use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
use std::{hash,cmp};
+pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
+ /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower failed, but is expected
+ /// to succeed at some point in the future).
+ /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
+ /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
+ /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
+ /// the channel to an operational state.
+ TemporaryFailure,
+ /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
+ /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
+ /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
+ PermanentFailure,
+}
+
/// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
/// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
/// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
/// server(s).
+/// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
+/// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
+/// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
+/// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
/// Adds or updates a monitor for the given funding_txid+funding_output_index.
- fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: (Sha256dHash, u16), monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError>;
+ fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: (Sha256dHash, u16), monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
}
/// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
}
impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<(Sha256dHash, u16)> {
- fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: (Sha256dHash, u16), monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
- self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor)
+ fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: (Sha256dHash, u16), monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
+ match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
+ Ok(_) => Ok(()),
+ Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
+ }
}
}
-/// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it directly, instead broadcast
-/// the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transaction and claim the revocation from that.
-const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
+/// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
+/// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
+const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
+/// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
+/// HTLC-Success transaction.
+const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
#[derive(Clone)]
-enum RevocationStorage {
+enum KeyStorage {
PrivMode {
revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
+ htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
},
SigsMode {
revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
+ htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
sigs: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Signature>,
}
}
#[derive(Clone)]
-struct PerCommitmentTransactionData {
- revoked_output_index: u32,
- htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature)>,
+struct LocalSignedTx {
+ txid: Sha256dHash,
+ tx: Transaction,
+ revocation_key: PublicKey,
+ a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
+ b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
+ delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
+ feerate_per_kw: u64,
+ htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>,
}
-#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct ChannelMonitor {
funding_txo: Option<(Sha256dHash, u16)>,
commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
- revocation_base_key: RevocationStorage,
+ key_storage: KeyStorage,
delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
- htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
- to_self_delay: u16,
+ // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
+ their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
+
+ our_to_self_delay: u16,
+ their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
- claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, PerCommitmentTransactionData>,
- payment_preimages: Vec<[u8; 32]>,
+ remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>>,
+ remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain: Mutex<HashMap<Sha256dHash, u64>>,
+
+ // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
+ // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
+ // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
+ // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
+ prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
+ current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
+
+ payment_preimages: HashMap<[u8; 32], [u8; 32]>,
destination_script: Script,
secp_ctx: Secp256k1, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
}
+impl Clone for ChannelMonitor {
+ fn clone(&self) -> Self {
+ ChannelMonitor {
+ funding_txo: self.funding_txo.clone(),
+ commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor.clone(),
+
+ key_storage: self.key_storage.clone(),
+ delayed_payment_base_key: self.delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
+ their_htlc_base_key: self.their_htlc_base_key.clone(),
+ their_cur_revocation_points: self.their_cur_revocation_points.clone(),
+
+ our_to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
+ their_to_self_delay: self.their_to_self_delay,
+
+ old_secrets: self.old_secrets.clone(),
+ remote_claimable_outpoints: self.remote_claimable_outpoints.clone(),
+ remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain: Mutex::new((*self.remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain.lock().unwrap()).clone()),
+
+ prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(),
+ current_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(),
+
+ payment_preimages: self.payment_preimages.clone(),
+
+ destination_script: self.destination_script.clone(),
+ secp_ctx: self.secp_ctx.clone(),
+ }
+ }
+}
impl ChannelMonitor {
- pub fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey, htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script) -> ChannelMonitor {
+ pub fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script) -> ChannelMonitor {
ChannelMonitor {
funding_txo: None,
commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
- revocation_base_key: RevocationStorage::PrivMode {
+ key_storage: KeyStorage::PrivMode {
revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
+ htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
},
delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
- htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
their_htlc_base_key: None,
- to_self_delay: to_self_delay,
+ their_cur_revocation_points: None,
+
+ our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
+ their_to_self_delay: None,
old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
- claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
- payment_preimages: Vec::new(),
+ remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
+ remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
+
+ prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
+ current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
+
+ payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
destination_script: destination_script,
secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
res
}
- /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Requires the revocation_base_key of
- /// the node which we are monitoring the channel on behalf of in order to generate signatures
- /// over revocation-claim transactions.
- pub fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Also optionally tracks the next
+ /// revocation point which may be required to claim HTLC outputs which we know the preimage of
+ /// in case the remote end force-closes using their latest state.
+ pub fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32], their_next_revocation_point: Option<(u64, PublicKey)>) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
for i in 0..pos {
let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
}
}
self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
+
+ if let Some(new_revocation_point) = their_next_revocation_point {
+ match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
+ Some(old_points) => {
+ if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 1 {
+ self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(new_revocation_point.1)));
+ } else if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 2 {
+ if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
+ self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(new_revocation_point.1)));
+ } else {
+ self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
+ }
+ } else {
+ self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
+ }
+ },
+ None => {
+ self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ // TODO: Prune payment_preimages no longer needed by the revocation (just have to check
+ // that non-revoked remote commitment tx(n) do not need it, and our latest local commitment
+ // tx does not need it.
Ok(())
}
- /// Informs this watcher of the set of HTLC outputs in a commitment transaction which our
- /// counterparty may broadcast. This allows us to reconstruct the commitment transaction's
- /// outputs fully, claiming revoked, unexpired HTLC outputs as well as revoked refund outputs.
- /// TODO: Doc new params!
- /// TODO: This seems to be wrong...we should be calling this from commitment_signed, but we
- /// should be calling this about remote transactions, ie ones that they can revoke_and_ack...
- pub fn provide_tx_info(&mut self, commitment_tx: &Transaction, revokeable_out_index: u32, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature)>) {
+ /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
+ /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
+ /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
+ pub fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) {
// TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
// so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
- self.claimable_outpoints.insert(commitment_tx.txid(), PerCommitmentTransactionData{
- revoked_output_index: revokeable_out_index,
- htlcs: htlc_outputs
+ // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
+ // timeouts)
+ self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(unsigned_commitment_tx.txid(), htlc_outputs);
+ }
+
+ /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
+ /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
+ /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
+ /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
+ /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
+ pub fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>) {
+ assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
+ self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
+ self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
+ txid: signed_commitment_tx.txid(),
+ tx: signed_commitment_tx,
+ revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
+ a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
+ b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
+ delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
+ feerate_per_kw,
+ htlc_outputs,
});
}
- pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
+ /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
+ pub fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], payment_preimage: &[u8; 32]) {
+ self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
+ }
+
+ pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
match self.funding_txo {
Some(txo) => if other.funding_txo.is_some() && other.funding_txo.unwrap() != txo {
return Err(HandleError{err: "Funding transaction outputs are not identical!", msg: None});
self.funding_txo = other.funding_txo;
}
}
- let other_max_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
- if self.get_min_seen_secret() > other_max_secret {
- self.provide_secret(other_max_secret, other.get_secret(other_max_secret).unwrap())
- } else { Ok(()) }
+ let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
+ let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
+ if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
+ self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap(), None)?;
+ }
+ if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
+ self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
+ for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
+ self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
+ }
+ if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
+ self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
+ }
+ if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
+ self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
+ }
+ self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
+ }
+ Ok(())
}
/// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
}
+ pub fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
+ self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
+ }
+
pub fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
self.funding_txo = None;
}
min
}
- pub fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_preimage: &[u8; 32]) {
- //TODO: Some kind of timeout here or ability to mark all states containing this preimage
- //revoked?
- self.payment_preimages.push(payment_preimage.clone());
- }
-
- #[inline]
- fn check_spend_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> Vec<Transaction> {
+ /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
+ /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
+ /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
+ /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions, and claim them using the revocation key (if
+ /// applicable) as well.
+ fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> Vec<Transaction> {
// Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
// a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
+ let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
macro_rules! ignore_error {
( $thing : expr ) => {
match $thing {
Ok(a) => a,
- Err(_) => return Vec::new()
+ Err(_) => return txn_to_broadcast
}
};
}
- let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
+ let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
+ let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
let commitment_number = (((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
- let revocation_pubkey = match self.revocation_base_key {
- RevocationStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key } => {
- ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key)), &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))))
+ let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
+ KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => {
+ let per_commitment_point = ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key));
+ (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))),
+ ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key)))))
},
- RevocationStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
- ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key)), &revocation_base_key))
+ KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
+ let per_commitment_point = ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key));
+ (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
+ ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)))
},
};
let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key)), &self.delayed_payment_base_key));
- let a_htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key)), &self.htlc_base_key));
- let b_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
- None => return Vec::new(),
+ let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
+ None => return txn_to_broadcast,
Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key)), &their_htlc_base_key)),
};
- let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
-
- let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
+ let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
+ let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
let mut total_value = 0;
let mut values = Vec::new();
- let inputs = match self.claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid) {
- Some(per_commitment_data) => {
- let mut inp = Vec::with_capacity(per_commitment_data.htlcs.len() + 1);
-
- if per_commitment_data.revoked_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[per_commitment_data.revoked_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh() {
- return Vec::new(); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, not much we can do
- }
+ let mut inputs = Vec::new();
+ let mut htlc_idxs = Vec::new();
- inp.push(TxIn {
+ for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
+ if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
+ inputs.push(TxIn {
prev_hash: commitment_txid,
- prev_index: per_commitment_data.revoked_output_index,
+ prev_index: idx as u32,
script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: 0xffffffff,
+ sequence: 0xfffffffd,
witness: Vec::new(),
});
- values.push(tx.output[per_commitment_data.revoked_output_index as usize].value);
- total_value += tx.output[per_commitment_data.revoked_output_index as usize].value;
-
- for &(ref htlc, ref _next_tx_sig) in per_commitment_data.htlcs.iter() {
- let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
- if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
- tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
- tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
- return Vec::new(); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
- }
- if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER {
- inp.push(TxIn {
- prev_hash: commitment_txid,
- prev_index: htlc.transaction_output_index,
- script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: 0xffffffff,
- witness: Vec::new(),
- });
- values.push(tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value);
- total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
+ htlc_idxs.push(None);
+ values.push(outp.value);
+ total_value += outp.value;
+ break; // There can only be one of these
+ }
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! sign_input {
+ ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
+ {
+ let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
+ KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
+ let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
+ let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()];
+ chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
+ };
+ let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
+ let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
+ (ignore_error!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key)), redeemscript)
+ },
+ KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
+ unimplemented!();
+ }
+ };
+ $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
+ $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+ if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
+ $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
} else {
- //TODO: Mark as "bad"
- //then broadcast using next_tx_sig
+ $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
}
+ $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_vec());
}
- inp
- }, None => {
- let mut inp = Vec::new(); // This is unlikely to succeed
- for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
- if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh() {
- inp.push(TxIn {
- prev_hash: commitment_txid,
- prev_index: idx as u32,
- script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: 0xffffffff,
- witness: Vec::new(),
- });
- values.push(outp.value);
- total_value += outp.value;
- break; // There can only be one of these
- }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
+ inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
+
+ for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
+ let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
+ if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
+ tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
+ tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
+ return txn_to_broadcast; // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
+ }
+ let input = TxIn {
+ prev_hash: commitment_txid,
+ prev_index: htlc.transaction_output_index,
+ script_sig: Script::new(),
+ sequence: 0xfffffffd,
+ witness: Vec::new(),
+ };
+ if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
+ inputs.push(input);
+ htlc_idxs.push(Some(idx));
+ values.push(tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value);
+ total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
+ } else {
+ let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: 0,
+ input: vec![input],
+ output: vec!(TxOut {
+ script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
+ value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
+ }),
+ };
+ let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
+ sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
+ txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx); // TODO: This is not yet tested in ChannelManager!
}
- if inp.is_empty() { return Vec::new(); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive
- inp
}
- };
+ }
+
+ if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() {
+ // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
+ // TODO: Register commitment_txid with the ChainWatchInterface!
+ self.remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
+ }
+ if inputs.is_empty() { return txn_to_broadcast; } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
};
let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
-
- // First input is the generic revokeable_redeemscript
let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
- {
- let sig = match self.revocation_base_key {
- RevocationStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key } => {
- let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &revokeable_redeemscript, values_drain.next().unwrap())[..]));
- let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
- ignore_error!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key))
- },
- RevocationStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
- unimplemented!();
- }
- };
- spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
- spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
- spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(1)); // First if branch is revocation_key
+ for (input, htlc_idx) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(htlc_idxs.iter()) {
+ let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
+ sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, htlc_idx, value);
}
- match self.claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid) {
- None => {},
- Some(per_commitment_data) => {
- let mut htlc_idx = 0;
- for (idx, input) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().enumerate() {
- if idx == 0 { continue; } // We already signed the first input
-
- let mut htlc;
- while {
- htlc = &per_commitment_data.htlcs[htlc_idx].0;
- htlc_idx += 1;
- htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
- } {}
-
- let sig = match self.revocation_base_key {
- RevocationStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key } => {
- let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
- let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&input, &htlc_redeemscript, values_drain.next().unwrap())[..]));
+ txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
+ } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
+ if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
+ let revocation_point_option =
+ if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
+ else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
+ if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
+ } else { None };
+ if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
+ let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
+ KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => {
+ (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))),
+ ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key)))))
+ },
+ KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
+ (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
+ ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
+ },
+ };
+ let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
+ None => return txn_to_broadcast,
+ Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
+ };
+
+ let mut total_value = 0;
+ let mut values = Vec::new();
+ let mut inputs = Vec::new();
+
+ macro_rules! sign_input {
+ ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
+ {
+ let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
+ KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
+ let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize];
+ let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
+ let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
+ let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
+ (ignore_error!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key)), redeemscript)
+ },
+ KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
+ unimplemented!();
+ }
+ };
+ $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
+ $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+ $input.witness.push($preimage);
+ $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_vec());
+ }
+ }
+ }
- let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
- ignore_error!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key))
- },
- RevocationStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
- unimplemented!();
+ for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
+ if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
+ let input = TxIn {
+ prev_hash: commitment_txid,
+ prev_index: htlc.transaction_output_index,
+ script_sig: Script::new(),
+ sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
+ witness: Vec::new(),
+ };
+ if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
+ inputs.push(input);
+ values.push((tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value, payment_preimage));
+ total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
+ } else {
+ let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: 0,
+ input: vec![input],
+ output: vec!(TxOut {
+ script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
+ value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
+ }),
+ };
+ let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
+ sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.to_vec());
+ txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
}
- };
+ }
+ }
- input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec()); // First if branch is revocation_key
- input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
- input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+ if inputs.is_empty() { return txn_to_broadcast; } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
+
+ let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
+ script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
+ value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
+ });
+ let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: 0,
+ input: inputs,
+ output: outputs,
+ };
+
+ let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
+ let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
+
+ for input in spend_tx.input.iter_mut() {
+ let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
+ sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, value.0, value.1.to_vec());
}
+
+ txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
}
}
-
- txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
+ } else {
+ //TODO: For each input check if its in our remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain map!
}
txn_to_broadcast
}
- fn block_connected(&self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface) {
- for tx in txn_matched {
- if tx.input.len() != 1 {
- // We currently only ever sign something spending a commitment or HTLC
- // transaction with 1 input, so we can skip most transactions trivially.
- continue;
+ fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx) -> Vec<Transaction> {
+ let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
+
+ for &(ref htlc, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
+ if htlc.offered {
+ let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
+
+ htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
+
+ htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
+ htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+ htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
+ htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+
+ htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
+ htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_vec());
+
+ res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
+ } else {
+ if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
+ let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
+
+ htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
+
+ htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
+ htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+ htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
+ htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+
+ htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.to_vec());
+ htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_vec());
+
+ res.push(htlc_success_tx);
+ }
}
+ }
+
+ res
+ }
+
+ /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
+ /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
+ /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
+ fn check_spend_local_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, _height: u32) -> Vec<Transaction> {
+ let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
+ if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
+ if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
+ return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx);
+ }
+ }
+ if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
+ if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
+ return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx);
+ }
+ }
+ Vec::new()
+ }
+ fn block_connected(&self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface) {
+ for tx in txn_matched {
for txin in tx.input.iter() {
if self.funding_txo.is_none() || (txin.prev_hash == self.funding_txo.unwrap().0 && txin.prev_index == self.funding_txo.unwrap().1 as u32) {
- for tx in self.check_spend_transaction(tx, height).iter() {
+ let mut txn = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height);
+ if txn.is_empty() {
+ txn = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height);
+ }
+ for tx in txn.iter() {
broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
}
}
}
}
+ if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
+ let mut needs_broadcast = false;
+ for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
+ if htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER {
+ if htlc.offered || self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash) {
+ needs_broadcast = true;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if needs_broadcast {
+ broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
+ for tx in self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx) {
+ broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ pub fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
+ if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
+ for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
+ if htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER {
+ if htlc.offered || self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash) {
+ return true;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ false
}
}
{
// insert_secret correct sequence
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &PublicKey::new(), 0, Script::new());
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
}
{
// insert_secret #1 incorrect
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &PublicKey::new(), 0, Script::new());
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
- assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err,
+ assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
"Previous secret did not match new one");
}
{
// insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &PublicKey::new(), 0, Script::new());
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
- assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err,
+ assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
"Previous secret did not match new one");
}
{
// insert_secret #3 incorrect
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &PublicKey::new(), 0, Script::new());
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
- assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err,
+ assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
"Previous secret did not match new one");
}
{
// insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &PublicKey::new(), 0, Script::new());
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
- assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err,
+ assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
"Previous secret did not match new one");
}
{
// insert_secret #5 incorrect
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &PublicKey::new(), 0, Script::new());
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
- assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err,
+ assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
"Previous secret did not match new one");
}
{
// insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &PublicKey::new(), 0, Script::new());
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
- assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err,
+ assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
"Previous secret did not match new one");
}
{
// insert_secret #7 incorrect
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &PublicKey::new(), 0, Script::new());
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
- assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err,
+ assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
"Previous secret did not match new one");
}
{
// insert_secret #8 incorrect
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &PublicKey::new(), 0, Script::new());
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
- assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err,
+ assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
"Previous secret did not match new one");
}
}
+
+ // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.
}