//! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
-use crate::sign::{EcdsaChannelSigner, SpendableOutputDescriptor};
+use crate::sign::{ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner, OutputSpender, SpendableOutputDescriptor};
use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, Balance};
use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use crate::chain::chaininterface::{LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight};
use crate::events::bump_transaction::{BumpTransactionEvent, WalletSource};
use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
use crate::ln::channel;
+use crate::ln::types::ChannelId;
use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
-use crate::util::crypto::sign;
+use crate::crypto::utils::sign;
use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
use crate::util::scid_utils::block_from_scid;
use crate::util::test_utils;
expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, false);
}
+#[test]
+fn archive_fully_resolved_monitors() {
+ // Test we can archive fully resolved channel monitor.
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
+
+ nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+ let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown);
+ let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown);
+
+ let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
+ let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed);
+ let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap());
+ let (_, _) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ let shutdown_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]);
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]);
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
+
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
+
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors().len(), 1);
+ // First archive should set balances_empty_height to current block height
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.archive_fully_resolved_channel_monitors();
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors().len(), 1);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4032);
+ // Second call after 4032 blocks, should archive the monitor
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.archive_fully_resolved_channel_monitors();
+ // Should have no monitors left
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors().len(), 0);
+ // Remove the corresponding outputs and transactions the chain source is
+ // watching. This is to make sure the `Drop` function assertions pass.
+ nodes.get_mut(0).unwrap().chain_source.remove_watched_txn_and_outputs(
+ OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 },
+ funding_tx.output[0].script_pubkey.clone()
+ );
+}
+
fn do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(anchors: bool) {
// Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim.
// Specifically, this tests that the channel non-HTLC balances show up in
let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
- assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
+ assert_eq!(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint), chan_id);
let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
assert_eq!(shutdown_tx, nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0));
assert_eq!(shutdown_tx.len(), 1);
- let shutdown_tx_conf_height_a = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]));
- let shutdown_tx_conf_height_b = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]));
+ let shutdown_tx_conf_height_a = block_from_scid(mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]));
+ let shutdown_tx_conf_height_b = block_from_scid(mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]));
assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
spendable_outputs_b
);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
}
#[test]
let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
- assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
+ assert_eq!(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint), chan_id);
// This HTLC is immediately claimed, giving node B the preimage
let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
commitment_tx
};
- let commitment_tx_conf_height_a = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx));
- if anchors && nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
+ let commitment_tx_conf_height_a = block_from_scid(mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx));
+ if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(txn[0].txid(), commitment_tx.txid());
let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
- assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
+ assert_eq!(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint), chan_id);
// We create five HTLCs for B to claim against A's revoked commitment transaction:
//
assert!(failed_payments.is_empty());
if let Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
match &events[1] {
- Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, .. } => {},
+ Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut, .. } => {},
_ => panic!(),
}
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
// Prior to channel closure, B considers the preimage HTLC as its own, and otherwise only
// lists the two on-chain timeout-able HTLCs as claimable balances.
let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 12_000_000);
let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
- assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
+ assert_eq!(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint), chan_id);
let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
let failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
- assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
+ assert_eq!(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint), chan_id);
// We create two HTLCs, one which we will give A the preimage to to generate an HTLC-Success
// transaction, and one which we will not, allowing B to claim the HTLC output in an aggregated
};
mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx);
+ if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
+ let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(txn[0].txid(), commitment_tx.txid());
+ }
// Connect blocks until the HTLC's expiration is met, expecting a transaction broadcast.
connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 2);
check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 2, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 1000000);
- let (revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b) = {
- let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
- assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
- assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
- assert_eq!(txn[1].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
- if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == chan_a.3.txid() {
- check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_a.3);
- check_spends!(&txn[1], &chan_b.3);
- (txn[0].clone(), txn[1].clone())
- } else {
- check_spends!(&txn[1], &chan_a.3);
- check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_b.3);
- (txn[1].clone(), txn[0].clone())
- }
- };
// Bob should now receive two events to bump his revoked commitment transaction fees.
assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
let events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
+ let mut revoked_commitment_txs = Vec::with_capacity(events.len());
let mut anchor_txs = Vec::with_capacity(events.len());
for (idx, event) in events.into_iter().enumerate() {
let utxo_value = Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat() * (idx + 1) as u64;
};
let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
+ assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
+ if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == chan_a.3.txid() {
+ check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_a.3);
+ } else {
+ check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_b.3);
+ }
let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = (&txn[0], &txn[1]);
check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, commitment_tx);
+
+ revoked_commitment_txs.push(commitment_tx.clone());
anchor_txs.push(anchor_tx.clone());
};
for node in &nodes {
- mine_transactions(node, &[&revoked_commitment_a, &anchor_txs[0], &revoked_commitment_b, &anchor_txs[1]]);
+ mine_transactions(node, &[&revoked_commitment_txs[0], &anchor_txs[0], &revoked_commitment_txs[1], &anchor_txs[1]]);
}
check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 2);
check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 2, true);
let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
assert_eq!(txn.len(), 4);
- let (revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_htlc_claim_b) = if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_commitment_a.txid() {
+ let (revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_htlc_claim_b) = if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_commitment_txs[0].txid() {
(if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] }, if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] })
} else {
(if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] }, if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] })
assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs
assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.output.len(), 1);
- check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_commitment_a);
+ check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_commitment_txs[0]);
assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs
assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.output.len(), 1);
- check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_b, revoked_commitment_b);
+ check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_b, revoked_commitment_txs[1]);
}
// Since Bob was able to confirm his revoked commitment, he'll now try to claim the HTLCs
sig
};
htlc_tx.input[0].witness = Witness::from_slice(&[fee_utxo_sig, public_key.to_bytes()]);
- check_spends!(htlc_tx, coinbase_tx, revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b);
+ check_spends!(htlc_tx, coinbase_tx, revoked_commitment_txs[0], revoked_commitment_txs[1]);
htlc_tx
};
check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim, htlc_tx);
}
- let mut revoked_claim_transaction_map = HashMap::new();
+ let mut revoked_claim_transaction_map = new_hash_map();
for current_tx in txn.into_iter() {
revoked_claim_transaction_map.insert(current_tx.txid(), current_tx);
}
).unwrap();
if let SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(_) = &outputs[0] {
- check_spends!(spend_tx, &revoked_commitment_a, &revoked_commitment_b);
+ check_spends!(spend_tx, &revoked_commitment_txs[0], &revoked_commitment_txs[1]);
} else {
check_spends!(spend_tx, revoked_claim_transactions.get(&spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid).unwrap());
}
// We should expect our round trip serialization check to fail as we're writing the monitor
// with the incorrect P2WPKH script but reading it with the correct P2WSH script.
*nodes[1].chain_monitor.expect_monitor_round_trip_fail.lock().unwrap() = Some(chan_id);
- let commitment_tx_conf_height = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx));
+ let commitment_tx_conf_height = block_from_scid(mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx));
let serialized_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).encode();
reload_node!(nodes[1], user_config, &nodes[1].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
commitment_tx_conf_height
} else {
let serialized_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).encode();
reload_node!(nodes[1], user_config, &nodes[1].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
- let commitment_tx_conf_height = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx));
+ let commitment_tx_conf_height = block_from_scid(mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx));
check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
commitment_tx_conf_height
(&nodes[0], &nodes[1])
};
- closing_node.node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &other_node.node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+ get_monitor!(closing_node, chan_id).broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(
+ &closing_node.tx_broadcaster, &closing_node.fee_estimator, &closing_node.logger
+ );
// The commitment transaction comes first.
let commitment_tx = {
mine_transaction(closing_node, &commitment_tx);
check_added_monitors!(closing_node, 1);
check_closed_broadcast!(closing_node, true);
- check_closed_event!(closing_node, 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [other_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
+ check_closed_event!(closing_node, 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [other_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
mine_transaction(other_node, &commitment_tx);
check_added_monitors!(other_node, 1);
// If we update the best block to the new height before providing the confirmed transactions,
// we'll see another broadcast of the commitment transaction.
- if anchors && !confirm_counterparty_commitment && nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
+ if !confirm_counterparty_commitment && nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
let _ = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
}
let htlc_timeout_tx = {
let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
- let tx = if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == commitment_tx.txid() {
- txn[0].clone()
- } else {
- txn[1].clone()
- };
+ let tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
check_spends!(tx, commitment_tx, coinbase_tx);
tx
};
do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(true, false);
do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(true, true);
}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_event_replay_causing_monitor_replay() {
+ // In LDK 0.0.121 there was a bug where if a `PaymentSent` event caused an RAA
+ // `ChannelMonitorUpdate` hold and then the node was restarted after the `PaymentSent` event
+ // and `ChannelMonitorUpdate` both completed but without persisting the `ChannelManager` we'd
+ // replay the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` on restart (which is fine, but triggered a safety panic).
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let persister;
+ let new_chain_monitor;
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+ let node_deserialized;
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
+
+ let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000).0;
+
+ do_claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1]]], false, payment_preimage);
+
+ // At this point the `PaymentSent` event has not been processed but the full commitment signed
+ // dance has completed.
+ let serialized_channel_manager = nodes[0].node.encode();
+
+ // Now process the `PaymentSent` to get the final RAA `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, checking that it
+ // resulted in a `ChannelManager` persistence request.
+ nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_needs_persistence();
+ expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, true, true /* expected post-event monitor update*/);
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_needs_persistence());
+
+ let serialized_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).encode();
+ reload_node!(nodes[0], &serialized_channel_manager, &[&serialized_monitor], persister, new_chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
+
+ // Expect the `PaymentSent` to get replayed, this time without the duplicate monitor update
+ expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false /* expected post-event monitor update*/);
+}