// Create some initial channels
let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 11_000_000);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 12_000_000);
let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
if anchors {
- assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[4].value, 10000); // to_self output
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[4].value, 11000); // to_self output
} else {
- assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[2].value, 10000); // to_self output
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[2].value, 11000); // to_self output
}
// The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have two HTLCs, an output for each side, and an
let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
let as_balances = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
// to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
- amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 11_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
+ amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 12_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
}, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
// to_self output in B's revoked commitment
- amount_satoshis: 10_000,
+ amount_satoshis: 11_000,
}, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
amount_satoshis: 3_000,
}, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
// to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
- amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 11_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
+ amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 12_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
}, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
// to_self output in B's revoked commitment
- amount_satoshis: 10_000,
+ amount_satoshis: 11_000,
}, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
amount_satoshis: 1_000,
}, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], false);
assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
// to_self output to B
- amount_satoshis: 10_000,
+ amount_satoshis: 11_000,
}, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
amount_satoshis: 1_000,
}, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0], false);
assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
// to_self output in B's revoked commitment
- amount_satoshis: 10_000,
+ amount_satoshis: 11_000,
}, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
amount_satoshis: 1_000,
}]),
connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
// to_self output in B's revoked commitment
- amount_satoshis: 10_000,
+ amount_satoshis: 11_000,
}, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
amount_satoshis: 1_000,
}]),
mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout_claim);
assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
// to_self output in B's revoked commitment
- amount_satoshis: 10_000,
+ amount_satoshis: 11_000,
}, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
amount_satoshis: revoked_htlc_timeout_claim.output[0].value,
confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
// secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
// secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
// transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
- chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
+ chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
if anchors {
do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(false);
do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(true);
}
+
+#[cfg(not(feature = "_test_vectors"))]
+fn do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(anchors: bool, confirm_counterparty_commitment: bool) {
+ // Tests that our monitor claims will always use fresh random signatures (ensuring a unique
+ // wtxid) to prevent certain classes of transaction replacement at the bitcoin P2P layer.
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
+ if anchors {
+ user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
+ user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
+ }
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
+ input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
+ output: vec![
+ TxOut {
+ value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
+ script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
+ },
+ ],
+ };
+ if anchors {
+ nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
+ }
+
+ // Open a channel and route a payment. We'll let it timeout to claim it.
+ let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0);
+ route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
+
+ let (closing_node, other_node) = if confirm_counterparty_commitment {
+ (&nodes[1], &nodes[0])
+ } else {
+ (&nodes[0], &nodes[1])
+ };
+
+ closing_node.node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &other_node.node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+
+ // The commitment transaction comes first.
+ let commitment_tx = {
+ let mut txn = closing_node.tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
+ txn.pop().unwrap()
+ };
+
+ mine_transaction(closing_node, &commitment_tx);
+ check_added_monitors!(closing_node, 1);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(closing_node, true);
+ check_closed_event!(closing_node, 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [other_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
+
+ mine_transaction(other_node, &commitment_tx);
+ check_added_monitors!(other_node, 1);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(other_node, true);
+ check_closed_event!(other_node, 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [closing_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
+
+ // If we update the best block to the new height before providing the confirmed transactions,
+ // we'll see another broadcast of the commitment transaction.
+ if anchors && !confirm_counterparty_commitment && nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
+ let _ = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ }
+
+ // Then comes the HTLC timeout transaction.
+ if confirm_counterparty_commitment {
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 5);
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx, false);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
+ } else {
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
+ }
+ if anchors && !confirm_counterparty_commitment {
+ handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 1);
+ }
+ let htlc_timeout_tx = {
+ let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
+ let tx = if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == commitment_tx.txid() {
+ txn[0].clone()
+ } else {
+ txn[1].clone()
+ };
+ check_spends!(tx, commitment_tx, coinbase_tx);
+ tx
+ };
+
+ // Check we rebroadcast it with a different wtxid.
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
+ if anchors && !confirm_counterparty_commitment {
+ handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 1);
+ }
+ {
+ let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(txn[0].txid(), htlc_timeout_tx.txid());
+ assert_ne!(txn[0].wtxid(), htlc_timeout_tx.wtxid());
+ }
+}
+
+#[cfg(not(feature = "_test_vectors"))]
+#[test]
+fn test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures() {
+ do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(false, false);
+ do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(false, true);
+ do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(true, false);
+ do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(true, true);
+}