- Ok(())
- }
-
- /// Informs this monitor of the latest counterparty (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
- /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
- /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
- /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
- pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info<L: Deref>(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
- // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
- // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
- // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
- // timeouts)
- for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
- self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
- }
-
- let new_txid = unsigned_commitment_tx.txid();
- log_trace!(logger, "Tracking new counterparty commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", new_txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
- log_trace!(logger, "New potential counterparty commitment transaction: {}", encode::serialize_hex(unsigned_commitment_tx));
- self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.take();
- self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid);
- self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, htlc_outputs.clone());
- self.current_counterparty_commitment_number = commitment_number;
- //TODO: Merge this into the other per-counterparty-transaction output storage stuff
- match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
- Some(old_points) => {
- if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
- self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
- } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
- if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
- self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
- } else {
- self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
- }
- } else {
- self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
- }
- },
- None => {
- self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
- }
- }
- let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs.len());
- for htlc in htlc_outputs {
- if htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
- htlcs.push(htlc.0);
- }
- }
- self.counterparty_tx_cache.per_htlc.insert(new_txid, htlcs);
- }
-
- /// Informs this monitor of the latest holder (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
- /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
- /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
- /// up-to-date as our holder commitment transaction is updated.
- /// Panics if set_on_holder_tx_csv has never been called.
- pub(super) fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
- let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
- let sequence = commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.input[0].sequence as u64;
- let locktime = commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.lock_time as u64;
- let mut new_holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
- txid,
- revocation_key: commitment_tx.keys.revocation_key,
- a_htlc_key: commitment_tx.keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
- b_htlc_key: commitment_tx.keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
- delayed_payment_key: commitment_tx.keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
- per_commitment_point: commitment_tx.keys.per_commitment_point,
- feerate_per_kw: commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw,
- htlc_outputs: htlc_outputs,
- };
- self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(commitment_tx);
- self.current_holder_commitment_number = 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((sequence & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (locktime as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
- mem::swap(&mut new_holder_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
- self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = Some(new_holder_commitment_tx);
- if self.holder_tx_signed {
- return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Latest holder commitment signed has already been signed, update is rejected"));
- }
- Ok(())
- }
-
- /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
- /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
- pub(crate) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage) {
- self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
- }
-
- pub(crate) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L)
- where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
- L::Target: Logger,
- {
- for tx in self.get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger).iter() {
- broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
- }
- self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(self.funding_info.0));
- }
-
- /// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
- /// itself.
- ///
- /// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id.
- pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, mut updates: ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError>
- where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
- L::Target: Logger,
- {
- if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
- panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
- }
- for update in updates.updates.drain(..) {
- match update {
- ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
- if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
- self.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx_info(commitment_tx, htlc_outputs)?
- },
- ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } =>
- self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point, logger),
- ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } =>
- self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage),
- ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } =>
- self.provide_secret(idx, secret)?,
- ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } => {
- self.lockdown_from_offchain = true;
- if should_broadcast {
- self.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger);
- } else {
- log_error!(logger, "You have a toxic holder commitment transaction avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take");
- }
- }
- }
- }
- self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
- Ok(())
- }
-
- /// Gets the update_id from the latest ChannelMonitorUpdate which was applied to this
- /// ChannelMonitor.
- pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
- self.latest_update_id
- }
-
- /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
- pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> &(OutPoint, Script) {
- &self.funding_info
- }
-
- /// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
- /// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
- ///
- /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
- pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Txid, Vec<Script>> {
- &self.outputs_to_watch
- }
-
- /// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
- /// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
- /// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
- /// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
- ///
- /// (C-not exported) as there is no practical way to track lifetimes of returned values.
- pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, &Script)> {
- let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
- for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
- for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
- res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
- }
- }
- res
- }
-
- /// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
- /// ChannelManager via [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`].
- ///
- /// [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`]: ../../chain/trait.Watch.html#tymethod.release_pending_monitor_events
- pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&mut self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
- let mut ret = Vec::new();
- mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_monitor_events);
- ret
- }
-
- /// Gets the list of pending events which were generated by previous actions, clearing the list
- /// in the process.
- ///
- /// This is called by ChainMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_events() and is equivalent to
- /// EventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_events() except that it requires &mut self as we do
- /// no internal locking in ChannelMonitors.
- pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&mut self) -> Vec<Event> {
- let mut ret = Vec::new();
- mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_events);
- ret
- }
-
- /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
- pub(crate) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
- self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx)
- }
-
- pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
- self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret()
- }
-
- pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
- self.current_counterparty_commitment_number
- }
-
- pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
- self.current_holder_commitment_number
- }
-
- /// Attempts to claim a counterparty commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
- /// data in counterparty_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
- /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
- /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
- /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
- /// revoked counterparty commitment tx
- fn check_spend_counterparty_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, (Txid, Vec<TxOut>)) where L::Target: Logger {
- // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
- // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
- let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
- let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
-
- let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
- let per_commitment_option = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
-
- macro_rules! ignore_error {
- ( $thing : expr ) => {
- match $thing {
- Ok(a) => a,
- Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
- }
- };
- }
-
- let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
- if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
- let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
- let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
- let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
- let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint));
- let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key));
-
- let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
- let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
-
- // First, process non-htlc outputs (to_holder & to_counterparty)
- for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
- if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
- let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, amount: outp.value, htlc: None, on_counterparty_tx_csv: self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv};
- claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 }, witness_data});
- }
- }
-
- // Then, try to find revoked htlc outputs
- if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
- for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
- if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
- if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
- tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
- return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
- }
- let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC }, amount: tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc: Some(htlc.clone()), on_counterparty_tx_csv: self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv};
- claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data });
- }
- }
- }
-
- // Last, track onchain revoked commitment transaction and fail backward outgoing HTLCs as payment path is broken
- if !claimable_outpoints.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
- // We're definitely a counterparty commitment transaction!
- log_trace!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len());
- watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
- self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
-
- macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
- ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
- if let Some(ref outpoints) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
- for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in outpoints.iter() {
- if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
- log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
- match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
- let e = entry.get_mut();
- e.retain(|ref event| {
- match **event {
- OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
- return htlc_update.0 != **source
- },
- _ => true
- }
- });
- e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
- }
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
- entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
- if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
- check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
- }
- if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
- check_htlc_fails!(txid, "counterparty");
- }
- // No need to check holder commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on counterparty commitment tx
- }
- } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
- // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
- // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
- // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
- // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
- // already processed the block, resulting in the counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
- // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
- // insert it here.
- watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
- self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
-
- log_trace!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked counterparty commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
-
- macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
- ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $id: tt) => {
- if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
- $id: for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
- if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
- // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
- // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
- // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
- // payment_preimage.
- // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
- // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
- // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
- // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
- // need to here.
- for &(ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in per_commitment_data.iter() {
- if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(source) == broadcast_source.as_ref() {
- continue $id;
- }
- }
- log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of counterparty commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
- match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
- let e = entry.get_mut();
- e.retain(|ref event| {
- match **event {
- OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
- return htlc_update.0 != **source
- },
- _ => true
- }
- });
- e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
- }
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
- entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
- if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
- check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current", 'current_loop);
- }
- if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
- check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop);
- }
-
- if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
- let revocation_point_option =
- if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
- else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
- if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
- } else { None };
- if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
- self.counterparty_payment_script = {
- // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
- // script_pubkey version
- let payment_hash160 = WPubkeyHash::hash(&self.keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
- Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script()
- };
-
- // Then, try to find htlc outputs
- for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
- if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
- if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
- tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
- return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
- }
- let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
- let aggregable = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
- if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
- let witness_data = InputMaterial::CounterpartyHTLC { per_commitment_point: *revocation_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, preimage, htlc: htlc.clone() };
- claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data });
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
- (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
- }
-
- /// Attempts to claim a counterparty HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
- fn check_spend_counterparty_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Option<(Txid, Vec<TxOut>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
- let htlc_txid = tx.txid();
- if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 || tx.input[0].witness.len() != 5 {
- return (Vec::new(), None)
- }
-
- macro_rules! ignore_error {
- ( $thing : expr ) => {
- match $thing {
- Ok(a) => a,
- Err(_) => return (Vec::new(), None)
- }
- };
- }
-
- let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (Vec::new(), None); };
- let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
- let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
-
- log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty HTLC broadcast {}:{}", htlc_txid, 0);
- let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, amount: tx.output[0].value, htlc: None, on_counterparty_tx_csv: self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv };
- let claimable_outpoints = vec!(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: htlc_txid, vout: 0}, witness_data });
- (claimable_outpoints, Some((htlc_txid, tx.output.clone())))
- }
-
- fn broadcast_by_holder_state(&self, commitment_tx: &Transaction, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Vec<TxOut>, Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>) {
- let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
- let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
-
- let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&holder_tx.revocation_key, self.on_holder_tx_csv, &holder_tx.delayed_payment_key);
- let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = Some((redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(), holder_tx.per_commitment_point.clone(), holder_tx.revocation_key.clone()));
-
- for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
- if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
- claim_requests.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: ::std::u32::MAX, aggregable: false, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: holder_tx.txid, vout: transaction_output_index as u32 },
- witness_data: InputMaterial::HolderHTLC {
- preimage: if !htlc.offered {
- if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
- Some(preimage.clone())
- } else {
- // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
- continue;
- }
- } else { None },
- amount: htlc.amount_msat,
- }});
- watch_outputs.push(commitment_tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone());
- }
- }
-
- (claim_requests, watch_outputs, broadcasted_holder_revokable_script)
- }
-
- /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
- /// revoked using data in holder_claimable_outpoints.
- /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
- fn check_spend_holder_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, (Txid, Vec<TxOut>)) where L::Target: Logger {
- let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
- let mut claim_requests = Vec::new();
- let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
-
- macro_rules! wait_threshold_conf {
- ($height: expr, $source: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
- log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} holder commitment tx due to broadcast of transaction, waiting confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!($payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
- match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry($height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
- let e = entry.get_mut();
- e.retain(|ref event| {
- match **event {
- OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
- return htlc_update.0 != $source
- },
- _ => true
- }
- });
- e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)});
- }
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
- entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)}]);
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
- ($updates: expr) => {
- claim_requests = $updates.0;
- watch_outputs.append(&mut $updates.1);
- self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = $updates.2;
- }
- }
-
- // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous holder commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
- let mut is_holder_tx = false;
-
- if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
- is_holder_tx = true;
- log_trace!(logger, "Got latest holder commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
- let mut res = self.broadcast_by_holder_state(tx, &self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
- append_onchain_update!(res);
- } else if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
- if holder_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
- is_holder_tx = true;
- log_trace!(logger, "Got previous holder commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
- let mut res = self.broadcast_by_holder_state(tx, holder_tx);
- append_onchain_update!(res);
- }
- }
-
- macro_rules! fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf {
- ($holder_tx: expr) => {
- for &(ref htlc, _, ref source) in &$holder_tx.htlc_outputs {
- if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() {
- if let &Some(ref source) = source {
- wait_threshold_conf!(height, source.clone(), "lastest", htlc.payment_hash.clone());
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- if is_holder_tx {
- fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
- if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
- fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(holder_tx);
- }
- }
-
- (claim_requests, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
- }
-
- /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest holder state if its copy of
- /// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable holder toxic tx in case of
- /// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our counterparty side knows
- /// a higher revocation secret than the holder commitment number we are aware of. Broadcasting these
- /// transactions are UNSAFE, as they allow counterparty side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to
- /// broadcast them if counterparty don't close channel with his higher commitment transaction after a
- /// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact
- /// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you.
- /// In any-case, choice is up to the user.
- pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
- log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed latest holder commitment transaction!");
- self.holder_tx_signed = true;
- if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
- let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
- let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
- for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
- if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
- let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
- if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
- // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
- continue;
- }
- } else { None };
- if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
- &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
- res.push(htlc_tx);
- }
- }
- }
- // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
- // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_holder_transaction if we get a confirmation.
- return res
- }
- Vec::new()
- }
-
- /// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_holder_commitment_txn used by our test framework
- /// to bypass HolderCommitmentTransaction state update lockdown after signature and generate
- /// revoked commitment transaction.
- #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
- pub fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
- log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest holder commitment transaction!");
- if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
- let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
- let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
- for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
- if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
- let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
- if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
- // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
- continue;
- }
- } else { None };
- if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
- &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
- res.push(htlc_tx);
- }
- }
- }
- return res
- }
- Vec::new()
- }
-
- /// Processes transactions in a newly connected block, which may result in any of the following:
- /// - update the monitor's state against resolved HTLCs
- /// - punish the counterparty in the case of seeing a revoked commitment transaction
- /// - force close the channel and claim/timeout incoming/outgoing HTLCs if near expiration
- /// - detect settled outputs for later spending
- /// - schedule and bump any in-flight claims
- ///
- /// Returns any new outputs to watch from `txdata`; after called, these are also included in
- /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`].
- ///
- /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`]: #method.get_outputs_to_watch
- pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)-> Vec<(Txid, Vec<TxOut>)>
- where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
- F::Target: FeeEstimator,
- L::Target: Logger,
- {
- let txn_matched = self.filter_block(txdata);
- for tx in &txn_matched {
- let mut output_val = 0;
- for out in tx.output.iter() {
- if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
- output_val += out.value;
- if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
- }
- }
-
- let block_hash = header.block_hash();
- log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", block_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
-
- let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
- let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
- for tx in &txn_matched {
- if tx.input.len() == 1 {
- // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
- // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
- // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
- // filters.
- let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
- if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 {
- if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
- let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_counterparty_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
- if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
- watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
- }
- if new_outpoints.is_empty() {
- let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_holder_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
- if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
- watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
- }
- claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
- }
- claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
- }
- } else {
- if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
- let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_counterparty_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, &logger);
- claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
- if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option {
- watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
- }
- }
- }
- }
- // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
- // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
- // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
- self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height, &logger);
-
- self.is_paying_spendable_output(&tx, height, &logger);
- }
- let should_broadcast = self.would_broadcast_at_height(height, &logger);
- if should_broadcast {
- claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height, aggregable: false, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), vout: self.funding_info.0.index as u32 }, witness_data: InputMaterial::Funding { funding_redeemscript: self.funding_redeemscript.clone() }});
- }
- if should_broadcast {
- self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(self.funding_info.0));
- if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
- self.holder_tx_signed = true;
- let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs, _) = self.broadcast_by_holder_state(&commitment_tx, &self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
- if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
- watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
- }
- claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
- }
- }
- if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&height) {
- for ev in events {
- match ev {
- OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => {
- log_trace!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!((htlc_update.1).0));
- self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
- payment_hash: htlc_update.1,
- payment_preimage: None,
- source: htlc_update.0,
- }));
- },
- OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
- log_trace!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
- self.pending_events.push(Event::SpendableOutputs {
- outputs: vec![descriptor]
- });
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- self.onchain_tx_handler.block_connected(&txn_matched, claimable_outpoints, height, &*broadcaster, &*fee_estimator, &*logger);
- self.last_block_hash = block_hash;
-
- // Determine new outputs to watch by comparing against previously known outputs to watch,
- // updating the latter in the process.
- watch_outputs.retain(|&(ref txid, ref txouts)| {
- let output_scripts = txouts.iter().map(|o| o.script_pubkey.clone()).collect();
- self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), output_scripts).is_none()
- });
- watch_outputs
- }
-
- /// Determines if the disconnected block contained any transactions of interest and updates
- /// appropriately.
- pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)
- where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
- F::Target: FeeEstimator,
- L::Target: Logger,
- {
- let block_hash = header.block_hash();
- log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", block_hash, height);
-
- if let Some(_) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1)) {
- //We may discard:
- //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
- //- maturing spendable output has transaction paying us has been disconnected
- }
-
- self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
-
- self.last_block_hash = block_hash;
- }
-
- /// Filters a block's `txdata` for transactions spending watched outputs or for any child
- /// transactions thereof.
- fn filter_block<'a>(&self, txdata: &TransactionData<'a>) -> Vec<&'a Transaction> {
- let mut matched_txn = HashSet::new();
- txdata.iter().filter(|&&(_, tx)| {
- let mut matches = self.spends_watched_output(tx);
- for input in tx.input.iter() {
- if matches { break; }
- if matched_txn.contains(&input.previous_output.txid) {
- matches = true;
- }
- }
- if matches {
- matched_txn.insert(tx.txid());
- }
- matches
- }).map(|(_, tx)| *tx).collect()
- }
-
- /// Checks if a given transaction spends any watched outputs.
- fn spends_watched_output(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> bool {
- for input in tx.input.iter() {
- if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
- for (idx, _script_pubkey) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
- if idx == input.previous_output.vout as usize {
- return true;
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- false
- }
-
- fn would_broadcast_at_height<L: Deref>(&self, height: u32, logger: &L) -> bool where L::Target: Logger {
- // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
- // * in any unrevoked counterparty commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
- // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
- // * are in our latest holder commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
- // broadcast if we go on-chain.
- // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
- // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
- // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
- // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
- // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
- macro_rules! scan_commitment {
- ($htlcs: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
- for ref htlc in $htlcs {
- // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
- // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
- // time out the HTLC first.
- // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
- // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
- // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
- // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
- // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
- // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
- // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
- // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
- // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
- // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
- // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
- // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
- // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
- // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
- // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
- // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
- // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
- // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
- // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
- // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
- let htlc_outbound = $holder_tx == htlc.offered;
- if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
- (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
- log_info!(logger, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
- return true;
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
-
- if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
- if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
- scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
- }
- }
- if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
- if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
- scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
- }
- }
-
- false
- }
-
- /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a holder
- /// or counterparty commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
- fn is_resolving_htlc_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
- 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
- let mut payment_data = None;
- let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
- || (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
- let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[4].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
- let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);
-
- macro_rules! log_claim {
- ($tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
- // We found the output in question, but aren't failing it backwards
- // as we have no corresponding source and no valid counterparty commitment txid
- // to try a weak source binding with same-hash, same-value still-valid offered HTLC.
- // This implies either it is an inbound HTLC or an outbound HTLC on a revoked transaction.
- let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == $htlc.offered;
- if ($holder_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
- (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
- log_error!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
- $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
- if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
- if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
- } else {
- log_info!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
- $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
- if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
- if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
- }
- }
- }
-
- macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_counterparty {
- ($counterparty_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
- if let Some(txid) = $counterparty_txid {
- for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
- if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
- if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
- log_claim!("revoked counterparty commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
- payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash));
- break;
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- macro_rules! scan_commitment {
- ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
- for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
- if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
- if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
- log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, true);
- // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
- // holder commitment transactions or an unrevoked counterparty commitment
- // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
- // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
- // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
- payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash));
- } else if !$holder_tx {
- check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
- if payment_data.is_none() {
- check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
- }
- }
- if payment_data.is_none() {
- log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, false);
- continue 'outer_loop;
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- if input.previous_output.txid == self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
- scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
- "our latest holder commitment tx", true);
- }
- if let Some(ref prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
- if input.previous_output.txid == prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
- scan_commitment!(prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
- "our previous holder commitment tx", true);
- }
- }
- if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
- scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
- "counterparty commitment tx", false);
- }
-
- // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
- // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
- if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data {
- let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
- if accepted_preimage_claim {
- if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
- |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update { upd.source == source } else { false }) {
- payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
- self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
- source,
- payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
- payment_hash
- }));
- }
- } else if offered_preimage_claim {
- if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
- |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update {
- upd.source == source
- } else { false }) {
- payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
- self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
- source,
- payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
- payment_hash
- }));
- }
- } else {
- log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
- match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
- let e = entry.get_mut();
- e.retain(|ref event| {
- match **event {
- OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
- return htlc_update.0 != source
- },
- _ => true
- }
- });
- e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)});
- }
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
- entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)}]);
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is paying fund back to some address we can assume to own
- fn is_paying_spendable_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
- let mut spendable_output = None;
- for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { // There is max one spendable output for any channel tx, including ones generated by us
- if i > ::std::u16::MAX as usize {
- // While it is possible that an output exists on chain which is greater than the
- // 2^16th output in a given transaction, this is only possible if the output is not
- // in a lightning transaction and was instead placed there by some third party who
- // wishes to give us money for no reason.
- // Namely, any lightning transactions which we pre-sign will never have anywhere
- // near 2^16 outputs both because such transactions must have ~2^16 outputs who's
- // scripts are not longer than one byte in length and because they are inherently
- // non-standard due to their size.
- // Thus, it is completely safe to ignore such outputs, and while it may result in
- // us ignoring non-lightning fund to us, that is only possible if someone fills
- // nearly a full block with garbage just to hit this case.
- continue;
- }
- if outp.script_pubkey == self.destination_script {
- spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
- outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
- output: outp.clone(),
- });
- break;
- } else if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
- if broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
- spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
- outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
- per_commitment_point: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1,
- to_self_delay: self.on_holder_tx_csv,
- output: outp.clone(),
- key_derivation_params: self.keys.key_derivation_params(),
- revocation_pubkey: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.clone(),
- });
- break;
- }
- } else if self.counterparty_payment_script == outp.script_pubkey {
- spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutputCounterpartyPayment {
- outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
- output: outp.clone(),
- key_derivation_params: self.keys.key_derivation_params(),
- });
- break;
- } else if outp.script_pubkey == self.shutdown_script {
- spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
- outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
- output: outp.clone(),
- });
- }
- }
- if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
- log_trace!(logger, "Maturing {} until {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
- match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
- let e = entry.get_mut();
- e.push(OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output });
- }
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
- entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output }]);
- }
- }
- }
- }
-}
-
-const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
-
-impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable> Readable for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) {
- fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
- ($key: expr) => {
- match $key {
- Ok(res) => res,
- Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- }
- }
- }
-
- let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
- return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
- }
-
- let latest_update_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
-
- let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
- 0 => {
- let revokable_address = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let revokable_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
- Some((revokable_address, per_commitment_point, revokable_script))
- },
- 1 => { None },
- _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- };
- let counterparty_payment_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let shutdown_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
-
- let keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
- // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
- // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
- let outpoint = OutPoint {
- txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
- index: Readable::read(reader)?,
- };
- let funding_info = (outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?);
- let current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
-
- let counterparty_tx_cache = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
-
- let their_cur_revocation_points = {
- let first_idx = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
- if first_idx == 0 {
- None
- } else {
- let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
- if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
- Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
- } else {
- Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
- }
- }
- };
-
- let on_holder_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
-
- let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
-
- macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
- () => {
- {
- let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
-
- HTLCOutputInCommitment {
- offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- let counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut counterparty_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
- for _ in 0..counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len {
- let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
- for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
- htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
- }
- if let Some(_) = counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
- return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
- }
- }
-
- let counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
- for _ in 0..counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
- let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
- let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable>::read(reader)?;
- let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8));
- for _ in 0..outputs_count {
- outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
- }
- if let Some(_) = counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
- return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
- }
- }
-
- let counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut counterparty_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
- for _ in 0..counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len {
- let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
- if let Some(_) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
- return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
- }
- }
-
- macro_rules! read_holder_tx {
- () => {
- {
- let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let feerate_per_kw: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
-
- let htlcs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
- for _ in 0..htlcs_len {
- let htlc = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
- let sigs = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
- 0 => None,
- 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
- _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- };
- htlcs.push((htlc, sigs, Readable::read(reader)?));
- }
-
- HolderSignedTx {
- txid,
- revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw,
- htlc_outputs: htlcs
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
- 0 => None,
- 1 => {
- Some(read_holder_tx!())
- },
- _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- };
- let current_holder_commitment_tx = read_holder_tx!();
-
- let current_counterparty_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
- let current_holder_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
-
- let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
- for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
- let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
- if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
- return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
- }
- }
-
- let pending_monitor_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut pending_monitor_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_monitor_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3)));
- for _ in 0..pending_monitor_events_len {
- let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
- 0 => MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(Readable::read(reader)?),
- 1 => MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_info.0),
- _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
- };
- pending_monitor_events.push(ev);
- }
-
- let pending_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut pending_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Event>()));
- for _ in 0..pending_events_len {
- if let Some(event) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
- pending_events.push(event);
- }
- }
-
- let last_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
-
- let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
- for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
- let height_target = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
- for _ in 0..events_len {
- let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
- 0 => {
- let htlc_source = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
- OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
- htlc_update: (htlc_source, hash)
- }
- },
- 1 => {
- let descriptor = Readable::read(reader)?;
- OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
- descriptor
- }
- },
- _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- };
- events.push(ev);
- }
- onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.insert(height_target, events);
- }
-
- let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Txid>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<Script>>())));
- for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
- let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Script>()));
- for _ in 0..outputs_len {
- outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
- }
- if let Some(_) = outputs_to_watch.insert(txid, outputs) {
- return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
- }
- }
- let onchain_tx_handler = Readable::read(reader)?;
-
- let lockdown_from_offchain = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let holder_tx_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
-
- Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
- latest_update_id,
- commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
-
- destination_script,
- broadcasted_holder_revokable_script,
- counterparty_payment_script,
- shutdown_script,
-
- keys,
- funding_info,
- current_counterparty_commitment_txid,
- prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
-
- counterparty_tx_cache,
- funding_redeemscript,
- channel_value_satoshis,
- their_cur_revocation_points,
-
- on_holder_tx_csv,
-
- commitment_secrets,
- counterparty_claimable_outpoints,
- counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain,
- counterparty_hash_commitment_number,
-
- prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx,
- current_holder_commitment_tx,
- current_counterparty_commitment_number,
- current_holder_commitment_number,
-
- payment_preimages,
- pending_monitor_events,
- pending_events,
-
- onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf,
- outputs_to_watch,
-
- onchain_tx_handler,
-
- lockdown_from_offchain,
- holder_tx_signed,
-
- last_block_hash,
- secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
- }))
- }
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
- use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
- use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
- use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
- use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
- use bitcoin::util::bip143;
- use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
- use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
- use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
- use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
- use hex;
- use chain::chainmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
- use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
- use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
- use ln::onchaintx::{OnchainTxHandler, InputDescriptors};
- use ln::chan_utils;
- use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, HolderCommitmentTransaction};
- use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
- use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
- use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
- use std::sync::Arc;
- use chain::keysinterface::InMemoryChannelKeys;
-
- #[test]
- fn test_prune_preimages() {
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
-
- let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
- let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
-
- let mut preimages = Vec::new();
- {
- for i in 0..20 {
- let preimage = PaymentPreimage([i; 32]);
- let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
- preimages.push((preimage, hash));
- }
- }
-
- macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
- ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
- {
- let mut res = Vec::new();
- for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
- res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
- offered: true,
- amount_msat: 0,
- cltv_expiry: 0,
- payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
- transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
- }, None));
- }
- res
- }
- }
- }
- macro_rules! preimages_to_holder_htlcs {
- ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
- {
- let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
- let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
- res
- }
- }
- }
-
- macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
- ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
- for preimage in $preimages_slice {
- assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
- }
- }
- }
-
- let keys = InMemoryChannelKeys::new(
- &secp_ctx,
- SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
- SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
- SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
- SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
- SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
- [41; 32],
- 0,
- (0, 0)
- );
-
- // Prune with one old state and a holder commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
- // old state.
- let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys,
- &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()), 0, &Script::new(),
- (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()),
- &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
- &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()),
- 10, Script::new(), 46, 0, HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy());
-
- monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx_info(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])).unwrap();
- monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key, &logger);
- monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key, &logger);
- monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
- monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
- for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
- monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
- }
-
- // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
- let mut secret = [0; 32];
- secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
- test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
- test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
-
- // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
- secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
- test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
- test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
-
- // Now update holder commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
- // previous commitment tx's preimages too
- monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx_info(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..5])).unwrap();
- secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
- test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
- test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
-
- // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
- monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx_info(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..3])).unwrap();
- secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
- test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);