+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &timeout_htlc_txn[0], false);
+
+ // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
+ // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
+ // monitor events or claimable balances.
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
+ assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() {
+ do_test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs(false);
+ do_test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs(true);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_no_preimage_inbound_htlc_balances() {
+ // Tests that MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC are generated for inbound HTLCs for which we do not
+ // have a preimage.
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
+ let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
+
+ // Send two HTLCs, one from A to B, and one from B to A.
+ let to_b_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000).1;
+ let to_a_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 20_000_000).1;
+ let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
+
+ let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
+ let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
+
+ let a_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
+ amount_satoshis: 10_000,
+ claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash,
+ };
+ let a_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
+ amount_satoshis: 20_000,
+ expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash,
+ };
+ let b_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
+ amount_satoshis: 10_000,
+ expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash,
+ };
+ let b_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
+ amount_satoshis: 20_000,
+ claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash,
+ };
+
+ // Both A and B will have an HTLC that's claimable on timeout and one that's claimable if they
+ // receive the preimage. These will remain the same through the channel closure and until the
+ // HTLC output is spent.
+
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
+ amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
+ amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
+ }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transaction
+ let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
+ assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 2);
+ check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]);
+ check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx);
+
+ // Now close the channel by confirming A's commitment transaction on both nodes, checking the
+ // claimable balances remain the same except for the non-HTLC balance changing variant.
+ let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
+ let as_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
+ }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);
+
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
+ nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
+
+ assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
+ sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
+
+ let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
+ let mut bs_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
+ confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
+ }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);
+ assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
+ sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ // We'll broadcast the HTLC-Timeout transaction one block prior to the htlc's expiration (as it
+ // is confirmable in the next block), but will still include the same claimable balances as no
+ // HTLC has been spent, even after the HTLC expires. We'll also fail the inbound HTLC, but it
+ // won't do anything as the channel is already closed.
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
+ let as_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+ assert_eq!(as_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(as_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[0],
+ [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash }]);
+
+ assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
+ sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
+ assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
+ sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ // For node B, we'll get the non-HTLC funds claimable after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0], false);
+ bs_pre_spend_claims.retain(|e| if let Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { .. } = e { false } else { true });
+
+ // The next few blocks for B look the same as for A, though for the opposite HTLC
+ nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - (ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1));
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[1],
+ [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash }]);
+ let bs_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+ assert_eq!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
+
+ assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
+ sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
+ assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
+ sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ // Now confirm the two HTLC timeout transactions for A, checking that the inbound HTLC resolves
+ // after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations and the other takes BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT confirmations.
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
+ let as_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + (BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32) - 1;
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
+ }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ amount_satoshis: 10_000,
+ confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
+ }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ amount_satoshis: 10_000,
+ confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ // Once as_htlc_timeout_claim[0] reaches ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations, we should get a
+ // payment failure event.
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
+ expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], to_b_failed_payment_hash, false);
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
+ }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ amount_satoshis: 10_000,
+ confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
+ assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ amount_satoshis: 10_000,
+ confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
+ }],
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0], false);
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], as_timeout_claimable_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
+ assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0], false);
+
+ // The process for B should be completely identical as well, noting that the non-HTLC-balance
+ // was already claimed.
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
+ let bs_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ amount_satoshis: 20_000,
+ confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ amount_satoshis: 20_000,
+ confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
+ expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], to_a_failed_payment_hash, false);
+
+ assert_eq!(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone()],
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0], false);
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
+ assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
+
+ // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
+ // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
+ // monitor events or claimable balances.
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
+ assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
+}
+
+fn sorted_vec_with_additions<T: Ord + Clone>(v_orig: &Vec<T>, extra_ts: &[&T]) -> Vec<T> {
+ let mut v = v_orig.clone();
+ for t in extra_ts {
+ v.push((*t).clone());
+ }
+ v.sort_unstable();
+ v
+}
+
+fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(anchors: bool, confirm_htlc_spend_first: bool) {
+ // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions.
+ let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
+ // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
+ // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
+ // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
+ chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
+ if anchors {
+ user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
+ user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
+ }
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
+ let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
+ assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
+
+ // We create five HTLCs for B to claim against A's revoked commitment transaction:
+ //
+ // (1) one for which A is the originator and B knows the preimage
+ // (2) one for which B is the originator where the HTLC has since timed-out
+ // (3) one for which B is the originator but where the HTLC has not yet timed-out
+ // (4) one dust HTLC which is lost in the channel closure
+ // (5) one that actually isn't in the revoked commitment transaction at all, but was added in
+ // later commitment transaction updates
+ //
+ // Though they could all be claimed in a single claim transaction, due to CLTV timeouts they
+ // are all currently claimed in separate transactions, which helps us test as we can claim
+ // HTLCs individually.
+
+ let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
+ let timeout_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
+ let dust_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000).1;
+
+ let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 10);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 10);
+
+ let live_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
+ let live_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 5_000_000).1;
+
+ // Get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
+ let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
+ let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
+
+ let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
+
+ let missing_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
+ let missing_htlc_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000).1;
+
+ nodes[1].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
+ expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let _b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
+ let mut failed_payments: HashSet<_> =
+ [timeout_payment_hash, dust_payment_hash, live_payment_hash, missing_htlc_payment_hash]
+ .iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
+ events.retain(|ev| {
+ match ev {
+ Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id, channel_id }, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(*channel_id, chan_id);
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, Some(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
+ false
+ },
+ Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }, .. } => {
+ assert!(failed_payments.remove(payment_hash));
+ false
+ },
+ _ => true,
+ }
+ });
+ assert!(failed_payments.is_empty());
+ if let Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
+ match &events[1] {
+ Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!(),
+ }
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
+
+ // Prior to channel closure, B considers the preimage HTLC as its own, and otherwise only
+ // lists the two on-chain timeout-able HTLCs as claimable balances.
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
+ amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3 - 2_000 + 3_000,
+ }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
+ amount_satoshis: 2_000,
+ claimable_height: missing_htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ payment_hash: missing_htlc_payment_hash,
+ }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
+ amount_satoshis: 4_000,
+ claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
+ }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
+ amount_satoshis: 5_000,
+ claimable_height: live_htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ payment_hash: live_payment_hash,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
+ let mut claim_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..).filter(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid())).collect();
+ // Currently the revoked commitment is claimed in four transactions as the HTLCs all expire
+ // quite soon.
+ assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 4);
+ claim_txn.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::<u64>());
+
+ // The following constants were determined experimentally
+ const BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: u64 = 483;
+ let outbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight: u64 = if anchors { 574 } else { 571 };
+ let inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight: u64 = if anchors { 582 } else { 578 };
+
+ // Check that the weight is close to the expected weight. Note that signature sizes vary
+ // somewhat so it may not always be exact.
+ fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[0].weight().to_wu(), outbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight);
+ fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[1].weight().to_wu(), inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight);
+ fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[2].weight().to_wu(), inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight);
+ fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[3].weight().to_wu(), BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
+
+ let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
+ let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
+ let inbound_htlc_claim_fee = chan_feerate * inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight / 1000;
+ let outbound_htlc_claim_fee = chan_feerate * outbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight / 1000;
+ let to_self_claim_fee = chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight().to_wu() / 1000;
+
+ // The expected balance for the next three checks, with the largest-HTLC and to_self output
+ // claim balances separated out.
+ let expected_balance = vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
+ amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
+ confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
+ }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
+ amount_satoshis: 3_000,
+ }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
+ amount_satoshis: 4_000,
+ }];
+
+ let to_self_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
+ amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
+ };
+ let to_self_claimed_avail_height;
+ let largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
+ amount_satoshis: 5_000,
+ };
+ let largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height;
+
+ // Once the channel has been closed by A, B now considers all of the commitment transactions'
+ // outputs as `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable`.
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
+ largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
+ to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
+ } else {
+ // Connect the to_self output claim, taking all of A's non-HTLC funds
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
+ to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
+ largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
+ }
+
+ let largest_htlc_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ amount_satoshis: 5_000 - inbound_htlc_claim_fee,
+ confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
+ };
+ let to_self_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value - to_self_claim_fee,
+ confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
+ };
+
+ if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+ } else {
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+ }
+
+ if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
+ } else {
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
+ }
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ // Finally, connect the last two remaining HTLC spends and check that they move to
+ // `ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0]);
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1]);
+
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
+ amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
+ confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1,
+ }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value - to_self_claim_fee,
+ confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
+ }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ amount_satoshis: 3_000 - outbound_htlc_claim_fee,
+ confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 4,
+ }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ amount_satoshis: 4_000 - inbound_htlc_claim_fee,
+ confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
+ }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ amount_satoshis: 5_000 - inbound_htlc_claim_fee,
+ confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0], false);
+
+ let mut payment_failed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[..2].to_vec(),
+ missing_htlc_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
+ expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[2..].to_vec(),
+ dust_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 2 } else { 3 }], false);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 3 } else { 2 }], false);
+ expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], live_payment_hash, false);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0], false);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1], false);
+ expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, false);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
+
+ // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
+ // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
+ // monitor events or claimable balances.
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
+ assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances() {
+ do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(false, true);
+ do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(false, false);
+ do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(true, true);
+ do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(true, false);
+}
+
+fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances(anchors: bool) {
+ // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revocation spends of HTLC transactions.
+ let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
+ if anchors {
+ user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
+ user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
+ }
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
+ input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
+ output: vec![
+ TxOut {
+ value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
+ script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
+ },
+ TxOut {
+ value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
+ script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
+ },
+ ],
+ };
+ if anchors {
+ nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
+ nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 1 }, coinbase_tx.output[1].value);
+ }
+
+ // Create some initial channels
+ let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 12_000_000);
+ let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
+ assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
+
+ let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
+ let failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
+ let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
+ if anchors {
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[4].value, 11000); // to_self output
+ } else {
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[2].value, 11000); // to_self output
+ }
+
+ // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have two HTLCs, an output for each side, and an
+ // anchor output for each side if enabled.
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if anchors { 6 } else { 4 });
+
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
+
+ let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
+ let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
+
+ // B will generate an HTLC-Success from its revoked commitment tx
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
+ if anchors {
+ handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[1], 1);
+ }
+ let revoked_htlc_success = {
+ let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(txn[0].input.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
+ assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, if anchors { 3 } else { 1 });
+ assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(),
+ if anchors { ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT_ANCHORS } else { ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT });
+ check_spends!(txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
+ txn.pop().unwrap()
+ };
+ let revoked_htlc_success_fee = chan_feerate * revoked_htlc_success.weight().to_wu() / 1000;
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
+ if anchors {
+ handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[1], 2);
+ }
+ let revoked_htlc_timeout = {
+ let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
+ if txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output {
+ txn.remove(1)
+ } else {
+ txn.remove(0)
+ }
+ };
+ check_spends!(revoked_htlc_timeout, revoked_local_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
+ assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_timeout.input[0].previous_output);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success.lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
+ assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
+
+ // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
+ let to_remote_conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
+
+ let revoked_to_self_claim = {
+ let mut as_commitment_claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
+ if anchors {
+ assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 4); // Separate to_remote claim
+ check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
+ assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
+ assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
+ assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 3);
+ check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
+ Some(as_commitment_claim_txn.remove(0))
+ } else {
+ assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
+ assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
+ assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.vout, 0);
+ assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[2].previous_output.vout, 1);
+ check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
+ None
+ }
+ };
+
+ // The next two checks have the same balance set for A - even though we confirm a revoked HTLC
+ // transaction our balance tracking doesn't use the on-chain value so the
+ // `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable` entry doesn't change.
+ let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
+ let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
+ let as_balances = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
+ amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 12_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
+ confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
+ }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
+ // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
+ amount_satoshis: 11_000,
+ }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
+ amount_satoshis: 3_000,
+ }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
+ amount_satoshis: 1_000,
+ }]);
+ assert_eq!(as_balances,
+ sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_success);
+ let as_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+ assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx.len(), 2);
+ assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_success);
+ // A has to generate a new claim for the remaining revoked outputs (which no longer includes the
+ // spent HTLC output)
+ assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1].input.len(), if anchors { 1 } else { 2 });
+ assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
+ if !anchors {
+ assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 0);
+ }
+ check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
+
+ assert_eq!(as_balances,
+ sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output.len(), 1);
+ let as_revoked_htlc_success_claim_fee = chan_feerate * as_htlc_claim_tx[0].weight().to_wu() / 1000;
+ if anchors {
+ // With anchors, B can pay for revoked_htlc_success's fee with additional inputs, rather
+ // than with the HTLC itself.
+ fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
+ 3_000 - as_revoked_htlc_success_claim_fee);
+ } else {
+ fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
+ 3_000 - revoked_htlc_success_fee - as_revoked_htlc_success_claim_fee);
+ }
+
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
+ amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 12_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
+ confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
+ }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
+ // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
+ amount_satoshis: 11_000,
+ }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
+ amount_satoshis: 1_000,
+ }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
+ confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 3);
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], false);
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
+ // to_self output to B
+ amount_satoshis: 11_000,
+ }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
+ amount_satoshis: 1_000,
+ }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
+ confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 2,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2);
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0], false);
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
+ // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
+ amount_satoshis: 11_000,
+ }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
+ amount_satoshis: 1_000,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(&nodes[0],
+ [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: failed_payment_hash }]);
+ // As time goes on A may split its revocation claim transaction into multiple.
+ let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+ for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
+ check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
+ }
+
+ // Connect a number of additional blocks to ensure we don't forget the HTLC output needs
+ // claiming.
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+ let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+ for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
+ check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
+ }
+
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout);
+ let (revoked_htlc_timeout_claim, revoked_to_self_claim) = {
+ let mut as_second_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx.len(), if anchors { 1 } else { 2 });
+ if anchors {
+ assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0);
+ check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_timeout);
+ (as_second_htlc_claim_tx.remove(0), revoked_to_self_claim.unwrap())
+ } else {
+ assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0);
+ check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_timeout);
+ assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
+ check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
+ (as_second_htlc_claim_tx.remove(0), as_second_htlc_claim_tx.remove(0))
+ }
+ };
+
+ // Connect blocks to finalize the HTLC resolution with the HTLC-Timeout transaction. In a
+ // previous iteration of the revoked balance handling this would result in us "forgetting" that
+ // the revoked HTLC output still needed to be claimed.
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
+ // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
+ amount_satoshis: 11_000,
+ }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
+ amount_satoshis: 1_000,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout_claim);
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
+ // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
+ amount_satoshis: 11_000,
+ }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ amount_satoshis: revoked_htlc_timeout_claim.output[0].value,
+ confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_to_self_claim);
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
+ amount_satoshis: revoked_to_self_claim.output[0].value,
+ confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
+ }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ amount_satoshis: revoked_htlc_timeout_claim.output[0].value,
+ confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout_claim, false);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_to_self_claim, false);
+
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
+
+ // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
+ // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
+ // monitor events or claimable balances.
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
+ assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances() {
+ do_test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances(false);
+ do_test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances(true);
+}
+
+fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims(anchors: bool) {
+ // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions when
+ // claiming with an aggregated claim transaction.
+ let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
+ // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
+ // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
+ // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
+ chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
+ if anchors {
+ user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
+ user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
+ }
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
+ input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
+ output: vec![TxOut {
+ value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
+ script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
+ }],
+ };
+ nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
+
+ let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
+ let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
+ assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
+
+ // We create two HTLCs, one which we will give A the preimage to to generate an HTLC-Success
+ // transaction, and one which we will not, allowing B to claim the HTLC output in an aggregated
+ // revocation-claim transaction.
+
+ let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
+ let revoked_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
+
+ let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
+
+ // Cheat by giving A's ChannelMonitor the preimage to the to-be-claimed HTLC so that we have an
+ // HTLC-claim transaction on the to-be-revoked state.
+ get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(&claimed_payment_hash, &claimed_payment_preimage,
+ &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger);
+
+ // Now get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
+ let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
+
+ assert_eq!(as_revoked_txn.len(), if anchors { 1 } else { 2 });
+ check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[0], funding_tx);
+ if !anchors {
+ check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[1], as_revoked_txn[0]); // The HTLC-Claim transaction
+ }
+
+ let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
+ let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
+
+ {
+ let mut feerate = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
+ *feerate += 1;
+ }
+ nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let fee_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &fee_update.update_fee.unwrap());
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], fee_update.commitment_signed, false);
+
+ nodes[0].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
+ expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let _a_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
+ amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
+ }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
+ amount_satoshis: 4_000,
+ claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ payment_hash: revoked_payment_hash,
+ }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
+ amount_satoshis: 3_000,
+ claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ payment_hash: claimed_payment_hash,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ let mut claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
+ let revoked_to_self_claim = if anchors {
+ assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 5); // Separate to_remote claim
+ check_spends!(claim_txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
+ assert_eq!(claim_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
+ assert_eq!(claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
+ assert_eq!(claim_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 3);
+ check_spends!(claim_txn[1], as_revoked_txn[0]);
+ Some(claim_txn.remove(0))
+ } else {
+ assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
+ assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
+ assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.vout, 0);
+ assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[2].previous_output.vout, 1);
+ check_spends!(claim_txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
+ None
+ };
+
+ let to_remote_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
+
+ let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
+ let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
+ amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
+ confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
+ }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
+ // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
+ amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
+ }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
+ amount_satoshis: 4_000,
+ }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
+ amount_satoshis: 3_000,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ // Confirm A's HTLC-Success transaction which presumably raced B's claim, causing B to create a
+ // new claim.
+ if anchors {
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
+ check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
+ check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
+ handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 1);
+ }
+ let htlc_success_claim = if anchors {
+ let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
+ txn.pop().unwrap()
+ } else {
+ as_revoked_txn[1].clone()
+ };
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_claim);
+ expect_payment_sent(&nodes[1], claimed_payment_preimage, None, true, false);
+
+ let mut claim_txn_2 = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ // Once B sees the HTLC-Success transaction it splits its claim transaction into two, though in
+ // theory it could re-aggregate the claims as well.
+ assert_eq!(claim_txn_2.len(), 2);
+ if anchors {
+ assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0);
+ check_spends!(claim_txn_2[0], &htlc_success_claim);
+ assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
+ check_spends!(claim_txn_2[1], as_revoked_txn[0]);
+ } else {
+ assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0);
+ check_spends!(claim_txn_2[0], as_revoked_txn[1]);
+ assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input.len(), 2);
+ assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
+ assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 1);
+ check_spends!(claim_txn_2[1], as_revoked_txn[0]);
+ }
+
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
+ amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
+ confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
+ }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
+ // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
+ amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
+ }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
+ amount_satoshis: 4_000,
+ }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
+ // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
+ // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
+ // anyway, so its not a big change.
+ amount_satoshis: 3_000,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0], false);
+
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
+ // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
+ amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
+ }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
+ amount_satoshis: 4_000,
+ }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
+ // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
+ // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
+ // anyway, so its not a big change.
+ amount_satoshis: 3_000,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0]);
+ let htlc_2_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
+
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
+ // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
+ amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
+ }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
+ amount_satoshis: 4_000,
+ }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { // HTLC 2
+ amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[0].output[0].value,
+ confirmation_height: htlc_2_claim_maturity,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0], false);
+
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
+ // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
+ amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
+ }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
+ amount_satoshis: 4_000,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ if anchors {
+ mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[&claim_txn_2[1], revoked_to_self_claim.as_ref().unwrap()]);
+ } else {
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1]);
+ }
+ let rest_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
+
+ if anchors {
+ assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[1].output[0].value,
+ confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
+ }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ amount_satoshis: revoked_to_self_claim.as_ref().unwrap().output[0].value,
+ confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
+ }],
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
+ } else {
+ assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[1].output[0].value,
+ confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
+ }],
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
+ }
+
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); // We shouldn't fail the payment until we spend the output
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
+ expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], revoked_payment_hash, false);
+ if anchors {
+ let events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
+ for (i, event) in events.into_iter().enumerate() {
+ if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, .. } = event {
+ assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
+ let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
+ &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
+ 253, None, &Secp256k1::new()
+ ).unwrap();
+ check_spends!(spend_tx, if i == 0 { &claim_txn_2[1] } else { revoked_to_self_claim.as_ref().unwrap() });
+ } else { panic!(); }
+ }
+ } else {
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1], false);
+ }
+ assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
+
+ // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
+ // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
+ // monitor events or claimable balances.
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
+ assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims() {
+ do_test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims(false);
+ do_test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims(true);
+}
+
+fn do_test_restored_packages_retry(check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade: bool) {
+ // Tests that we'll retry packages that were previously timelocked after we've restored them.
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let persister;
+ let new_chain_monitor;
+
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+ let node_deserialized;
+
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ // Open a channel, lock in an HTLC, and immediately broadcast the commitment transaction. This
+ // ensures that the HTLC timeout package is held until we reach its expiration height.
+ let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 50_000_000);
+ route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);
+
+ nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
+ check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
+ check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false,
+ [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
+
+ let commitment_tx = {
+ let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 3);
+ check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
+ txn.pop().unwrap()
+ };
+
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx);
+ if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
+ let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(txn[0].txid(), commitment_tx.txid());
+ }
+
+ // Connect blocks until the HTLC's expiration is met, expecting a transaction broadcast.
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
+ let htlc_timeout_tx = {
+ let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(txn[0], commitment_tx);
+ txn.pop().unwrap()
+ };
+
+ // Check that we can still rebroadcast these packages/transactions if we're upgrading from an
+ // old `ChannelMonitor` that did not exercise said rebroadcasting logic.
+ if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
+ let serialized_monitor = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex(
+ 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0",
+ ).unwrap();
+ reload_node!(nodes[0], &nodes[0].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, new_chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
+ }
+
+ // Connecting more blocks should result in the HTLC transactions being rebroadcast.
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
+ if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
+ }
+ {
+ let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ if !nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().skips_blocks() {
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 6);
+ } else {
+ assert!(txn.len() < 6);
+ }
+ for tx in txn {
+ assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.input.len());
+ assert_eq!(tx.output.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.output.len());
+ assert_eq!(tx.input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
+ assert_eq!(tx.output[0], htlc_timeout_tx.output[0]);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_restored_packages_retry() {
+ do_test_restored_packages_retry(false);
+ do_test_restored_packages_retry(true);
+}
+
+fn do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(anchors: bool) {
+ // Test that we will retry broadcasting pending claims for a force-closed channel on every
+ // `ChainMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims` call.
+ let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
+ if anchors {
+ config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
+ config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
+ }
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), Some(config)]);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ let (_, _, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
+ &nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 500_000_000
+ );
+ const HTLC_AMT_MSAT: u64 = 1_000_000;
+ const HTLC_AMT_SAT: u64 = HTLC_AMT_MSAT / 1000;
+ route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], HTLC_AMT_MSAT);
+
+ let htlc_expiry = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1;
+
+ let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(&nodes[0], &chan_id);
+ assert_eq!(commitment_txn.len(), if anchors { 1 /* commitment tx only */} else { 2 /* commitment and htlc timeout tx */ });
+ check_spends!(&commitment_txn[0], &funding_tx);
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_txn[0]);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(&nodes[0], true);
+ check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed,
+ false, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
+ input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
+ output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx` on anchors
+ value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
+ script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
+ }],
+ };
+ nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
+
+ // Set up a helper closure we'll use throughout our test. We should only expect retries without
+ // bumps if fees have not increased after a block has been connected (assuming the height timer
+ // re-evaluates at every block) or after `ChainMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims` is called.
+ let mut prev_htlc_tx_feerate = None;
+ let mut check_htlc_retry = |should_retry: bool, should_bump: bool| -> Option<Transaction> {
+ let (htlc_tx, htlc_tx_feerate) = if anchors {
+ assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().is_empty());
+ let events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), if should_retry { 1 } else { 0 });
+ if !should_retry {
+ return None;
+ }
+ match &events[0] {
+ Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
+ nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
+ let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
+ let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
+ check_spends!(&htlc_tx, &commitment_txn[0], &coinbase_tx);
+ let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT + coinbase_tx.output[0].value -
+ htlc_tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::<u64>();
+ let htlc_tx_weight = htlc_tx.weight().to_wu();
+ (htlc_tx, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(htlc_tx_fee, htlc_tx_weight))
+ }
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ } else {
+ assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), if should_retry { 1 } else { 0 });
+ if !should_retry {
+ return None;
+ }
+ let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
+ check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_txn[0]);
+ let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT - htlc_tx.output[0].value;
+ let htlc_tx_weight = htlc_tx.weight().to_wu();
+ (htlc_tx, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(htlc_tx_fee, htlc_tx_weight))
+ };
+ if should_bump {
+ assert!(htlc_tx_feerate > prev_htlc_tx_feerate.take().unwrap());
+ } else if let Some(prev_feerate) = prev_htlc_tx_feerate.take() {
+ assert_eq!(htlc_tx_feerate, prev_feerate);
+ }
+ prev_htlc_tx_feerate = Some(htlc_tx_feerate);
+ Some(htlc_tx)
+ };
+
+ // Connect blocks up to one before the HTLC expires. This should not result in a claim/retry.
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_expiry - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
+ check_htlc_retry(false, false);
+
+ // Connect one more block, producing our first claim.
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
+ check_htlc_retry(true, false);
+
+ // Connect one more block, expecting a retry with a fee bump. Unfortunately, we cannot bump HTLC
+ // transactions pre-anchors.
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
+ check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
+
+ // Trigger a call and we should have another retry, but without a bump.
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
+ check_htlc_retry(true, false);
+
+ // Double the feerate and trigger a call, expecting a fee-bumped retry.
+ *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
+ check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
+
+ // Connect one more block, expecting a retry with a fee bump. Unfortunately, we cannot bump HTLC
+ // transactions pre-anchors.
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
+ let htlc_tx = check_htlc_retry(true, anchors).unwrap();
+
+ // Mine the HTLC transaction to ensure we don't retry claims while they're confirmed.
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_tx);
+ // If we have a `ConnectStyle` that advertises the new block first without the transactions,
+ // we'll receive an extra bumped claim.
+ if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
+ nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
+ nodes[0].wallet_source.remove_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 1 });
+ check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
+ }
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
+ check_htlc_retry(false, false);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_monitor_timer_based_claim() {
+ do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(false);
+ do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(true);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_yield_anchors_events() {
+ // Tests that two parties supporting anchor outputs can open a channel, route payments over
+ // it, and finalize its resolution uncooperatively. Once the HTLCs are locked in, one side will
+ // force close once the HTLCs expire. The force close should stem from an event emitted by LDK,
+ // allowing the consumer to provide additional fees to the commitment transaction to be
+ // broadcast. Once the commitment transaction confirms, events for the HTLC resolution should be
+ // emitted by LDK, such that the consumer can attach fees to the zero fee HTLC transactions.
+ let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
+ anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
+ anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
+ anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
+ &nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000
+ );
+ let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
+ let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000);
+
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+
+ *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
+ assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().is_empty());
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
+ {
+ let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
+ }
+
+ get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
+ &payment_hash_2, &payment_preimage_2, &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster,
+ &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger
+ );
+ get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
+ &payment_hash_1, &payment_preimage_1, &node_cfgs[1].tx_broadcaster,
+ &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
+ );
+
+ let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 1);
+ let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = match holder_events.pop().unwrap() {
+ Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
+ let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
+ input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
+ output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx`
+ value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
+ script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
+ }],
+ };
+ nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
+ nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
+ let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
+ let anchor_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
+ let commitment_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
+ check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
+ check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, commitment_tx);
+ (commitment_tx, anchor_tx)
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+
+ assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output[2].value, 1_000); // HTLC A -> B
+ assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output[3].value, 2_000); // HTLC B -> A
+
+ mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ {
+ let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { 3 } else { 2 });
+
+ let htlc_preimage_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(htlc_preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(htlc_preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
+ check_spends!(htlc_preimage_tx, commitment_tx);
+
+ let htlc_timeout_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
+ check_spends!(htlc_timeout_tx, commitment_tx);
+
+ if let Some(commitment_tx) = txn.pop() {
+ check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
+ }
+ }
+
+ let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
+ // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
+ if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
+ assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
+ if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = holder_events.remove(0) {}
+ else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
+ } else {
+ assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 2);
+ }
+ let mut htlc_txs = Vec::with_capacity(2);
+ for event in holder_events {
+ match event {
+ Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
+ nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
+ let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
+ let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
+ check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_tx, anchor_tx);
+ htlc_txs.push(htlc_tx);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ }
+
+ mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&htlc_txs[0], &htlc_txs[1]]);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+
+ assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
+
+ let holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
+ for event in holder_events {
+ match event {
+ Event::SpendableOutputs { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Clear the remaining events as they're not relevant to what we're testing.
+ nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() {
+ // Test that `ChannelMonitor`s can properly detect and claim funds from a counterparty claiming
+ // multiple HTLCs from multiple channels in a single transaction via the success path from a
+ // revoked commitment.
+ let secp = Secp256k1::new();
+ let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ // Required to sign a revoked commitment transaction
+ chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let bob_persister;
+ let bob_chain_monitor;
+
+ let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
+ anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
+ anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
+ anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
+ let bob_deserialized;
+
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ let chan_a = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
+ let chan_b = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
+
+ // Serialize Bob with the initial state of both channels, which we'll use later.
+ let bob_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
+
+ // Route two payments for each channel from Alice to Bob to lock in the HTLCs.
+ let payment_a = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
+ let payment_b = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
+ let payment_c = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
+ let payment_d = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
+
+ // Serialize Bob's monitors with the HTLCs locked in. We'll restart Bob later on with the state
+ // at this point such that he broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction with the HTLCs
+ // present.
+ let bob_serialized_monitor_a = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_a.2).encode();
+ let bob_serialized_monitor_b = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_b.2).encode();
+
+ // Bob claims all the HTLCs...
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_a.0);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_b.0);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_c.0);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_d.0);
+
+ // ...and sends one back through each channel such that he has a motive to broadcast his
+ // revoked state.
+ send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
+
+ // Restart Bob with the revoked state and provide the HTLC preimages he claimed.
+ reload_node!(
+ nodes[1], anchors_config, bob_serialized, &[&bob_serialized_monitor_a, &bob_serialized_monitor_b],
+ bob_persister, bob_chain_monitor, bob_deserialized
+ );
+ for chan_id in [chan_a.2, chan_b.2].iter() {
+ let monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id);
+ for payment in [payment_a, payment_b, payment_c, payment_d].iter() {
+ monitor.provide_payment_preimage(
+ &payment.1, &payment.0, &node_cfgs[1].tx_broadcaster,
+ &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
+ );
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Bob force closes by restarting with the outdated state, prompting the ChannelMonitors to
+ // broadcast the latest commitment transaction known to them, which in our case is the one with
+ // the HTLCs still pending.
+ *nodes[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
+ nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 2);
+ check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 2, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 1000000);
+
+ // Bob should now receive two events to bump his revoked commitment transaction fees.
+ assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ let events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
+ let mut revoked_commitment_txs = Vec::with_capacity(events.len());
+ let mut anchor_txs = Vec::with_capacity(events.len());
+ for (idx, event) in events.into_iter().enumerate() {
+ let utxo_value = Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat() * (idx + 1) as u64;
+ let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
+ input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
+ output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx`
+ value: utxo_value,
+ script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
+ }],
+ };
+ nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, utxo_value);
+ match event {
+ Event::BumpTransaction(event) => nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event),
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+ let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
+ assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
+ if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == chan_a.3.txid() {
+ check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_a.3);
+ } else {
+ check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_b.3);
+ }
+ let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = (&txn[0], &txn[1]);
+ check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, commitment_tx);
+
+ revoked_commitment_txs.push(commitment_tx.clone());
+ anchor_txs.push(anchor_tx.clone());
+ };
+
+ for node in &nodes {
+ mine_transactions(node, &[&revoked_commitment_txs[0], &anchor_txs[0], &revoked_commitment_txs[1], &anchor_txs[1]]);
+ }
+ check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 2);
+ check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 2, true);
+ check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 1000000);
+
+ // Alice should detect the confirmed revoked commitments, and attempt to claim all of the
+ // revoked outputs.
+ {
+ let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 4);
+
+ let (revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_htlc_claim_b) = if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_commitment_txs[0].txid() {
+ (if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] }, if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] })
+ } else {
+ (if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] }, if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] })
+ };
+
+ assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs
+ assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.output.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_commitment_txs[0]);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs
+ assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.output.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_b, revoked_commitment_txs[1]);
+ }
+
+ // Since Bob was able to confirm his revoked commitment, he'll now try to claim the HTLCs
+ // through the success path.
+ assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ let mut events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
+ // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
+ match *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() {
+ ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks => {
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
+ if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(0) {}
+ else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
+ if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(1) {}
+ else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
+
+ },
+ _ => assert_eq!(events.len(), 2),
+ };
+ let htlc_tx = {
+ let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap();
+ let public_key = PublicKey::new(secret_key.public_key(&secp));
+ let fee_utxo_script = ScriptBuf::new_v0_p2wpkh(&public_key.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
+ let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
+ input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
+ output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx`
+ value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
+ script_pubkey: fee_utxo_script.clone(),
+ }],
+ };
+ let mut htlc_tx = Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
+ input: vec![TxIn { // Fee input
+ previous_output: bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
+ ..Default::default()
+ }],
+ output: vec![TxOut { // Fee input change
+ value: coinbase_tx.output[0].value / 2 ,
+ script_pubkey: ScriptBuf::new_op_return(&[]),
+ }],
+ };
+ let mut descriptors = Vec::with_capacity(4);
+ for event in events {
+ // We don't use the `BumpTransactionEventHandler` here because it does not support
+ // creating one transaction from multiple `HTLCResolution` events.
+ if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { mut htlc_descriptors, tx_lock_time, .. }) = event {
+ assert_eq!(htlc_descriptors.len(), 2);
+ for htlc_descriptor in &htlc_descriptors {
+ assert!(!htlc_descriptor.htlc.offered);
+ htlc_tx.input.push(htlc_descriptor.unsigned_tx_input());
+ htlc_tx.output.push(htlc_descriptor.tx_output(&secp));
+ }
+ descriptors.append(&mut htlc_descriptors);
+ htlc_tx.lock_time = tx_lock_time;
+ } else {
+ panic!("Unexpected event");
+ }
+ }
+ for (idx, htlc_descriptor) in descriptors.into_iter().enumerate() {
+ let htlc_input_idx = idx + 1;
+ let signer = htlc_descriptor.derive_channel_signer(&nodes[1].keys_manager);
+ let our_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, htlc_input_idx, &htlc_descriptor, &secp).unwrap();
+ let witness_script = htlc_descriptor.witness_script(&secp);
+ htlc_tx.input[htlc_input_idx].witness = htlc_descriptor.tx_input_witness(&our_sig, &witness_script);
+ }
+ let fee_utxo_sig = {
+ let witness_script = ScriptBuf::new_p2pkh(&public_key.pubkey_hash());
+ let sighash = hash_to_message!(&SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(
+ 0, &witness_script, coinbase_tx.output[0].value, EcdsaSighashType::All
+ ).unwrap()[..]);
+ let sig = sign(&secp, &sighash, &secret_key);
+ let mut sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
+ sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
+ sig
+ };
+ htlc_tx.input[0].witness = Witness::from_slice(&[fee_utxo_sig, public_key.to_bytes()]);
+ check_spends!(htlc_tx, coinbase_tx, revoked_commitment_txs[0], revoked_commitment_txs[1]);
+ htlc_tx
+ };
+
+ for node in &nodes {
+ mine_transaction(node, &htlc_tx);
+ }
+
+ // Alice should see that Bob is trying to claim to HTLCs, so she should now try to claim them at
+ // the second level instead.
+ let revoked_claim_transactions = {
+ let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
+
+ let revoked_htlc_claims = txn.iter().filter(|tx|
+ tx.input.len() == 2 &&
+ tx.output.len() == 1 &&
+ tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == htlc_tx.txid()
+ ).collect::<Vec<_>>();
+ assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claims.len(), 2);
+ for revoked_htlc_claim in revoked_htlc_claims {
+ check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim, htlc_tx);
+ }
+
+ let mut revoked_claim_transaction_map = HashMap::new();
+ for current_tx in txn.into_iter() {
+ revoked_claim_transaction_map.insert(current_tx.txid(), current_tx);
+ }
+ revoked_claim_transaction_map
+ };
+ for node in &nodes {
+ mine_transactions(node, &revoked_claim_transactions.values().collect::<Vec<_>>());
+ }
+
+
+ // Connect one block to make sure the HTLC events are not yielded while ANTI_REORG_DELAY has not
+ // been reached.
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
+
+ assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+
+ // Connect the remaining blocks to reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
+
+ assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ let spendable_output_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(spendable_output_events.len(), 4);
+ for event in spendable_output_events {
+ if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, channel_id } = event {
+ assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(vec![chan_b.2, chan_a.2].contains(&channel_id.unwrap()));
+ let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
+ &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), ScriptBuf::new_op_return(&[]), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new(),
+ ).unwrap();
+
+ if let SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(_) = &outputs[0] {
+ check_spends!(spend_tx, &revoked_commitment_txs[0], &revoked_commitment_txs[1]);
+ } else {
+ check_spends!(spend_tx, revoked_claim_transactions.get(&spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid).unwrap());
+ }
+ } else {
+ panic!("unexpected event");
+ }
+ }
+
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+ // On the Alice side, the individual to_self_claim are still pending confirmation.
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 2);
+ // TODO: From Bob's PoV, he still thinks he can claim the outputs from his revoked commitment.
+ // This needs to be fixed before we enable pruning `ChannelMonitor`s once they don't have any
+ // balances to claim.
+ //
+ // The 6 claimable balances correspond to his `to_self` outputs and the 2 HTLC outputs in each
+ // revoked commitment which Bob has the preimage for.
+ assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 6);
+}
+
+fn do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(confirm_commitment_before_reload: bool) {
+ // Tests that we'll fix a ChannelMonitor's `counterparty_payment_script` for an anchor outputs
+ // channel upon deserialization.
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let persister;
+ let chain_monitor;
+ let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
+ user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
+ user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
+ let node_deserialized;
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 50_000_000);
+
+ // Set the monitor's `counterparty_payment_script` to a dummy P2WPKH script.
+ let secp = Secp256k1::new();
+ let privkey = bitcoin::PrivateKey::from_slice(&[1; 32], bitcoin::Network::Testnet).unwrap();
+ let pubkey = bitcoin::PublicKey::from_private_key(&secp, &privkey);
+ let p2wpkh_script = ScriptBuf::new_v0_p2wpkh(&pubkey.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
+ get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).set_counterparty_payment_script(p2wpkh_script.clone());
+ assert_eq!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_counterparty_payment_script(), p2wpkh_script);
+
+ // Confirm the counterparty's commitment and reload the monitor (either before or after) such
+ // that we arrive at the correct `counterparty_payment_script` after the reload.
+ nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
+ check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
+ check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false,
+ [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
+
+ let commitment_tx = {
+ let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 4);
+ check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
+ txn.pop().unwrap()
+ };
+
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx);
+ let commitment_tx_conf_height = if confirm_commitment_before_reload {
+ // We should expect our round trip serialization check to fail as we're writing the monitor
+ // with the incorrect P2WPKH script but reading it with the correct P2WSH script.
+ *nodes[1].chain_monitor.expect_monitor_round_trip_fail.lock().unwrap() = Some(chan_id);
+ let commitment_tx_conf_height = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx));
+ let serialized_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).encode();
+ reload_node!(nodes[1], user_config, &nodes[1].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
+ commitment_tx_conf_height
+ } else {
+ let serialized_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).encode();
+ reload_node!(nodes[1], user_config, &nodes[1].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
+ let commitment_tx_conf_height = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx));
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
+ check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
+ commitment_tx_conf_height
+ };
+ check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false,
+ [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
+ assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_counterparty_payment_script().is_v0_p2wsh());
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+
+ if confirm_commitment_before_reload {
+ // If we saw the commitment before our `counterparty_payment_script` was fixed, we'll never
+ // get the spendable output event for the `to_remote` output, so we'll need to get it
+ // manually via `get_spendable_outputs`.
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
+ let outputs = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&commitment_tx, commitment_tx_conf_height);
+ assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
+ let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
+ &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
+ 253, None, &secp
+ ).unwrap();
+ check_spends!(spend_tx, &commitment_tx);
+ } else {
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx, false);
+ }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload() {
+ do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(false);
+ do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(true);
+}
+
+#[cfg(not(feature = "_test_vectors"))]
+fn do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(anchors: bool, confirm_counterparty_commitment: bool) {
+ // Tests that our monitor claims will always use fresh random signatures (ensuring a unique
+ // wtxid) to prevent certain classes of transaction replacement at the bitcoin P2P layer.
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
+ if anchors {
+ user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
+ user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
+ }
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
+ input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
+ output: vec![
+ TxOut {
+ value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
+ script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
+ },
+ ],
+ };
+ if anchors {
+ nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
+ }
+
+ // Open a channel and route a payment. We'll let it timeout to claim it.
+ let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0);
+ route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
+
+ let (closing_node, other_node) = if confirm_counterparty_commitment {
+ (&nodes[1], &nodes[0])
+ } else {
+ (&nodes[0], &nodes[1])
+ };
+
+ closing_node.node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &other_node.node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+
+ // The commitment transaction comes first.
+ let commitment_tx = {
+ let mut txn = closing_node.tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
+ txn.pop().unwrap()
+ };
+
+ mine_transaction(closing_node, &commitment_tx);
+ check_added_monitors!(closing_node, 1);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(closing_node, true);
+ check_closed_event!(closing_node, 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [other_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
+
+ mine_transaction(other_node, &commitment_tx);
+ check_added_monitors!(other_node, 1);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(other_node, true);
+ check_closed_event!(other_node, 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [closing_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
+
+ // If we update the best block to the new height before providing the confirmed transactions,
+ // we'll see another broadcast of the commitment transaction.
+ if !confirm_counterparty_commitment && nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
+ let _ = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ }
+
+ // Then comes the HTLC timeout transaction.
+ if confirm_counterparty_commitment {
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 5);
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx, false);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
+ } else {
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
+ }
+ if anchors && !confirm_counterparty_commitment {
+ handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 1);
+ }
+ let htlc_timeout_tx = {
+ let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
+ let tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
+ check_spends!(tx, commitment_tx, coinbase_tx);
+ tx
+ };
+
+ // Check we rebroadcast it with a different wtxid.
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
+ if anchors && !confirm_counterparty_commitment {
+ handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 1);
+ }
+ {
+ let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(txn[0].txid(), htlc_timeout_tx.txid());
+ assert_ne!(txn[0].wtxid(), htlc_timeout_tx.wtxid());
+ }
+}
+
+#[cfg(not(feature = "_test_vectors"))]
+#[test]
+fn test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures() {
+ do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(false, false);
+ do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(false, true);
+ do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(true, false);
+ do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(true, true);