use secp256k1;
use crypto::digest::Digest;
-use crypto::hkdf::{hkdf_extract,hkdf_expand};
use ln::msgs;
-use ln::msgs::{ErrorAction, HandleError};
+use ln::msgs::{ErrorAction, HandleError, RAACommitmentOrder};
use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
use ln::channelmanager::{PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, PendingForwardHTLCInfo, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg};
use ln::chan_utils::{TxCreationKeys,HTLCOutputInCommitment,HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT,HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT};
use ln::chan_utils;
use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
+use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface};
use util::{transaction_utils,rng};
use util::ser::Writeable;
use util::sha2::Sha256;
use std::time::Instant;
use std::sync::{Arc};
-pub struct ChannelKeys {
- pub funding_key: SecretKey,
- pub revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
- pub payment_base_key: SecretKey,
- pub delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey,
- pub htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
- pub channel_close_key: SecretKey,
- pub channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey,
- pub commitment_seed: [u8; 32],
-}
-
#[cfg(test)]
pub struct ChannelValueStat {
pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
pub their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
}
-impl ChannelKeys {
- pub fn new_from_seed(seed: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<ChannelKeys, secp256k1::Error> {
- let mut prk = [0; 32];
- hkdf_extract(Sha256::new(), b"rust-lightning key gen salt", seed, &mut prk);
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::without_caps();
-
- let mut okm = [0; 32];
- hkdf_expand(Sha256::new(), &prk, b"rust-lightning funding key info", &mut okm);
- let funding_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &okm)?;
-
- hkdf_expand(Sha256::new(), &prk, b"rust-lightning revocation base key info", &mut okm);
- let revocation_base_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &okm)?;
-
- hkdf_expand(Sha256::new(), &prk, b"rust-lightning payment base key info", &mut okm);
- let payment_base_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &okm)?;
-
- hkdf_expand(Sha256::new(), &prk, b"rust-lightning delayed payment base key info", &mut okm);
- let delayed_payment_base_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &okm)?;
-
- hkdf_expand(Sha256::new(), &prk, b"rust-lightning htlc base key info", &mut okm);
- let htlc_base_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &okm)?;
-
- hkdf_expand(Sha256::new(), &prk, b"rust-lightning channel close key info", &mut okm);
- let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &okm)?;
-
- hkdf_expand(Sha256::new(), &prk, b"rust-lightning channel monitor claim key info", &mut okm);
- let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &okm)?;
-
- hkdf_expand(Sha256::new(), &prk, b"rust-lightning local commitment seed info", &mut okm);
-
- Ok(ChannelKeys {
- funding_key: funding_key,
- revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key,
- payment_base_key: payment_base_key,
- delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key,
- htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key,
- channel_close_key: channel_close_key,
- channel_monitor_claim_key: channel_monitor_claim_key,
- commitment_seed: okm
- })
- }
-}
-
enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
state: InboundHTLCState,
}
-#[derive(PartialEq)]
enum OutboundHTLCState {
/// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
/// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
/// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
/// doesn't matter to us and its up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
/// we'll never get out of sync).
- LocalAnnounced,
+ /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as its rather large and we don't want to blow up
+ /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
+ LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
Committed,
/// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
/// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
/// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
/// dance.
PeerDisconnected = (1 << 7),
+ /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating the user has told us they
+ /// failed to update our ChannelMonitor somewhere and we should pause sending any outbound
+ /// messages until they've managed to do so.
+ MonitorUpdateFailed = (1 << 8),
/// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
/// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
/// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
/// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
/// later.
/// Flag is set on ChannelFunded.
- AwaitingRemoteRevoke = (1 << 8),
+ AwaitingRemoteRevoke = (1 << 9),
/// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
/// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
/// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
- RemoteShutdownSent = (1 << 9),
+ RemoteShutdownSent = (1 << 10),
/// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
/// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
/// TODO: Investigate some kind of timeout mechanism by which point the remote end must provide
/// us their shutdown.
- LocalShutdownSent = (1 << 10),
+ LocalShutdownSent = (1 << 11),
/// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
/// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
- ShutdownComplete = 2048,
+ ShutdownComplete = 4096,
}
const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32);
+const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
channel_value_satoshis: u64,
local_keys: ChannelKeys,
+ shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
// Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
// generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
+ /// Upon receipt of a channel_reestablish we have to figure out whether to send a
+ /// revoke_and_ack first or a commitment update first. Generally, we prefer to send
+ /// revoke_and_ack first, but if we had a pending commitment update of our own waiting on a
+ /// remote revoke when we received the latest commitment update from the remote we have to make
+ /// sure that commitment update gets resent first.
+ received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa: bool,
pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
+ monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
+ monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
+ monitor_pending_order: Option<RAACommitmentOrder>,
+ monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>,
+ monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32], HTLCFailReason)>,
+
// pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee
// For outbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated with the value from
// pending_update_fee when revoke_and_ack is received
}
// Constructors:
- pub fn new_outbound(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, chan_keys: ChannelKeys, their_node_id: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, announce_publicly: bool, user_id: u64, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Channel, APIError> {
+ pub fn new_outbound(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, keys_provider: &Arc<KeysInterface>, their_node_id: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, announce_publicly: bool, user_id: u64, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Channel, APIError> {
+ let chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(false);
+
if channel_value_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "funding value > 2^24"});
}
let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = Hash160::from_data(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan_keys.channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
- let our_channel_monitor_claim_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script();
- let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&chan_keys.revocation_base_key,
- &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan_keys.delayed_payment_base_key),
- &chan_keys.htlc_base_key,
- BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, our_channel_monitor_claim_script);
+ let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&chan_keys.revocation_base_key, &chan_keys.delayed_payment_base_key,
+ &chan_keys.htlc_base_key, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT,
+ keys_provider.get_destination_script());
Ok(Channel {
user_id: user_id,
channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis,
local_keys: chan_keys,
+ shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
value_to_self_msat: channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat,
+ received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa: false,
+
pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
next_remote_htlc_id: 0,
channel_update_count: 1,
+ monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
+ monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
+ monitor_pending_order: None,
+ monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
+ monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
+
#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
/// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
/// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
- pub fn new_from_req(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, chan_keys: ChannelKeys, their_node_id: PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, require_announce: bool, allow_announce: bool, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Channel, ChannelError> {
+ pub fn new_from_req(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, keys_provider: &Arc<KeysInterface>, their_node_id: PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, require_announce: bool, allow_announce: bool, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Channel, ChannelError> {
+ let chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(true);
+
// Check sanity of message fields:
if msg.funding_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("funding value > 2^24"));
}
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = Hash160::from_data(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan_keys.channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
- let our_channel_monitor_claim_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script();
- let mut channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&chan_keys.revocation_base_key,
- &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan_keys.delayed_payment_base_key),
- &chan_keys.htlc_base_key,
- BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, our_channel_monitor_claim_script);
+ let mut channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&chan_keys.revocation_base_key, &chan_keys.delayed_payment_base_key,
+ &chan_keys.htlc_base_key, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT,
+ keys_provider.get_destination_script());
channel_monitor.set_their_base_keys(&msg.htlc_basepoint, &msg.delayed_payment_basepoint);
channel_monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(msg.to_self_delay);
announce_publicly: their_announce,
local_keys: chan_keys,
+ shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
+ received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa: false,
+
pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
next_remote_htlc_id: 0,
channel_update_count: 1,
+ monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
+ monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
+ monitor_pending_order: None,
+ monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
+ monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
+
#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
let include = match htlc.state {
- OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced => generated_by_local,
+ OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => generated_by_local,
OutboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved => generated_by_local,
OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove => generated_by_local,
#[inline]
fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
- let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::from_data(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.channel_close_key).serialize());
+ let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::from_data(&self.shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script()
}
// can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
self.channel_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash_calc, &payment_preimage_arg);
- if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
match pending_update {
&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
}
// Now update local state:
- if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
match pending_update {
&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent funding_locked when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
}
- let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK);
+
+ let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
+
if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32;
} else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
- self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK);
+ self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
self.channel_update_count += 1;
} else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 &&
// Note that funding_signed/funding_created will have decremented both by 1!
Ok(())
}
- /// Removes an outbound HTLC which has been commitment_signed by the remote end
+ /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
#[inline]
fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<[u8; 32]>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
}
};
match htlc.state {
- OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced =>
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC before it had been committed")),
+ OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC before it had been committed")),
OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved;
htlc.fail_reason = fail_reason;
},
OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved =>
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC that they'd already fulfilled")),
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC that they'd already fulfilled/failed")),
}
return Ok(&htlc.source);
}
}
}
}
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
+ // This is a response to our post-monitor-failed unfreeze messages, so we can clear the
+ // monitor_pending_order requirement as we won't re-send the monitor_pending messages.
+ self.monitor_pending_order = None;
+ }
self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(local_commitment_tx.0, local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, htlcs_and_sigs);
}
}
for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
- if htlc.state == OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {
+ if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved = htlc.state {
htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove;
need_our_commitment = true;
}
self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
self.last_local_commitment_txn = new_local_commitment_txn;
+ self.received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) != 0;
+
+ if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
+ self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
+ self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= need_our_commitment;
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA", action: Some(ErrorAction::IgnoreError)});
+ }
let (our_commitment_signed, monitor_update) = if need_our_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
// If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
/// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
/// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
fn free_holding_cell_htlcs(&mut self) -> Result<Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitor)>, HandleError> {
+ assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: msgs::ErrorMessage{data: "Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_string(), channel_id: msg.channel_id}})});
}
+
if let Some(their_prev_commitment_point) = self.their_prev_commitment_point {
if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secp_call!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret", self.channel_id())) != their_prev_commitment_point {
return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey", action: None});
self.their_prev_commitment_point = self.their_cur_commitment_point;
self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
+ self.received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa = false;
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
+ // This is a response to our post-monitor-failed unfreeze messages, so we can clear the
+ // monitor_pending_order requirement as we won't re-send the monitor_pending messages.
+ self.monitor_pending_order = None;
+ }
let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
} else { true }
});
self.pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
- if htlc.state == OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {
+ if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke = htlc.state {
if let Some(reason) = htlc.fail_reason.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
} else {
}
}
for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
- if htlc.state == OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {
+ if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
- } else if htlc.state == OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {
+ } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove = htlc.state {
htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke;
require_commitment = true;
}
}
}
+ if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 {
+ // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
+ // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
+ if require_commitment {
+ self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
+ }
+ self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
+ self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
+ return Ok((None, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), self.channel_monitor.clone()));
+ }
+
match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs()? {
Some(mut commitment_update) => {
commitment_update.0.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
if !self.channel_outbound {
panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
}
-
if !self.is_usable() {
panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
}
+ if !self.is_live() {
+ panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
+ }
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
});
for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
- if htlc.state == OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {
+ if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved = htlc.state {
// They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
// commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
// the update upon reconnection.
outbound_drops
}
+ /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update failed to be stored by the client and further
+ /// updates are partially paused.
+ /// This must be called immediately after the call which generated the ChannelMonitor update
+ /// which failed, with the order argument set to the type of call it represented (ie a
+ /// commitment update or a revoke_and_ack generation). The messages which were generated from
+ /// that original call must *not* have been sent to the remote end, and must instead have been
+ /// dropped. They will be regenerated when monitor_updating_restored is called.
+ pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, order: RAACommitmentOrder) {
+ assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
+ match order {
+ RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
+ self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
+ self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
+ },
+ RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
+ self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
+ self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
+ },
+ }
+ self.monitor_pending_order = Some(order);
+ self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
+ }
+
+ /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
+ /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
+ /// to the remote side.
+ pub fn monitor_updating_restored(&mut self) -> (Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32], HTLCFailReason)>) {
+ assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
+ self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
+
+ let mut forwards = Vec::new();
+ mem::swap(&mut forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
+ let mut failures = Vec::new();
+ mem::swap(&mut failures, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
+
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
+ // Leave monitor_pending_order so we can order our channel_reestablish responses
+ self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
+ self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
+ return (None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, forwards, failures);
+ }
+
+ let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
+ Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
+ } else { None };
+ let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
+ Some(self.get_last_commitment_update())
+ } else { None };
+
+ self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
+ self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
+ (raa, commitment_update, self.monitor_pending_order.clone().unwrap(), forwards, failures)
+ }
+
pub fn update_fee(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
if self.channel_outbound {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee"));
Ok(())
}
+ fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
+ let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number));
+ let per_commitment_secret = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed, self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
+ msgs::RevokeAndACK {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id,
+ per_commitment_secret,
+ next_per_commitment_point,
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn get_last_commitment_update(&self) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
+ let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
+ let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
+ let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
+ let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
+
+ for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
+ update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+ htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
+ amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
+ payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
+ cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
+ onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
+ });
+ }
+ }
+
+ for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
+ match reason {
+ &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
+ update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+ htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
+ reason: err_packet.clone()
+ });
+ },
+ &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
+ update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+ htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
+ sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
+ failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
+ });
+ },
+ &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
+ update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+ htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
+ payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
+ });
+ },
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
+ update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
+ update_fee: None, //TODO: We need to support re-generating any update_fees in the last commitment_signed!
+ commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update().expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
+ }
+ }
+
/// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
/// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
- pub fn channel_reestablish(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitor>), ChannelError> {
+ pub fn channel_reestablish(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitor>, RAACommitmentOrder), ChannelError> {
if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
// While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
// almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 || msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
msg.next_remote_commitment_number == 0 || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer send garbage channel_reestablish"));
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish"));
}
// Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
// remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
- let mut required_revoke = None;
- if msg.next_remote_commitment_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number {
+ let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number {
// Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
// Note that if we need to repeat our FundingLocked we'll do that in the next if block.
+ None
} else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number {
- let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number));
- let per_commitment_secret = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed, self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
- required_revoke = Some(msgs::RevokeAndACK {
- channel_id: self.channel_id,
- per_commitment_secret,
- next_per_commitment_point,
- });
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
+ self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
+ None
+ } else {
+ Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
+ }
} else {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction"));
- }
+ };
- if msg.next_local_commitment_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number {
- if msg.next_remote_commitment_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number {
- log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with no lost commitment txn", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
- if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && msg.next_remote_commitment_number == 1 {
- let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
- let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
- return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
- channel_id: self.channel_id(),
- next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
- }), None, None, None));
- }
+ // We increment cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
+ // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
+ // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
+ // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
+ let our_next_remote_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
+
+ let resend_funding_locked = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
+ // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateFailed resending FundingLocked
+ let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
+ let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
+ Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+ next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
+ })
+ } else { None };
+
+ let order = self.monitor_pending_order.clone().unwrap_or(if self.received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa {
+ RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
+ } else {
+ RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst
+ });
+
+ if msg.next_local_commitment_number == our_next_remote_commitment_number {
+ if required_revoke.is_some() {
+ log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ } else {
+ log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
}
- if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 &&
+ self.monitor_pending_order.is_none() { // monitor_pending_order indicates we're waiting on a response to a unfreeze
// We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
// channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
// have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs");
}
},
- Ok(Some((commitment_update, channel_monitor))) => return Ok((None, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(channel_monitor))),
- Ok(None) => return Ok((None, required_revoke, None, None)),
+ Ok(Some((commitment_update, channel_monitor))) => return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(channel_monitor), order)),
+ Ok(None) => return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, order)),
}
} else {
- return Ok((None, required_revoke, None, None));
+ return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, order));
}
- } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number {
- return Ok((None, required_revoke,
- Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
- update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fee: None,
- commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update().expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
- }), None));
+ } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == our_next_remote_commitment_number - 1 {
+ if required_revoke.is_some() {
+ log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ } else {
+ log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ }
+
+ // If monitor_pending_order is set, it must be CommitmentSigned if we have no RAA
+ debug_assert!(self.monitor_pending_order != Some(RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst) || required_revoke.is_some());
+
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
+ self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
+ return Ok((resend_funding_locked, None, None, None, order));
+ }
+
+ return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(self.get_last_commitment_update()), None, order));
} else {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction"));
}
}
});
for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
- if htlc.state == OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {
+ if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
return Ok((None, None, dropped_outbound_htlcs));
}
}
self.our_htlc_minimum_msat
}
+ /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
+ pub fn get_their_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
+ self.our_htlc_minimum_msat
+ }
+
pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
self.channel_value_satoshis
}
/// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
/// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
- self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
+ self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0)
+ }
+
+ /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
+ /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
+ pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
+ (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0
}
/// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
/// apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed post-shutdown.
/// Only returns an ErrorAction of DisconnectPeer, if Err.
pub fn block_connected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, HandleError> {
- let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK);
+ let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
if header.bitcoin_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
self.last_block_connected = header.bitcoin_hash();
self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
true
} else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
- self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK);
+ self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
self.channel_update_count += 1;
true
- } else if self.channel_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
+ } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
// We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
// funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
false
return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value", action: None});
}
- if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
// Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
// incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
// the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
// disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
// end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
// IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected", action: Some(ErrorAction::IgnoreError)});
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected/frozen for channel monitor update", action: Some(ErrorAction::IgnoreError)});
}
let (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
amount_msat: amount_msat,
payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
- state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced,
+ state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
source,
fail_reason: None,
});
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
}
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
+ panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
+ }
let mut have_updates = self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
- if htlc.state == OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {
+ if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
have_updates = true;
}
if have_updates { break; }
}
}
for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
- if htlc.state == OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {
+ if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove = htlc.state {
htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke;
}
}
/// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>), APIError> {
for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
- if htlc.state == OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {
+ if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first"});
}
}
}
}
assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
- return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected, maybe force-close instead?"});
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
+ return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?"});
}
let our_closing_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
- use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
+ use bitcoin::util::hash::{Sha256dHash, Hash160};
use bitcoin::util::bip143;
use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
- use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
use hex;
use ln::channelmanager::HTLCSource;
use ln::channel::{Channel,ChannelKeys,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,TxCreationKeys};
use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
use ln::chan_utils;
use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
+ use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use util::test_utils;
use util::logger::Logger;
"MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS is greater than all satoshis on existence");
}
+ struct Keys {
+ chan_keys: ChannelKeys,
+ }
+ impl KeysInterface for Keys {
+ fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); }
+ fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
+ let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = Hash160::from_data(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
+ Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
+ }
+
+ fn get_shutdown_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey {
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
+ let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)
+ }
+
+ fn get_channel_keys(&self, _inbound: bool) -> ChannelKeys { self.chan_keys.clone() }
+ }
+
#[test]
fn outbound_commitment_test() {
// Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix C:
// These aren't set in the test vectors:
revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
- channel_close_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
- channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
commitment_seed: [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
};
assert_eq!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan_keys.funding_key).serialize()[..],
hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
+ let keys_provider: Arc<KeysInterface> = Arc::new(Keys { chan_keys });
let their_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
- let mut chan = Channel::new_outbound(&feeest, chan_keys, their_node_id, 10000000, 100000, false, 42, Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
+ let mut chan = Channel::new_outbound(&feeest, &keys_provider, their_node_id, 10000000, 100000, false, 42, Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
chan.their_to_self_delay = 144;
chan.our_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;