+ fn sign_justice_revoked_output(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
+ Ok(self.inner.sign_justice_revoked_output(justice_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_key, secp_ctx).unwrap())
+ }
+
+ fn sign_justice_revoked_htlc(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
+ Ok(self.inner.sign_justice_revoked_htlc(justice_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_key, htlc, secp_ctx).unwrap())
+ }
+
+ #[cfg(anchors)]
+ fn sign_holder_htlc_transaction(
+ &self, htlc_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, htlc_descriptor: &HTLCDescriptor,
+ secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>
+ ) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
+ let per_commitment_point = self.get_per_commitment_point(htlc_descriptor.per_commitment_number, secp_ctx);
+ assert_eq!(htlc_tx.input[input], htlc_descriptor.unsigned_tx_input());
+ assert_eq!(htlc_tx.output[input], htlc_descriptor.tx_output(&per_commitment_point, secp_ctx));
+ Ok(self.inner.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(htlc_tx, input, htlc_descriptor, secp_ctx).unwrap())
+ }
+
+ fn sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(&self, htlc_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
+ Ok(self.inner.sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(htlc_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_point, htlc, secp_ctx).unwrap())
+ }
+
+ fn sign_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
+ closing_tx.verify(self.inner.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint())
+ .expect("derived different closing transaction");
+ Ok(self.inner.sign_closing_transaction(closing_tx, secp_ctx).unwrap())
+ }
+
+ fn sign_holder_anchor_input(
+ &self, anchor_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
+ ) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
+ debug_assert!(MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS > ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI);
+ // As long as our minimum dust limit is enforced and is greater than our anchor output
+ // value, an anchor output can only have an index within [0, 1].
+ assert!(anchor_tx.input[input].previous_output.vout == 0 || anchor_tx.input[input].previous_output.vout == 1);
+ self.inner.sign_holder_anchor_input(anchor_tx, input, secp_ctx)
+ }
+
+ fn sign_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>)
+ -> Result<(Signature, Signature), ()> {