+ /// The Proportion of the channel value to configure as counterparty's channel reserve,
+ /// i.e., `their_channel_reserve_satoshis` for both outbound and inbound channels.
+ ///
+ /// `their_channel_reserve_satoshis` is the minimum balance that the other node has to maintain
+ /// on their side, at all times.
+ /// This ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
+ /// claiming at least this value on chain.
+ ///
+ /// Channel reserve values greater than 30% could be considered highly unreasonable, since that
+ /// amount can never be used for payments.
+ /// Also, if our selected channel reserve for counterparty and counterparty's selected
+ /// channel reserve for us sum up to equal or greater than channel value, channel negotiations
+ /// will fail.
+ ///
+ /// Note: Versions of LDK earlier than v0.0.104 will fail to read channels with any channel reserve
+ /// other than the default value.
+ ///
+ /// Default value: 1% of channel value, i.e., configured as 10,000 millionths.
+ /// Minimum value: If the calculated proportional value is less than 1000 sats, it will be treated
+ /// as 1000 sats instead, which is a safe implementation-specific lower bound.
+ /// Maximum value: 1,000,000, any values larger than 1 Million will be treated as 1 Million (or 100%)
+ /// instead, although channel negotiations will fail in that case.
+ pub their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths: u32,
+ #[cfg(anchors)]
+ /// If set, we attempt to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`option for outbound channels.
+ ///
+ /// If this option is set, channels may be created that will not be readable by LDK versions
+ /// prior to 0.0.114, causing [`ChannelManager`]'s read method to return a
+ /// [`DecodeError::InvalidValue`].
+ ///
+ /// Note that setting this to true does *not* prevent us from opening channels with
+ /// counterparties that do not support the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option; we will simply
+ /// fall back to a `static_remote_key` channel.
+ ///
+ /// LDK will not support the legacy `option_anchors` commitment version due to a discovered
+ /// vulnerability after its deployment. For more context, see the [`SIGHASH_SINGLE + update_fee
+ /// Considered Harmful`] mailing list post.
+ ///
+ /// Default value: false. This value is likely to change to true in the future.
+ ///
+ /// [`ChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager
+ /// [`DecodeError::InvalidValue`]: crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue
+ /// [`SIGHASH_SINGLE + update_fee Considered Harmful`]: https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2020-September/002796.html
+ pub negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx: bool,
+
+ /// The maximum number of HTLCs in-flight from our counterparty towards us at the same time.
+ ///
+ /// Increasing the value can help improve liquidity and stability in
+ /// routing at the cost of higher long term disk / DB usage.
+ ///
+ /// Note: Versions of LDK earlier than v0.0.115 will fail to read channels with a configuration
+ /// other than the default value.
+ ///
+ /// Default value: 50
+ /// Maximum value: 483, any values larger will be treated as 483.
+ /// This is the BOLT #2 spec limit on `max_accepted_htlcs`.
+ pub our_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,