+ let mut last_commitment_number_guard = self.last_commitment_number.lock().unwrap();
+ let actual_commitment_number = commitment_tx.commitment_number();
+ let last_commitment_number = last_commitment_number_guard.unwrap_or(actual_commitment_number);
+ // These commitment numbers are backwards counting. We expect either the same as the previously encountered,
+ // or the next one.
+ assert!(last_commitment_number == actual_commitment_number || last_commitment_number - 1 == actual_commitment_number, "{} doesn't come after {}", actual_commitment_number, last_commitment_number);
+ *last_commitment_number_guard = Some(cmp::min(last_commitment_number, actual_commitment_number))
+ }
+
+ Ok(self.inner.sign_counterparty_commitment(commitment_tx, secp_ctx).unwrap())
+ }
+
+ fn sign_holder_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
+ self.verify_holder_commitment_tx(commitment_tx, secp_ctx);
+
+ // TODO: enforce the ChannelKeys contract - error if this commitment was already revoked
+ // TODO: need the commitment number
+ Ok(self.inner.sign_holder_commitment(commitment_tx, secp_ctx).unwrap())
+ }
+
+ #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
+ fn unsafe_sign_holder_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
+ Ok(self.inner.unsafe_sign_holder_commitment(commitment_tx, secp_ctx).unwrap())
+ }
+
+ fn sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Signature>, ()> {
+ let trusted_tx = self.verify_holder_commitment_tx(commitment_tx, secp_ctx);
+ let commitment_txid = trusted_tx.txid();
+ let holder_csv = self.inner.counterparty_selected_contest_delay();
+
+ for (this_htlc, sig) in trusted_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs) {
+ assert!(this_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some());
+ let keys = trusted_tx.keys();
+ let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(), holder_csv, &this_htlc, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
+
+ let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&this_htlc, &keys);
+
+ let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, this_htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]);
+ secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, sig, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).unwrap();