+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[1]);
+
+ // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
+ // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
+ // monitor events or claimable balances.
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
+ assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_no_preimage_inbound_htlc_balances() {
+ // Tests that MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC are generated for inbound HTLCs for which we do not
+ // have a preimage.
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
+ let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
+
+ // Send two HTLCs, one from A to B, and one from B to A.
+ let to_b_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000).1;
+ let to_a_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 20_000_000).1;
+ let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
+
+ let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
+ let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id);
+
+ // Both A and B will have an HTLC that's claimable on timeout and one that's claimable if they
+ // receive the preimage. These will remain the same through the channel closure and until the
+ // HTLC output is spent.
+
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ }, Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
+ expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
+ claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
+ }, Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
+ expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
+ claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transaction
+ let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
+ assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 2);
+ check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]);
+ check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx);
+
+ // Now close the channel by confirming A's commitment transaction on both nodes, checking the
+ // claimable balances remain the same except for the non-HTLC balance changing variant.
+ let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
+ let as_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
+ }, Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
+ expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
+ claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }]);
+
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
+ nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
+
+ assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
+ sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
+
+ let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
+ let mut bs_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
+ confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
+ }, Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
+ expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
+ claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }]);
+ assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
+ sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ // We'll broadcast the HTLC-Timeout transaction one block prior to the htlc's expiration (as it
+ // is confirmable in the next block), but will still include the same claimable balances as no
+ // HTLC has been spent, even after the HTLC expires. We'll also fail the inbound HTLC, but it
+ // won't do anything as the channel is already closed.
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
+ let as_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+ assert_eq!(as_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(as_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[0],
+ [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash }]);
+
+ assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
+ sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
+ assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
+ sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ // For node B, we'll get the non-HTLC funds claimable after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
+ bs_pre_spend_claims.retain(|e| if let Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { .. } = e { false } else { true });
+
+ // The next few blocks for B look the same as for A, though for the opposite HTLC
+ nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - (ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) - 1);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[1],
+ [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash }]);
+ let bs_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+ assert_eq!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
+
+ assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
+ sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
+ assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
+ sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ // Now confirm the two HTLC timeout transactions for A, checking that the inbound HTLC resolves
+ // after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations and the other takes BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT confirmations.
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
+ let as_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + (BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32) - 1;
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
+ }, Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
+ expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
+ confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
+ }, Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
+ expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
+ confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ // Once as_htlc_timeout_claim[0] reaches ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations, we should get a
+ // payment failure event.
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
+ expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], to_b_failed_payment_hash, false);
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
+ }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
+ confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
+ assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
+ confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
+ }],
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], as_timeout_claimable_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
+ assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
+
+ // The process for B should be completely identical as well, noting that the non-HTLC-balance
+ // was already claimed.
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
+ let bs_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
+ expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
+ confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
+ expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
+ confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
+ expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], to_a_failed_payment_hash, false);
+
+ assert_eq!(vec![Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
+ expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }],
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
+ assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
+
+ // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
+ // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
+ // monitor events or claimable balances.
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
+ assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
+}
+
+fn sorted_vec_with_additions<T: Ord + Clone>(v_orig: &Vec<T>, extra_ts: &[&T]) -> Vec<T> {
+ let mut v = v_orig.clone();
+ for t in extra_ts {
+ v.push((*t).clone());
+ }
+ v.sort_unstable();
+ v
+}
+
+fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(confirm_htlc_spend_first: bool) {
+ // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions.
+ let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
+ // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
+ // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
+ // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
+ chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
+ let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
+ assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
+
+ // We create five HTLCs for B to claim against A's revoked commitment transaction:
+ //
+ // (1) one for which A is the originator and B knows the preimage
+ // (2) one for which B is the originator where the HTLC has since timed-out
+ // (3) one for which B is the originator but where the HTLC has not yet timed-out
+ // (4) one dust HTLC which is lost in the channel closure
+ // (5) one that actually isn't in the revoked commitment transaction at all, but was added in
+ // later commitment transaction updates
+ //
+ // Though they could all be claimed in a single claim transaction, due to CLTV timeouts they
+ // are all currently claimed in separate transactions, which helps us test as we can claim
+ // HTLCs individually.
+
+ let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
+ let timeout_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
+ let dust_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000).1;
+
+ let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 10);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 10);
+
+ let live_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
+ let live_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 5_000_000).1;
+
+ // Get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
+ let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
+ let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id);
+
+ let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
+
+ let missing_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
+ let missing_htlc_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000).1;
+
+ nodes[1].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
+ expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let _b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
+ let mut failed_payments: HashSet<_> =
+ [timeout_payment_hash, dust_payment_hash, live_payment_hash, missing_htlc_payment_hash]
+ .iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
+ events.retain(|ev| {
+ match ev {
+ Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id, channel_id }, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(*channel_id, chan_id);
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, Some(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
+ false
+ },
+ Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }, .. } => {
+ assert!(failed_payments.remove(payment_hash));
+ false
+ },
+ _ => true,
+ }
+ });
+ assert!(failed_payments.is_empty());
+ if let Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
+ match &events[1] {
+ Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!(),
+ }
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
+
+ // Prior to channel closure, B considers the preimage HTLC as its own, and otherwise only
+ // lists the two on-chain timeout-able HTLCs as claimable balances.
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3 - 2_000 + 3_000,
+ }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 2_000,
+ claimable_height: missing_htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
+ claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 5_000,
+ claimable_height: live_htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
+ let mut claim_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..).filter(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid())).collect();
+ // Currently the revoked commitment is claimed in four transactions as the HTLCs all expire
+ // quite soon.
+ assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 4);
+ claim_txn.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::<u64>());
+
+ // The following constants were determined experimentally
+ const BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 483;
+ const OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 571;
+ const INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 578;
+
+ // Check that the weight is close to the expected weight. Note that signature sizes vary
+ // somewhat so it may not always be exact.
+ fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[0].weight(), OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
+ fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[1].weight(), INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
+ fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[2].weight(), INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
+ fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[3].weight(), BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
+
+ // The expected balance for the next three checks, with the largest-HTLC and to_self output
+ // claim balances separated out.
+ let expected_balance = vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
+ confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
+ }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
+ }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
+ }];
+
+ let to_self_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ };
+ let to_self_claimed_avail_height;
+ let largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 5_000,
+ };
+ let largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height;
+
+ // Once the channel has been closed by A, B now considers all of the commitment transactions'
+ // outputs as `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable`.
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
+ largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
+ to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
+ } else {
+ // Connect the to_self output claim, taking all of A's non-HTLC funds
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
+ to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
+ largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
+ }
+
+ let largest_htlc_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 5_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
+ confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
+ };
+ let to_self_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
+ - chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight() as u64 / 1000,
+ confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
+ };
+
+ if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+ } else {
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+ }
+
+ if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
+ } else {
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
+ }
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ // Finally, connect the last two remaining HTLC spends and check that they move to
+ // `ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0]);
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1]);
+
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
+ confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1,
+ }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
+ - chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight() as u64 / 1000,
+ confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
+ }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000 - chan_feerate * OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
+ confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 4,
+ }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
+ confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
+ }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 5_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
+ confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
+
+ let mut payment_failed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(&nodes[1], payment_failed_events.pop().unwrap(),
+ dust_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
+ expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(&nodes[1], payment_failed_events.pop().unwrap(),
+ missing_htlc_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
+ assert!(payment_failed_events.is_empty());
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 2 } else { 3 }]);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 3 } else { 2 }]);
+ expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], live_payment_hash, false);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0]);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1]);
+ expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, false);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
+
+ // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
+ // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
+ // monitor events or claimable balances.
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
+ assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances() {
+ do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(true);
+ do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(false);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances() {
+ // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revocation spends of HTLC transactions.
+ let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ // Create some initial channels
+ let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 11_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
+ let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
+ assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
+
+ let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
+ let failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
+ let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
+
+ // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have two HTLCs and an output for both sides
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
+
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
+
+ let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
+ let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id);
+
+ // B will generate an HTLC-Success from its revoked commitment tx
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
+ let revoked_htlc_success_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+
+ assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success_txn.len(), 2);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ check_spends!(revoked_htlc_success_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
+ check_spends!(revoked_htlc_success_txn[1], funding_tx);
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
+ let revoked_htlc_timeout_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_timeout_txn.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(revoked_htlc_timeout_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
+ assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_timeout_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
+ assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_timeout_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
+
+ // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
+ let to_remote_conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
+
+ let as_commitment_claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+ assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn.len(), 2);
+ check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
+ check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1], funding_tx);
+
+ // The next two checks have the same balance set for A - even though we confirm a revoked HTLC
+ // transaction our balance tracking doesn't use the on-chain value so the
+ // `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable` entry doesn't change.
+ let as_balances = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 11_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
+ }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
+ // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
+ }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
+ }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
+ }]);
+ assert_eq!(as_balances,
+ sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_success_txn[0]);
+ let as_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+ assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx.len(), 2);
+ check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_success_txn[0]);
+ check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]); // A has to generate a new claim for the remaining revoked
+ // outputs (which no longer includes the spent HTLC output)
+
+ assert_eq!(as_balances,
+ sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output.len(), 1);
+ fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
+ 3_000 - chan_feerate * (revoked_htlc_success_txn[0].weight() + as_htlc_claim_tx[0].weight()) as u64 / 1000);
+
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 11_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
+ (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
+ }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
+ // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
+ }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
+ }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
+ confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 3);
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
+ // to_self output to B
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
+ }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
+ }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
+ confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 2,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2);
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
+ // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
+ }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], revoked_htlc_timeout_txn[0].lock_time.0 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(&nodes[0],
+ [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: failed_payment_hash }]);
+ // As time goes on A may split its revocation claim transaction into multiple.
+ let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+ for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
+ check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);