Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner()
}
-pub(crate) fn next_hop_packet_pubkey<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, packet_pubkey: PublicKey, packet_shared_secret: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error> {
+/// Calculates a pubkey for the next hop, such as the next hop's packet pubkey or blinding point.
+pub(crate) fn next_hop_pubkey<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(
+ secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, curr_pubkey: PublicKey, shared_secret: &[u8]
+) -> Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error> {
let blinding_factor = {
let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
- sha.input(&packet_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
- sha.input(packet_shared_secret);
+ sha.input(&curr_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
+ sha.input(shared_secret);
Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
};
- packet_pubkey.mul_tweak(secp_ctx, &Scalar::from_be_bytes(blinding_factor).unwrap())
+ curr_pubkey.mul_tweak(secp_ctx, &Scalar::from_be_bytes(blinding_factor).unwrap())
}
// can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
#[inline]
-pub(super) fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop, usize)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
+pub(super) fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T, FType>(
+ secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, path: &Path, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType
+) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error>
+where
+ T: secp256k1::Signing,
+ FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, Option<&RouteHop>, usize)
+{
let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
- for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
- let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
+ let unblinded_hops_iter = path.hops.iter().map(|h| (&h.pubkey, Some(h)));
+ let blinded_pks_iter = path.blinded_tail.as_ref()
+ .map(|t| t.hops.iter()).unwrap_or([].iter())
+ .skip(1) // Skip the intro node because it's included in the unblinded hops
+ .map(|h| (&h.blinded_node_id, None));
+ for (idx, (pubkey, route_hop_opt)) in unblinded_hops_iter.chain(blinded_pks_iter).enumerate() {
+ let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(pubkey, &blinded_priv);
let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
blinded_priv = blinded_priv.mul_tweak(&Scalar::from_be_bytes(blinding_factor).unwrap())?;
blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
- callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop, idx);
+ callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, route_hop_opt, idx);
}
Ok(())
pub(super) fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, path: &Path, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(path.hops.len());
- construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, &path.hops, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _, _| {
+ construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, &path, session_priv,
+ |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _, _|
+ {
let (rho, mu) = gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret.as_ref());
res.push(OnionKeys {
}
/// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
-pub(super) fn build_onion_payloads(path: &Path, total_msat: u64, mut recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, starting_htlc_offset: u32, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), APIError> {
+pub(super) fn build_onion_payloads(path: &Path, total_msat: u64, mut recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, starting_htlc_offset: u32, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OutboundOnionPayload>, u64, u32), APIError> {
let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
- let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(path.hops.len());
+ let mut res: Vec<msgs::OutboundOnionPayload> = Vec::with_capacity(path.hops.len());
for (idx, hop) in path.hops.iter().rev().enumerate() {
// First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
// the intended recipient).
let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
- res.insert(0, msgs::OnionHopData {
- format: if idx == 0 {
- msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
- payment_data: if let Some(secret) = recipient_onion.payment_secret.take() {
- Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
- payment_secret: secret,
- total_msat,
- })
- } else { None },
- payment_metadata: recipient_onion.payment_metadata.take(),
- keysend_preimage: *keysend_preimage,
- }
- } else {
- msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode {
- short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
- }
- },
- amt_to_forward: value_msat,
- outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
+ res.insert(0, if idx == 0 {
+ msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Receive {
+ payment_data: if let Some(secret) = recipient_onion.payment_secret.take() {
+ Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
+ payment_secret: secret,
+ total_msat,
+ })
+ } else { None },
+ payment_metadata: recipient_onion.payment_metadata.take(),
+ keysend_preimage: *keysend_preimage,
+ custom_tlvs: recipient_onion.custom_tlvs.clone(),
+ amt_msat: value_msat,
+ outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
+ }
+ } else {
+ msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Forward {
+ short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
+ amt_to_forward: value_msat,
+ outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
+ }
});
cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
}
}
-pub(super) fn route_size_insane(payloads: &Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>) -> bool {
- let mut len = 0;
- for payload in payloads.iter() {
- let mut payload_len = LengthCalculatingWriter(0);
- payload.write(&mut payload_len).expect("Failed to calculate length");
- assert!(payload_len.0 + 32 < ONION_DATA_LEN);
- len += payload_len.0 + 32;
- if len > ONION_DATA_LEN {
- return true;
- }
- }
- false
-}
-
-/// panics if route_size_insane(payloads)
-pub(super) fn construct_onion_packet(payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, prng_seed: [u8; 32], associated_data: &PaymentHash) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
+pub(super) fn construct_onion_packet(
+ payloads: Vec<msgs::OutboundOnionPayload>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, prng_seed: [u8; 32],
+ associated_data: &PaymentHash
+) -> Result<msgs::OnionPacket, ()> {
let mut packet_data = [0; ONION_DATA_LEN];
let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&prng_seed, &[0; 8]);
#[cfg(test)]
/// Used in testing to write bogus `BogusOnionHopData` as well as `RawOnionHopData`, which is
/// otherwise not representable in `msgs::OnionHopData`.
-pub(super) fn construct_onion_packet_with_writable_hopdata<HD: Writeable>(payloads: Vec<HD>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, prng_seed: [u8; 32], associated_data: &PaymentHash) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
+pub(super) fn construct_onion_packet_with_writable_hopdata<HD: Writeable>(payloads: Vec<HD>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, prng_seed: [u8; 32], associated_data: &PaymentHash) -> Result<msgs::OnionPacket, ()> {
let mut packet_data = [0; ONION_DATA_LEN];
let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&prng_seed, &[0; 8]);
payloads.iter().map(|p| p.serialized_length() + 32 /* HMAC */).sum()
}
-/// panics if payloads_serialized_length(payloads) > packet_data_len
pub(crate) fn construct_onion_message_packet<HD: Writeable, P: Packet<Data = Vec<u8>>>(
- payloads: Vec<HD>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, prng_seed: [u8; 32], packet_data_len: usize) -> P
+ payloads: Vec<HD>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, prng_seed: [u8; 32], packet_data_len: usize) -> Result<P, ()>
{
let mut packet_data = vec![0; packet_data_len];
construct_onion_packet_with_init_noise::<_, _>(payloads, onion_keys, packet_data, None)
}
-/// panics if payloads_serialized_length(payloads) > packet_data.len()
fn construct_onion_packet_with_init_noise<HD: Writeable, P: Packet>(
- mut payloads: Vec<HD>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, mut packet_data: P::Data, associated_data: Option<&PaymentHash>) -> P
+ mut payloads: Vec<HD>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, mut packet_data: P::Data, associated_data: Option<&PaymentHash>) -> Result<P, ()>
{
let filler = {
let packet_data = packet_data.as_mut();
let mut payload_len = LengthCalculatingWriter(0);
payload.write(&mut payload_len).expect("Failed to calculate length");
pos += payload_len.0 + 32;
- assert!(pos <= packet_data.len());
+ if pos > packet_data.len() {
+ return Err(());
+ }
res.resize(pos, 0u8);
chacha.process_in_place(&mut res);
chacha.process_in_place(packet_data);
if i == 0 {
- packet_data[ONION_DATA_LEN - filler.len()..ONION_DATA_LEN].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
+ let stop_index = packet_data.len();
+ let start_index = stop_index.checked_sub(filler.len()).ok_or(())?;
+ packet_data[start_index..stop_index].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
}
let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.mu);
hmac_res = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
}
- P::new(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey, packet_data, hmac_res)
+ Ok(P::new(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey, packet_data, hmac_res))
}
/// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
}
+pub(crate) struct DecodedOnionFailure {
+ pub(crate) network_update: Option<NetworkUpdate>,
+ pub(crate) short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
+ pub(crate) payment_retryable: bool,
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub(crate) onion_error_code: Option<u16>,
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub(crate) onion_error_data: Option<Vec<u8>>,
+}
+
/// Process failure we got back from upstream on a payment we sent (implying htlc_source is an
/// OutboundRoute).
-/// Returns update, a boolean indicating that the payment itself failed, the short channel id of
-/// the responsible channel, and the error code.
#[inline]
-pub(super) fn process_onion_failure<T: secp256k1::Signing, L: Deref>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, logger: &L, htlc_source: &HTLCSource, mut packet_decrypted: Vec<u8>) -> (Option<NetworkUpdate>, Option<u64>, bool, Option<u16>, Option<Vec<u8>>) where L::Target: Logger {
- if let &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = htlc_source {
- let mut res = None;
- let mut htlc_msat = *first_hop_htlc_msat;
- let mut error_code_ret = None;
- let mut error_packet_ret = None;
- let mut is_from_final_node = false;
-
- // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
- construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, &path.hops, session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop, route_hop_idx| {
- if res.is_some() { return; }
-
- let amt_to_forward = htlc_msat - route_hop.fee_msat;
- htlc_msat = amt_to_forward;
-
- let ammag = gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret.as_ref());
-
- let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
- decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
- let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
- chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
- packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
-
- // The failing hop includes either the inbound channel to the recipient or the outbound
- // channel from the current hop (i.e., the next hop's inbound channel).
- is_from_final_node = route_hop_idx + 1 == path.hops.len();
- let failing_route_hop = if is_from_final_node { route_hop } else { &path.hops[route_hop_idx + 1] };
-
- if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
- let um = gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret.as_ref());
- let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&um);
- hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
-
- if fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &err_packet.hmac) {
- if let Some(error_code_slice) = err_packet.failuremsg.get(0..2) {
- const BADONION: u16 = 0x8000;
- const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
- const NODE: u16 = 0x2000;
- const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
-
- let error_code = u16::from_be_bytes(error_code_slice.try_into().expect("len is 2"));
- error_code_ret = Some(error_code);
- error_packet_ret = Some(err_packet.failuremsg[2..].to_vec());
-
- let (debug_field, debug_field_size) = errors::get_onion_debug_field(error_code);
-
- // indicate that payment parameter has failed and no need to
- // update Route object
- let payment_failed = match error_code & 0xff {
- 15|16|17|18|19|23 => true,
- _ => false,
- } && is_from_final_node; // PERM bit observed below even if this error is from the intermediate nodes
-
- let mut network_update = None;
- let mut short_channel_id = None;
-
- if error_code & BADONION == BADONION {
- // If the error code has the BADONION bit set, always blame the channel
- // from the node "originating" the error to its next hop. The
- // "originator" is ultimately actually claiming that its counterparty
- // is the one who is failing the HTLC.
- // If the "originator" here isn't lying we should really mark the
- // next-hop node as failed entirely, but we can't be confident in that,
- // as it would allow any node to get us to completely ban one of its
- // counterparties. Instead, we simply remove the channel in question.
+pub(super) fn process_onion_failure<T: secp256k1::Signing, L: Deref>(
+ secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, logger: &L, htlc_source: &HTLCSource, mut packet_decrypted: Vec<u8>
+) -> DecodedOnionFailure where L::Target: Logger {
+ let (path, session_priv, first_hop_htlc_msat) = if let &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
+ ref path, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ..
+ } = htlc_source {
+ (path, session_priv, first_hop_htlc_msat)
+ } else { unreachable!() };
+ let mut res = None;
+ let mut htlc_msat = *first_hop_htlc_msat;
+ let mut error_code_ret = None;
+ let mut error_packet_ret = None;
+ let mut is_from_final_node = false;
+
+ const BADONION: u16 = 0x8000;
+ const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
+ const NODE: u16 = 0x2000;
+ const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
+
+ // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
+ construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, &path, session_priv,
+ |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop_opt, route_hop_idx|
+ {
+ if res.is_some() { return; }
+
+ let route_hop = match route_hop_opt {
+ Some(hop) => hop,
+ None => {
+ // Got an error from within a blinded route.
+ error_code_ret = Some(BADONION | PERM | 24); // invalid_onion_blinding
+ error_packet_ret = Some(vec![0; 32]);
+ is_from_final_node = false;
+ return
+ },
+ };
+
+ let amt_to_forward = htlc_msat - route_hop.fee_msat;
+ htlc_msat = amt_to_forward;
+
+ let ammag = gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret.as_ref());
+
+ let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
+ decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
+ let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
+ chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
+ packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
+
+ // The failing hop includes either the inbound channel to the recipient or the outbound channel
+ // from the current hop (i.e., the next hop's inbound channel).
+ is_from_final_node = route_hop_idx + 1 == path.hops.len();
+ let failing_route_hop = if is_from_final_node { route_hop } else { &path.hops[route_hop_idx + 1] };
+
+ let err_packet = match msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
+ Ok(p) => p,
+ Err(_) => return
+ };
+ let um = gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret.as_ref());
+ let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&um);
+ hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
+
+ if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &err_packet.hmac) { return }
+ let error_code_slice = match err_packet.failuremsg.get(0..2) {
+ Some(s) => s,
+ None => {
+ // Useless packet that we can't use but it passed HMAC, so it definitely came from the peer
+ // in question
+ let network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
+ node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
+ is_permanent: true,
+ });
+ let short_channel_id = Some(route_hop.short_channel_id);
+ res = Some((network_update, short_channel_id, !is_from_final_node));
+ return
+ }
+ };
+
+ let error_code = u16::from_be_bytes(error_code_slice.try_into().expect("len is 2"));
+ error_code_ret = Some(error_code);
+ error_packet_ret = Some(err_packet.failuremsg[2..].to_vec());
+
+ let (debug_field, debug_field_size) = errors::get_onion_debug_field(error_code);
+
+ // indicate that payment parameter has failed and no need to update Route object
+ let payment_failed = match error_code & 0xff {
+ 15|16|17|18|19|23 => true,
+ _ => false,
+ } && is_from_final_node; // PERM bit observed below even if this error is from the intermediate nodes
+
+ let mut network_update = None;
+ let mut short_channel_id = None;
+
+ if error_code & BADONION == BADONION {
+ // If the error code has the BADONION bit set, always blame the channel from the node
+ // "originating" the error to its next hop. The "originator" is ultimately actually claiming
+ // that its counterparty is the one who is failing the HTLC.
+ // If the "originator" here isn't lying we should really mark the next-hop node as failed
+ // entirely, but we can't be confident in that, as it would allow any node to get us to
+ // completely ban one of its counterparties. Instead, we simply remove the channel in
+ // question.
+ network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
+ short_channel_id: failing_route_hop.short_channel_id,
+ is_permanent: true,
+ });
+ } else if error_code & NODE == NODE {
+ let is_permanent = error_code & PERM == PERM;
+ network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure { node_id: route_hop.pubkey, is_permanent });
+ short_channel_id = Some(route_hop.short_channel_id);
+ } else if error_code & PERM == PERM {
+ if !payment_failed {
+ network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
+ short_channel_id: failing_route_hop.short_channel_id,
+ is_permanent: true,
+ });
+ short_channel_id = Some(failing_route_hop.short_channel_id);
+ }
+ } else if error_code & UPDATE == UPDATE {
+ if let Some(update_len_slice) = err_packet.failuremsg.get(debug_field_size+2..debug_field_size+4) {
+ let update_len = u16::from_be_bytes(update_len_slice.try_into().expect("len is 2")) as usize;
+ if let Some(mut update_slice) = err_packet.failuremsg.get(debug_field_size + 4..debug_field_size + 4 + update_len) {
+ // Historically, the BOLTs were unclear if the message type
+ // bytes should be included here or not. The BOLTs have now
+ // been updated to indicate that they *are* included, but many
+ // nodes still send messages without the type bytes, so we
+ // support both here.
+ // TODO: Switch to hard require the type prefix, as the current
+ // permissiveness introduces the (although small) possibility
+ // that we fail to decode legitimate channel updates that
+ // happen to start with ChannelUpdate::TYPE, i.e., [0x01, 0x02].
+ if update_slice.len() > 2 && update_slice[0..2] == msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.to_be_bytes() {
+ update_slice = &update_slice[2..];
+ } else {
+ log_trace!(logger, "Failure provided features a channel update without type prefix. Deprecated, but allowing for now.");
+ }
+ let update_opt = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&update_slice));
+ if update_opt.is_ok() || update_slice.is_empty() {
+ // if channel_update should NOT have caused the failure:
+ // MAY treat the channel_update as invalid.
+ let is_chan_update_invalid = match error_code & 0xff {
+ 7 => false,
+ 11 => update_opt.is_ok() &&
+ amt_to_forward >
+ update_opt.as_ref().unwrap().contents.htlc_minimum_msat,
+ 12 => update_opt.is_ok() && amt_to_forward
+ .checked_mul(update_opt.as_ref().unwrap()
+ .contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
+ .map(|prop_fee| prop_fee / 1_000_000)
+ .and_then(|prop_fee| prop_fee.checked_add(
+ update_opt.as_ref().unwrap().contents.fee_base_msat as u64))
+ .map(|fee_msats| route_hop.fee_msat >= fee_msats)
+ .unwrap_or(false),
+ 13 => update_opt.is_ok() &&
+ route_hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u16 >=
+ update_opt.as_ref().unwrap().contents.cltv_expiry_delta,
+ 14 => false, // expiry_too_soon; always valid?
+ 20 => update_opt.as_ref().unwrap().contents.flags & 2 == 0,
+ _ => false, // unknown error code; take channel_update as valid
+ };
+ if is_chan_update_invalid {
+ // This probably indicates the node which forwarded
+ // to the node in question corrupted something.
network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
- short_channel_id: failing_route_hop.short_channel_id,
+ short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id,
is_permanent: true,
});
- } else if error_code & NODE == NODE {
- let is_permanent = error_code & PERM == PERM;
- network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure { node_id: route_hop.pubkey, is_permanent });
- short_channel_id = Some(route_hop.short_channel_id);
- } else if error_code & PERM == PERM {
- if !payment_failed {
- network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
- short_channel_id: failing_route_hop.short_channel_id,
- is_permanent: true,
- });
- short_channel_id = Some(failing_route_hop.short_channel_id);
- }
- } else if error_code & UPDATE == UPDATE {
- if let Some(update_len_slice) = err_packet.failuremsg.get(debug_field_size+2..debug_field_size+4) {
- let update_len = u16::from_be_bytes(update_len_slice.try_into().expect("len is 2")) as usize;
- if let Some(mut update_slice) = err_packet.failuremsg.get(debug_field_size + 4..debug_field_size + 4 + update_len) {
- // Historically, the BOLTs were unclear if the message type
- // bytes should be included here or not. The BOLTs have now
- // been updated to indicate that they *are* included, but many
- // nodes still send messages without the type bytes, so we
- // support both here.
- // TODO: Switch to hard require the type prefix, as the current
- // permissiveness introduces the (although small) possibility
- // that we fail to decode legitimate channel updates that
- // happen to start with ChannelUpdate::TYPE, i.e., [0x01, 0x02].
- if update_slice.len() > 2 && update_slice[0..2] == msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.to_be_bytes() {
- update_slice = &update_slice[2..];
- } else {
- log_trace!(logger, "Failure provided features a channel update without type prefix. Deprecated, but allowing for now.");
- }
- if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&update_slice)) {
- // if channel_update should NOT have caused the failure:
- // MAY treat the channel_update as invalid.
- let is_chan_update_invalid = match error_code & 0xff {
- 7 => false,
- 11 => amt_to_forward > chan_update.contents.htlc_minimum_msat,
- 12 => amt_to_forward
- .checked_mul(chan_update.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
- .map(|prop_fee| prop_fee / 1_000_000)
- .and_then(|prop_fee| prop_fee.checked_add(chan_update.contents.fee_base_msat as u64))
- .map(|fee_msats| route_hop.fee_msat >= fee_msats)
- .unwrap_or(false),
- 13 => route_hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u16 >= chan_update.contents.cltv_expiry_delta,
- 14 => false, // expiry_too_soon; always valid?
- 20 => chan_update.contents.flags & 2 == 0,
- _ => false, // unknown error code; take channel_update as valid
- };
- if is_chan_update_invalid {
- // This probably indicates the node which forwarded
- // to the node in question corrupted something.
- network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
- short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id,
- is_permanent: true,
- });
- } else {
- // Make sure the ChannelUpdate contains the expected
- // short channel id.
- if failing_route_hop.short_channel_id == chan_update.contents.short_channel_id {
- short_channel_id = Some(failing_route_hop.short_channel_id);
- } else {
- log_info!(logger, "Node provided a channel_update for which it was not authoritative, ignoring.");
- }
- network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
- msg: chan_update,
- })
- };
- }
+ } else {
+ if let Ok(chan_update) = update_opt {
+ // Make sure the ChannelUpdate contains the expected
+ // short channel id.
+ if failing_route_hop.short_channel_id == chan_update.contents.short_channel_id {
+ short_channel_id = Some(failing_route_hop.short_channel_id);
+ } else {
+ log_info!(logger, "Node provided a channel_update for which it was not authoritative, ignoring.");
}
- }
- if network_update.is_none() {
- // They provided an UPDATE which was obviously bogus, not worth
- // trying to relay through them anymore.
- network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
- node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
- is_permanent: true,
+ network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
+ msg: chan_update,
+ })
+ } else {
+ // The node in question intentionally encoded a 0-length channel update. This is
+ // likely due to https://github.com/ElementsProject/lightning/issues/6200.
+ network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
+ short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id,
+ is_permanent: false,
});
}
- if short_channel_id.is_none() {
- short_channel_id = Some(route_hop.short_channel_id);
- }
- } else if payment_failed {
- // Only blame the hop when a value in the HTLC doesn't match the
- // corresponding value in the onion.
- short_channel_id = match error_code & 0xff {
- 18|19 => Some(route_hop.short_channel_id),
- _ => None,
- };
- } else {
- // We can't understand their error messages and they failed to
- // forward...they probably can't understand our forwards so its
- // really not worth trying any further.
- network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
- node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
- is_permanent: true,
- });
- short_channel_id = Some(route_hop.short_channel_id);
- }
-
- res = Some((network_update, short_channel_id, !(error_code & PERM == PERM && is_from_final_node)));
-
- let (description, title) = errors::get_onion_error_description(error_code);
- if debug_field_size > 0 && err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 + debug_field_size {
- log_info!(logger, "Onion Error[from {}: {}({:#x}) {}({})] {}", route_hop.pubkey, title, error_code, debug_field, log_bytes!(&err_packet.failuremsg[4..4+debug_field_size]), description);
- }
- else {
- log_info!(logger, "Onion Error[from {}: {}({:#x})] {}", route_hop.pubkey, title, error_code, description);
- }
+ };
} else {
- // Useless packet that we can't use but it passed HMAC, so it
- // definitely came from the peer in question
- let network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
- node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
- is_permanent: true,
- });
- let short_channel_id = Some(route_hop.short_channel_id);
- res = Some((network_update, short_channel_id, !is_from_final_node));
+ // If the channel_update had a non-zero length (i.e. was
+ // present) but we couldn't read it, treat it as a total
+ // node failure.
+ log_info!(logger,
+ "Failed to read a channel_update of len {} in an onion",
+ update_slice.len());
}
}
}
- }).expect("Route that we sent via spontaneously grew invalid keys in the middle of it?");
- if let Some((channel_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable)) = res {
- (channel_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, error_code_ret, error_packet_ret)
+ if network_update.is_none() {
+ // They provided an UPDATE which was obviously bogus, not worth
+ // trying to relay through them anymore.
+ network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
+ node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
+ is_permanent: true,
+ });
+ }
+ if short_channel_id.is_none() {
+ short_channel_id = Some(route_hop.short_channel_id);
+ }
+ } else if payment_failed {
+ // Only blame the hop when a value in the HTLC doesn't match the corresponding value in the
+ // onion.
+ short_channel_id = match error_code & 0xff {
+ 18|19 => Some(route_hop.short_channel_id),
+ _ => None,
+ };
+ } else {
+ // We can't understand their error messages and they failed to forward...they probably can't
+ // understand our forwards so it's really not worth trying any further.
+ network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
+ node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
+ is_permanent: true,
+ });
+ short_channel_id = Some(route_hop.short_channel_id);
+ }
+
+ res = Some((network_update, short_channel_id, !(error_code & PERM == PERM && is_from_final_node)));
+
+ let (description, title) = errors::get_onion_error_description(error_code);
+ if debug_field_size > 0 && err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 + debug_field_size {
+ log_info!(logger, "Onion Error[from {}: {}({:#x}) {}({})] {}", route_hop.pubkey, title, error_code, debug_field, log_bytes!(&err_packet.failuremsg[4..4+debug_field_size]), description);
} else {
- // only not set either packet unparseable or hmac does not match with any
- // payment not retryable only when garbage is from the final node
- (None, None, !is_from_final_node, None, None)
+ log_info!(logger, "Onion Error[from {}: {}({:#x})] {}", route_hop.pubkey, title, error_code, description);
}
- } else { unreachable!(); }
+ }).expect("Route that we sent via spontaneously grew invalid keys in the middle of it?");
+ if let Some((network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable)) = res {
+ DecodedOnionFailure {
+ network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable,
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ onion_error_code: error_code_ret,
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ onion_error_data: error_packet_ret
+ }
+ } else {
+ // only not set either packet unparseable or hmac does not match with any
+ // payment not retryable only when garbage is from the final node
+ DecodedOnionFailure {
+ network_update: None, short_channel_id: None, payment_retryable: !is_from_final_node,
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ onion_error_code: None,
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ onion_error_data: None
+ }
+ }
}
#[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
},
(1, Reason) => {
(0, failure_code, required),
- (2, data, vec_type),
+ (2, data, required_vec),
},
;);
pub(super) fn decode_onion_failure<T: secp256k1::Signing, L: Deref>(
&self, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, logger: &L, htlc_source: &HTLCSource
- ) -> (Option<NetworkUpdate>, Option<u64>, bool, Option<u16>, Option<Vec<u8>>)
- where L::Target: Logger {
+ ) -> DecodedOnionFailure where L::Target: Logger {
match self.0 {
HTLCFailReasonRepr::LightningError { ref err } => {
process_onion_failure(secp_ctx, logger, &htlc_source, err.data.clone())
},
+ #[allow(unused)]
HTLCFailReasonRepr::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data, .. } => {
// we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
// TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
// generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
// ChannelDetails.
if let &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, .. } = htlc_source {
- (None, Some(path.hops[0].short_channel_id), true, Some(*failure_code), Some(data.clone()))
+ DecodedOnionFailure {
+ network_update: None,
+ payment_retryable: true,
+ short_channel_id: Some(path.hops[0].short_channel_id),
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ onion_error_code: Some(*failure_code),
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ onion_error_data: Some(data.clone()),
+ }
} else { unreachable!(); }
}
}
pub(crate) enum Hop {
/// This onion payload was for us, not for forwarding to a next-hop. Contains information for
/// verifying the incoming payment.
- Receive(msgs::OnionHopData),
+ Receive(msgs::InboundOnionPayload),
/// This onion payload needs to be forwarded to a next-hop.
Forward {
/// Onion payload data used in forwarding the payment.
- next_hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData,
+ next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload,
/// HMAC of the next hop's onion packet.
next_hop_hmac: [u8; 32],
/// Bytes of the onion packet we're forwarding.
// with raw hex instead of our in-memory enums, as the payloads contains custom types, and
// we have no way of representing that with our enums.
let payloads = vec!(
- RawOnionHopData::new(msgs::OnionHopData {
- format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode {
- short_channel_id: 1,
- },
+ RawOnionHopData::new(msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Forward {
+ short_channel_id: 1,
amt_to_forward: 15000,
outgoing_cltv_value: 1500,
}),
RawOnionHopData {
data: hex::decode("52020236b00402057806080000000000000002fd02013c0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f").unwrap(),
},
- RawOnionHopData::new(msgs::OnionHopData {
- format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode {
- short_channel_id: 3,
- },
+ RawOnionHopData::new(msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Forward {
+ short_channel_id: 3,
amt_to_forward: 12500,
outgoing_cltv_value: 1250,
}),
- RawOnionHopData::new(msgs::OnionHopData {
- format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode {
- short_channel_id: 4,
- },
+ RawOnionHopData::new(msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Forward {
+ short_channel_id: 4,
amt_to_forward: 10000,
outgoing_cltv_value: 1000,
}),
let pad_keytype_seed = super::gen_pad_from_shared_secret(&get_test_session_key().secret_bytes());
- let packet: msgs::OnionPacket = super::construct_onion_packet_with_writable_hopdata::<_>(payloads, onion_keys, pad_keytype_seed, &PaymentHash([0x42; 32]));
+ let packet: msgs::OnionPacket = super::construct_onion_packet_with_writable_hopdata::<_>(payloads, onion_keys, pad_keytype_seed, &PaymentHash([0x42; 32])).unwrap();
assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode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unwrap());
}
data: Vec<u8>
}
impl RawOnionHopData {
- fn new(orig: msgs::OnionHopData) -> Self {
+ fn new(orig: msgs::OutboundOnionPayload) -> Self {
Self { data: orig.encode() }
}
}