//! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
//! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
//! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
+//!
use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
-use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
use chain;
use chain::Watch;
-use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,FeeEstimator};
-use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
+use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
+use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent};
+use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
-use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent};
use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
use ln::msgs;
/// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
-pub(super) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
+pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
short_channel_id: u64,
htlc_id: u64,
incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
/// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
-pub(super) enum HTLCSource {
+pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
OutboundRoute {
path: Vec<RouteHop>,
last_block_hash: Mutex<BlockHash>,
secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
- #[cfg(test)]
+ #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
- #[cfg(not(test))]
+ #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
our_network_key: SecretKey,
let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?;
let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
///
/// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
/// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
/// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
let mut chan = {
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
- short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
+ short_channel_id,
},
payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
- short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
+ short_channel_id,
timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
}
let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
/// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
/// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
let (chan, msg) = {
let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- msg: msg,
+ msg,
});
match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
///
/// Panics if addresses is absurdly large (more than 500).
pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
if addresses.len() > 500 {
panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
/// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
/// Will likely generate further events.
pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
let mut new_events = Vec::new();
let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
}
} else if total_value == data.total_msat {
new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
- payment_hash: payment_hash,
+ payment_hash,
payment_secret: Some(data.payment_secret),
amt: total_value,
});
}
} else {
new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
- payment_hash: payment_hash,
+ payment_hash,
payment_secret: None,
amt: amt_to_forward,
});
///
/// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
pub fn timer_chan_freshness_every_min(&self) {
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
/// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
/// HTLC backwards has been started.
pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> bool {
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(*payment_hash, *payment_secret));
pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, expected_amount: u64) -> bool {
let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(payment_hash, *payment_secret));
/// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
/// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
let mut close_results = Vec::new();
let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
channel_value_satoshis: value,
- output_script: output_script,
+ output_script,
user_channel_id: user_id,
});
Ok(())
};
let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
- funding_txo: funding_txo,
+ funding_txo,
user_channel_id: user_id,
});
Ok(())
/// (C-not exported) Cause its doc(hidden) anyway
#[doc(hidden)]
pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
let counterparty_node_id;
let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
}
}
-impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref + Sync + Send, T: Deref + Sync + Send, K: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send, L: Deref + Sync + Send>
- ChainListener for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
+impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
- L::Target: Logger,
+ L::Target: Logger,
{
- fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &[(usize, &Transaction)], height: u32) {
+ /// Updates channel state based on transactions seen in a connected block.
+ pub fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
let header_hash = header.block_hash();
log_trace!(self.logger, "Block {} at height {} connected", header_hash, height);
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
{
}
}
- /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
- fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, _: u32) {
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ /// Updates channel state based on a disconnected block.
+ ///
+ /// If necessary, the channel may be force-closed without letting the counterparty participate
+ /// in the shutdown.
+ pub fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
+ let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
{
let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
L::Target: Logger,
{
fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
}
fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
}
fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
}
fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
}
fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
}
fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
}
fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
}
fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
}
fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
}
fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
}
fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
}
fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
}
fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
}
fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
}
fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
}
fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
}
fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
let mut no_channels_remain = true;
fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
{
let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
}
fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
for chan in self.list_channels() {
L::Target: Logger,
{
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
+ let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
/// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
/// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
/// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
-/// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
+/// ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch() and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
/// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
/// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local chain::Watch.
/// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.