//! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
//!
-use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
+use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
-use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
-use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
use bitcoin::secp256k1;
use chain;
-use chain::{Confirm, Watch, BestBlock};
+use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
-use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
+use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
// Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
// construct one themselves.
-use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
-pub use ln::channel::CounterpartyForwardingInfo;
+use ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
-use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
-use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
+use ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
+use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
use ln::msgs;
use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
use ln::onion_utils;
-use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
-use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
+use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT, OptionalField};
+use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner, Recipient};
use util::config::UserConfig;
-use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
+use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
use util::{byte_utils, events};
-use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
-use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
-use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
+use util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
+use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
+use util::logger::{Level, Logger};
use util::errors::APIError;
use io;
use prelude::*;
use core::{cmp, mem};
use core::cell::RefCell;
-use io::{Cursor, Read};
+use io::Read;
use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
use core::time::Duration;
-#[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
-use std::time::Instant;
use core::ops::Deref;
+#[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
+use std::time::Instant;
+use util::crypto::sign;
+
// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
//
// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
#[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
-enum PendingHTLCRouting {
+pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
Forward {
onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
Receive {
payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
+ phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
},
ReceiveKeysend {
payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
#[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
- routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
- incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
+ pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
+ pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
payment_hash: PaymentHash,
pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
}
/// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
short_channel_id: u64,
htlc_id: u64,
incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
+ phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
// This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
// channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
}
enum OnionPayload {
- /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
- /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
- /// are part of the same payment.
- Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData),
+ /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
+ Invoice {
+ /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
+ /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
+ _legacy_hop_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
+ },
/// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
}
+/// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
struct ClaimableHTLC {
prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
cltv_expiry: u32,
+ /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
value: u64,
onion_payload: OnionPayload,
+ timer_ticks: u8,
+ /// The sum total of all MPP parts
+ total_msat: u64,
}
+/// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
+/// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
+#[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
+pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
+
+impl Writeable for PaymentId {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
+ self.0.write(w)
+ }
+}
+
+impl Readable for PaymentId {
+ fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
+ Ok(PaymentId(buf))
+ }
+}
/// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+#[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
OutboundRoute {
/// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
/// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
+ payment_id: PaymentId,
+ payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
+ payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
},
}
+#[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
+impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
+ fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
+ match self {
+ HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
+ 0u8.hash(hasher);
+ prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
+ },
+ HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
+ 1u8.hash(hasher);
+ path.hash(hasher);
+ session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
+ payment_id.hash(hasher);
+ payment_secret.hash(hasher);
+ first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
+ payment_params.hash(hasher);
+ },
+ }
+ }
+}
+#[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
#[cfg(test)]
impl HTLCSource {
pub fn dummy() -> Self {
path: Vec::new(),
session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
+ payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
+ payment_secret: None,
+ payment_params: None,
}
}
}
}
}
+struct ReceiveError {
+ err_code: u16,
+ err_data: Vec<u8>,
+ msg: &'static str,
+}
+
/// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
PrevHopForceClosed,
struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
err: msgs::LightningError,
+ chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
}
impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
},
},
},
+ chan_id: None,
shutdown_finish: None,
}
}
err,
action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
},
+ chan_id: None,
shutdown_finish: None,
}
}
#[inline]
fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
- Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
+ Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
}
#[inline]
- fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
+ fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
Self {
err: LightningError {
err: err.clone(),
},
},
},
+ chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
}
}
fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
Self {
err: match err {
+ ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
+ err: msg.clone(),
+ action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
+ msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
+ channel_id,
+ data: msg
+ },
+ log_level: Level::Warn,
+ },
+ },
ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
err: msg,
action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
},
},
},
+ chan_id: None,
shutdown_finish: None,
}
}
// Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
+ /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) to the real channel id. Outbound SCID aliases are added
+ /// here once the channel is available for normal use, with SCIDs being added once the funding
+ /// transaction is confirmed at the channel's required confirmation depth.
pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
- /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
+ /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
+ ///
+ /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
+ /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
+ /// and via the classic SCID.
+ ///
/// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
/// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
/// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
///
/// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
/// here.
+///
+/// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
+/// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
struct PendingInboundPayment {
/// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
}
+/// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
+/// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
+pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
+ Legacy {
+ session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
+ },
+ Retryable {
+ session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash,
+ payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
+ pending_amt_msat: u64,
+ /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
+ pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
+ /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
+ total_msat: u64,
+ /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
+ starting_block_height: u32,
+ },
+ /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
+ /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
+ /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
+ Fulfilled {
+ session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
+ payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
+ },
+ /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
+ /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
+ /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
+ /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
+ /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
+ ///
+ /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
+ Abandoned {
+ session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash,
+ },
+}
+
+impl PendingOutboundPayment {
+ fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
+ match self {
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
+ _ => false,
+ }
+ }
+ fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
+ match self {
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
+ _ => false,
+ }
+ }
+ fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
+ match self {
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
+ _ => false,
+ }
+ }
+ fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
+ match self {
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
+ _ => None,
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
+ match self {
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
+ let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
+ core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
+ => session_privs,
+ });
+ let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
+ *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash };
+ }
+
+ fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
+ let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
+ let our_payment_hash;
+ core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
+ return Err(()),
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
+ our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
+ session_privs
+ },
+ });
+ *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
+ fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
+ let remove_res = match self {
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
+ session_privs.remove(session_priv)
+ }
+ };
+ if remove_res {
+ if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
+ let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
+ let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
+ *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
+ if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
+ *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ remove_res
+ }
+
+ fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
+ let insert_res = match self {
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
+ session_privs.insert(session_priv)
+ }
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
+ };
+ if insert_res {
+ if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
+ let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
+ *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
+ if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
+ *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ insert_res
+ }
+
+ fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
+ match self {
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
+ session_privs.len()
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
/// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
/// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
/// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
/// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
/// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
/// concrete type of the KeysManager.
+///
+/// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
/// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
/// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
/// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
/// concrete type of the KeysManager.
+///
+/// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
/// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
/// Locked *after* channel_state.
pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
- /// The session_priv bytes of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
+ /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
/// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
/// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
- /// PaymentSent/PaymentFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
+ /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
/// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
/// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
/// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
/// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
///
+ /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
+ ///
/// Locked *after* channel_state.
- pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashSet<[u8; 32]>>,
+ pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
+
+ /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
+ /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
+ /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
+ /// active channel list on load.
+ outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
our_network_key: SecretKey,
our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
+ inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
+
+ /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
+ /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
+ /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
+ ///
+ /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
+ fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
+
/// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
/// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
#[allow(dead_code)]
const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
+/// The number of blocks before we consider an outbound payment for expiry if it doesn't have any
+/// pending HTLCs in flight.
+pub(crate) const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
+
+/// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
+pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
+
+/// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
+ /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
+ pub fee_base_msat: u32,
+ /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
+ pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
+ /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
+ /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
+ /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
+ pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
+}
+
/// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
/// to better separate parameters.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
/// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
/// payments to us through this channel.
pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
+ /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
+ /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
+ /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
+ pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
+ /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
+ pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
}
/// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
/// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
/// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
+ /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
+ ///
+ /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
+ pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
/// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
/// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
+ ///
+ /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
+ /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
+ ///
+ /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
+ /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
+ /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
+ /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
+ /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
+ /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
+ ///
+ /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
+ /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
+ ///
+ /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
+ pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
/// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
/// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
///
/// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
- /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
- pub user_id: u64,
+ /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
+ pub user_channel_id: u64,
+ /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
+ /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
+ /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
+ ///
+ /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
+ /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
+ /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
+ /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
+ ///
+ /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
+ pub balance_msat: u64,
/// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
- /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
+ /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
/// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
/// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
///
+ /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
+ ///
/// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
/// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
/// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
+ /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
+ /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
+ /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
+ /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
+ ///
+ /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
+ pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
/// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
- /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
+ /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
/// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
/// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
/// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
pub is_usable: bool,
/// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
pub is_public: bool,
+ /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
+ /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
+ pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
+ /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
+ pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
+}
+
+impl ChannelDetails {
+ /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
+ /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
+ /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
+ ///
+ /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
+ /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
+ pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
+ self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
+ }
}
/// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
/// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
/// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
/// with the latest update_id.
- PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
+ PartialFailure {
+ /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
+ results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
+ /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
+ /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
+ /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
+ failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
+ /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
+ payment_id: PaymentId,
+ },
+}
+
+/// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
+///
+/// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
+ /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
+ pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
+ /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
+ /// route hints.
+ pub phantom_scid: u64,
+ /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
+ pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
}
macro_rules! handle_error {
($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
match $internal {
Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
- Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
+ Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
{
// In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
// entering the macro.
assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
+ assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
}
let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
msg: update
});
}
+ if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
+ $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
+ channel_id, user_channel_id,
+ reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
+ });
+ }
}
log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
}
}
+macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
+ ($self: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr) => {
+ if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
+ $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
+ } else {
+ // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
+ // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
+ // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
+ // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
+ // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
+ // stage.
+ let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
+ debug_assert!(alias_removed);
+ }
+ $short_to_id.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
+ }
+}
+
/// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
match $err {
+ ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
+ (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
+ },
ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
(false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
},
ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
- if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
- $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
- }
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $channel);
let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
- (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
+ (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
+ shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
},
ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
- if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
- $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
- }
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $channel);
let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
- (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
+ (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
+ shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
}
}
}
}
macro_rules! remove_channel {
- ($channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
+ ($self: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
{
let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
- if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
- $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
- }
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel_state.short_to_id, channel);
channel
}
}
}
macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
- ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
- handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
- };
- ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
+ ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
match $err {
ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
- if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
- $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
- }
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $chan);
// TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
// chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
// will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
// splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
// given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
// retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
- let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id,
+ let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
$chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
(res, true)
},
ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
- log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
+ log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
match $action_type {
else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
else { "nothing" },
(&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
- (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
+ (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
+ (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
if !$resend_commitment {
debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
}
if !$resend_raa {
debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
}
- $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
+ $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
(Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
},
}
};
- ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => { {
- let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $entry.key());
+ ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
+ let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
if drop {
$entry.remove_entry();
}
res
} };
+ ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
+ debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
+ handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
+ } };
+ ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
+ handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
+ };
+ ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
+ handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
+ };
+ ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
+ handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
+ };
}
macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
}
}
+macro_rules! send_funding_locked {
+ ($short_to_id: expr, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $funding_locked_msg: expr) => {
+ $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
+ node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ msg: $funding_locked_msg,
+ });
+ // Note that we may send a funding locked multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
+ // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
+ let outbound_alias_insert = $short_to_id.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), $channel.channel_id());
+ assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == $channel.channel_id(),
+ "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
+ if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
+ let scid_insert = $short_to_id.insert(real_scid, $channel.channel_id());
+ assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == $channel.channel_id(),
+ "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
+ }
+ }
+}
+
macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
$raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
- $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr) => { {
+ $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr, $announcement_sigs: expr) => { {
let mut htlc_forwards = None;
- let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
+ let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
let res = loop {
let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
if !forwards.is_empty() {
// Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
// before it should be allowed to.
assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
- $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
+ send_funding_locked!($channel_state.short_to_id, $channel_state.pending_msg_events, $channel_entry.get(), msg);
+ }
+ if let Some(msg) = $announcement_sigs {
+ $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
node_id: counterparty_node_id,
msg,
});
- if let Some(announcement_sigs) = $self.get_announcement_sigs($channel_entry.get()) {
- $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
- node_id: counterparty_node_id,
- msg: announcement_sigs,
- });
- }
- $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
}
let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
///
/// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
///
- /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
- ///
/// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
/// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
/// from after `params.latest_hash`.
pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
-
+ let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
+ let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
ChannelManager {
default_configuration: config.clone(),
genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
}),
+ outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
- pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
+ pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
- our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
- our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
+ our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
+ our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
secp_ctx,
+ inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
+ fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
+
last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
&self.default_configuration
}
+ fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
+ let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
+ let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
+ let mut i = 0;
+ loop {
+ if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
+ outbound_scid_alias += 1;
+ } else {
+ outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
+ }
+ if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
+ break;
+ }
+ i += 1;
+ if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
+ }
+ outbound_scid_alias
+ }
+
/// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
///
- /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady events to allow
- /// tracking of which events correspond with which create_channel call. Note that the
- /// user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for
- /// user_id here. user_id has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and
- /// otherwise ignored.
+ /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
+ /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
+ /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
+ /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
+ /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
+ /// ignored.
///
- /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
- /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
- ///
- /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
- /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
+ /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
+ /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
///
/// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
/// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
- /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten.
- pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
+ ///
+ /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
+ /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
+ /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
+ /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
+ /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
+ /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
+ ///
+ /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
+ /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
+ /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
+ pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
}
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
Some(peer_state) => {
+ let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
- Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?
+ match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key,
+ their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
+ self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
+ {
+ Ok(res) => res,
+ Err(e) => {
+ self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
+ return Err(e);
+ },
+ }
},
None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
}
// We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
+ let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
+ match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
- if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
+ if cfg!(fuzzing) {
return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
} else {
panic!("RNG is bad???");
node_id: their_network_key,
msg: res,
});
- Ok(())
+ Ok(temporary_channel_id)
}
fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
- let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
+ let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
res.push(ChannelDetails {
features: InitFeatures::empty(),
unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
+ // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
+ // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
+ // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
+ // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
+ // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
+ outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
+ Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
+ outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
},
funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
+ // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
+ // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
+ channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
+ inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
- inbound_capacity_msat,
- outbound_capacity_msat,
- user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
+ balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
+ inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
+ outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
+ next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
+ user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
is_usable: channel.is_live(),
is_public: channel.should_announce(),
+ inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
+ inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat()
});
}
}
self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
}
- /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
- /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
- /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
- ///
- /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
- pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
+ fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
+ let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
+ Some(transaction) => {
+ pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
+ },
+ None => {},
+ }
+ pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
+ channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
+ user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
+ reason: closure_reason
+ });
+ }
+
+ fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
let counterparty_node_id;
Some(peer_state) => {
let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
- chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features)?
+ chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
},
None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
};
if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
let (result, is_permanent) =
- handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
+ handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
if is_permanent {
- remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
+ remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
break result;
}
}
});
if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
- let channel = remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
+ let channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
msg: channel_update
});
}
+ self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
}
break Ok(());
},
Ok(())
}
+ /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
+ /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
+ /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
+ ///
+ /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
+ /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
+ /// estimate.
+ /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
+ /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
+ /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
+ /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
+ ///
+ /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
+ ///
+ /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
+ /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
+ /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
+ pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, None)
+ }
+
+ /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
+ /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
+ /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
+ ///
+ /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
+ /// the channel being closed or not:
+ /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
+ /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
+ /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
+ /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
+ /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
+ /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
+ /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
+ ///
+ /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
+ ///
+ /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
+ /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
+ /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
+ pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
+ }
+
#[inline]
fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
}
}
- fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
+ /// `peer_node_id` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
+ /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
+ fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>, peer_msg: Option<&String>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
let mut chan = {
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
}
}
- if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
- channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
+ if peer_node_id.is_some() {
+ if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
+ self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
+ }
+ } else {
+ self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
}
- chan.remove_entry().1
+ remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan)
} else {
return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
}
/// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
- match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None) {
+ match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None, None) {
Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
}
}
+ fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
+ {
+ // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
+ if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
+ return Err(ReceiveError {
+ msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
+ err_code: 18,
+ err_data: byte_utils::be32_to_array(cltv_expiry).to_vec()
+ })
+ }
+ // final_expiry_too_soon
+ // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
+ // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
+ // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
+ // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
+ // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
+ if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
+ return Err(ReceiveError {
+ err_code: 17,
+ err_data: Vec::new(),
+ msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
+ });
+ }
+ if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
+ return Err(ReceiveError {
+ err_code: 19,
+ err_data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(amt_msat).to_vec(),
+ msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
+ });
+ }
+
+ let routing = match hop_data.format {
+ msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => {
+ return Err(ReceiveError {
+ err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
+ err_data: Vec::new(),
+ msg: "We require payment_secrets",
+ });
+ },
+ msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
+ return Err(ReceiveError {
+ err_code: 0x4000|22,
+ err_data: Vec::new(),
+ msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
+ });
+ },
+ msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
+ if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
+ return Err(ReceiveError {
+ err_code: 0x4000|22,
+ err_data: Vec::new(),
+ msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
+ });
+ } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
+ PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
+ payment_data: data,
+ incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
+ phantom_shared_secret,
+ }
+ } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
+ // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
+ // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
+ // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
+ // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
+ // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
+ let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
+ if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
+ return Err(ReceiveError {
+ err_code: 0x4000|22,
+ err_data: Vec::new(),
+ msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
+ });
+ }
+
+ PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
+ payment_preimage,
+ incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
+ }
+ } else {
+ return Err(ReceiveError {
+ err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
+ err_data: Vec::new(),
+ msg: "We require payment_secrets",
+ });
+ }
+ },
+ };
+ Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
+ routing,
+ payment_hash,
+ incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
+ amt_to_forward: amt_msat,
+ outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
+ })
+ }
+
fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
arr
};
- let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
//TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
}
- let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
- hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
- hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
- if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
- return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
- }
-
let mut channel_state = None;
macro_rules! return_err {
($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
}
}
- let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
- let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
- let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac): (msgs::OnionHopData, _) = {
- match <msgs::OnionHopData as Readable>::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
- Err(err) => {
- let error_code = match err {
- msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
- msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
- msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
- msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
- _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
- };
- return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
- },
- Ok(msg) => {
- let mut hmac = [0; 32];
- if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
- return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
- }
- (msg, hmac)
- },
- }
+ let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
+ Ok(res) => res,
+ Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
+ return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
+ },
+ Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
+ return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
+ },
};
- let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
- #[cfg(test)]
- {
- // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
- // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
- // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
- // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
- // as-is (and were originally 0s).
- // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
- // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
- let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
- chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
- assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
- chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
- assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
- }
+ let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
+ onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
+ // OUR PAYMENT!
+ match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
+ Ok(info) => {
+ // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
+ // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
+ // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
+ // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
+ PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
+ },
+ Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
+ }
+ },
+ onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
+ let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
+
+ let blinding_factor = {
+ let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
+ sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
+ sha.input(&shared_secret);
+ Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
+ };
- // OUR PAYMENT!
- // final_expiry_too_soon
- // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
- // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
- // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
- // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
- // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
- if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
- return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
- }
- // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
- if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
- return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
- }
- // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
- if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
- return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
- }
+ let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
+ Err(e)
+ } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
- let routing = match next_hop_data.format {
- msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]),
- msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
- msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
- if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
- return_err!("We don't support MPP keysend payments", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
- } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
- PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
- payment_data: data,
- incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
- }
- } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
- // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
- // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
- // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
- // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
- // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
- let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
- if hashed_preimage != msg.payment_hash {
- return_err!("Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
- }
+ let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
+ version: 0,
+ public_key,
+ hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
+ hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
+ };
- PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
- payment_preimage,
- incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
- }
- } else {
- return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
- }
- },
- };
+ let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
+ msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
+ msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
+ msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
+ return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
+ },
+ };
- // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
- // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
- // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
- // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
-
- PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
- routing,
- payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
- incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
- amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
- outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
- })
- } else {
- let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
- let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
- #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
- {
- // Check two things:
- // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
- // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
- // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
- let mut t = [0; 1];
- debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
+ PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
+ routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
+ onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
+ short_channel_id,
+ },
+ payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
+ incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
+ amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
+ outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
+ })
}
- // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
- // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
- chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
-
- let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
-
- let blinding_factor = {
- let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
- sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
- sha.input(&shared_secret);
- Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
- };
-
- let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
- Err(e)
- } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
-
- let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
- version: 0,
- public_key,
- hop_data: new_packet_data,
- hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
- };
-
- let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
- msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
- msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
- msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
- return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
- },
- };
-
- PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
- routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
- onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
- short_channel_id,
- },
- payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
- incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
- amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
- outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
- })
};
channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
- let forwarding_id = match id_option {
+ let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
None => { // unknown_next_peer
- break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
+ // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
+ // phantom.
+ if fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id) {
+ None
+ } else {
+ break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
+ }
},
- Some(id) => id.clone(),
+ Some(id) => Some(id.clone()),
};
+ let (chan_update_opt, forwardee_cltv_expiry_delta) = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt {
+ let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
+ if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
+ // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
+ // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
+ // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
+ break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
+ }
+ if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
+ // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
+ // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
+ // we don't have the channel here.
+ break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
+ }
+ let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
+
+ // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
+ // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
+ // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
+ // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
+ // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
+ if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
+ break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
+ }
+ if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
+ break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
+ }
+ let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
+ .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
+ .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
+ if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
+ break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, chan_update_opt));
+ }
+ (chan_update_opt, chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta())
+ } else { (None, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA) };
- let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
-
- if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
- // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
- // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
- // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
- break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
- }
-
- // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
- // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
- // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
- // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
- // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
- if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
- break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
- }
- if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
- break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
- }
- let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
- .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
- .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
- if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
- break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
- }
- if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
- break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
+ if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + forwardee_cltv_expiry_delta as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
+ break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, chan_update_opt));
}
let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
- // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
- // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
+ // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
+ // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
+ // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
- break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
+ break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
}
if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
}
- // In theory, we would be safe against unintentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
- // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longer delay.
- if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
- break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
+ // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
+ // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
+ // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
+ // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
+ // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
+ // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
+ // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
+ // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
+ if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
+ break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
}
break None;
}
{
- let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
+ let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 8 + 2));
if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
- res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
+ msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
}
else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
- res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
+ msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
}
else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
// TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
- res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
+ 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
}
- res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
+ (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
+ chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
}
- return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
+ return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
}
}
}
Some(id) => id,
};
+ self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
+ }
+ fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
}
// Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
- pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
- assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().insert(session_priv_bytes));
let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+
+ let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
+ let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
+ if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
+ if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
+ return Err(APIError::RouteError {
+ err: "Payment already completed"
+ });
+ }
+ }
+
let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
Some(id) => id.clone(),
};
+ macro_rules! insert_outbound_payment {
+ () => {
+ let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
+ session_privs: HashSet::new(),
+ pending_amt_msat: 0,
+ pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
+ payment_hash: *payment_hash,
+ payment_secret: *payment_secret,
+ starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
+ total_msat: total_value,
+ });
+ assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path));
+ }
+ }
+
let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
match {
if !chan.get().is_live() {
return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
}
- break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
- path: path.clone(),
- session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
- first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
- }, onion_packet, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
+ break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
+ htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
+ path: path.clone(),
+ session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
+ first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
+ payment_id,
+ payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
+ payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
+ }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
+ channel_state, chan)
} {
Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
// is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
// it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
// send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
+ insert_outbound_payment!(); // Only do this after possibly break'ing on Perm failure above.
return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
}
+ insert_outbound_payment!();
log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
},
});
},
- None => {},
+ None => { insert_outbound_payment!(); },
}
} else { unreachable!(); }
return Ok(());
/// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
/// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
/// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
- pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
- self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None)
+ pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
+ self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
}
- fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
+ fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
if route.paths.len() < 1 {
return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
}
let mut total_value = 0;
let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
+ let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
}
+ if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
+ debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
+ total_value = amt_msat;
+ }
+
+ let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
+ let mut results = Vec::new();
+ for path in route.paths.iter() {
+ results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
+ }
+ let mut has_ok = false;
+ let mut has_err = false;
+ let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
+ let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
+ for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
+ if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
+ if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
+ if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
+ // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
+ // PartialFailure.
+ has_err = true;
+ has_ok = true;
+ } else if res.is_err() {
+ pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
+ max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
+ }
+ }
+ if has_err && has_ok {
+ Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
+ results,
+ payment_id,
+ failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
+ if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params {
+ Some(RouteParameters {
+ payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
+ final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
+ final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
+ })
+ } else { None }
+ } else { None },
+ })
+ } else if has_err {
+ // If we failed to send any paths, we shouldn't have inserted the new PaymentId into
+ // our `pending_outbound_payments` map at all.
+ debug_assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().get(&payment_id).is_none());
+ Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
+ } else {
+ Ok(payment_id)
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
+ ///
+ /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
+ /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
+ /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
+ /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
+ /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
+ ///
+ /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
+ /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
+ pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
+ const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
+ for path in route.paths.iter() {
+ if path.len() == 0 {
+ return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
+ err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
+ }))
+ }
+ }
+
+ let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
+ let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
+ if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
+ match payment {
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
+ total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
+ } => {
+ let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
+ if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
+ return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
+ err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
+ }))
+ }
+ (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
+ },
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
+ return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
+ err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
+ }))
+ },
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
+ return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
+ err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
+ }));
+ },
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
+ return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
+ err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
+ }));
+ },
+ }
+ } else {
+ return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
+ err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
+ }))
+ }
+ };
+ return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
+ }
+
+ /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
+ ///
+ /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
+ /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
+ /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
+ /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
+ ///
+ /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
+ /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
+ /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
+ ///
+ /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
+ /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
+ /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
+ pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
- let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
- let mut results = Vec::new();
- for path in route.paths.iter() {
- results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, &keysend_preimage));
- }
- let mut has_ok = false;
- let mut has_err = false;
- for res in results.iter() {
- if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
- if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
- if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
- // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
- // PartialFailure.
- has_err = true;
- has_ok = true;
- break;
+ let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
+ if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
+ if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
+ if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
+ self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
+ payment_id,
+ payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
+ });
+ payment.remove();
+ }
}
}
- if has_err && has_ok {
- Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
- } else if has_err {
- Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
- } else {
- Ok(())
- }
}
/// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
/// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
///
/// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
- pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
+ pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
let preimage = match payment_preimage {
Some(p) => p,
None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
};
let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
- match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage)) {
- Ok(()) => Ok(payment_hash),
+ match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
+ Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
Err(e) => Err(e)
}
}
(chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
.map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
- MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
+ MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
} else { unreachable!(); })
, chan)
},
/// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
/// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
///
- /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
+ /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
+ /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
///
/// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
/// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
/// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
///
/// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
+ /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
})
}
- fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
- if !chan.should_announce() {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
- return None
- }
-
- let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
- Ok(res) => res,
- Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
- };
- let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
- let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
-
- Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
- channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
- short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
- node_signature: our_node_sig,
- bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
- })
- }
-
#[allow(dead_code)]
// Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
// be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
excess_data: Vec::new(),
};
let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
- let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
+ let node_announce_sig = sign(&self.secp_ctx, &msghash, &self.our_network_key);
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
let mut announced_chans = false;
for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
- if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
+ if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
msg,
update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
let mut new_events = Vec::new();
let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
+ let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
{
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
None => {
- failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
match forward_info {
- HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
- prev_funding_outpoint } => {
- let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
- short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
- outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
- htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
- incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
- });
- failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
- HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
- ));
- },
+ HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
+ routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
+ prev_funding_outpoint } => {
+ macro_rules! fail_forward {
+ ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
+ {
+ log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
+ let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
+ short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
+ outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
+ htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
+ incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
+ phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
+ });
+ failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
+ HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: $err_code, data: $err_data }
+ ));
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
+ let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
+ if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id) {
+ let phantom_shared_secret = {
+ let mut arr = [0; 32];
+ arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap())[..]);
+ arr
+ };
+ let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
+ Ok(res) => res,
+ Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
+ let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
+ // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
+ // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
+ // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
+ // of the onion.
+ fail_forward!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
+ },
+ Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
+ fail_forward!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
+ },
+ };
+ match next_hop {
+ onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
+ match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
+ Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
+ Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => fail_forward!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
+ }
+ },
+ _ => panic!(),
+ }
+ } else {
+ fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
+ }
+ } else {
+ fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
+ }
+ },
HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
// Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
// the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
+ // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
+ phantom_shared_secret: None,
});
- match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
+ match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
Err(e) => {
if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
} else {
panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
}
- let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap();
+ let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
- HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
+ HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data }
));
continue;
},
// close channel and then send error message to peer.
let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
- ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
+ ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
- },
+ }
ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
- let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
- if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
- channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
- }
- Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
+ let mut channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan);
+ // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
+ Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel.channel_id(), channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
},
ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
};
HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
prev_funding_outpoint } => {
- let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload) = match routing {
- PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
- (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data)),
+ let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
+ PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
+ let _legacy_hop_data = payment_data.clone();
+ (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
+ },
PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
- (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage)),
+ (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
_ => {
panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
}
outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
+ phantom_shared_secret,
},
value: amt_to_forward,
+ timer_ticks: 0,
+ total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { amt_to_forward },
cltv_expiry,
onion_payload,
};
outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
+ phantom_shared_secret,
}), payment_hash,
HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
));
}
}
+ macro_rules! check_total_value {
+ ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
+ let mut payment_received_generated = false;
+ let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
+ .or_insert(Vec::new());
+ if htlcs.len() == 1 {
+ if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
+ fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
+ continue
+ }
+ }
+ let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
+ for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
+ total_value += htlc.value;
+ match &htlc.onion_payload {
+ OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
+ if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
+ log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
+ total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
+ }
+ if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
+ },
+ _ => unreachable!(),
+ }
+ }
+ if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
+ log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
+ fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
+ } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
+ htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
+ new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
+ payment_hash,
+ purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
+ payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
+ payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
+ },
+ amt: total_value,
+ });
+ payment_received_generated = true;
+ } else {
+ // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
+ // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
+ // MPP parts.
+ htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
+ }
+ payment_received_generated
+ }}
+ }
+
// Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
// MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
// "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
- OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we didn't have a corresponding inbound payment.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
- fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
+ OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
+ let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
+ let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
+ Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
+ Err(()) => {
+ fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
+ continue
+ }
+ };
+ check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
},
OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
}
},
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
- let payment_data =
- if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
- data.clone()
- } else {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
- fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
- continue
- };
+ if payment_data.is_none() {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
+ fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
+ continue
+ };
+ let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
} else {
- let mut total_value = 0;
- let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
- .or_insert(Vec::new());
- if htlcs.len() == 1 {
- if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
- fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
- continue
- }
- }
- htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
- for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
- total_value += htlc.value;
- match &htlc.onion_payload {
- OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
- if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != payment_data.total_msat {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
- log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
- total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
- }
- if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
- },
- _ => unreachable!(),
- }
- }
- if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > payment_data.total_msat {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
- log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, payment_data.total_msat);
- for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
- fail_htlc!(htlc);
- }
- } else if total_value == payment_data.total_msat {
- new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
- payment_hash,
- purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
- payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
- payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
- user_payment_id: inbound_payment.get().user_payment_id,
- },
- amt: total_value,
- });
- // Only ever generate at most one PaymentReceived
- // per registered payment_hash, even if it isn't
- // claimed.
+ let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
+ if payment_received_generated {
inbound_payment.remove_entry();
- } else {
- // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
- // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
- // MPP parts.
}
}
},
for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
}
+ self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
let ret_err = match res {
Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
- let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_id);
+ let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
if drop { retain_channel = false; }
res
} else {
let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
+ let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
{
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
+ let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
+ let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
+ if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
+ if err.is_err() {
+ handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
+ }
+ if !retain_channel { return false; }
+
+ if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
+ let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
+ handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
+ if needs_close { return false; }
+ }
+
match chan.channel_update_status() {
ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
_ => {},
}
- let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
- let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
- if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
- if err.is_err() {
- handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
+ true
+ });
+
+ channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
+ if htlcs.is_empty() {
+ // This should be unreachable
+ debug_assert!(false);
+ return false;
}
- retain_channel
+ if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
+ // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
+ // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
+ if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
+ return true;
+ } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
+ htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
+ return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
+ }) {
+ timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.into_iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.prev_hop.clone(), payment_hash.clone())));
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+ true
});
}
+ for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0), &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 23, data: Vec::new() });
+ }
+
for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
}
-
should_persist
});
}
} else { false }
}
+ /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
+ /// that we want to return and a channel.
+ ///
+ /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
+ /// forwarding
+ fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
+ // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
+ // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
+ // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
+ // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
+ let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
+ chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
+ } else {
+ chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
+ };
+ if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
+ self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
+ } else {
+ (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
+ }
+ }
+
+
+ /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
+ /// that we want to return and a channel.
+ fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
+ debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
+ if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
+ let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 4));
+ if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
+ // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
+ 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
+ }
+ (upd.serialized_length() as u16).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
+ upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
+ (desired_err_code, enc.0)
+ } else {
+ // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
+ // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
+ // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
+ // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
+ (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
+ }
+ }
+
// Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
// failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
// be surfaced to the user.
let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
- if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&chan_entry.get()) {
- (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
- } else {
- (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
- }
+ self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
};
self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
},
- HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } => {
- if {
- let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
- session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
- self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
- } {
- self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
- events::Event::PaymentFailed {
+ HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, payment_params, .. } => {
+ let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
+ session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
+ let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
+ if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
+ if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) && !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
+ let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
+ let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
+ Some(RouteParameters {
+ payment_params: payment_params_data,
+ final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
+ final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
+ })
+ } else { None };
+ let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
+ payment_id: Some(payment_id),
payment_hash,
rejected_by_dest: false,
-#[cfg(test)]
+ network_update: None,
+ all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
+ path: path.clone(),
+ short_channel_id: None,
+ retry,
+ #[cfg(test)]
error_code: None,
-#[cfg(test)]
+ #[cfg(test)]
error_data: None,
+ });
+ if payment.get().abandoned() && payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
+ pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
+ payment_id,
+ payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
+ });
+ payment.remove();
}
- )
+ }
} else {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
}
// from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
// being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
match source {
- HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, .. } => {
- if {
- let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
- session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
- !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
- } {
+ HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
+ let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
+ session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
+ let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
+ let mut all_paths_failed = false;
+ let mut full_failure_ev = None;
+ if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
+ if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
+ return;
+ }
+ if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
+ return;
+ }
+ if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
+ all_paths_failed = true;
+ if payment.get().abandoned() {
+ full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
+ payment_id,
+ payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
+ });
+ payment.remove();
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
return;
}
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
- match &onion_error {
+ let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
+ let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
+ Some(RouteParameters {
+ payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
+ final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
+ final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
+ })
+ } else { None };
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
+
+ let path_failure = match &onion_error {
&HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
#[cfg(test)]
- let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
+ let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
#[cfg(not(test))]
- let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
+ let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
// TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
// process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
// next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
- if let Some(update) = channel_update {
- self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
- events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
- update,
- }
- );
- }
- self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
- events::Event::PaymentFailed {
- payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
- rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
+ events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
+ payment_id: Some(payment_id),
+ payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
+ rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
+ network_update,
+ all_paths_failed,
+ path: path.clone(),
+ short_channel_id,
+ retry,
#[cfg(test)]
- error_code: onion_error_code,
+ error_code: onion_error_code,
#[cfg(test)]
- error_data: onion_error_data
- }
- );
+ error_data: onion_error_data
+ }
},
&HTLCFailReason::Reason {
#[cfg(test)]
ref data,
.. } => {
// we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
- // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
+ // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
// failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
// generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
// ChannelDetails.
// TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
// channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
- self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
- events::Event::PaymentFailed {
- payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
- rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
+ events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
+ payment_id: Some(payment_id),
+ payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
+ rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
+ network_update: None,
+ all_paths_failed,
+ path: path.clone(),
+ short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id),
+ retry,
#[cfg(test)]
- error_code: Some(*failure_code),
+ error_code: Some(*failure_code),
#[cfg(test)]
- error_data: Some(data.clone()),
- }
- );
+ error_data: Some(data.clone()),
+ }
}
- }
+ };
+ let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ pending_events.push(path_failure);
+ if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
},
- HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
+ HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret, .. }) => {
let err_packet = match onion_error {
HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
- let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
- onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
+ if let Some(phantom_ss) = phantom_shared_secret {
+ let phantom_packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
+ let encrypted_phantom_packet = onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, &phantom_packet);
+ onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &encrypted_phantom_packet.data[..])
+ } else {
+ let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
+ onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
+ }
},
HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
}
}
- /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
- /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
- /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
+ /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
+ /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
///
/// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
/// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
/// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
/// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
///
- /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
+ /// Returns whether any HTLCs were claimed, and thus if any new [`MessageSendEvent`]s are now
+ /// pending for processing via [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`].
///
+ /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
/// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
/// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
+ /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
} else { unreachable!(); }
}
+ fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
+ let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
+ let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ for source in sources.drain(..) {
+ if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
+ let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
+ session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
+ if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
+ assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
+ if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
+ pending_events.push(
+ events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
+ payment_id,
+ payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
+ path,
+ }
+ );
+ }
+ if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
+ payment.remove();
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
match source {
- HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } => {
+ HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
- if {
- let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
- session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
- self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
- } {
+ let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
+ session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
+ let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
+ if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
- payment_preimage
- });
+ if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
+ let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
+ let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
+ pending_events.push(
+ events::Event::PaymentSent {
+ payment_id: Some(payment_id),
+ payment_preimage,
+ payment_hash,
+ fee_paid_msat,
+ }
+ );
+ payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
+ }
+
+ if from_onchain {
+ // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
+ // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
+ // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
+ // restart.
+ // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
+ // irrevocably fulfilled.
+ if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
+ let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
+ pending_events.push(
+ events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
+ payment_id,
+ payment_hash,
+ path,
+ }
+ );
+ }
+
+ if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
+ payment.remove();
+ }
+ }
} else {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
}
} else { None };
let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+
+ let source_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
+ source_channel_id,
fee_earned_msat,
claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
});
self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
}
- /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
- /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
- /// operation.
- ///
- /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
- /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
- ///
- /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
- /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
- /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
- /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
- ///
- /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
- /// 1) You register a chain::Watch with this ChannelManager,
- /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
- /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
- /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
- /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
- /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
- /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
- pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
+ fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
let chan_restoration_res;
- let mut pending_failures = {
+ let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims) = {
let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
return;
}
- let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, pending_failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked) = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
- let channel_update = if funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() && !channel.get().should_announce() {
+ let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
+ let channel_update = if updates.funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
// We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
- // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. Further, we rely on the
- // normal announcement_signatures process to send a channel_update for public
- // channels, only generating a unicast channel_update if this is a private channel.
- Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
- node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
- msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
- })
+ // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
+ // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
+ // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
+ // now.
+ if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
+ Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
+ node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ msg,
+ })
+ } else { None }
} else { None };
- chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, raa, commitment_update, order, None, pending_forwards, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked);
+ chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.funding_locked, updates.announcement_sigs);
if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
}
- pending_failures
+ (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs)
};
post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
+ self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
}
}
+ /// Called to accept a request to open a channel after [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`] has been
+ /// triggered.
+ ///
+ /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted.
+ ///
+ /// For inbound channels, the `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
+ /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
+ /// with which `accept_inbound_channel` call.
+ ///
+ /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
+ /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
+ pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+
+ let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
+ match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
+ if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
+ }
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
+ node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
+ });
+ }
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
+ return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() });
+ }
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
}
- let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
- .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
+ if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
+ }
+
+ let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
+ let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager,
+ counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration,
+ self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
+ {
+ Err(e) => {
+ self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
+ },
+ Ok(res) => res
+ };
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
+ self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
+ },
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
- node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
- msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
- });
+ if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
+ node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
+ msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(0),
+ });
+ } else {
+ let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ pending_events.push(
+ events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
+ temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
+ counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
+ funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
+ push_msat: msg.push_msat,
+ channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
+ }
+ );
+ }
+
entry.insert(channel);
}
}
if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
}
- try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.peer_channel_config_limits, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
(chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
// hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
// accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
// until we have persisted our monitor.
- chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
+ chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
},
}
}
Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
};
if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
- return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
+ let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
+ if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
+ // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
+ // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
+ // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
+ if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
+ shutdown_finish.0.take();
+ }
+ }
+ return res
}
funding_tx
},
if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
}
- try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
- if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
- // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
- // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
- // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
- // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
- // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
- // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
- // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
- // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
- // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
+ let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
+ self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
+ if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
msg: announcement_sigs,
});
} else if chan.get().is_usable() {
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
- node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
- msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
- });
+ // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
+ // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
+ // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
+ // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
+ // announcement_signatures.
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
+ if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
+ node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
+ msg,
+ });
+ }
}
Ok(())
},
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
}
- let (shutdown, closing_signed, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
+ if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
+ log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
+ log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
+ if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
+ }
+
+ let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
// Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
let (result, is_permanent) =
- handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
+ handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
if is_permanent {
- remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
+ remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
break result;
}
}
msg,
});
}
- if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
- // TODO: Do not send this if the monitor update failed.
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
- node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
- msg,
- });
- }
break Ok(());
},
// also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
// fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
// watch for old state broadcasts)!
- if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
- channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
- }
- (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
+ (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry)))
} else { (tx, None) }
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
msg: update
});
}
+ self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
}
Ok(())
}
}
let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
- // Ensure error_code has the UPDATE flag set, since by default we send a
- // channel update along as part of failing the HTLC.
- assert!((error_code & 0x1000) != 0);
// If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
// but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
// want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
match pending_forward_info {
PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
- let reason = if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
- onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
- let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
- // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
- res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
- res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
- res
- }[..])
+ let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
+ let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
+ onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, real_code, &error_data)
} else {
- // The only case where we'd be unable to
- // successfully get a channel update is if the
- // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
- // implying our counterparty is trying to route
- // payments over the channel back to themselves
- // (cause no one else should know the short_id
- // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
- // no problem just calling this
- // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
- onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
+ onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
};
let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
channel_id: msg.channel_id,
if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
}
- let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
- match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
+ let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
+ match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
Err((Some(update), e)) => {
assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
};
if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
- //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
}
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
},
});
}
- if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
- node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
- msg,
- });
- }
Ok(())
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
}
let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
- let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail_in) =
- break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
- htlcs_to_fail = htlcs_to_fail_in;
- if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
+ let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
+ chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
+ htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
+ if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
if was_frozen_for_monitor {
- assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
+ assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
+ assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
} else {
- if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures) {
+ if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
+ RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
+ raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(),
+ raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
+ raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
break Err(e);
} else { unreachable!(); }
}
}
- if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
+ if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
updates,
});
}
- if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
- node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
- msg,
- });
- }
- break Ok((pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"), chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
+ break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
+ raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
+ chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
+ .expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"),
+ chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
}
};
self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
match res {
- Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) => {
+ Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
+ short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
+ {
for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
}
self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
+ self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
Ok(())
},
Err(e) => Err(e)
}
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
- msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), msg), channel_state, chan),
+ msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
+ self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), channel_state, chan),
// Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
// so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
// disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
// freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
// add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
- let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, order, htlcs_failed_forward, shutdown) =
- try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
+ let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
+ msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
+ &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), channel_state, chan);
let mut channel_update = None;
- if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
+ if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
msg,
// If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
// down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
// they have the latest channel parameters.
- channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
- node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
- msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
- });
+ if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
+ channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
+ node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ msg,
+ });
+ }
}
let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
- chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order, monitor_update_opt, Vec::new(), None, funding_locked);
+ chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(
+ self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
+ responses.mon_update, Vec::new(), None, responses.funding_locked, responses.announcement_sigs);
if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
}
- (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround)
+ (responses.holding_cell_failed_htlcs, need_lnd_workaround)
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
}
self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
}
},
- MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_outpoint) => {
+ MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
+ MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
- let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
- if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
- if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
- short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
- }
+ if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
+ let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
msg: update
});
}
+ let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
+ ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
+ } else {
+ ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
+ };
+ self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
});
}
},
+ MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
+ self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
+ },
}
}
has_pending_monitor_events
}
+ /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
+ /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
+ /// update events as a separate process method here.
+ #[cfg(fuzzing)]
+ pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
+ self.process_pending_monitor_events();
+ }
+
/// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
/// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
/// update was applied.
if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
has_monitor_update = true;
- let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
+ let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
if close_channel { return false; }
} else {
Err(e) => {
let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
+ // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
!close_channel
}
}
});
}
- let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
+ let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
}
has_update
}
+ /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
+ /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
+ /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
+ fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
+ let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
+ let mut has_update = false;
+ {
+ let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
+ let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
+ let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
+ let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
+
+ by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
+ match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
+ Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
+ if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
+ has_update = true;
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
+ node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
+ });
+ }
+ if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
+ // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
+ // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
+ if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ msg: update
+ });
+ }
+
+ self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
+
+ log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
+ self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, chan);
+ false
+ } else { true }
+ },
+ Err(e) => {
+ has_update = true;
+ let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
+ handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
+ !close_channel
+ }
+ }
+ });
+ }
+
+ for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
+ let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
+ }
+
+ has_update
+ }
+
/// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
/// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
/// Channel object.
}
}
- fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
+ fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
+ if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
+ }
+
let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
- payment_secret, min_value_msat, user_payment_id, payment_preimage,
+ payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
+ user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
// We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
- // its updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
+ // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
// a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
// Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
// never fail a payment too early.
/// to pay us.
///
/// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
- /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you, returning the first and storing the second.
+ /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
///
/// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
/// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
///
/// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
///
+ /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
+ /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
+ ///
+ /// # Note
+ ///
+ /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
+ /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
+ ///
+ /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
+ ///
/// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
/// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
/// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
/// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
- pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> (PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) {
+ pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
+ inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
+ }
+
+ /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
+ /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
+ ///
+ /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
+ ///
+ /// # Note
+ /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
+ ///
+ /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
+ #[deprecated]
+ pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
-
- (payment_hash,
- self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
- .expect("RNG Generated Duplicate PaymentHash"))
+ let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
+ Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
}
/// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
/// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
/// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
///
- /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This
- /// method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending.
- ///
- /// `user_payment_id` will be provided back in [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`] events to
- /// allow tracking of which events correspond with which calls to this and
- /// [`create_inbound_payment`]. `user_payment_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply
- /// copied to events and otherwise ignored. It may be used to correlate PaymentReceived events
- /// with invoice metadata stored elsewhere.
+ /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
+ /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
+ /// payments.
///
/// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
/// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
/// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
/// [`PaymentReceived`].
///
- /// Pending inbound payments are stored in memory and in serialized versions of this
- /// [`ChannelManager`]. If potentially unbounded numbers of inbound payments may exist and
- /// space is limited, you may wish to rate-limit inbound payment creation.
- ///
- /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
- ///
/// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
/// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
///
+ /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
+ /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
+ ///
+ /// # Note
+ ///
+ /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
+ /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
+ ///
+ /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
+ ///
/// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
/// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
- /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id
- pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
- self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
+ pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
+ inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
}
- #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
+ /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
+ /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
+ ///
+ /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
+ ///
+ /// # Note
+ /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
+ ///
+ /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
+ #[deprecated]
+ pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
+ self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
+ }
+
+ /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
+ /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
+ ///
+ /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
+ pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
+ inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
+ }
+
+ /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
+ /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
+ ///
+ /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
+ pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
+ let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
+ loop {
+ let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block.height(), &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
+ // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
+ match channel_state.short_to_id.entry(scid_candidate) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => continue,
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return scid_candidate
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
+ ///
+ /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
+ pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
+ PhantomRouteHints {
+ channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
+ phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
+ real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
+ }
+ }
+
+ #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
- let event_handler = |event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
+ let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
events.into_inner()
}
+
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
+ !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
+ }
+
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
+ self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
+ }
}
impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
}
+ if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
+ result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
+ }
let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
}
for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
- handler.handle_event(event);
+ handler.handle_event(&event);
}
result
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
{
- fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
+ fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
{
let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
+ assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
"Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
"Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
}
- let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
- self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
- self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
+ self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
+ self.best_block_updated(header, height);
}
fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
*best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
}
- self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, &self.logger));
+ self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
}
}
log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
- self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
+ self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
+ .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
+
+ let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
+ if height < last_best_block_height {
+ let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
+ self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
+ }
}
fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
*self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
- self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, &self.logger));
+ self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
macro_rules! max_time {
($timestamp: expr) => {
payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
});
+
+ let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
+ let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ outbounds.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
+ if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
+ if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, payment_hash, .. } = payment {
+ if *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS <= height {
+ log_info!(self.logger, "Timing out payment with id {} and hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_id.0), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
+ pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
+ payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash,
+ });
+ false
+ } else { true }
+ } else { true }
+ });
}
fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
- channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
- } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
- } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
+ channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
+ } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
+ } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
});
}
}
/// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
/// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
/// the function.
- fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage>>
+ fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
(&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
// Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
// during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
let res = f(channel);
- if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
+ if let Ok((funding_locked_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
- let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
- timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
- failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
- data: chan_update,
+ let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
+ timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
+ failure_code, data,
}));
}
- if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
- node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- msg: funding_locked,
- });
- if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
- node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- msg: announcement_sigs,
- });
- } else if channel.is_usable() {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures but with private channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
- node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
- });
+ if let Some(funding_locked) = funding_locked_opt {
+ send_funding_locked!(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, channel, funding_locked);
+ if channel.is_usable() {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
+ if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
+ node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ msg,
+ });
+ }
} else {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
}
- short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
}
- } else if let Err(e) = res {
- if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
- short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
+ if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
+ node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ msg: announcement_sigs,
+ });
+ if let Some(height) = height_opt {
+ if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
+ msg: announcement,
+ // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
+ // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
+ update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
+ });
+ }
+ }
}
+ } else if let Err(reason) = res {
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, channel);
// It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
// reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
msg: update
});
}
+ let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
+ self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
+ action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
+ channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
+ data: reason_message,
+ } },
});
return false;
}
/// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
/// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
/// up.
- /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
- #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
+ ///
+ /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
+ #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
}
{
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
- let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
+ let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
if no_connection_possible {
log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
- if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
- short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
- }
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, chan);
failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
msg: update
});
}
+ self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
false
} else {
true
if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
if chan.is_shutdown() {
- if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
- short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
- }
+ update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, chan);
+ self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
return false;
} else {
no_channels_remain = false;
&events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
&events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
&events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
- &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
&events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
&events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
&events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
+ &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
}
});
}
for chan in self.list_channels() {
if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
// Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
- let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
+ let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
}
}
} else {
+ {
+ // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
+ let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
+ if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
+ return;
+ }
+ if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
+ node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
+ msg,
+ });
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
// Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
- let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
+ let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
}
}
}
}
}
- #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
+ #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
let current_time = Instant::now();
loop {
const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
+impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
+ (2, fee_base_msat, required),
+ (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
+ (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
+});
+
+impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
+ (2, node_id, required),
+ (4, features, required),
+ (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
+ (8, forwarding_info, option),
+ (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
+ (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
+});
+
+impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelDetails, {
+ (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
+ (2, channel_id, required),
+ (3, channel_type, option),
+ (4, counterparty, required),
+ (6, funding_txo, option),
+ (8, short_channel_id, option),
+ (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
+ (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
+ (14, user_channel_id, required),
+ (16, balance_msat, required),
+ (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
+ // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
+ // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
+ (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap())),
+ (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
+ (22, confirmations_required, option),
+ (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
+ (26, is_outbound, required),
+ (28, is_funding_locked, required),
+ (30, is_usable, required),
+ (32, is_public, required),
+ (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
+ (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
+});
+
+impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
+ (2, channels, vec_type),
+ (4, phantom_scid, required),
+ (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
+});
+
impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
(0, Forward) => {
(0, onion_packet, required),
},
(1, Receive) => {
(0, payment_data, required),
+ (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
(2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
},
(2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
(8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
});
-impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailureMsg, ;
- (0, Relay),
- (1, Malformed),
-);
+
+impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
+ match self {
+ HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
+ 0u8.write(writer)?;
+ channel_id.write(writer)?;
+ htlc_id.write(writer)?;
+ reason.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
+ channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
+ }) => {
+ 1u8.write(writer)?;
+ channel_id.write(writer)?;
+ htlc_id.write(writer)?;
+ sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
+ failure_code.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
+ fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ match id {
+ 0 => {
+ Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
+ channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ }))
+ },
+ 1 => {
+ Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
+ channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ }))
+ },
+ // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
+ // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
+ // messages contained in the variants.
+ // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
+ // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
+ // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
+ 2 => {
+ let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
+ let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
+ s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
+ Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
+ },
+ 3 => {
+ let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
+ let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
+ s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
+ Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
+ },
+ _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
+ }
+ }
+}
+
impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
(0, Forward),
(1, Fail),
impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
(0, short_channel_id, required),
+ (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
(2, outpoint, required),
(4, htlc_id, required),
(6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
- OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()),
+ OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => Some(_legacy_hop_data),
_ => None,
};
let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
- OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None,
+ OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => None,
OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
};
- write_tlv_fields!
- (writer,
- {
- (0, self.prev_hop, required), (2, self.value, required),
- (4, payment_data, option), (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
- (8, keysend_preimage, option),
- });
+ write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
+ (0, self.prev_hop, required),
+ (1, self.total_msat, required),
+ (2, self.value, required),
+ (4, payment_data, option),
+ (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
+ (8, keysend_preimage, option),
+ });
Ok(())
}
}
let mut value = 0;
let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
+ let mut total_msat = None;
let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
- read_tlv_fields!
- (reader,
- {
- (0, prev_hop, required), (2, value, required),
- (4, payment_data, option), (6, cltv_expiry, required),
- (8, keysend_preimage, option)
- });
+ read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
+ (0, prev_hop, required),
+ (1, total_msat, option),
+ (2, value, required),
+ (4, payment_data, option),
+ (6, cltv_expiry, required),
+ (8, keysend_preimage, option)
+ });
let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
Some(p) => {
if payment_data.is_some() {
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
}
+ if total_msat.is_none() {
+ total_msat = Some(value);
+ }
OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
},
None => {
if payment_data.is_none() {
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
}
- OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap())
+ if total_msat.is_none() {
+ total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
+ }
+ OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data.unwrap() }
},
};
Ok(Self {
prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
+ timer_ticks: 0,
value,
+ total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
onion_payload,
cltv_expiry,
})
}
}
-impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCSource,
- (0, OutboundRoute) => {
- (0, session_priv, required),
- (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
- (4, path, vec_type),
- }, ;
- (1, PreviousHopData)
-);
+impl Readable for HTLCSource {
+ fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ match id {
+ 0 => {
+ let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
+ let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
+ let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
+ let mut payment_id = None;
+ let mut payment_secret = None;
+ let mut payment_params = None;
+ read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
+ (0, session_priv, required),
+ (1, payment_id, option),
+ (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
+ (3, payment_secret, option),
+ (4, path, vec_type),
+ (5, payment_params, option),
+ });
+ if payment_id.is_none() {
+ // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
+ // instead.
+ payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
+ }
+ Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
+ session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
+ first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
+ path: path.unwrap(),
+ payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
+ payment_secret,
+ payment_params,
+ })
+ }
+ 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
+ _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
+ match self {
+ HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
+ 0u8.write(writer)?;
+ let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
+ write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
+ (0, session_priv, required),
+ (1, payment_id_opt, option),
+ (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
+ (3, payment_secret, option),
+ (4, path, vec_type),
+ (5, payment_params, option),
+ });
+ }
+ HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
+ 1u8.write(writer)?;
+ field.write(writer)?;
+ }
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
(0, LightningError) => {
(8, min_value_msat, required),
});
+impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
+ (0, Legacy) => {
+ (0, session_privs, required),
+ },
+ (1, Fulfilled) => {
+ (0, session_privs, required),
+ (1, payment_hash, option),
+ },
+ (2, Retryable) => {
+ (0, session_privs, required),
+ (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
+ (2, payment_hash, required),
+ (4, payment_secret, option),
+ (6, total_msat, required),
+ (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
+ (10, starting_block_height, required),
+ },
+ (3, Abandoned) => {
+ (0, session_privs, required),
+ (2, payment_hash, required),
+ },
+);
+
impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
}
+ let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
+ let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
(events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
for event in events.iter() {
(self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
(self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
- let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
(pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
hash.write(writer)?;
pending_payment.write(writer)?;
}
- let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
- (pending_outbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
- for session_priv in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
- session_priv.write(writer)?;
+ // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
+ let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
+ for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
+ if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
+ num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
+ }
+ }
+ num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
+ for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
+ match outbound {
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
+ for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
+ session_priv.write(writer)?;
+ }
+ }
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
+ }
}
- write_tlv_fields!(writer, {});
+ // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
+ let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
+ for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
+ match outbound {
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
+ PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
+ pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
+ },
+ _ => {},
+ }
+ }
+ write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
+ (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
+ (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
+ (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
+ (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
+ });
Ok(())
}
///
/// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
/// is:
-/// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
-/// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling:
-/// <(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)
-/// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
-/// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
-/// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints the same
-/// way you would handle a `chain::Filter` call using ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch() and
-/// ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
-/// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
-/// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
-/// 6) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local chain::Watch.
+/// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
+/// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
+/// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
+/// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
+/// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
+/// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
+/// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
+/// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
+/// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
+/// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
+/// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
+/// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
+/// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
+/// the next step.
+/// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
+/// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
///
-/// Note that the ordering of #4-6 is not of importance, however all three must occur before you
-/// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized ChannelManager.
+/// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
+/// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
///
/// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
/// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
/// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
/// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
/// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
+///
+/// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
+ let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
for _ in 0..channel_count {
- let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?;
+ let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
- log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
+ log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
} else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
+ channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
+ channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
+ user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
+ reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
+ });
} else {
+ log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
}
log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
- log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
+ log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
}
for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
+ log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
}
}
None => continue,
}
}
+ if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
+ // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
+ // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
+ // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
+ // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
+ // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
+ pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
+ time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
+ });
+ }
let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
}
}
- let pending_outbound_payments_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut pending_outbound_payments: HashSet<[u8; 32]> = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
- for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count {
- if !pending_outbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?) {
- return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
- }
+ let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
+ HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
+ for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
+ let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
+ session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
+ };
+ if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
+ };
+ }
+
+ // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
+ let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
+ let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
+ let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
+ let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
+ read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
+ (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
+ (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
+ (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
+ (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
+ });
+ if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
+ fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
}
- read_tlv_fields!(reader, {});
+ if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
+ pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
+ } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
+ let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
+ for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
+ outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
+ }
+ pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
+ } else {
+ // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
+ // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
+ // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
+ // corresponding `Channel` at all).
+ // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
+ // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
+ // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
+ // 0.0.102+
+ for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors {
+ if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
+ for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
+ if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
+ if path.is_empty() {
+ log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
+ }
+ let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
+ let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
+ session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
+ match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
+ let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
+ log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
+ if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
+ let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
+ entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
+ session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
+ payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
+ payment_secret,
+ pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
+ pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
+ total_msat: path_amt,
+ starting_block_height: best_block_height,
+ });
+ log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
+ path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
+ if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
+ pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
+ }
+
+ let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
+ Ok(key) => key,
+ Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
+ };
+ let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
+ if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
+ if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
+ log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
+ }
+ }
+
+ let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
+ for (chan_id, chan) in by_id.iter_mut() {
+ if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
+ let mut outbound_scid_alias;
+ loop {
+ outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
+ .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.keys_manager);
+ if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
+ }
+ chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
+ } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
+ // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
+ // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
+ log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
+ }
+ if chan.is_usable() {
+ if short_to_id.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), *chan_id).is_some() {
+ // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
+ // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
+ log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
+ let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
genesis_hash,
fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
claimable_htlcs,
pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
}),
+ inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
- pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments),
+ pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
+
+ outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
+ fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
- our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
- our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
+ our_network_key,
+ our_network_pubkey,
secp_ctx,
last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use core::time::Duration;
+ use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
- use ln::channelmanager::PaymentSendFailure;
- use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
+ use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
+ use ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment;
+ use ln::features::InitFeatures;
use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
use ln::msgs;
use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
- use routing::router::{get_keysend_route, get_route};
+ use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
use util::errors::APIError;
use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
use util::test_utils;
+ use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
#[cfg(feature = "std")]
#[test]
fn test_wait_timeout() {
use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
use sync::Arc;
- use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
+ use core::sync::atomic::AtomicBool;
use std::thread;
let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
- let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
// First, send a partial MPP payment.
- let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
- let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
- let (payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
+ let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
+ let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
// Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
// indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
- nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
// Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
- nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- // There's an existing bug that generates a PaymentSent event for each MPP path, so handle that here.
+ // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
+ // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
match events[0] {
- Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage: ref preimage } => {
+ Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
+ assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
match events[1] {
- Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage: ref preimage } => {
- assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
+ Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
+ assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
+ assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ match events[2] {
+ Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
+ assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
+ assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
+ assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
- let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
+ let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
+ let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
// To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
// Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
- let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
+ let route_params = RouteParameters {
+ payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
+ final_value_msat: 100_000,
+ final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
+ };
+ let route = find_route(
+ &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
+ nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
+ ).unwrap();
nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
// To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
- let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
- let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
+ let route = find_route(
+ &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
+ nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
+ ).unwrap();
+ let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
- nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
- nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
- let network_graph = nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
+ let route_params = RouteParameters {
+ payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
+ final_value_msat: 10000,
+ final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
+ };
+ let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
- let route = get_keysend_route(&payer_pubkey, &network_graph, &payee_pubkey,
- Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), &vec![], 10000, 40,
- nodes[0].logger).unwrap();
+ let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
+ let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
+ let route = find_route(
+ &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
+ nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
+ ).unwrap();
let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
- let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
+ let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
- nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
- nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
- let network_graph = nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
+ let route_params = RouteParameters {
+ payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
+ final_value_msat: 10000,
+ final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
+ };
+ let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
- let route = get_keysend_route(&payer_pubkey, &network_graph, &payee_pubkey,
- Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), &vec![], 10000, 40,
- nodes[0].logger).unwrap();
+ let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
+ let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
+ let route = find_route(
+ &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
+ nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
+ ).unwrap();
let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
- let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
+ let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
- let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
// Marshall an MPP route.
- let (_, payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
- let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
- let mut route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
+ let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
let path = route.paths[0].clone();
route.paths.push(path);
route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
_ => panic!("unexpected error")
}
}
+
+ #[test]
+ fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
+ // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
+ let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
+ payment_secret,
+ total_msat: 100_000,
+ };
+
+ // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
+ // payment verification fails as expected.
+ let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
+ bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
+ match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
+ Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
+ Err(()) => {
+ nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
+ assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
+ }
}
-#[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
+#[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
pub mod bench {
use chain::Listen;
- use chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor;
- use chain::channelmonitor::Persist;
- use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
+ use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
+ use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
- use routing::router::get_route;
+ use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
use util::test_utils;
use util::config::UserConfig;
- use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
+ use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
});
let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
- node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
- node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
+ node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
+ node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
macro_rules! send_payment {
($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
- let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &dummy_graph, &$node_b.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()),
- Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), &[], 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a).unwrap();
+ let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
+ .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
+ let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
+ let seed = [3u8; 32];
+ let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
+ let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
+ let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
+ Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
payment_count += 1;
let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
- let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
+ let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
$node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());