// You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
// licenses.
+use prelude::*;
+
use ln::msgs::LightningError;
use ln::msgs;
-use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine, Hmac, HmacEngine};
+use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
use bitcoin::secp256k1;
use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20Poly1305RFC;
-use util::byte_utils;
+use util::crypto::hkdf_extract_expand_twice;
use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
/// Maximum Lightning message data length according to
/// [BOLT-8](https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/v1.0/08-transport.md#lightning-message-specification)
/// and [BOLT-1](https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/01-messaging.md#lightning-message-format):
-pub const LN_MAX_MSG_LEN: usize = ::std::u16::MAX as usize; // Must be equal to 65535
+pub const LN_MAX_MSG_LEN: usize = ::core::u16::MAX as usize; // Must be equal to 65535
// Sha256("Noise_XK_secp256k1_ChaChaPoly_SHA256")
const NOISE_CK: [u8; 32] = [0x26, 0x40, 0xf5, 0x2e, 0xeb, 0xcd, 0x9e, 0x88, 0x29, 0x58, 0x95, 0x1c, 0x79, 0x42, 0x50, 0xee, 0xdb, 0x28, 0x00, 0x2c, 0x05, 0xd7, 0xdc, 0x2e, 0xa0, 0xf1, 0x95, 0x40, 0x60, 0x42, 0xca, 0xf1];
PeerChannelEncryptor {
their_node_id: Some(their_node_id),
- secp_ctx: secp_ctx,
+ secp_ctx,
noise_state: NoiseState::InProgress {
state: NoiseStep::PreActOne,
directional_state: DirectionalNoiseState::Outbound {
ie: ephemeral_key,
},
bidirectional_state: BidirectionalNoiseState {
- h: h,
+ h,
ck: NOISE_CK,
},
}
PeerChannelEncryptor {
their_node_id: None,
- secp_ctx: secp_ctx,
+ secp_ctx,
noise_state: NoiseState::InProgress {
state: NoiseStep::PreActOne,
directional_state: DirectionalNoiseState::Inbound {
temp_k2: None,
},
bidirectional_state: BidirectionalNoiseState {
- h: h,
+ h,
ck: NOISE_CK,
},
}
#[inline]
fn encrypt_with_ad(res: &mut[u8], n: u64, key: &[u8; 32], h: &[u8], plaintext: &[u8]) {
let mut nonce = [0; 12];
- nonce[4..].copy_from_slice(&byte_utils::le64_to_array(n));
+ nonce[4..].copy_from_slice(&n.to_le_bytes()[..]);
let mut chacha = ChaCha20Poly1305RFC::new(key, &nonce, h);
let mut tag = [0; 16];
#[inline]
fn decrypt_with_ad(res: &mut[u8], n: u64, key: &[u8; 32], h: &[u8], cyphertext: &[u8]) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
let mut nonce = [0; 12];
- nonce[4..].copy_from_slice(&byte_utils::le64_to_array(n));
+ nonce[4..].copy_from_slice(&n.to_le_bytes()[..]);
let mut chacha = ChaCha20Poly1305RFC::new(key, &nonce, h);
if !chacha.decrypt(&cyphertext[0..cyphertext.len() - 16], res, &cyphertext[cyphertext.len() - 16..]) {
Ok(())
}
- fn hkdf_extract_expand(salt: &[u8], ikm: &[u8]) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
- let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(salt);
- hmac.input(ikm);
- let prk = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
- let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&prk[..]);
- hmac.input(&[1; 1]);
- let t1 = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
- let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&prk[..]);
- hmac.input(&t1);
- hmac.input(&[2; 1]);
- (t1, Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner())
- }
-
#[inline]
fn hkdf(state: &mut BidirectionalNoiseState, ss: SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
- let (t1, t2) = Self::hkdf_extract_expand(&state.ck, &ss[..]);
+ let (t1, t2) = hkdf_extract_expand_twice(&state.ck, ss.as_ref());
state.ck = t1;
t2
}
let temp_k = PeerChannelEncryptor::hkdf(bidirectional_state, ss);
PeerChannelEncryptor::encrypt_with_ad(&mut res[50..], 0, &temp_k, &bidirectional_state.h, &[0; 0]);
- final_hkdf = Self::hkdf_extract_expand(&bidirectional_state.ck, &[0; 0]);
+ final_hkdf = hkdf_extract_expand_twice(&bidirectional_state.ck, &[0; 0]);
ck = bidirectional_state.ck.clone();
res
},
let (sk, rk) = final_hkdf;
self.noise_state = NoiseState::Finished {
- sk: sk,
+ sk,
sn: 0,
sck: ck.clone(),
- rk: rk,
+ rk,
rn: 0,
rck: ck,
};
let temp_k = PeerChannelEncryptor::hkdf(bidirectional_state, ss);
PeerChannelEncryptor::decrypt_with_ad(&mut [0; 0], 0, &temp_k, &bidirectional_state.h, &act_three[50..])?;
- final_hkdf = Self::hkdf_extract_expand(&bidirectional_state.ck, &[0; 0]);
+ final_hkdf = hkdf_extract_expand_twice(&bidirectional_state.ck, &[0; 0]);
ck = bidirectional_state.ck.clone();
},
_ => panic!("Wrong direction for act"),
let (rk, sk) = final_hkdf;
self.noise_state = NoiseState::Finished {
- sk: sk,
+ sk,
sn: 0,
sck: ck.clone(),
- rk: rk,
+ rk,
rn: 0,
rck: ck,
};
match self.noise_state {
NoiseState::Finished { ref mut sk, ref mut sn, ref mut sck, rk: _, rn: _, rck: _ } => {
if *sn >= 1000 {
- let (new_sck, new_sk) = Self::hkdf_extract_expand(sck, sk);
+ let (new_sck, new_sk) = hkdf_extract_expand_twice(sck, sk);
*sck = new_sck;
*sk = new_sk;
*sn = 0;
}
- Self::encrypt_with_ad(&mut res[0..16+2], *sn, sk, &[0; 0], &byte_utils::be16_to_array(msg.len() as u16));
+ Self::encrypt_with_ad(&mut res[0..16+2], *sn, sk, &[0; 0], &(msg.len() as u16).to_be_bytes());
*sn += 1;
Self::encrypt_with_ad(&mut res[16+2..], *sn, sk, &[0; 0], msg);
match self.noise_state {
NoiseState::Finished { sk: _, sn: _, sck: _, ref mut rk, ref mut rn, ref mut rck } => {
if *rn >= 1000 {
- let (new_rck, new_rk) = Self::hkdf_extract_expand(rck, rk);
+ let (new_rck, new_rk) = hkdf_extract_expand_twice(rck, rk);
*rck = new_rck;
*rk = new_rk;
*rn = 0;
let mut res = [0; 2];
Self::decrypt_with_ad(&mut res, *rn, rk, &[0; 0], msg)?;
*rn += 1;
- Ok(byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&res))
+ Ok(u16::from_be_bytes(res))
},
_ => panic!("Tried to decrypt a message prior to noise handshake completion"),
}
mod tests {
use super::LN_MAX_MSG_LEN;
- use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
+ use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
use hex;
#[test]
fn max_msg_len_limit_value() {
assert_eq!(LN_MAX_MSG_LEN, 65535);
- assert_eq!(LN_MAX_MSG_LEN, ::std::u16::MAX as usize);
+ assert_eq!(LN_MAX_MSG_LEN, ::core::u16::MAX as usize);
}
#[test]