self.write(writer, false)
}
- //TODO: Functions to serialize/deserialize (with different forms depending on which information
- //we want to leave out (eg funding_txo, etc).
-
/// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of non-revoked remote commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
+ // TODO: We really should only fail backwards after our revocation claims have been
+ // confirmed, but we also need to do more other tracking of in-flight pre-confirm
+ // on-chain claims, so we can do that at the same time.
+ macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
+ ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $id: tt) => {
+ if let Some(&(_, ref latest_outpoints)) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&$txid) {
+ $id: for &(ref payment_hash, ref source, _) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
+ // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
+ // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
+ // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
+ // payment_preimage.
+ // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
+ // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
+ // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
+ // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
+ // need to here.
+ for &(_, ref broadcast_source, ref output_idx) in per_commitment_data.1.iter() {
+ if output_idx.is_some() && source == broadcast_source {
+ continue $id;
+ }
+ }
+ log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
+ htlc_updated.push(((*source).clone(), None, payment_hash.clone()));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
+ if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
+ check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current", 'current_loop);
+ }
+ if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
+ check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop);
+ }
+ }
+
if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
let revocation_point_option =
if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
});
txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
-
- // TODO: We need to fail back HTLCs that were't included in the broadcast
- // commitment transaction, either because they didn't meet dust or because a
- // stale (but not yet revoked) commitment transaction was broadcast!
}
}
}
}
if payment_data.is_none() {
for htlc_output in $htlc_outputs {
- if input.previous_output.vout == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
+ if input.previous_output.vout == htlc_output.transaction_output_index && !htlc_output.offered {
log_info!(self, "Input spending {}:{} in {} resolves inbound HTLC with timeout from {}", input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(), $source);
continue 'outer_loop;
+ } else if input.previous_output.vout == htlc_output.transaction_output_index && tx.lock_time > 0 {
+ log_info!(self, "Input spending {}:{} in {} resolves offered HTLC with HTLC-timeout from {}", input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(), $source);
+ continue 'outer_loop;
}
}
}