
HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
"We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
- self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
+ if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
+ debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
+ }
+ let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
+ channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
+ counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
+ };
+ self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
+ session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
+ &self.logger);
},
HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
+ let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
+ #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
+ let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
- |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
- if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
- let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
- Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
- } else { None };
+ |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
+ let chan_to_release =
+ if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
+ Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker))
+ } else {
+ // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
+ // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
+ // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
+ // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
+ // closed.
+ None
+ };
+ if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
+ // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
+ // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
+ // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
+ // in the background.
+ #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
+ let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
+ // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
+ assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
+ match ev {
+ // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
+ BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
+ funding_txo, update, ..
+ } => {
+ if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
+ assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
+ if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
+ payment_preimage: update_preimage
+ } = upd {
+ payment_preimage == *update_preimage
+ } else { false }
+ ), "{:?}", update);
+ true
+ } else { false }
+ },
+ // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
+ BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
+ (funding_txo, monitor_update)
+ ) => {
+ if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
+ assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
+ assert!(matches!(
+ monitor_update.updates[0],
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
+ ));
+ true
+ } else { false }
+ },
+ // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
+ // immediately once we get going.
+ BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
+ channel_id, ..
+ } =>
+ *channel_id == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(),
+ }
+ }), "{:?}", *background_events);
+ }
+ None
+ } else if definitely_duplicate {
+ if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
+ Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
+ downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
+ downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
+ blocking_action: other_chan.2,
+ })
+ } else { None }
+ } else {
+ let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
+ if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
+ Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
+ } else { None }
+ } else { None };
Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
fee_earned_msat,
claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
- next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
+ next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
},
- downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: None,
+ downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
})
- } else { None }
+ }
});
if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
}
fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
+ debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
+ debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
+ debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
+
for action in actions.into_iter() {
match action {
MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
- if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
+ if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
+ amount_msat,
+ payment_purpose: purpose,
+ receiver_node_id,
+ htlcs,
+ sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
+ }) = payment {
self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
- payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
+ payment_hash,
+ purpose,
+ amount_msat,
+ receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
+ htlcs,
+ sender_intended_total_msat,
}, None));
}
},
self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
}
},
+ MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
+ downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, blocking_action,
+ } => {
+ self.handle_monitor_update_release(
+ downstream_counterparty_node_id,
+ downstream_funding_outpoint,
+ Some(blocking_action),
+ );
+ },
}
}
}
/// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
/// update completion.
fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
- channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
+ channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
-> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
- log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()),
+ &channel.context.channel_id(),
if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- let mut channel = {
- match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
- }
- };
+ let channel =
+ if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
+ chan
+ } else {
+ let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
+ .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
+ mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
+ mem::drop(per_peer_state);
+ self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
+ return;
+ };
let remaining_in_flight =
if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
pending.len()
} else { 0 };
log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
- highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
+ highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
remaining_in_flight);
- if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
+ if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
return;
}
- handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut());
+ handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
}
/// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
///
/// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
/// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
- pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
}
///
/// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
/// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
- pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
}
- fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
let peers_without_funded_channels =
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
- match peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
- if !channel.get().is_awaiting_accept() {
- return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
+
+ // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
+ // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
+ // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
+ // succeed.
+ let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
+ Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
+ let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
+ InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
+ counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
+ &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
+ &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
+ }
+ _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
+ }?;
+
+ if accept_0conf {
+ // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
+ debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
+ } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
+ let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
+ node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
+ msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
}
- if accept_0conf {
- channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
- } else if channel.get().context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
- let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
- node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
- msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
- }
- };
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
- let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
- return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
- } else {
- // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
- // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
- // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
- if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
- let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
- node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
- msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
- }
- };
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
- let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
- return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
+ };
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
+ } else {
+ // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
+ // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
+ // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
+ if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
+ let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
+ node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
+ msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
}
- }
-
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
- node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
- });
- }
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
- return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
+ };
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
}
}
+
+ // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
+ let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
+ channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
+
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
+ node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
+ });
+
+ peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
+
Ok(())
}
/// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
/// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
- where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
+ where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
{
}
fn unfunded_channel_count(
- peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
+ peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
) -> usize {
let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
- for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
- // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
- // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
- if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
- chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
- {
- num_unfunded_channels += 1;
- }
- }
- for (_, chan) in peer.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
- if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
- num_unfunded_channels += 1;
+ for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
+ match phase {
+ ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
+ // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
+ // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
+ if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
+ chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
+ {
+ num_unfunded_channels += 1;
+ }
+ },
+ ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
+ if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
+ num_unfunded_channels += 1;
+ }
+ },
+ ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
+ // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
+ continue;
+ }
}
}
- num_unfunded_channels
+ num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
}
fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
- if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
+ // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
+ // likely to be lost on restart!
+ if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
}
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
}
- let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
- random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
- let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
- let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
-
// Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
// about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
// channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
}
+ let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
+ let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
+ if channel_exists {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
+ }
+
+ // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
+ if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
+ let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
+ temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
+ counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
+ funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
+ push_msat: msg.push_msat,
+ channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
+ }, None));
+ peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
+ open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
+ ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
+ });
+ return Ok(());
+ }
+
+ // Otherwise create the channel right now.
+ let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
+ random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
+ let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
- &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
+ &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
{
Err(e) => {
- self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
},
Ok(res) => res
};
- let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
- let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
- if channel_exists {
- self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
- } else {
- if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
- let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
- if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
- }
- if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
- }
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
- node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
- msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
- });
- } else {
- let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
- temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
- counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
- funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
- push_msat: msg.push_msat,
- channel_type: channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
- }, None));
- }
- peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, channel);
+
+ let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
+ if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
+ }
+ if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
}
+
+ let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
+ channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
+
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
+ node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
+ msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
+ });
+ peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
Ok(())
}
fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
+ // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
+ // likely to be lost on restart!
let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
})?;
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- try_v1_outbound_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
- (chan.get().context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().context.get_user_id())
+ match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
+ match phase.get_mut() {
+ ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
+ try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
+ (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
+ },
+ _ => {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
+ }
+ }
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
}
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
let (chan, funding_msg, monitor) =
- match peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
- Some(inbound_chan) => {
+ match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
+ Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
Ok(res) => res,
Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
- msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None));
+ msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, inbound_chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
},
}
},
+ Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) => {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
+ },
None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
};
Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
- match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
+ let mut id_to_peer_lock = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
+ match id_to_peer_lock.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
"The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
funding_msg.channel_id))
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
- i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
- }
- }
-
- // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
- // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
- // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
- // until we have persisted our monitor.
- let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
- node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
- msg: funding_msg,
- });
+ let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
+ if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
+ i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
+ mem::drop(id_to_peer_lock);
+
+ // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
+ // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
+ // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
+ // until we have persisted our monitor.
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
+ node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
+ msg: funding_msg,
+ });
- let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
-
- let chan = e.insert(chan);
- let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
- per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR,
- { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
-
- // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
- // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
- // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
- // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
- // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
- // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
- // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
- if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
- res.0 = None;
+ if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
+ handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
+ per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
+ } else {
+ unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ } else {
+ log_error!(self.logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
+ "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
+ funding_msg.channel_id));
+ }
+ }
}
- res.map(|_| ())
}
}
}
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
- chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
- let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
- let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
- if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
- // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
- // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
- // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
- if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
- shutdown_finish.0.take();
- }
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
+ match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
+ ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => {
+ let monitor = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
+ chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
+ if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
+ handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
+ Ok(())
+ } else {
+ try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned())), chan_phase_entry)
+ }
+ },
+ _ => {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
+ },
}
- res.map(|_| ())
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
}
}
fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
+ // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
+ // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
.ok_or_else(|| {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
- self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
- if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().context.channel_id()));
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
- node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
- msg: announcement_sigs,
- });
- } else if chan.get().context.is_usable() {
- // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
- // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
- // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
- // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
- // announcement_signatures.
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().context.channel_id()));
- if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
+ if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
+ let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
+ self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
+ if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
- msg,
+ msg: announcement_sigs,
});
+ } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
+ // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
+ // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
+ // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
+ // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
+ // announcement_signatures.
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
+ if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
+ node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
+ msg,
+ });
+ }
}
- }
- {
- let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan.get_mut());
- }
+ {
+ let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
+ }
- Ok(())
+ Ok(())
+ } else {
+ try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
+ "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
+ }
},
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
+ Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
+ }
}
}
fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
- let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
- let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
+ let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
+ let mut finish_shutdown = None;
+ {
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
.ok_or_else(|| {
})?;
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
-
- if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
- log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
- log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
- if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
- }
-
- let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
- let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
- chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
- dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
+ if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
+ let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
+ match phase {
+ ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
+ if !chan.received_shutdown() {
+ log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
+ msg.channel_id,
+ if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
+ }
- if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
- // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
- // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
- // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
- node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
- msg,
- });
- }
+ let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
+ let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
+ chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
+ dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
- // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
- if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
- break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
- peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry).map(|_| ());
- }
- break Ok(());
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
+ if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
+ // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
+ // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
+ // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
+ node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
+ msg,
+ });
+ }
+ // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
+ if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
+ handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
+ peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
+ }
+ },
+ ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
+ let context = phase.context_mut();
+ log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
+ self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
+ let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
+ finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
+ },
+ }
+ } else {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
}
- };
+ }
for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
}
+ if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
+ self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
+ }
- result
+ Ok(())
}
fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
debug_assert!(false);
MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
})?;
- let (tx, chan_option) = {
+ let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
- let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
- if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
- node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
- msg,
- });
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
+ if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
+ let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
+ debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
+ if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
+ node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
+ msg,
+ });
+ }
+ if tx.is_some() {
+ // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
+ // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
+ // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
+ // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
+ // watch for old state broadcasts)!
+ (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
+ } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
+ } else {
+ return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
+ "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
}
- if tx.is_some() {
- // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
- // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
- // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
- // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
- // watch for old state broadcasts)!
- (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
- } else { (tx, None) }
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
}
log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
}
- if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
+ if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
}
self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
}
+ mem::drop(per_peer_state);
+ if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
+ self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
+ }
Ok(())
}
//encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
//but we should prevent it anyway.
+ // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
+ // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
+
let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
-
- let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
- Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
- self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
- chan.get().context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
- Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
- };
- let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
- // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
- // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
- // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
- match pending_forward_info {
- PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
- let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
- let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
- HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
- } else {
- HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
- }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
- let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
- channel_id: msg.channel_id,
- htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
- reason
- };
- PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
- },
- _ => pending_forward_info
- }
- };
- try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan);
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
+ if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
+ let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
+ Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
+ self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
+ chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
+ Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
+ };
+ let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
+ // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
+ // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
+ // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
+ match pending_forward_info {
+ PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
+ let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
+ let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
+ HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
+ } else {
+ HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
+ }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
+ let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
+ channel_id: msg.channel_id,
+ htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
+ reason
+ };
+ PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
+ },
+ _ => pending_forward_info
+ }
+ };
+ try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
+ } else {
+ return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
+ "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
+ }
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
}
}
fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
+ let funding_txo;
let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
+ if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
+ let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
+ if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
+ log_trace!(self.logger,
+ "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
+ msg.channel_id);
+ peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
+ .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
+ .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
+ }
+ // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
+ // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
+ // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
+ // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
+ // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
+ // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
+ funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
+ res
+ } else {
+ return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
+ "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
+ }
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
}
};
- self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
+ self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id), funding_txo);
Ok(())
}
fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
+ // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
+ // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
.ok_or_else(|| {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
+ if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
+ try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
+ } else {
+ return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
+ "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
+ }
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
}
}
fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
+ // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
+ // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
.ok_or_else(|| {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
- try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
+ try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
+ }
+ if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
+ try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
+ } else {
+ return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
+ "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
}
- try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
Ok(())
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
- let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
- if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
- handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
- peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
- } else { Ok(()) }
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
+ if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
+ let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
+ let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
+ if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
+ handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
+ peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ } else {
+ return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
+ "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
+ }
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
}
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
- fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
+ fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
{
let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
+ user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
/// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
/// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
- actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
+ actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
) -> bool {
actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
})
}
+ #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
+ pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
+ counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
+ ) -> bool {
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
+ let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
+
+ if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
+ return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
+ chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), counterparty_node_id);
+ }
+ }
+ false
+ }
+
fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
- let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
+ let htlcs_to_fail = {
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
.ok_or_else(|| {
}).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
- let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan);
- let res = if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
- handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
- peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
- } else { Ok(()) };
- (htlcs_to_fail, res)
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
+ if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
+ let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
+ let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
+ self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
+ &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
+ *counterparty_node_id)
+ } else { false };
+ let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
+ chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
+ if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
+ let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
+ .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
+ handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
+ peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
+ }
+ htlcs_to_fail
+ } else {
+ return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
+ "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
+ }
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
}
};
self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
- res
+ Ok(())
}
fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
+ if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
+ try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
+ } else {
+ return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
+ "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
+ }
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
}
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- if !chan.get().context.is_usable() {
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
- }
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
+ if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
+ if !chan.context.is_usable() {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
+ }
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
- msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
- &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
- msg, &self.default_configuration
- ), chan),
- // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
- // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
- update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
- });
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
+ msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
+ &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
+ msg, &self.default_configuration
+ ), chan_phase_entry),
+ // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
+ // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
+ update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
+ });
+ } else {
+ return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
+ "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
+ }
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
}
Ok(())
}
- /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
+ /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
None => {
// It's not a local channel
- return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
+ return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
}
};
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
- return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
+ return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
}
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- if chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
- if chan.get().context.should_announce() {
- // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
- // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
- // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
- return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
+ if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
+ if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
+ if chan.context.should_announce() {
+ // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
+ // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
+ // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
+ return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
+ }
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
+ }
+ let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
+ let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
+ if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
+ return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
+ } else {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
+ let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
+ // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
+ // persisting.
+ if !did_change {
+ return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
+ }
}
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
- }
- let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
- let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
- if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
- return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
} else {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
- try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
+ return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
+ "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
}
},
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
}
Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
}
- fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
+ fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
let htlc_forwards;
let need_lnd_workaround = {
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
.ok_or_else(|| {
debug_assert!(false);
- MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
+ MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
+ format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
+ msg.channel_id
+ )
})?;
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
- // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
- // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
- // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
- // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
- let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
- msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
- &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
- let mut channel_update = None;
- if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
- node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
- msg,
- });
- } else if chan.get().context.is_usable() {
- // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
- // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
- // they have the latest channel parameters.
- if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
- channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
- node_id: chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
+ if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
+ // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
+ // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
+ // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
+ // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
+ let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
+ msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
+ &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
+ let mut channel_update = None;
+ if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
+ node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
msg,
});
+ } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
+ // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
+ // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
+ // they have the latest channel parameters.
+ if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
+ channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
+ node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ msg,
+ });
+ }
}
+ let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
+ htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
+ &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
+ Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
+ if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
+ }
+ need_lnd_workaround
+ } else {
+ return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
+ "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
}
- let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
- htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
- &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
- Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
- if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
- }
- need_lnd_workaround
},
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
+ log_bytes!(msg.channel_id.0));
+ // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
+ // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
+ // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
+ // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
+ // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
+ // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
+ //
+ // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
+ // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
+ // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
+ // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
+ // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
+ // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
+ // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
+ node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
+ msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
+ channel_id: msg.channel_id,
+ next_local_commitment_number: 0,
+ next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
+ your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
+ my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
+ next_funding_txid: None,
+ },
+ });
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
+ format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
+ counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
+ )
+ }
}
};
+ let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
+ persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
}
if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
}
- Ok(())
+ Ok(persist)
}
/// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
match monitor_event {
MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
- self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
+ self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint);
} else {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
}
},
- MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
- MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
+ MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_outpoint) => {
let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
None => {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
- if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
- let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
- failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
- if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
- msg: update
+ if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
+ if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
+ failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
+ if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ msg: update
+ });
+ }
+ self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
+ node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
+ msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
+ },
});
}
- let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
- ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
- } else {
- ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
- };
- self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, reason);
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
- node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
- msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
- },
- });
}
}
}
}
for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
- self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
+ self.finish_close_channel(failure);
}
has_pending_monitor_events
fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
let mut has_monitor_update = false;
let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
- let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
// Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
// update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
'chan_loop: loop {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
+ for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
+ |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
+ ) {
let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
has_monitor_update = true;
- let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
- let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
- peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
- peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
- if res.is_err() {
- handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
- }
+ handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
+ peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
continue 'peer_loop;
}
}
break 'peer_loop;
}
- let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
+ let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
}
- for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
- let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
- }
-
has_update
}
fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
let mut has_update = false;
+ let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
{
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
- peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
- match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
- Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
- if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
- has_update = true;
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
- node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
- });
- }
- if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
- // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
- // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
- if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
- msg: update
- });
- }
+ peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
+ match phase {
+ ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
+ match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
+ Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
+ if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
+ has_update = true;
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
+ node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
+ });
+ }
+ debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
+ if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
+ shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
+ }
+ if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
+ // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
+ // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
+ if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ msg: update
+ });
+ }
- self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
+ self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
- log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
- self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
- update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
- false
- } else { true }
+ log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
+ self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
+ false
+ } else { true }
+ },
+ Err(e) => {
+ has_update = true;
+ let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
+ handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
+ !close_channel
+ }
+ }
},
- Err(e) => {
- has_update = true;
- let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
- handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
- !close_channel
- }
+ _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
}
});
}
let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
}
+ for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
+ self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
+ }
+
has_update
}
// Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
// so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
// timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
- if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
+ if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
assert!(should_broadcast);
counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
});
}
- self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
+ self.finish_close_channel(failure);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
+ /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
+ /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
+ ///
+ /// # Privacy
+ ///
+ /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the offer with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the
+ /// introduction node and a derived signing pubkey for recipient privacy. As such, currently,
+ /// the node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction
+ /// node in order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
+ ///
+ /// # Limitations
+ ///
+ /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
+ /// reply path.
+ ///
+ /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
+ ///
+ /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
+ /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
+ pub fn create_offer_builder(
+ &self, description: String
+ ) -> OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All> {
+ let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
+ let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
+ let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
+ let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
+ let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
+
+ OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx)
+ .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
+ .path(path)
+ }
+
+ /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
+ /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
+ ///
+ /// # Payment
+ ///
+ /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
+ /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
+ ///
+ /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
+ /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
+ /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
+ /// expired.
+ ///
+ /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
+ /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
+ /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
+ ///
+ /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
+ /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
+ ///
+ /// # Privacy
+ ///
+ /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the refund with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as
+ /// the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
+ /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
+ /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
+ ///
+ /// # Limitations
+ ///
+ /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
+ /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
+ ///
+ /// # Errors
+ ///
+ /// Errors if a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link
+ /// or if `amount_msats` is invalid.
+ ///
+ /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
+ ///
+ /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
+ /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
+ /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
+ pub fn create_refund_builder(
+ &self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
+ payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
+ ) -> Result<RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>, Bolt12SemanticError> {
+ let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
+ let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
+ let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
+ let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
+ let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
+
+ let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
+ description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
+ )?
+ .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
+ .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
+ .path(path);
+
+ let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
+ self.pending_outbound_payments
+ .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
+ payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
+ )
+ .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
+
+ Ok(builder)
+ }
+
+ /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
+ /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
+ /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
+ ///
+ /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
+ /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
+ /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
+ /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
+ /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
+ /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
+ /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
+ ///
+ /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
+ /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
+ ///
+ /// # Payment
+ ///
+ /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
+ /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
+ /// been sent.
+ ///
+ /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
+ /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
+ /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
+ ///
+ /// # Privacy
+ ///
+ /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
+ /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
+ /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
+ /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
+ ///
+ /// # Limitations
+ ///
+ /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
+ /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
+ /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
+ ///
+ /// # Errors
+ ///
+ /// Errors if a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link
+ /// or if the provided parameters are invalid for the offer.
+ ///
+ /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
+ /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
+ /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
+ /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
+ /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
+ /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
+ /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
+ pub fn pay_for_offer(
+ &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
+ payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
+ max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
+ ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
+ let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
+ let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
+ let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
+
+ let builder = offer
+ .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
+ .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
+ let builder = match quantity {
+ None => builder,
+ Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
+ };
+ let builder = match amount_msats {
+ None => builder,
+ Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
+ };
+ let builder = match payer_note {
+ None => builder,
+ Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
+ };
+
+ let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
+ let reply_path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
+
+ let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
+ self.pending_outbound_payments
+ .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
+ payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
+ )
+ .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
+
+ let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
+ if offer.paths().is_empty() {
+ let message = new_pending_onion_message(
+ OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
+ Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
+ Some(reply_path),
+ );
+ pending_offers_messages.push(message);
+ } else {
+ // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
+ // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
+ // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
+ const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
+ for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
+ let message = new_pending_onion_message(
+ OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
+ Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
+ Some(reply_path.clone()),
+ );
+ pending_offers_messages.push(message);
+ }
+ }
+
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
+ /// message.
+ ///
+ /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
+ /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
+ /// [`PaymentPreimage`].
+ ///
+ /// # Limitations
+ ///
+ /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
+ /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
+ /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
+ /// received and no retries will be made.
+ ///
+ /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
+ pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
+ let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
+ let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
+ let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
+
+ let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
+ let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
+
+ match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
+ Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
+ let payment_paths = vec![
+ self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
+ ];
+ #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
+ let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
+ payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
+ )?;
+ #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
+ let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
+ self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
+ );
+ #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
+ let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
+ payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
+ )?;
+ let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
+ let reply_path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
+
+ let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
+ if refund.paths().is_empty() {
+ let message = new_pending_onion_message(
+ OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice),
+ Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
+ Some(reply_path),
+ );
+ pending_offers_messages.push(message);
+ } else {
+ for path in refund.paths() {
+ let message = new_pending_onion_message(
+ OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
+ Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
+ Some(reply_path.clone()),
+ );
+ pending_offers_messages.push(message);
+ }
+ }
+
+ Ok(())
+ },
+ Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
}
}
inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
}
+ /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction
+ /// node.
+ fn create_one_hop_blinded_path(&self) -> BlindedPath {
+ let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
+ let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
+ BlindedPath::one_hop_for_message(self.get_our_node_id(), entropy_source, secp_ctx).unwrap()
+ }
+
+ /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction
+ /// node.
+ fn create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(
+ &self, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
+ ) -> (BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath) {
+ let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
+ let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
+
+ let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
+ let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
+ let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
+ payment_secret,
+ payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
+ max_cltv_expiry,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
+ },
+ };
+ // TODO: Err for overflow?
+ BlindedPath::one_hop_for_payment(
+ payee_node_id, payee_tlvs, entropy_source, secp_ctx
+ ).unwrap()
+ }
+
/// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
/// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
///
let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
loop {
- let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
+ let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
// Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
Some(_) => continue,
let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
loop {
- let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
+ let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
// Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
return scid_candidate
for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
+ for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
+ |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
+ ) {
for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
/// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
/// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
- let mut errors = Vec::new();
loop {
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
// blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
// update(s) when those blockers complete.
log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
- log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
+ &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
break;
}
- if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
- debug_assert_eq!(chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
- if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.get_mut().unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
- log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
- if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
- peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
- {
- errors.push((e, counterparty_node_id));
- }
- if further_update_exists {
- // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
- // top of the loop.
- continue;
+ if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
+ if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
+ debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
+ if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
+ channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
+ handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
+ peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
+ if further_update_exists {
+ // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
+ // top of the loop.
+ continue;
+ }
+ } else {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
+ channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
}
- } else {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
- log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
}
}
} else {
}
break;
}
- for (err, counterparty_node_id) in errors {
- let res = Err::<(), _>(err);
- let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
- }
}
fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
/// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
- PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
- let mut result = self.process_background_events();
+ PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
+ let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
// TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
// ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
}
fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
- &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
+ let _persistence_guard =
+ PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
+ self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
let new_height = height - 1;
{
let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
*best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
}
- self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
+ self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
}
}
let block_hash = header.block_hash();
log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
- &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
- self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
+ let _persistence_guard =
+ PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
+ self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
+ self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
.map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
if height < last_best_block_height {
let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
- self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
+ self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
}
}
let block_hash = header.block_hash();
log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
- &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
+ let _persistence_guard =
+ PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
+ self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
*self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
- self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
+ self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
macro_rules! max_time {
($timestamp: expr) => {
for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
+ for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
}
}
fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
- &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
+ let _persistence_guard =
+ PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
+ self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
/// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
/// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
/// the function.
- fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
+ fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
(&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
// Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
// during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
- peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
- let res = f(channel);
- if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
- for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
- let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
- timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
- HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
- }
- if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
- send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
- if channel.context.is_usable() {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
- if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
- node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- msg,
- });
+ peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
+ match phase {
+ // Retain unfunded channels.
+ ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
+ ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
+ let res = f(channel);
+ if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
+ for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
+ let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
+ timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
+ HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
+ }
+ if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
+ send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
+ if channel.context.is_usable() {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
+ if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
+ node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ msg,
+ });
+ }
+ } else {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
+ }
}
- } else {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
- }
- }
- {
- let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
- }
+ {
+ let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
+ }
- if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
- node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- msg: announcement_sigs,
- });
- if let Some(height) = height_opt {
- if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
- msg: announcement,
- // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
- // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
- update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
+ if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
+ node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ msg: announcement_sigs,
});
+ if let Some(height) = height_opt {
+ if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
+ msg: announcement,
+ // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
+ // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
+ update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
+ });
+ }
+ }
}
+ if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
+ if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
+ // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
+ // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
+ // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
+ // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
+ // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
+ // is always consistent.
+ let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
+ let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
+ assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
+ "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
+ fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
+ }
+ }
+ } else if let Err(reason) = res {
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
+ // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
+ // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
+ failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
+ if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ msg: update
+ });
+ }
+ let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
+ self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
+ node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
+ msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
+ channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
+ data: reason_message,
+ })
+ },
+ });
+ return false;
}
+ true
}
- if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
- if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
- // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
- // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
- // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
- // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
- // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
- // is always consistent.
- let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
- let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
- assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
- "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
- fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
- }
- }
- } else if let Err(reason) = res {
- update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
- // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
- // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
- failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
- if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
- msg: update
- });
- }
- let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
- self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
- node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
- channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
- data: reason_message,
- } },
- });
- return false;
}
- true
});
}
}
if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
+ user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
phantom_shared_secret: None,
}
}
- /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
+ /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
+ /// may have events that need processing.
+ ///
+ /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
+ /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
///
/// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
/// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
- ///
- pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
- self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
+ pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
+ self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
+ }
+
+ /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
+ pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
+ self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
}
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
- pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
- self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
+ pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
+ self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
}
/// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
}
- /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
+ /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
/// [`ChannelManager`].
pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
}
- /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
+ /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
/// [`ChannelManager`].
///
/// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
/// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
#[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
- pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
- provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
+ pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
+ provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
+ }
+
+ /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
+ /// [`ChannelManager`].
+ fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
+ provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
}
- /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
+ /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
/// [`ChannelManager`].
pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
}
- /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
+ /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
/// [`ChannelManager`].
pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
}
- /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
+ /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
/// [`ChannelManager`].
pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
L::Target: Logger,
{
fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
- let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
+ // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
+ // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
+ // change to the contents.
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
+ let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
+ let persist = match &res {
+ Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
+ debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
+ NotifyOption::DoPersist
+ },
+ _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
+ };
+ let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
+ persist
+ });
}
fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
}
fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
- let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
+ // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
+ // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
+ // change to the contents.
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
+ let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
+ NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
+ });
}
fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
}
fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
- let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
+ // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
+ // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
+ // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
+ // will not force-close the channel on startup.
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
+ let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
+ let persist = match &res {
+ Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
+ _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
+ };
+ let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
+ persist
+ });
}
fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
}
fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
- let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
+ // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
+ // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
+ // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
+ let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
+ let persist = match &res {
+ Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
+ Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
+ Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
+ };
+ let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
+ persist
+ });
}
fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
}
fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
- let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
+ // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
+ // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
+ // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
+ let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
+ let persist = match &res {
+ Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
+ Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
+ Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
+ };
+ let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
+ persist
+ });
}
fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
- let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
+ // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
+ // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
+ // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
+ let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
+ let persist = match &res {
+ Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
+ Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
+ Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
+ };
+ let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
+ persist
+ });
}
fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
}
fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
- let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
+ // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
+ // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
+ // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
+ let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
+ let persist = match &res {
+ Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
+ Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
+ Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
+ };
+ let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
+ persist
+ });
}
fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
}
fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
- PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
- let force_persist = self.process_background_events();
+ PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
- if force_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { NotifyOption::DoPersist } else { persist }
+ persist
} else {
- NotifyOption::SkipPersist
+ NotifyOption::DoPersist
}
});
}
fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
- let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
+ let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
+ let persist = match &res {
+ Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
+ Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
+ Ok(persist) => *persist,
+ };
+ let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
+ persist
+ });
}
fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
+ self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
let remove_peer = {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
- peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
- chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
- if chan.is_shutdown() {
- update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
- self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
- return false;
- }
- true
- });
- peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
- update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
- self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
- false
- });
- peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
- update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
- self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
+ peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
+ let context = match phase {
+ ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
+ if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger).is_ok() {
+ // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
+ return true;
+ }
+ &mut chan.context
+ },
+ // Unfunded channels will always be removed.
+ ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
+ &mut chan.context
+ },
+ ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
+ &mut chan.context
+ },
+ };
+ // Clean up for removal.
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
+ self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
+ failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
false
});
+ // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
+ // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
+ peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
match msg {
// V1 Channel Establishment
mem::drop(per_peer_state);
for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
- self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
+ self.finish_close_channel(failure);
}
}
return Err(());
}
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
+ let mut res = Ok(());
- // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
- // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
- // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
- // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
- let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
- let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
+ PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
+ // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
+ // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
+ // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
+ // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
+ let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
+ let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
- {
- let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
- match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
- if inbound_peer_limited {
- return Err(());
- }
- e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
- channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
- outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
- inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
- latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
- pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
- in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
- monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
- actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
- is_connected: true,
- }));
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
- let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
- peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
-
- let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
- if inbound_peer_limited &&
- Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
- peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
- {
- return Err(());
- }
+ {
+ let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
+ match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
+ if inbound_peer_limited {
+ res = Err(());
+ return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
+ }
+ e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
+ channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
+ inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
+ latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
+ pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
+ in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
+ monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
+ actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
+ is_connected: true,
+ }));
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
+ let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
+ peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
+
+ let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
+ if inbound_peer_limited &&
+ Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
+ peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
+ {
+ res = Err(());
+ return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
+ }
- debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
- peer_state.is_connected = true;
- },
+ debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
+ peer_state.is_connected = true;
+ },
+ }
}
- }
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
- let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
- for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
- let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
- let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
- peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
- let retain = if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
- if !chan.context.have_received_message() {
- // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
- // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
- // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
- // drop it.
- false
- } else {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
- node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
- });
- true
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
+
+ peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
+ if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else {
+ // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
+ // (so won't be recovered after a crash), they shouldn't exist here and we would never need to
+ // worry about closing and removing them.
+ debug_assert!(false);
+ None
}
- } else { true };
- if retain && chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
- if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
- if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
+ ).for_each(|chan| {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
+ node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
+ });
+ });
+ }
+
+ return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
+ //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
+ });
+ res
+ }
+
+ fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
+
+ match &msg.data as &str {
+ "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
+ "link failed to shutdown" =>
+ {
+ // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
+ // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
+ // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
+ // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
+ // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
+ // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
+ // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
+ if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
+ if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
+ let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
+ if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
+ if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
- msg, update_msg,
+ msg,
});
}
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
+ node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
+ action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
+ msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
+ channel_id: msg.channel_id,
+ data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
+ },
+ log_level: Level::Trace,
+ }
+ });
}
}
- retain
- });
+ return;
+ }
+ _ => {}
}
- //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
- Ok(())
- }
-
- fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
- if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
- let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
+ if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
+ let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned()
- .chain(peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.keys().cloned())
- .chain(peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.keys().cloned()).collect()
+ // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
+ // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
+ peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
+ peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
};
for channel_id in channel_ids {
// Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- if let Some(chan) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
- if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
+ if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
+ if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
msg,
provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
}
- fn get_genesis_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
- Some(vec![ChainHash::from(&self.genesis_hash[..])])
+ fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
+ Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
}
fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
}
}
-/// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
+impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
+OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
+where
+ M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
+ T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
+ ES::Target: EntropySource,
+ NS::Target: NodeSigner,
+ SP::Target: SignerProvider,
+ F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+ R::Target: Router,
+ L::Target: Logger,
+{
+ fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
+ let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
+ let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
+
+ match message {
+ OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
+ let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
+ &invoice_request
+ ) {
+ Ok(amount_msats) => Some(amount_msats),
+ Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
+ };
+ let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
+ Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
+ Err(()) => {
+ let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
+ return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
+ },
+ };
+ let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
+
+ match self.create_inbound_payment(amount_msats, relative_expiry, None) {
+ Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) if invoice_request.keys.is_some() => {
+ let payment_paths = vec![
+ self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
+ ];
+ #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
+ let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
+ payment_paths, payment_hash
+ );
+ #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
+ let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
+ self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
+ );
+ #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
+ let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
+ payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
+ );
+ match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) {
+ Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
+ Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
+ }
+ },
+ Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
+ let payment_paths = vec![
+ self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
+ ];
+ #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
+ let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
+ #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
+ let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
+ self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
+ );
+ #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
+ let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
+ payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
+ );
+ let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
+ .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into()))
+ .and_then(|invoice|
+ match invoice.sign(|invoice| self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)) {
+ Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
+ Err(SignError::Signing(())) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
+ InvoiceError::from_string("Failed signing invoice".to_string())
+ )),
+ Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
+ InvoiceError::from_string("Failed invoice signature verification".to_string())
+ )),
+ });
+ match response {
+ Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice),
+ Err(error) => Some(error),
+ }
+ },
+ Err(()) => {
+ Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount.into()))
+ },
+ }
+ },
+ OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
+ match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
+ Err(()) => {
+ Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned())))
+ },
+ Ok(_) if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&self.bolt12_invoice_features()) => {
+ Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures.into()))
+ },
+ Ok(payment_id) => {
+ if let Err(e) = self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id) {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
+ Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))))
+ } else {
+ None
+ }
+ },
+ }
+ },
+ OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
+ None
+ },
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
+ core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
+ }
+}
+
+/// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
/// [`ChannelManager`].
pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
- provided_init_features(config).to_context()
+ let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
+ node_features.set_keysend_optional();
+ node_features
}
-/// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
+/// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
/// [`ChannelManager`].
///
/// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
/// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
#[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
-pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
+pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
+ provided_init_features(config).to_context()
+}
+
+/// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
+/// [`ChannelManager`].
+pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
provided_init_features(config).to_context()
}
-/// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
+/// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
/// [`ChannelManager`].
pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
provided_init_features(config).to_context()
}
-/// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
+/// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
/// [`ChannelManager`].
pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
}
-/// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
+/// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
/// [`ChannelManager`].
pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
// Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
+ _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
(1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
(2, channel_id, required),
(3, channel_type, option),
(1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
(2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
(3, payment_metadata, option),
+ (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
},
(2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
(0, payment_preimage, required),
(2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
(3, payment_metadata, option),
(4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
+ (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
},
;);
(1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
(2, outpoint, required),
(4, htlc_id, required),
- (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
+ (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
+ (7, user_channel_id, option),
});
impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
+ _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
(0, prev_hop, required),
(1, total_msat, option),
(2, value_ser, required),
write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
- self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
+ self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
{
let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
best_block.height().write(writer)?;
let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
{
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
- let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
- let mut number_of_channels = 0;
+ let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
serializable_peer_count += 1;
}
- number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
- for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
- if !channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
- unfunded_channels += 1;
- }
- }
+
+ number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
+ |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
+ ).count();
}
- ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
+ (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
- if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
- channel.write(writer)?;
- }
+ for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
+ |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
+ if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
+ } else { None }
+ ) {
+ channel.write(writer)?;
}
}
}
session_priv.write(writer)?;
}
}
+ PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
+ PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
}
fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
- let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
- let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
+ let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
for _ in 0..channel_count {
- let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
+ let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
&args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
))?;
let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
// But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
- log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
- log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
- let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
- if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
+ if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
+ log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
+ &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
+ }
+ if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
+ log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
+ &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
+ }
+ if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
+ log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
+ &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
+ }
+ if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
+ log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
+ &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
+ }
+ let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
+ if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
+ }
+ if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
});
}
- failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
+ failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
- reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
+ reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
+ counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
+ channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
}, None));
for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
let mut found_htlc = false;
// backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
log_info!(args.logger,
"Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
- log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
+ &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
}
}
} else {
log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
- log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
+ &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
monitor.get_latest_update_id());
if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
}
- if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
+ if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() {
id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
}
- match peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
+ match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
- by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel);
+ by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
- by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel);
+ by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
entry.insert(by_id_map);
}
}
channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
+ counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
+ channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
}, None));
} else {
- log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
+ log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
- log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
+ &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
PeerState {
channel_by_id,
- outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
- inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
+ inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
};
let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
+ let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
for _ in 0..peer_count {
let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let peer_chans = peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
+ let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
$chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
- update.update_id, $channel_info_log, log_bytes!($funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
+ update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
pending_background_events.push(
BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
update: update.clone(),
});
}
+ if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
+ // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
+ // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
+ // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
+ pending_background_events.push(
+ BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
+ counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
+ channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
+ });
+ }
if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
- // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
- // discarded.
- let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
- let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
- .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
- let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
- if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
- if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
- max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
- handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
- funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
+ for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
+ if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
+ // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
+ // discarded.
+ let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
+ let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
+ .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
+ let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
+ if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
+ if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
+ max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
+ handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
+ funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
+ }
}
- }
- if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
- // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
- log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
- log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
- log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
- log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
- log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
- log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
- log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
- log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
+ if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
+ // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
+ log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
+ log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
+ chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
+ log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
+ log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
+ log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
+ log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
+ log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
+ }
+ } else {
+ // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
+ // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
+ debug_assert!(false);
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
}
} else {
log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
- log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
+ &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
- if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
+ if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), &htlc.payment_hash);
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
+ custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
total_msat: path_amt,
starting_block_height: best_block_height,
+ remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
});
log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
- path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
+ path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
}
}
}
if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
- log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
+ &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
false
} else { true }
} else { true }
pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
- log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
+ &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
intercepted_id != ev_id
// generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
// it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
// `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
- pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
+ let compl_action =
+ EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
+ channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
+ counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
+ };
+ pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
+ path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &args.logger);
pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
}
},
// downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
// channel_id -> peer map entry).
counterparty_opt.is_none(),
- monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()))
+ counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
+ monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
} else { None }
} else {
// If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
Err(()) => {
- log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
+ log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
}
for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
- if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
- let mut outbound_scid_alias;
- loop {
- outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
- .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
- if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
- }
- chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
- } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
- // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
- // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
- log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
- return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
- }
- if chan.context.is_usable() {
- if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
+ for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
+ if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
+ if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
+ let mut outbound_scid_alias;
+ loop {
+ outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
+ .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
+ if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
+ }
+ chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
+ } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
// Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
// channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
+ if chan.context.is_usable() {
+ if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
+ // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
+ // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
+ log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
+ // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
+ debug_assert!(false);
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
}
}
for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
- log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
+ log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
.expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
}
- for claimable_htlc in payment.htlcs {
+ for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
// Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
+ if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
}
}
payment_hash,
purpose: payment.purpose,
amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
+ htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
+ sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
}, None));
}
}
Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
} = action {
if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
+ log_trace!(args.logger,
+ "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
+ blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id());
blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
.entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
.or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
+ } else {
+ // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
+ // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
+ // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
+ // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
+ // anymore.
}
}
+ if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
+ debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
+ }
}
}
peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
}
let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
- genesis_hash,
+ chain_hash,
fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
- persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
+
+ event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
+ needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
+
+ funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
+
+ pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
node_signer: args.node_signer,
channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
}
- for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_chan_id) in pending_claims_to_replay {
+ for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
// We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
// don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
// channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
- downstream_closed, downstream_chan_id);
+ downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding);
}
//TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
+ use crate::ln::ChannelId;
use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
// All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
// with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
- assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
+ assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
// The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
// ... but the last node should not.
- assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
+ assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
// After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
- assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
- assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
+ assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
+ assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
// Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
// about the channel.
nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
- assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
+ assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
// The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
// parties.
nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
- assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
- assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
+ assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
+ assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
// At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
// persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
- assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
- assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
+ assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
+ assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
// the channel info has updated.
nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
}
let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
+ expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
// Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
// path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
match events[0] {
- Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
- assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
- assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
- assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- match events[1] {
Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
- match events[2] {
+ match events[1] {
Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
// To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
- let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
+ let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
// Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
- let route_params = RouteParameters {
- payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
- final_value_msat: 100_000,
- };
+ let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
+ PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
+ TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
let route = find_route(
&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
- None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
+ None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
).unwrap();
nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
let route = find_route(
&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
- None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
+ None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
).unwrap();
let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
// Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
- let route_params = RouteParameters {
- payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
- final_value_msat: 100_000,
- };
+ let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
+ PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
+ 100_000
+ );
let route = find_route(
&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
- None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
+ None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
).unwrap();
let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
- let route_params = RouteParameters {
- payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
- final_value_msat: 10_000,
- };
+ let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
+ PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
let route = find_route(
&payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
- nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
+ nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
).unwrap();
let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
- let route_params = RouteParameters {
- payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
- final_value_msat: 10_000,
- };
+ let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
+ PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
let route = find_route(
&payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
- nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
+ nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
).unwrap();
let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
{
// Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
- let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
+ let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().into_inner());
{
// Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
// funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
// as it has the funding transaction.
let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
- assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
+ assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
}
assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
{
let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
- assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
+ assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
}
expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
// as it has the funding transaction.
let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
- assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
+ assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
}
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
- nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
// party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
- assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
+ assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
}
{
// kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
- assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
+ assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
}
nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
// doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
- assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
+ assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
}
let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
}
let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
}
fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
}
+ fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
+ let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
+ check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
+ }
+
+ fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
+ let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
+ check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
+ }
+
fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
match res_err {
Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
// Dummy values
- let channel_id = [4; 32];
+ let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
}
+ #[test]
+ fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
+ // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
+ // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
+ // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
+ // the given `channel_id`.
+ let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
+ let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
+
+ let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
+
+ // Dummy values
+ let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
+
+ // Test the API functions.
+ check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
+
+ check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
+
+ check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
+
+ check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
+
+ check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
+
+ check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
+ }
+
#[test]
fn test_connection_limiting() {
// Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
}
- open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
+ open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
}
// A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
- open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
+ open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
- open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
+ open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
}
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
+ open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
}
// Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
- open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
+ open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
}
// If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
let extra_fee_msat = 10;
- let hop_data = msgs::OnionHopData {
- amt_to_forward: 100,
+ let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
+ amt_msat: 100,
outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
- format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
- keysend_preimage: None,
- payment_metadata: None,
- payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
- payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
- }),
- }
+ payment_metadata: None,
+ keysend_preimage: None,
+ payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
+ payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
+ }),
+ custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
};
// Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
// intended amount, we fail the payment.
- if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::ReceiveError { err_code, .. }) =
+ if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat))
{
} else { panic!(); }
// If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
- let hop_data = msgs::OnionHopData { // This is the same hop_data as above, OnionHopData doesn't implement Clone
- amt_to_forward: 100,
+ let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
+ amt_msat: 100,
outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
- format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
- keysend_preimage: None,
- payment_metadata: None,
- payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
- payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
- }),
- }
+ payment_metadata: None,
+ keysend_preimage: None,
+ payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
+ payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
+ }),
+ custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
};
assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok());
}
+ #[test]
+ fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
+ let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
+ let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
+ let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
+ let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
+
+ let result = node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
+ amt_msat: 100,
+ outgoing_cltv_value: 22,
+ payment_metadata: None,
+ keysend_preimage: None,
+ payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
+ payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
+ }),
+ custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
+ }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None);
+
+ // Should not return an error as this condition:
+ // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
+ // is not satisfied.
+ assert!(result.is_ok());
+ }
+
#[test]
fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
// Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
- check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
+ // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
+ // not have generated any events.
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
}
#[test]
MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
_ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
}
+
+ // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
+ // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
+ let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
+ let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
+ let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
+ assert!(
+ matches!(
+ nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
+ forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
+ ..Default::default()
+ }),
+ Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
+ )
+ );
+ // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_payment_display() {
+ let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
+ assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
+ let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
+ assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
+ let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
+ assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
+ let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
+ let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
+ let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
+
+ // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
+ let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+ check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
+ {
+ let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
+ }
+
+ // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
+ // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
+ // their side.
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, true).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, false).unwrap();
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
+ nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
+ );
+ nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
+
+ // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
+ // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
+ // close even if it was an lnd node.
+ let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
+ if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
+ assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
+ nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
+ } else { panic!() };
+ check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
+ let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
+ err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
+ };
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
+ {
+ let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
+ }
}
}
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
- use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
+ use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
use criterion::Criterion;
&'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
&'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
- struct ANodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
- node: &'a Manager<'a, P>,
+ struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
+ node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
}
- impl<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'a, P> {
- type CM = Manager<'a, P>;
+ impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
+ type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
#[inline]
- fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'a, P> { self.node }
+ fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
#[inline]
fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
}
let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
- let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
+ let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
macro_rules! send_payment {
($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
- .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap();
+ .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
payment_count += 1;
let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
$node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
- PaymentId(payment_hash.0), RouteParameters {
- payment_params, final_value_msat: 10_000,
- }, Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
+ PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
+ RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
+ Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
$node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
$node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);