// You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
// licenses.
-//! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
-//! here.
+//! Logic to connect off-chain channel management with on-chain transaction monitoring.
//!
-//! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
-//! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
-//! be made in responding to certain messages, see [`chain::Watch`] for more.
+//! [`ChainMonitor`] is an implementation of [`chain::Watch`] used both to process blocks and to
+//! update [`ChannelMonitor`]s accordingly. If any on-chain events need further processing, it will
+//! make those available as [`MonitorEvent`]s to be consumed.
//!
-//! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
-//! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
-//! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
-//! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
-//! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
+//! [`ChainMonitor`] is parameterized by an optional chain source, which must implement the
+//! [`chain::Filter`] trait. This provides a mechanism to signal new relevant outputs back to light
+//! clients, such that transactions spending those outputs are included in block data.
//!
-//! [`chain::Watch`]: ../../chain/trait.Watch.html
-
-use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
-use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxOut,Transaction};
-use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
-use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
-use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
-use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
-
-use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
-use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
-use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
-
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
-use bitcoin::secp256k1;
-
-use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
-use ln::chan_utils;
-use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HolderCommitmentTransaction, HTLCType};
-use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
-use ln::onchaintx::{OnchainTxHandler, InputDescriptors};
+//! [`ChainMonitor`] may be used directly to monitor channels locally or as a part of a distributed
+//! setup to monitor channels remotely. In the latter case, a custom [`chain::Watch`] implementation
+//! would be responsible for routing each update to a remote server and for retrieving monitor
+//! events. The remote server would make use of [`ChainMonitor`] for block processing and for
+//! servicing [`ChannelMonitor`] updates from the client.
+
+use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
+use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
+
use chain;
-use chain::Filter;
+use chain::{ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Filter, WatchedOutput};
use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
+use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Balance, MonitorEvent, TransactionOutputs, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS};
use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
-use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, ChannelKeys};
+use chain::keysinterface::Sign;
+use util::atomic_counter::AtomicCounter;
use util::logger::Logger;
-use util::ser::{Readable, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, U48};
-use util::{byte_utils, events};
-use util::events::Event;
-
-use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet, hash_map};
-use std::sync::Mutex;
-use std::{cmp, mem};
-use std::ops::Deref;
-use std::io::Error;
-
-/// An update generated by the underlying Channel itself which contains some new information the
-/// ChannelMonitor should be made aware of.
-#[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq))]
-#[derive(Clone)]
-#[must_use]
-pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
- pub(crate) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
- /// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this
- /// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly
- /// increasing and increase by one for each new update.
- ///
- /// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned
- /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure have been applied to all copies of a given
- /// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called.
- pub update_id: u64,
+use util::errors::APIError;
+use util::events;
+use util::events::EventHandler;
+use ln::channelmanager::ChannelDetails;
+
+use prelude::*;
+use sync::{RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, Mutex, MutexGuard};
+use core::ops::Deref;
+use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, AtomicUsize, Ordering};
+
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
+/// A specific update's ID stored in a `MonitorUpdateId`, separated out to make the contents
+/// entirely opaque.
+enum UpdateOrigin {
+ /// An update that was generated by the `ChannelManager` (via our `chain::Watch`
+ /// implementation). This corresponds to an actual [`ChannelMonitorUpdate::update_id`] field
+ /// and [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_update_id`].
+ OffChain(u64),
+ /// An update that was generated during blockchain processing. The ID here is specific to the
+ /// generating [`ChainMonitor`] and does *not* correspond to any on-disk IDs.
+ ChainSync(u64),
}
-impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- self.update_id.write(w)?;
- (self.updates.len() as u64).write(w)?;
- for update_step in self.updates.iter() {
- update_step.write(w)?;
- }
- Ok(())
- }
+/// An opaque identifier describing a specific [`Persist`] method call.
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct MonitorUpdateId {
+ contents: UpdateOrigin,
}
-impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
- fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- let update_id: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
- let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
- let mut updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::std::mem::size_of::<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>()));
- for _ in 0..len {
- updates.push(Readable::read(r)?);
- }
- Ok(Self { update_id, updates })
+
+impl MonitorUpdateId {
+ pub(crate) fn from_monitor_update(update: &ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Self {
+ Self { contents: UpdateOrigin::OffChain(update.update_id) }
+ }
+ pub(crate) fn from_new_monitor<ChannelSigner: Sign>(monitor: &ChannelMonitor<ChannelSigner>) -> Self {
+ Self { contents: UpdateOrigin::OffChain(monitor.get_latest_update_id()) }
}
}
-/// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
-#[derive(Clone)]
-pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
- /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower or remote backup of
- /// our state failed, but is expected to succeed at some point in the future).
+/// `Persist` defines behavior for persisting channel monitors: this could mean
+/// writing once to disk, and/or uploading to one or more backup services.
+///
+/// Each method can return three possible values:
+/// * If persistence (including any relevant `fsync()` calls) happens immediately, the
+/// implementation should return `Ok(())`, indicating normal channel operation should continue.
+/// * If persistence happens asynchronously, implementations should first ensure the
+/// [`ChannelMonitor`] or [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] are written durably to disk, and then return
+/// `Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure)` while the update continues in the
+/// background. Once the update completes, [`ChainMonitor::channel_monitor_updated`] should be
+/// called with the corresponding [`MonitorUpdateId`].
+///
+/// Note that unlike the direct [`chain::Watch`] interface,
+/// [`ChainMonitor::channel_monitor_updated`] must be called once for *each* update which occurs.
+///
+/// * If persistence fails for some reason, implementations should return
+/// `Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure)`, in which case the channel will likely be
+/// closed without broadcasting the latest state. See
+/// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure`] for more details.
+pub trait Persist<ChannelSigner: Sign> {
+ /// Persist a new channel's data in response to a [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] call. This is
+ /// called by [`ChannelManager`] for new channels, or may be called directly, e.g. on startup.
+ ///
+ /// The data can be stored any way you want, but the identifier provided by LDK is the
+ /// channel's outpoint (and it is up to you to maintain a correct mapping between the outpoint
+ /// and the stored channel data). Note that you **must** persist every new monitor to disk.
+ ///
+ /// The `update_id` is used to identify this call to [`ChainMonitor::channel_monitor_updated`],
+ /// if you return [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure`].
+ ///
+ /// See [`Writeable::write`] on [`ChannelMonitor`] for writing out a `ChannelMonitor`
+ /// and [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr`] for requirements when returning errors.
+ ///
+ /// [`ChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager
+ /// [`Writeable::write`]: crate::util::ser::Writeable::write
+ fn persist_new_channel(&self, channel_id: OutPoint, data: &ChannelMonitor<ChannelSigner>, update_id: MonitorUpdateId) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
+
+ /// Update one channel's data. The provided [`ChannelMonitor`] has already applied the given
+ /// update.
///
- /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
- /// submitting new commitment transactions to the counterparty. Once the update(s) which failed
- /// have been successfully applied, ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated can be used to
- /// restore the channel to an operational state.
+ /// Note that on every update, you **must** persist either the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] or the
+ /// updated monitor itself to disk/backups. See the [`Persist`] trait documentation for more
+ /// details.
///
- /// Note that a given ChannelManager will *never* re-generate a given ChannelMonitorUpdate. If
- /// you return a TemporaryFailure you must ensure that it is written to disk safely before
- /// writing out the latest ChannelManager state.
+ /// During blockchain synchronization operations, this may be called with no
+ /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`], in which case the full [`ChannelMonitor`] needs to be persisted.
+ /// Note that after the full [`ChannelMonitor`] is persisted any previous
+ /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which were persisted should be discarded - they can no longer be
+ /// applied to the persisted [`ChannelMonitor`] as they were already applied.
///
- /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
- /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
- /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
- /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
- /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
- /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
- /// been "frozen".
+ /// If an implementer chooses to persist the updates only, they need to make
+ /// sure that all the updates are applied to the `ChannelMonitors` *before*
+ /// the set of channel monitors is given to the `ChannelManager`
+ /// deserialization routine. See [`ChannelMonitor::update_monitor`] for
+ /// applying a monitor update to a monitor. If full `ChannelMonitors` are
+ /// persisted, then there is no need to persist individual updates.
///
- /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
- /// channel_monitor_updated to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal channel
- /// operation.
+ /// Note that there could be a performance tradeoff between persisting complete
+ /// channel monitors on every update vs. persisting only updates and applying
+ /// them in batches. The size of each monitor grows `O(number of state updates)`
+ /// whereas updates are small and `O(1)`.
///
- /// Note that the update being processed here will not be replayed for you when you call
- /// ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated, so you must store the update itself along
- /// with the persisted ChannelMonitor on your own local disk prior to returning a
- /// TemporaryFailure. You may, of course, employ a journaling approach, storing only the
- /// ChannelMonitorUpdate on disk without updating the monitor itself, replaying the journal at
- /// reload-time.
+ /// The `update_id` is used to identify this call to [`ChainMonitor::channel_monitor_updated`],
+ /// if you return [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure`].
///
- /// For deployments where a copy of ChannelMonitors and other local state are backed up in a
- /// remote location (with local copies persisted immediately), it is anticipated that all
- /// updates will return TemporaryFailure until the remote copies could be updated.
- TemporaryFailure,
- /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
- /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
- /// of this channel).
+ /// See [`Writeable::write`] on [`ChannelMonitor`] for writing out a `ChannelMonitor`,
+ /// [`Writeable::write`] on [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] for writing out an update, and
+ /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr`] for requirements when returning errors.
///
- /// At reception of this error, ChannelManager will force-close the channel and return at
- /// least a final ChannelMonitorUpdate::ChannelForceClosed which must be delivered to at
- /// least one ChannelMonitor copy. Revocation secret MUST NOT be released and offchain channel
- /// update must be rejected.
+ /// [`Writeable::write`]: crate::util::ser::Writeable::write
+ fn update_persisted_channel(&self, channel_id: OutPoint, update: &Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, data: &ChannelMonitor<ChannelSigner>, update_id: MonitorUpdateId) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
+}
+
+struct MonitorHolder<ChannelSigner: Sign> {
+ monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChannelSigner>,
+ /// The full set of pending monitor updates for this Channel.
///
- /// This failure may also signal a failure to update the local persisted copy of one of
- /// the channel monitor instance.
+ /// Note that this lock must be held during updates to prevent a race where we call
+ /// update_persisted_channel, the user returns a TemporaryFailure, and then calls
+ /// channel_monitor_updated immediately, racing our insertion of the pending update into the
+ /// contained Vec.
///
- /// Note that even when you fail a holder commitment transaction update, you must store the
- /// update to ensure you can claim from it in case of a duplicate copy of this ChannelMonitor
- /// broadcasts it (e.g distributed channel-monitor deployment)
+ /// Beyond the synchronization of updates themselves, we cannot handle user events until after
+ /// any chain updates have been stored on disk. Thus, we scan this list when returning updates
+ /// to the ChannelManager, refusing to return any updates for a ChannelMonitor which is still
+ /// being persisted fully to disk after a chain update.
///
- /// In case of distributed watchtowers deployment, the new version must be written to disk, as
- /// state may have been stored but rejected due to a block forcing a commitment broadcast. This
- /// storage is used to claim outputs of rejected state confirmed onchain by another watchtower,
- /// lagging behind on block processing.
- PermanentFailure,
+ /// This avoids the possibility of handling, e.g. an on-chain claim, generating a claim monitor
+ /// event, resulting in the relevant ChannelManager generating a PaymentSent event and dropping
+ /// the pending payment entry, and then reloading before the monitor is persisted, resulting in
+ /// the ChannelManager re-adding the same payment entry, before the same block is replayed,
+ /// resulting in a duplicate PaymentSent event.
+ pending_monitor_updates: Mutex<Vec<MonitorUpdateId>>,
+ /// When the user returns a PermanentFailure error from an update_persisted_channel call during
+ /// block processing, we inform the ChannelManager that the channel should be closed
+ /// asynchronously. In order to ensure no further changes happen before the ChannelManager has
+ /// processed the closure event, we set this to true and return PermanentFailure for any other
+ /// chain::Watch events.
+ channel_perm_failed: AtomicBool,
+ /// The last block height at which no [`UpdateOrigin::ChainSync`] monitor updates were present
+ /// in `pending_monitor_updates`.
+ /// If it's been more than [`LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS`] since we started waiting on a chain
+ /// sync event, we let monitor events return to `ChannelManager` because we cannot hold them up
+ /// forever or we'll end up with HTLC preimages waiting to feed back into an upstream channel
+ /// forever, risking funds loss.
+ last_chain_persist_height: AtomicUsize,
}
-/// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
-/// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::update_monitor this
-/// means you tried to update a monitor for a different channel or the ChannelMonitorUpdate was
-/// corrupted.
-/// Contains a human-readable error message.
-#[derive(Debug)]
-pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
-
-/// An event to be processed by the ChannelManager.
-#[derive(PartialEq)]
-pub enum MonitorEvent {
- /// A monitor event containing an HTLCUpdate.
- HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate),
-
- /// A monitor event that the Channel's commitment transaction was broadcasted.
- CommitmentTxBroadcasted(OutPoint),
+impl<ChannelSigner: Sign> MonitorHolder<ChannelSigner> {
+ fn has_pending_offchain_updates(&self, pending_monitor_updates_lock: &MutexGuard<Vec<MonitorUpdateId>>) -> bool {
+ pending_monitor_updates_lock.iter().any(|update_id|
+ if let UpdateOrigin::OffChain(_) = update_id.contents { true } else { false })
+ }
+ fn has_pending_chainsync_updates(&self, pending_monitor_updates_lock: &MutexGuard<Vec<MonitorUpdateId>>) -> bool {
+ pending_monitor_updates_lock.iter().any(|update_id|
+ if let UpdateOrigin::ChainSync(_) = update_id.contents { true } else { false })
+ }
}
-/// Simple structure sent back by `chain::Watch` when an HTLC from a forward channel is detected on
-/// chain. Used to update the corresponding HTLC in the backward channel. Failing to pass the
-/// preimage claim backward will lead to loss of funds.
+/// A read-only reference to a current ChannelMonitor.
///
-/// [`chain::Watch`]: ../../chain/trait.Watch.html
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
-pub struct HTLCUpdate {
- pub(crate) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
- pub(crate) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
- pub(crate) source: HTLCSource
+/// Note that this holds a mutex in [`ChainMonitor`] and may block other events until it is
+/// released.
+pub struct LockedChannelMonitor<'a, ChannelSigner: Sign> {
+ lock: RwLockReadGuard<'a, HashMap<OutPoint, MonitorHolder<ChannelSigner>>>,
+ funding_txo: OutPoint,
+}
+
+impl<ChannelSigner: Sign> Deref for LockedChannelMonitor<'_, ChannelSigner> {
+ type Target = ChannelMonitor<ChannelSigner>;
+ fn deref(&self) -> &ChannelMonitor<ChannelSigner> {
+ &self.lock.get(&self.funding_txo).expect("Checked at construction").monitor
+ }
}
-impl_writeable!(HTLCUpdate, 0, { payment_hash, payment_preimage, source });
/// An implementation of [`chain::Watch`] for monitoring channels.
///
/// Connected and disconnected blocks must be provided to `ChainMonitor` as documented by
/// [`chain::Watch`]. May be used in conjunction with [`ChannelManager`] to monitor channels locally
-/// or used independently to monitor channels remotely.
+/// or used independently to monitor channels remotely. See the [module-level documentation] for
+/// details.
///
-/// [`chain::Watch`]: ../../chain/trait.Watch.html
-/// [`ChannelManager`]: ../channelmanager/struct.ChannelManager.html
-pub struct ChainMonitor<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, C: Deref, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
+/// [`ChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager
+/// [module-level documentation]: crate::chain::chainmonitor
+pub struct ChainMonitor<ChannelSigner: Sign, C: Deref, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref, P: Deref>
where C::Target: chain::Filter,
T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
+ P::Target: Persist<ChannelSigner>,
{
- /// The monitors
- pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>>,
+ monitors: RwLock<HashMap<OutPoint, MonitorHolder<ChannelSigner>>>,
+ /// When we generate a [`MonitorUpdateId`] for a chain-event monitor persistence, we need a
+ /// unique ID, which we calculate by simply getting the next value from this counter. Note that
+ /// the ID is never persisted so it's ok that they reset on restart.
+ sync_persistence_id: AtomicCounter,
chain_source: Option<C>,
broadcaster: T,
logger: L,
- fee_estimator: F
+ fee_estimator: F,
+ persister: P,
+ /// "User-provided" (ie persistence-completion/-failed) [`MonitorEvent`]s. These came directly
+ /// from the user and not from a [`ChannelMonitor`].
+ pending_monitor_events: Mutex<Vec<MonitorEvent>>,
+ /// The best block height seen, used as a proxy for the passage of time.
+ highest_chain_height: AtomicUsize,
}
-impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, C: Deref, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChainMonitor<ChanSigner, C, T, F, L>
- where C::Target: chain::Filter,
- T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
- F::Target: FeeEstimator,
- L::Target: Logger,
+impl<ChannelSigner: Sign, C: Deref, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref, P: Deref> ChainMonitor<ChannelSigner, C, T, F, L, P>
+where C::Target: chain::Filter,
+ T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
+ F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+ L::Target: Logger,
+ P::Target: Persist<ChannelSigner>,
{
/// Dispatches to per-channel monitors, which are responsible for updating their on-chain view
- /// of a channel and reacting accordingly based on transactions in the connected block. See
+ /// of a channel and reacting accordingly based on transactions in the given chain data. See
/// [`ChannelMonitor::block_connected`] for details. Any HTLCs that were resolved on chain will
/// be returned by [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`].
///
- /// Calls back to [`chain::Filter`] if any monitor indicated new outputs to watch, returning
- /// `true` if so. Subsequent calls must not exclude any transactions matching the new outputs
- /// nor any in-block descendants of such transactions. It is not necessary to re-fetch the block
- /// to obtain updated `txdata`.
+ /// Calls back to [`chain::Filter`] if any monitor indicated new outputs to watch. Subsequent
+ /// calls must not exclude any transactions matching the new outputs nor any in-block
+ /// descendants of such transactions. It is not necessary to re-fetch the block to obtain
+ /// updated `txdata`.
///
- /// [`ChannelMonitor::block_connected`]: struct.ChannelMonitor.html#method.block_connected
- /// [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`]: ../../chain/trait.Watch.html#tymethod.release_pending_monitor_events
- /// [`chain::Filter`]: ../../chain/trait.Filter.html
- pub fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) -> bool {
- let mut has_new_outputs_to_watch = false;
+ /// Calls which represent a new blockchain tip height should set `best_height`.
+ fn process_chain_data<FN>(&self, header: &BlockHeader, best_height: Option<u32>, txdata: &TransactionData, process: FN)
+ where
+ FN: Fn(&ChannelMonitor<ChannelSigner>, &TransactionData) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
+ {
+ let mut dependent_txdata = Vec::new();
{
- let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
- for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
- let mut txn_outputs = monitor.block_connected(header, txdata, height, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator, &*self.logger);
- has_new_outputs_to_watch |= !txn_outputs.is_empty();
+ let monitor_states = self.monitors.write().unwrap();
+ if let Some(height) = best_height {
+ // If the best block height is being updated, update highest_chain_height under the
+ // monitors write lock.
+ let old_height = self.highest_chain_height.load(Ordering::Acquire);
+ let new_height = height as usize;
+ if new_height > old_height {
+ self.highest_chain_height.store(new_height, Ordering::Release);
+ }
+ }
+ for (funding_outpoint, monitor_state) in monitor_states.iter() {
+ let monitor = &monitor_state.monitor;
+ let mut txn_outputs;
+ {
+ txn_outputs = process(monitor, txdata);
+ let update_id = MonitorUpdateId {
+ contents: UpdateOrigin::ChainSync(self.sync_persistence_id.get_increment()),
+ };
+ let mut pending_monitor_updates = monitor_state.pending_monitor_updates.lock().unwrap();
+ if let Some(height) = best_height {
+ if !monitor_state.has_pending_chainsync_updates(&pending_monitor_updates) {
+ // If there are not ChainSync persists awaiting completion, go ahead and
+ // set last_chain_persist_height here - we wouldn't want the first
+ // TemporaryFailure to always immediately be considered "overly delayed".
+ monitor_state.last_chain_persist_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
+ }
+ }
+
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Syncing Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(monitor));
+ match self.persister.update_persisted_channel(*funding_outpoint, &None, monitor, update_id) {
+ Ok(()) =>
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Finished syncing Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(monitor)),
+ Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
+ monitor_state.channel_perm_failed.store(true, Ordering::Release);
+ self.pending_monitor_events.lock().unwrap().push(MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(*funding_outpoint));
+ },
+ Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Channel Monitor sync for channel {} in progress, holding events until completion!", log_funding_info!(monitor));
+ pending_monitor_updates.push(update_id);
+ },
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Register any new outputs with the chain source for filtering, storing any dependent
+ // transactions from within the block that previously had not been included in txdata.
if let Some(ref chain_source) = self.chain_source {
- for (txid, outputs) in txn_outputs.drain(..) {
- for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
- chain_source.register_output(&OutPoint { txid, index: idx as u16 }, &output.script_pubkey);
+ let block_hash = header.block_hash();
+ for (txid, mut outputs) in txn_outputs.drain(..) {
+ for (idx, output) in outputs.drain(..) {
+ // Register any new outputs with the chain source for filtering and recurse
+ // if it indicates that there are dependent transactions within the block
+ // that had not been previously included in txdata.
+ let output = WatchedOutput {
+ block_hash: Some(block_hash),
+ outpoint: OutPoint { txid, index: idx as u16 },
+ script_pubkey: output.script_pubkey,
+ };
+ if let Some(tx) = chain_source.register_output(output) {
+ dependent_txdata.push(tx);
+ }
}
}
}
}
}
- has_new_outputs_to_watch
- }
- /// Dispatches to per-channel monitors, which are responsible for updating their on-chain view
- /// of a channel based on the disconnected block. See [`ChannelMonitor::block_disconnected`] for
- /// details.
- ///
- /// [`ChannelMonitor::block_disconnected`]: struct.ChannelMonitor.html#method.block_disconnected
- pub fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, disconnected_height: u32) {
- let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
- for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
- monitor.block_disconnected(header, disconnected_height, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator, &*self.logger);
+ // Recursively call for any dependent transactions that were identified by the chain source.
+ if !dependent_txdata.is_empty() {
+ dependent_txdata.sort_unstable_by_key(|(index, _tx)| *index);
+ dependent_txdata.dedup_by_key(|(index, _tx)| *index);
+ let txdata: Vec<_> = dependent_txdata.iter().map(|(index, tx)| (*index, tx)).collect();
+ self.process_chain_data(header, None, &txdata, process); // We skip the best height the second go-around
}
}
/// pre-filter blocks or only fetch blocks matching a compact filter. Otherwise, clients may
/// always need to fetch full blocks absent another means for determining which blocks contain
/// transactions relevant to the watched channels.
- ///
- /// [`chain::Filter`]: ../../chain/trait.Filter.html
- pub fn new(chain_source: Option<C>, broadcaster: T, logger: L, feeest: F) -> Self {
+ pub fn new(chain_source: Option<C>, broadcaster: T, logger: L, feeest: F, persister: P) -> Self {
Self {
- monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
+ monitors: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
+ sync_persistence_id: AtomicCounter::new(),
chain_source,
broadcaster,
logger,
fee_estimator: feeest,
+ persister,
+ pending_monitor_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
+ highest_chain_height: AtomicUsize::new(0),
}
}
- /// Adds the monitor that watches the channel referred to by the given outpoint.
+ /// Gets the balances in the contained [`ChannelMonitor`]s which are claimable on-chain or
+ /// claims which are awaiting confirmation.
///
- /// Calls back to [`chain::Filter`] with the funding transaction and outputs to watch.
+ /// Includes the balances from each [`ChannelMonitor`] *except* those included in
+ /// `ignored_channels`, allowing you to filter out balances from channels which are still open
+ /// (and whose balance should likely be pulled from the [`ChannelDetails`]).
///
- /// [`chain::Filter`]: ../../chain/trait.Filter.html
- fn add_monitor(&self, outpoint: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
- let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
- let entry = match monitors.entry(outpoint) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Channel monitor for given outpoint is already present")),
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => e,
- };
- {
- let funding_txo = monitor.get_funding_txo();
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.0.to_channel_id()[..]));
-
- if let Some(ref chain_source) = self.chain_source {
- chain_source.register_tx(&funding_txo.0.txid, &funding_txo.1);
- for (txid, outputs) in monitor.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() {
- for (idx, script_pubkey) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
- chain_source.register_output(&OutPoint { txid: *txid, index: idx as u16 }, &script_pubkey);
- }
+ /// See [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] for more details on the exact criteria for
+ /// inclusion in the return value.
+ pub fn get_claimable_balances(&self, ignored_channels: &[&ChannelDetails]) -> Vec<Balance> {
+ let mut ret = Vec::new();
+ let monitor_states = self.monitors.read().unwrap();
+ for (_, monitor_state) in monitor_states.iter().filter(|(funding_outpoint, _)| {
+ for chan in ignored_channels {
+ if chan.funding_txo.as_ref() == Some(funding_outpoint) {
+ return false;
}
}
+ true
+ }) {
+ ret.append(&mut monitor_state.monitor.get_claimable_balances());
}
- entry.insert(monitor);
- Ok(())
+ ret
}
- /// Updates the monitor that watches the channel referred to by the given outpoint.
- fn update_monitor(&self, outpoint: OutPoint, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
- let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
- match monitors.get_mut(&outpoint) {
- Some(orig_monitor) => {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(orig_monitor));
- orig_monitor.update_monitor(update, &self.broadcaster, &self.logger)
- },
- None => Err(MonitorUpdateError("No such monitor registered"))
+ /// Gets the [`LockedChannelMonitor`] for a given funding outpoint, returning an `Err` if no
+ /// such [`ChannelMonitor`] is currently being monitored for.
+ ///
+ /// Note that the result holds a mutex over our monitor set, and should not be held
+ /// indefinitely.
+ pub fn get_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint) -> Result<LockedChannelMonitor<'_, ChannelSigner>, ()> {
+ let lock = self.monitors.read().unwrap();
+ if lock.get(&funding_txo).is_some() {
+ Ok(LockedChannelMonitor { lock, funding_txo })
+ } else {
+ Err(())
}
}
-}
-
-impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, C: Deref + Sync + Send, T: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send, L: Deref + Sync + Send> chain::Watch for ChainMonitor<ChanSigner, C, T, F, L>
- where C::Target: chain::Filter,
- T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
- F::Target: FeeEstimator,
- L::Target: Logger,
-{
- type Keys = ChanSigner;
- fn watch_channel(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
- match self.add_monitor(funding_txo, monitor) {
- Ok(_) => Ok(()),
- Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
- }
+ /// Lists the funding outpoint of each [`ChannelMonitor`] being monitored.
+ ///
+ /// Note that [`ChannelMonitor`]s are not removed when a channel is closed as they are always
+ /// monitoring for on-chain state resolutions.
+ pub fn list_monitors(&self) -> Vec<OutPoint> {
+ self.monitors.read().unwrap().keys().map(|outpoint| *outpoint).collect()
}
- fn update_channel(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
- match self.update_monitor(funding_txo, update) {
- Ok(_) => Ok(()),
- Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
- }
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub fn remove_monitor(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint) -> ChannelMonitor<ChannelSigner> {
+ self.monitors.write().unwrap().remove(funding_txo).unwrap().monitor
}
- fn release_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
- let mut pending_monitor_events = Vec::new();
- for chan in self.monitors.lock().unwrap().values_mut() {
- pending_monitor_events.append(&mut chan.get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events());
+ /// Indicates the persistence of a [`ChannelMonitor`] has completed after
+ /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure`] was returned from an update operation.
+ ///
+ /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
+ /// 1) This [`ChainMonitor`] calls [`Persist::update_persisted_channel`] which stores the
+ /// update to disk and begins updating any remote (e.g. watchtower/backup) copies,
+ /// returning [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure`],
+ /// 2) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the
+ /// `completed_update_id` that completed, and once all pending updates have completed the
+ /// channel will be re-enabled.
+ // Note that we re-enable only after `UpdateOrigin::OffChain` updates complete, we don't
+ // care about `UpdateOrigin::ChainSync` updates for the channel state being updated. We
+ // only care about `UpdateOrigin::ChainSync` for returning `MonitorEvent`s.
+ ///
+ /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if `funding_txo` does not match any currently
+ /// registered [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
+ pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, completed_update_id: MonitorUpdateId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ let monitors = self.monitors.read().unwrap();
+ let monitor_data = if let Some(mon) = monitors.get(&funding_txo) { mon } else {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("No ChannelMonitor matching funding outpoint {:?} found", funding_txo) });
+ };
+ let mut pending_monitor_updates = monitor_data.pending_monitor_updates.lock().unwrap();
+ pending_monitor_updates.retain(|update_id| *update_id != completed_update_id);
+
+ match completed_update_id {
+ MonitorUpdateId { contents: UpdateOrigin::OffChain(_) } => {
+ // Note that we only check for `UpdateOrigin::OffChain` failures here - if
+ // we're being told that a `UpdateOrigin::OffChain` monitor update completed,
+ // we only care about ensuring we don't tell the `ChannelManager` to restore
+ // the channel to normal operation until all `UpdateOrigin::OffChain` updates
+ // complete.
+ // If there's some `UpdateOrigin::ChainSync` update still pending that's okay
+ // - we can still update our channel state, just as long as we don't return
+ // `MonitorEvent`s from the monitor back to the `ChannelManager` until they
+ // complete.
+ let monitor_is_pending_updates = monitor_data.has_pending_offchain_updates(&pending_monitor_updates);
+ if monitor_is_pending_updates || monitor_data.channel_perm_failed.load(Ordering::Acquire) {
+ // If there are still monitor updates pending (or an old monitor update
+ // finished after a later one perm-failed), we cannot yet construct an
+ // UpdateCompleted event.
+ return Ok(());
+ }
+ self.pending_monitor_events.lock().unwrap().push(MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted {
+ funding_txo,
+ monitor_update_id: monitor_data.monitor.get_latest_update_id(),
+ });
+ },
+ MonitorUpdateId { contents: UpdateOrigin::ChainSync(_) } => {
+ if !monitor_data.has_pending_chainsync_updates(&pending_monitor_updates) {
+ monitor_data.last_chain_persist_height.store(self.highest_chain_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), Ordering::Release);
+ // The next time release_pending_monitor_events is called, any events for this
+ // ChannelMonitor will be returned.
+ }
+ },
}
- pending_monitor_events
+ Ok(())
}
-}
-impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, C: Deref, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> events::EventsProvider for ChainMonitor<ChanSigner, C, T, F, L>
- where C::Target: chain::Filter,
- T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
- F::Target: FeeEstimator,
- L::Target: Logger,
-{
- fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
- let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
- for chan in self.monitors.lock().unwrap().values_mut() {
- pending_events.append(&mut chan.get_and_clear_pending_events());
- }
- pending_events
+ /// This wrapper avoids having to update some of our tests for now as they assume the direct
+ /// chain::Watch API wherein we mark a monitor fully-updated by just calling
+ /// channel_monitor_updated once with the highest ID.
+ #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+ pub fn force_channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor_update_id: u64) {
+ self.pending_monitor_events.lock().unwrap().push(MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted {
+ funding_txo,
+ monitor_update_id,
+ });
}
-}
-
-/// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
-/// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
-pub(crate) const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
-/// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
-/// HTLC-Success transaction.
-/// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
-/// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
-pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
-/// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
-/// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
-/// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
-/// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
-/// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
-/// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
-/// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
-/// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
-/// accurate block height.
-/// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
-/// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
-/// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
-pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
-/// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding inbound
-/// HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us losing money.
-/// We use also this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
-/// It may cause spurrious generation of bumped claim txn but that's allright given the outpoint is already
-/// solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
-/// keeping bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
-pub(crate) const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
-/// Number of blocks before confirmation at which we fail back an un-relayed HTLC or at which we
-/// refuse to accept a new HTLC.
-///
-/// This is used for a few separate purposes:
-/// 1) if we've received an MPP HTLC to us and it expires within this many blocks and we are
-/// waiting on additional parts (or waiting on the preimage for any HTLC from the user), we will
-/// fail this HTLC,
-/// 2) if we receive an HTLC within this many blocks of its expiry (plus one to avoid a race
-/// condition with the above), we will fail this HTLC without telling the user we received it,
-/// 3) if we are waiting on a connection or a channel state update to send an HTLC to a peer, and
-/// that HTLC expires within this many blocks, we will simply fail the HTLC instead.
-///
-/// (1) is all about protecting us - we need enough time to update the channel state before we hit
-/// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, at which point we'd go on chain to claim the HTLC with the preimage.
-///
-/// (2) is the same, but with an additional buffer to avoid accepting an HTLC which is immediately
-/// in a race condition between the user connecting a block (which would fail it) and the user
-/// providing us the preimage (which would claim it).
-///
-/// (3) is about our counterparty - we don't want to relay an HTLC to a counterparty when they may
-/// end up force-closing the channel on us to claim it.
-pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER: u32 = CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
-
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
-struct HolderSignedTx {
- /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
- txid: Txid,
- revocation_key: PublicKey,
- a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
- b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
- delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
- per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
- feerate_per_kw: u32,
- htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
-}
-
-/// We use this to track counterparty commitment transactions and htlcs outputs and
-/// use it to generate any justice or 2nd-stage preimage/timeout transactions.
-#[derive(PartialEq)]
-struct CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
- counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
- counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
- on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
- per_htlc: HashMap<Txid, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>>
-}
-impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- self.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.write(w)?;
- self.counterparty_htlc_base_key.write(w)?;
- w.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_counterparty_tx_csv))?;
- w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_htlc.len() as u64))?;
- for (ref txid, ref htlcs) in self.per_htlc.iter() {
- w.write_all(&txid[..])?;
- w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlcs.len() as u64))?;
- for &ref htlc in htlcs.iter() {
- htlc.write(w)?;
- }
- }
- Ok(())
- }
-}
-impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
- fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- let counterparty_commitment_transaction = {
- let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(r)?;
- let counterparty_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(r)?;
- let on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
- let per_htlc_len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
- let mut per_htlc = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(per_htlc_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
- for _ in 0..per_htlc_len {
- let txid: Txid = Readable::read(r)?;
- let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
- let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
- for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
- let htlc = Readable::read(r)?;
- htlcs.push(htlc);
- }
- if let Some(_) = per_htlc.insert(txid, htlcs) {
- return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
- }
- }
- CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
- counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
- counterparty_htlc_base_key,
- on_counterparty_tx_csv,
- per_htlc,
- }
- };
- Ok(counterparty_commitment_transaction)
+ #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
+ pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
+ use util::events::EventsProvider;
+ let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
+ let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
+ self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
+ events.into_inner()
}
}
-/// When ChannelMonitor discovers an onchain outpoint being a step of a channel and that it needs
-/// to generate a tx to push channel state forward, we cache outpoint-solving tx material to build
-/// a new bumped one in case of lenghty confirmation delay
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
-pub(crate) enum InputMaterial {
- Revoked {
- per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
- counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
- counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
- per_commitment_key: SecretKey,
- input_descriptor: InputDescriptors,
- amount: u64,
- htlc: Option<HTLCOutputInCommitment>,
- on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
- },
- CounterpartyHTLC {
- per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
- counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
- counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
- preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
- htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment
- },
- HolderHTLC {
- preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
- amount: u64,
- },
- Funding {
- funding_redeemscript: Script,
+impl<ChannelSigner: Sign, C: Deref, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref, P: Deref>
+chain::Listen for ChainMonitor<ChannelSigner, C, T, F, L, P>
+where
+ C::Target: chain::Filter,
+ T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
+ F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+ L::Target: Logger,
+ P::Target: Persist<ChannelSigner>,
+{
+ fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
+ let header = &block.header;
+ let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "New best block {} at height {} provided via block_connected", header.block_hash(), height);
+ self.process_chain_data(header, Some(height), &txdata, |monitor, txdata| {
+ monitor.block_connected(
+ header, txdata, height, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator, &*self.logger)
+ });
}
-}
-impl Writeable for InputMaterial {
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- match self {
- &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref per_commitment_point, ref counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, ref counterparty_htlc_base_key, ref per_commitment_key, ref input_descriptor, ref amount, ref htlc, ref on_counterparty_tx_csv} => {
- writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
- per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
- counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.write(writer)?;
- counterparty_htlc_base_key.write(writer)?;
- writer.write_all(&per_commitment_key[..])?;
- input_descriptor.write(writer)?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
- htlc.write(writer)?;
- on_counterparty_tx_csv.write(writer)?;
- },
- &InputMaterial::CounterpartyHTLC { ref per_commitment_point, ref counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, ref counterparty_htlc_base_key, ref preimage, ref htlc} => {
- writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
- per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
- counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.write(writer)?;
- counterparty_htlc_base_key.write(writer)?;
- preimage.write(writer)?;
- htlc.write(writer)?;
- },
- &InputMaterial::HolderHTLC { ref preimage, ref amount } => {
- writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
- preimage.write(writer)?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
- },
- &InputMaterial::Funding { ref funding_redeemscript } => {
- writer.write_all(&[3; 1])?;
- funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
- }
+ fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
+ let monitor_states = self.monitors.read().unwrap();
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Latest block {} at height {} removed via block_disconnected", header.block_hash(), height);
+ for monitor_state in monitor_states.values() {
+ monitor_state.monitor.block_disconnected(
+ header, height, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator, &*self.logger);
}
- Ok(())
}
}
-impl Readable for InputMaterial {
- fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- let input_material = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
- 0 => {
- let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let counterparty_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let per_commitment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let input_descriptor = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let htlc = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let on_counterparty_tx_csv = Readable::read(reader)?;
- InputMaterial::Revoked {
- per_commitment_point,
- counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
- counterparty_htlc_base_key,
- per_commitment_key,
- input_descriptor,
- amount,
- htlc,
- on_counterparty_tx_csv
- }
- },
- 1 => {
- let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let counterparty_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let htlc = Readable::read(reader)?;
- InputMaterial::CounterpartyHTLC {
- per_commitment_point,
- counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
- counterparty_htlc_base_key,
- preimage,
- htlc
- }
- },
- 2 => {
- let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
- InputMaterial::HolderHTLC {
- preimage,
- amount,
- }
- },
- 3 => {
- InputMaterial::Funding {
- funding_redeemscript: Readable::read(reader)?,
- }
- }
- _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- };
- Ok(input_material)
+impl<ChannelSigner: Sign, C: Deref, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref, P: Deref>
+chain::Confirm for ChainMonitor<ChannelSigner, C, T, F, L, P>
+where
+ C::Target: chain::Filter,
+ T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
+ F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+ L::Target: Logger,
+ P::Target: Persist<ChannelSigner>,
+{
+ fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "{} provided transactions confirmed at height {} in block {}", txdata.len(), height, header.block_hash());
+ self.process_chain_data(header, None, txdata, |monitor, txdata| {
+ monitor.transactions_confirmed(
+ header, txdata, height, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator, &*self.logger)
+ });
}
-}
-
-/// ClaimRequest is a descriptor structure to communicate between detection
-/// and reaction module. They are generated by ChannelMonitor while parsing
-/// onchain txn leaked from a channel and handed over to OnchainTxHandler which
-/// is responsible for opportunistic aggregation, selecting and enforcing
-/// bumping logic, building and signing transactions.
-pub(crate) struct ClaimRequest {
- // Block height before which claiming is exclusive to one party,
- // after reaching it, claiming may be contentious.
- pub(crate) absolute_timelock: u32,
- // Timeout tx must have nLocktime set which means aggregating multiple
- // ones must take the higher nLocktime among them to satisfy all of them.
- // Sadly it has few pitfalls, a) it takes longuer to get fund back b) CLTV_DELTA
- // of a sooner-HTLC could be swallowed by the highest nLocktime of the HTLC set.
- // Do simplify we mark them as non-aggregable.
- pub(crate) aggregable: bool,
- // Basic bitcoin outpoint (txid, vout)
- pub(crate) outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint,
- // Following outpoint type, set of data needed to generate transaction digest
- // and satisfy witness program.
- pub(crate) witness_data: InputMaterial
-}
-
-/// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
-/// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
-enum OnchainEvent {
- /// HTLC output getting solved by a timeout, at maturation we pass upstream payment source information to solve
- /// inbound HTLC in backward channel. Note, in case of preimage, we pass info to upstream without delay as we can
- /// only win from it, so it's never an OnchainEvent
- HTLCUpdate {
- htlc_update: (HTLCSource, PaymentHash),
- },
- MaturingOutput {
- descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
- },
-}
-
-const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
-const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
-
-#[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq))]
-#[derive(Clone)]
-pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
- LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
- commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
- htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
- },
- LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
- unsigned_commitment_tx: Transaction, // TODO: We should actually only need the txid here
- htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
- commitment_number: u64,
- their_revocation_point: PublicKey,
- },
- PaymentPreimage {
- payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
- },
- CommitmentSecret {
- idx: u64,
- secret: [u8; 32],
- },
- /// Used to indicate that the no future updates will occur, and likely that the latest holder
- /// commitment transaction(s) should be broadcast, as the channel has been force-closed.
- ChannelForceClosed {
- /// If set to false, we shouldn't broadcast the latest holder commitment transaction as we
- /// think we've fallen behind!
- should_broadcast: bool,
- },
-}
-impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- match self {
- &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { ref commitment_tx, ref htlc_outputs } => {
- 0u8.write(w)?;
- commitment_tx.write(w)?;
- (htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?;
- for &(ref output, ref signature, ref source) in htlc_outputs.iter() {
- output.write(w)?;
- signature.write(w)?;
- source.write(w)?;
- }
- }
- &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { ref unsigned_commitment_tx, ref htlc_outputs, ref commitment_number, ref their_revocation_point } => {
- 1u8.write(w)?;
- unsigned_commitment_tx.write(w)?;
- commitment_number.write(w)?;
- their_revocation_point.write(w)?;
- (htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?;
- for &(ref output, ref source) in htlc_outputs.iter() {
- output.write(w)?;
- source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(w)?;
- }
- },
- &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { ref payment_preimage } => {
- 2u8.write(w)?;
- payment_preimage.write(w)?;
- },
- &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { ref idx, ref secret } => {
- 3u8.write(w)?;
- idx.write(w)?;
- secret.write(w)?;
- },
- &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { ref should_broadcast } => {
- 4u8.write(w)?;
- should_broadcast.write(w)?;
- },
- }
- Ok(())
- }
-}
-impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
- fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- match Readable::read(r)? {
- 0u8 => {
- Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
- commitment_tx: Readable::read(r)?,
- htlc_outputs: {
- let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
- let mut res = Vec::new();
- for _ in 0..len {
- res.push((Readable::read(r)?, Readable::read(r)?, Readable::read(r)?));
- }
- res
- },
- })
- },
- 1u8 => {
- Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
- unsigned_commitment_tx: Readable::read(r)?,
- commitment_number: Readable::read(r)?,
- their_revocation_point: Readable::read(r)?,
- htlc_outputs: {
- let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
- let mut res = Vec::new();
- for _ in 0..len {
- res.push((Readable::read(r)?, <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(r)?.map(|o| Box::new(o))));
- }
- res
- },
- })
- },
- 2u8 => {
- Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
- payment_preimage: Readable::read(r)?,
- })
- },
- 3u8 => {
- Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
- idx: Readable::read(r)?,
- secret: Readable::read(r)?,
- })
- },
- 4u8 => {
- Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed {
- should_broadcast: Readable::read(r)?
- })
- },
- _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Transaction {} reorganized out of chain", txid);
+ let monitor_states = self.monitors.read().unwrap();
+ for monitor_state in monitor_states.values() {
+ monitor_state.monitor.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator, &*self.logger);
}
}
-}
-
-/// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
-/// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
-///
-/// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
-/// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
-///
-/// Pending Events or updated HTLCs which have not yet been read out by
-/// get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events or get_and_clear_pending_events are serialized to disk and
-/// reloaded at deserialize-time. Thus, you must ensure that, when handling events, all events
-/// gotten are fully handled before re-serializing the new state.
-pub struct ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
- latest_update_id: u64,
- commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
-
- destination_script: Script,
- broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>,
- counterparty_payment_script: Script,
- shutdown_script: Script,
-
- keys: ChanSigner,
- funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
- current_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
- prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
-
- counterparty_tx_cache: CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction,
- funding_redeemscript: Script,
- channel_value_satoshis: u64,
- // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
- their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
-
- on_holder_tx_csv: u16,
-
- commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
- counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
- /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
- /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
- /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the counterparty
- /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
- /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
- counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Txid, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
- /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
- /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for counterparty transactions for non-revoked
- /// counterparty transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
- /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
- counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
-
- // We store two holder commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
- // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
- // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a holder
- // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
- prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx>,
- current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx,
-
- // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
- // deserialization
- current_counterparty_commitment_number: u64,
- // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
- // deserialization
- current_holder_commitment_number: u64,
-
- payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
-
- pending_monitor_events: Vec<MonitorEvent>,
- pending_events: Vec<Event>,
-
- // Used to track onchain events, i.e transactions parts of channels confirmed on chain, on which
- // we have to take actions once they reach enough confs. Key is a block height timer, i.e we enforce
- // actions when we receive a block with given height. Actions depend on OnchainEvent type.
- onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap<u32, Vec<OnchainEvent>>,
-
- // If we get serialized out and re-read, we need to make sure that the chain monitoring
- // interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
- // be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
- // Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
- outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Txid, Vec<Script>>,
- #[cfg(test)]
- pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<ChanSigner>,
- #[cfg(not(test))]
- onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<ChanSigner>,
-
- // This is set when the Channel[Manager] generated a ChannelMonitorUpdate which indicated the
- // channel has been force-closed. After this is set, no further holder commitment transaction
- // updates may occur, and we panic!() if one is provided.
- lockdown_from_offchain: bool,
-
- // Set once we've signed a holder commitment transaction and handed it over to our
- // OnchainTxHandler. After this is set, no future updates to our holder commitment transactions
- // may occur, and we fail any such monitor updates.
- //
- // In case of update rejection due to a locally already signed commitment transaction, we
- // nevertheless store update content to track in case of concurrent broadcast by another
- // remote monitor out-of-order with regards to the block view.
- holder_tx_signed: bool,
-
- // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
- // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
- // (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep
- // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
- // the full block_connected).
- last_block_hash: BlockHash,
- secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
-}
+ fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "New best block {} at height {} provided via best_block_updated", header.block_hash(), height);
+ self.process_chain_data(header, Some(height), &[], |monitor, txdata| {
+ // While in practice there shouldn't be any recursive calls when given empty txdata,
+ // it's still possible if a chain::Filter implementation returns a transaction.
+ debug_assert!(txdata.is_empty());
+ monitor.best_block_updated(
+ header, height, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator, &*self.logger)
+ });
+ }
-#[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
-/// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
-/// underlying object
-impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
- fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
- if self.latest_update_id != other.latest_update_id ||
- self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
- self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
- self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script != other.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script ||
- self.counterparty_payment_script != other.counterparty_payment_script ||
- self.keys.pubkeys() != other.keys.pubkeys() ||
- self.funding_info != other.funding_info ||
- self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.current_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
- self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
- self.counterparty_tx_cache != other.counterparty_tx_cache ||
- self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript ||
- self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis ||
- self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
- self.on_holder_tx_csv != other.on_holder_tx_csv ||
- self.commitment_secrets != other.commitment_secrets ||
- self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints != other.counterparty_claimable_outpoints ||
- self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
- self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number != other.counterparty_hash_commitment_number ||
- self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx ||
- self.current_counterparty_commitment_number != other.current_counterparty_commitment_number ||
- self.current_holder_commitment_number != other.current_holder_commitment_number ||
- self.current_holder_commitment_tx != other.current_holder_commitment_tx ||
- self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
- self.pending_monitor_events != other.pending_monitor_events ||
- self.pending_events.len() != other.pending_events.len() || // We trust events to round-trip properly
- self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf ||
- self.outputs_to_watch != other.outputs_to_watch ||
- self.lockdown_from_offchain != other.lockdown_from_offchain ||
- self.holder_tx_signed != other.holder_tx_signed
- {
- false
- } else {
- true
+ fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
+ let mut txids = Vec::new();
+ let monitor_states = self.monitors.read().unwrap();
+ for monitor_state in monitor_states.values() {
+ txids.append(&mut monitor_state.monitor.get_relevant_txids());
}
+
+ txids.sort_unstable();
+ txids.dedup();
+ txids
}
}
-impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
- /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
+impl<ChannelSigner: Sign, C: Deref , T: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref , P: Deref >
+chain::Watch<ChannelSigner> for ChainMonitor<ChannelSigner, C, T, F, L, P>
+where C::Target: chain::Filter,
+ T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
+ F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+ L::Target: Logger,
+ P::Target: Persist<ChannelSigner>,
+{
+ /// Adds the monitor that watches the channel referred to by the given outpoint.
+ ///
+ /// Calls back to [`chain::Filter`] with the funding transaction and outputs to watch.
///
- /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
- /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
- /// the "reorg path" (ie disconnecting blocks until you find a common ancestor from both the
- /// returned block hash and the the current chain and then reconnecting blocks to get to the
- /// best chain) upon deserializing the object!
- pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
- //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
- //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
- writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
- writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
-
- self.latest_update_id.write(writer)?;
-
- // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
- U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
-
- self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
- if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
- writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
- broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0.write(writer)?;
- broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1.write(writer)?;
- broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.write(writer)?;
+ /// Note that we persist the given `ChannelMonitor` while holding the `ChainMonitor`
+ /// monitors lock.
+ fn watch_channel(&self, funding_outpoint: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChannelSigner>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
+ let mut monitors = self.monitors.write().unwrap();
+ let entry = match monitors.entry(funding_outpoint) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
+ log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to add new channel data: channel monitor for given outpoint is already present");
+ return Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure)},
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => e,
+ };
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Got new ChannelMonitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(monitor));
+ let update_id = MonitorUpdateId::from_new_monitor(&monitor);
+ let mut pending_monitor_updates = Vec::new();
+ let persist_res = self.persister.persist_new_channel(funding_outpoint, &monitor, update_id);
+ if persist_res.is_err() {
+ log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to persist new ChannelMonitor for channel {}: {:?}", log_funding_info!(monitor), persist_res);
} else {
- writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
- }
-
- self.counterparty_payment_script.write(writer)?;
- self.shutdown_script.write(writer)?;
-
- self.keys.write(writer)?;
- writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.txid[..])?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.funding_info.0.index))?;
- self.funding_info.1.write(writer)?;
- self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
- self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
-
- self.counterparty_tx_cache.write(writer)?;
- self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
- self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
-
- match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
- Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
- writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
- match second_option {
- Some(second_pubkey) => {
- writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
- },
- None => {
- writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
- },
- }
- },
- None => {
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
- },
- }
-
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_holder_tx_csv))?;
-
- self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
-
- macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
- ($htlc_output: expr) => {
- writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
- writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
- $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
- }
- }
-
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
- for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
- writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
- for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
- serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
- htlc_source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(writer)?;
- }
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Finished persisting new ChannelMonitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(monitor));
}
-
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
- for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
- writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
- (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
- for script in txouts.iter() {
- script.write(writer)?;
- }
+ if persist_res == Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) {
+ return persist_res;
+ } else if persist_res.is_err() {
+ pending_monitor_updates.push(update_id);
}
-
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
- for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
- writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
+ if let Some(ref chain_source) = self.chain_source {
+ monitor.load_outputs_to_watch(chain_source);
}
+ entry.insert(MonitorHolder {
+ monitor,
+ pending_monitor_updates: Mutex::new(pending_monitor_updates),
+ channel_perm_failed: AtomicBool::new(false),
+ last_chain_persist_height: AtomicUsize::new(self.highest_chain_height.load(Ordering::Acquire)),
+ });
+ persist_res
+ }
- macro_rules! serialize_holder_tx {
- ($holder_tx: expr) => {
- $holder_tx.txid.write(writer)?;
- writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
- writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
- writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
- writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
- writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
-
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($holder_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
- for &(ref htlc_output, ref sig, ref htlc_source) in $holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
- serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
- if let &Some(ref their_sig) = sig {
- 1u8.write(writer)?;
- writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact())?;
+ /// Note that we persist the given `ChannelMonitor` update while holding the
+ /// `ChainMonitor` monitors lock.
+ fn update_channel(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
+ // Update the monitor that watches the channel referred to by the given outpoint.
+ let monitors = self.monitors.read().unwrap();
+ match monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
+ None => {
+ log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor: no such monitor registered");
+
+ // We should never ever trigger this from within ChannelManager. Technically a
+ // user could use this object with some proxying in between which makes this
+ // possible, but in tests and fuzzing, this should be a panic.
+ #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+ panic!("ChannelManager generated a channel update for a channel that was not yet registered!");
+ #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget")))]
+ Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure)
+ },
+ Some(monitor_state) => {
+ let monitor = &monitor_state.monitor;
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(monitor));
+ let update_res = monitor.update_monitor(&update, &self.broadcaster, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
+ if update_res.is_err() {
+ log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor for channel {}.", log_funding_info!(monitor));
+ }
+ // Even if updating the monitor returns an error, the monitor's state will
+ // still be changed. So, persist the updated monitor despite the error.
+ let update_id = MonitorUpdateId::from_monitor_update(&update);
+ let mut pending_monitor_updates = monitor_state.pending_monitor_updates.lock().unwrap();
+ let persist_res = self.persister.update_persisted_channel(funding_txo, &Some(update), monitor, update_id);
+ if let Err(e) = persist_res {
+ if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure {
+ pending_monitor_updates.push(update_id);
} else {
- 0u8.write(writer)?;
+ monitor_state.channel_perm_failed.store(true, Ordering::Release);
}
- htlc_source.write(writer)?;
+ log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update for channel {}: {:?}", log_funding_info!(monitor), e);
+ } else {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Finished persisting ChannelMonitor update for channel {}", log_funding_info!(monitor));
+ }
+ if update_res.is_err() {
+ Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure)
+ } else if monitor_state.channel_perm_failed.load(Ordering::Acquire) {
+ Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure)
+ } else {
+ persist_res
}
}
}
+ }
- if let Some(ref prev_holder_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
- writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
- serialize_holder_tx!(prev_holder_tx);
- } else {
- writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
- }
-
- serialize_holder_tx!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
-
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_counterparty_commitment_number))?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_holder_commitment_number))?;
-
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
- for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
- writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
- }
-
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_monitor_events.len() as u64))?;
- for event in self.pending_monitor_events.iter() {
- match event {
- MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(upd) => {
- 0u8.write(writer)?;
- upd.write(writer)?;
- },
- MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?
- }
- }
-
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_events.len() as u64))?;
- for event in self.pending_events.iter() {
- event.write(writer)?;
- }
-
- self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
-
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
- for (ref target, ref events) in self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(**target))?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(events.len() as u64))?;
- for ev in events.iter() {
- match *ev {
- OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
- 0u8.write(writer)?;
- htlc_update.0.write(writer)?;
- htlc_update.1.write(writer)?;
- },
- OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { ref descriptor } => {
- 1u8.write(writer)?;
- descriptor.write(writer)?;
- },
+ fn release_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
+ let mut pending_monitor_events = self.pending_monitor_events.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+ for monitor_state in self.monitors.read().unwrap().values() {
+ let is_pending_monitor_update = monitor_state.has_pending_chainsync_updates(&monitor_state.pending_monitor_updates.lock().unwrap());
+ if is_pending_monitor_update &&
+ monitor_state.last_chain_persist_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS as usize
+ > self.highest_chain_height.load(Ordering::Acquire)
+ {
+ log_info!(self.logger, "A Channel Monitor sync is still in progress, refusing to provide monitor events!");
+ } else {
+ if monitor_state.channel_perm_failed.load(Ordering::Acquire) {
+ // If a `UpdateOrigin::ChainSync` persistence failed with `PermanantFailure`,
+ // we don't really know if the latest `ChannelMonitor` state is on disk or not.
+ // We're supposed to hold monitor updates until the latest state is on disk to
+ // avoid duplicate events, but the user told us persistence is screw-y and may
+ // not complete. We can't hold events forever because we may learn some payment
+ // preimage, so instead we just log and hope the user complied with the
+ // `PermanentFailure` requirements of having at least the local-disk copy
+ // updated.
+ log_info!(self.logger, "A Channel Monitor sync returned PermanentFailure. Returning monitor events but duplicate events may appear after reload!");
+ }
+ if is_pending_monitor_update {
+ log_error!(self.logger, "A ChannelMonitor sync took longer than {} blocks to complete.", LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
+ log_error!(self.logger, " To avoid funds-loss, we are allowing monitor updates to be released.");
+ log_error!(self.logger, " This may cause duplicate payment events to be generated.");
}
+ pending_monitor_events.append(&mut monitor_state.monitor.get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events());
}
}
+ pending_monitor_events
+ }
+}
- (self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
- for (txid, output_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() {
- txid.write(writer)?;
- (output_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
- for script in output_scripts.iter() {
- script.write(writer)?;
- }
+impl<ChannelSigner: Sign, C: Deref, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref, P: Deref> events::EventsProvider for ChainMonitor<ChannelSigner, C, T, F, L, P>
+ where C::Target: chain::Filter,
+ T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
+ F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+ L::Target: Logger,
+ P::Target: Persist<ChannelSigner>,
+{
+ /// Processes [`SpendableOutputs`] events produced from each [`ChannelMonitor`] upon maturity.
+ ///
+ /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider, though this shouldn't be needed in
+ /// order to handle these events.
+ ///
+ /// [`SpendableOutputs`]: events::Event::SpendableOutputs
+ fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
+ let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
+ for monitor_state in self.monitors.read().unwrap().values() {
+ pending_events.append(&mut monitor_state.monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events());
+ }
+ for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
+ handler.handle_event(&event);
}
- self.onchain_tx_handler.write(writer)?;
-
- self.lockdown_from_offchain.write(writer)?;
- self.holder_tx_signed.write(writer)?;
-
- Ok(())
}
}
-impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
- pub(crate) fn new(keys: ChanSigner, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey,
- on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
- counterparty_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey,
- on_holder_tx_csv: u16, funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
- commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
- initial_holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction) -> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
-
- assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
- let our_channel_close_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
- let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
- let payment_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
- let counterparty_payment_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_key_hash[..]).into_script();
-
- let counterparty_tx_cache = CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction { counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: *counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: *counterparty_htlc_base_key, on_counterparty_tx_csv, per_htlc: HashMap::new() };
-
- let mut onchain_tx_handler = OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys.clone(), on_holder_tx_csv);
-
- let holder_tx_sequence = initial_holder_commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.input[0].sequence as u64;
- let holder_tx_locktime = initial_holder_commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.lock_time as u64;
- let holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
- txid: initial_holder_commitment_tx.txid(),
- revocation_key: initial_holder_commitment_tx.keys.revocation_key,
- a_htlc_key: initial_holder_commitment_tx.keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
- b_htlc_key: initial_holder_commitment_tx.keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
- delayed_payment_key: initial_holder_commitment_tx.keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
- per_commitment_point: initial_holder_commitment_tx.keys.per_commitment_point,
- feerate_per_kw: initial_holder_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw,
- htlc_outputs: Vec::new(), // There are never any HTLCs in the initial commitment transactions
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+ use bitcoin::BlockHeader;
+ use ::{check_added_monitors, check_closed_broadcast, check_closed_event};
+ use ::{expect_payment_sent, expect_payment_sent_without_paths, expect_payment_path_successful, get_event_msg};
+ use ::{get_htlc_update_msgs, get_local_commitment_txn, get_revoke_commit_msgs, get_route_and_payment_hash, unwrap_send_err};
+ use chain::{ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Confirm, Watch};
+ use chain::channelmonitor::LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
+ use ln::channelmanager::PaymentSendFailure;
+ use ln::features::InitFeatures;
+ use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
+ use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
+ use util::errors::APIError;
+ use util::events::{ClosureReason, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
+ use util::test_utils::{OnRegisterOutput, TxOutReference};
+
+ /// Tests that in-block dependent transactions are processed by `block_connected` when not
+ /// included in `txdata` but returned by [`chain::Filter::register_output`]. For instance,
+ /// a (non-anchor) commitment transaction's HTLC output may be spent in the same block as the
+ /// commitment transaction itself. An Electrum client may filter the commitment transaction but
+ /// needs to return the HTLC transaction so it can be processed.
+ #[test]
+ fn connect_block_checks_dependent_transactions() {
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+ let channel = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(
+ &nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
+
+ // Send a payment, saving nodes[0]'s revoked commitment and HTLC-Timeout transactions.
+ let (commitment_tx, htlc_tx) = {
+ let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5_000_000).0;
+ let mut txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], channel.2);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
+
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
+ (txn.remove(0), txn.remove(0))
};
- onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(initial_holder_commitment_tx);
-
- let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::new();
- outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![funding_info.1.clone()]);
-
- ChannelMonitor {
- latest_update_id: 0,
- commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
-
- destination_script: destination_script.clone(),
- broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: None,
- counterparty_payment_script,
- shutdown_script,
-
- keys,
- funding_info,
- current_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
- prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
-
- counterparty_tx_cache,
- funding_redeemscript,
- channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis,
- their_cur_revocation_points: None,
-
- on_holder_tx_csv,
-
- commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
- counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
- counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
- counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
-
- prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: None,
- current_holder_commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
- current_counterparty_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
- current_holder_commitment_number: 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((holder_tx_sequence & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (holder_tx_locktime as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor),
-
- payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
- pending_monitor_events: Vec::new(),
- pending_events: Vec::new(),
- onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap::new(),
- outputs_to_watch,
+ // Set expectations on nodes[1]'s chain source to return dependent transactions.
+ let htlc_output = TxOutReference(commitment_tx.clone(), 0);
+ let to_local_output = TxOutReference(commitment_tx.clone(), 1);
+ let htlc_timeout_output = TxOutReference(htlc_tx.clone(), 0);
+ nodes[1].chain_source
+ .expect(OnRegisterOutput { with: htlc_output, returns: Some((1, htlc_tx)) })
+ .expect(OnRegisterOutput { with: to_local_output, returns: None })
+ .expect(OnRegisterOutput { with: htlc_timeout_output, returns: None });
- onchain_tx_handler,
+ // Notify nodes[1] that nodes[0]'s revoked commitment transaction was mined. The chain
+ // source should return the dependent HTLC transaction when the HTLC output is registered.
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx);
- lockdown_from_offchain: false,
- holder_tx_signed: false,
-
- last_block_hash: Default::default(),
- secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
- }
+ // Clean up so uninteresting assertions don't fail.
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
}
- /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
- /// needed by holder commitment transactions HTCLs nor by counterparty ones. Unless we haven't already seen
- /// counterparty commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
- pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
- if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) {
- return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
- }
-
- // Prune HTLCs from the previous counterparty commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
- // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
- if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.take() {
- for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
- *source = None;
+ #[test]
+ fn test_async_ooo_offchain_updates() {
+ // Test that if we have multiple offchain updates being persisted and they complete
+ // out-of-order, the ChainMonitor waits until all have completed before informing the
+ // ChannelManager.
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
+
+ // Route two payments to be claimed at the same time.
+ let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000).0;
+ let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000).0;
+
+ chanmon_cfgs[1].persister.offchain_monitor_updates.lock().unwrap().clear();
+ chanmon_cfgs[1].persister.set_update_ret(Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure));
+
+ nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ chanmon_cfgs[1].persister.set_update_ret(Ok(()));
+
+ let persistences = chanmon_cfgs[1].persister.offchain_monitor_updates.lock().unwrap().clone();
+ assert_eq!(persistences.len(), 1);
+ let (funding_txo, updates) = persistences.iter().next().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(updates.len(), 2);
+
+ // Note that updates is a HashMap so the ordering here is actually random. This shouldn't
+ // fail either way but if it fails intermittently it's depending on the ordering of updates.
+ let mut update_iter = updates.iter();
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(*funding_txo, update_iter.next().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(*funding_txo, update_iter.next().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+
+ // Now manually walk the commitment signed dance - because we claimed two payments
+ // back-to-back it doesn't fit into the neat walk commitment_signed_dance does.
+
+ let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
+ expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
+ nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let (as_first_raa, as_first_update) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_update);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
+ expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
+ nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
+ expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let (as_second_raa, as_second_update) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let bs_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_raa);
+ expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ }
+
+ fn do_chainsync_pauses_events(block_timeout: bool) {
+ // When a chainsync monitor update occurs, any MonitorUpdates should be held before being
+ // passed upstream to a `ChannelManager` via `Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`. This
+ // tests that behavior, as well as some ways it might go wrong.
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+ let channel = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(
+ &nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
+
+ // Get a route for later and rebalance the channel somewhat
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);
+ let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
+
+ // First route a payment that we will claim on chain and give the recipient the preimage.
+ let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000).0;
+ nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
+ nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel.2);
+ assert_eq!(remote_txn.len(), 2);
+
+ // Temp-fail the block connection which will hold the channel-closed event
+ chanmon_cfgs[0].persister.chain_sync_monitor_persistences.lock().unwrap().clear();
+ chanmon_cfgs[0].persister.set_update_ret(Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure));
+
+ // Connect B's commitment transaction, but only to the ChainMonitor/ChannelMonitor. The
+ // channel is now closed, but the ChannelManager doesn't know that yet.
+ let new_header = BlockHeader {
+ version: 2, time: 0, bits: 0, nonce: 0,
+ prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_info().0,
+ merkle_root: Default::default() };
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(&new_header,
+ &[(0, &remote_txn[0]), (1, &remote_txn[1])], nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
+ assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events().is_empty());
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.best_block_updated(&new_header, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
+ assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events().is_empty());
+
+ // If the ChannelManager tries to update the channel, however, the ChainMonitor will pass
+ // the update through to the ChannelMonitor which will refuse it (as the channel is closed).
+ chanmon_cfgs[0].persister.set_update_ret(Ok(()));
+ unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret)),
+ true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
+ assert!(err.contains("ChannelMonitor storage failure")));
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2); // After the failure we generate a close-channel monitor update
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_string() });
+
+ // However, as the ChainMonitor is still waiting for the original persistence to complete,
+ // it won't yet release the MonitorEvents.
+ assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events().is_empty());
+
+ if block_timeout {
+ // After three blocks, pending MontiorEvents should be released either way.
+ let latest_header = BlockHeader {
+ version: 2, time: 0, bits: 0, nonce: 0,
+ prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_info().0,
+ merkle_root: Default::default() };
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.best_block_updated(&latest_header, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
+ } else {
+ for (funding_outpoint, update_ids) in chanmon_cfgs[0].persister.chain_sync_monitor_persistences.lock().unwrap().iter() {
+ for update_id in update_ids {
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(*funding_outpoint, *update_id).unwrap();
+ }
}
}
- if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
- let cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx = &self.current_holder_commitment_tx;
- let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
- let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
- let counterparty_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number;
-
- self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
- for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
- if k == htlc.payment_hash {
- return true
- }
- }
- if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
- for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
- if k == htlc.payment_hash {
- return true
- }
- }
- }
- let contains = if let Some(cn) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
- if *cn < min_idx {
- return true
- }
- true
- } else { false };
- if contains {
- counterparty_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
- }
- false
- });
- }
-
- Ok(())
- }
-
- /// Informs this monitor of the latest counterparty (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
- /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
- /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
- /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
- pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info<L: Deref>(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
- // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
- // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
- // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
- // timeouts)
- for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
- self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
- }
-
- let new_txid = unsigned_commitment_tx.txid();
- log_trace!(logger, "Tracking new counterparty commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", new_txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
- log_trace!(logger, "New potential counterparty commitment transaction: {}", encode::serialize_hex(unsigned_commitment_tx));
- self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.take();
- self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid);
- self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, htlc_outputs.clone());
- self.current_counterparty_commitment_number = commitment_number;
- //TODO: Merge this into the other per-counterparty-transaction output storage stuff
- match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
- Some(old_points) => {
- if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
- self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
- } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
- if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
- self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
- } else {
- self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
- }
- } else {
- self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
- }
- },
- None => {
- self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
- }
- }
- let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs.len());
- for htlc in htlc_outputs {
- if htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
- htlcs.push(htlc.0);
- }
- }
- self.counterparty_tx_cache.per_htlc.insert(new_txid, htlcs);
- }
-
- /// Informs this monitor of the latest holder (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
- /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
- /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
- /// up-to-date as our holder commitment transaction is updated.
- /// Panics if set_on_holder_tx_csv has never been called.
- pub(super) fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
- let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
- let sequence = commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.input[0].sequence as u64;
- let locktime = commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.lock_time as u64;
- let mut new_holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
- txid,
- revocation_key: commitment_tx.keys.revocation_key,
- a_htlc_key: commitment_tx.keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
- b_htlc_key: commitment_tx.keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
- delayed_payment_key: commitment_tx.keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
- per_commitment_point: commitment_tx.keys.per_commitment_point,
- feerate_per_kw: commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw,
- htlc_outputs: htlc_outputs,
- };
- self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(commitment_tx);
- self.current_holder_commitment_number = 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((sequence & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (locktime as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
- mem::swap(&mut new_holder_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
- self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = Some(new_holder_commitment_tx);
- if self.holder_tx_signed {
- return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Latest holder commitment signed has already been signed, update is rejected"));
- }
- Ok(())
- }
-
- /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
- /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
- pub(crate) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage) {
- self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
- }
-
- pub(crate) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L)
- where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
- L::Target: Logger,
- {
- for tx in self.get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger).iter() {
- broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
- }
- self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(self.funding_info.0));
- }
-
- /// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
- /// itself.
- ///
- /// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id.
- pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, mut updates: ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError>
- where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
- L::Target: Logger,
- {
- if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
- panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
- }
- for update in updates.updates.drain(..) {
- match update {
- ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
- if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
- self.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx_info(commitment_tx, htlc_outputs)?
- },
- ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } =>
- self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point, logger),
- ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } =>
- self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage),
- ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } =>
- self.provide_secret(idx, secret)?,
- ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } => {
- self.lockdown_from_offchain = true;
- if should_broadcast {
- self.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger);
- } else {
- log_error!(logger, "You have a toxic holder commitment transaction avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take");
- }
- }
- }
- }
- self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
- Ok(())
- }
-
- /// Gets the update_id from the latest ChannelMonitorUpdate which was applied to this
- /// ChannelMonitor.
- pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
- self.latest_update_id
- }
-
- /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
- pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> &(OutPoint, Script) {
- &self.funding_info
- }
-
- /// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
- /// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
- ///
- /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
- pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Txid, Vec<Script>> {
- &self.outputs_to_watch
- }
-
- /// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
- /// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
- /// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
- /// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
- ///
- /// (C-not exported) as there is no practical way to track lifetimes of returned values.
- pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, &Script)> {
- let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
- for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
- for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
- res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
- }
- }
- res
- }
-
- /// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
- /// ChannelManager via [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`].
- ///
- /// [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`]: ../../chain/trait.Watch.html#tymethod.release_pending_monitor_events
- pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&mut self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
- let mut ret = Vec::new();
- mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_monitor_events);
- ret
- }
-
- /// Gets the list of pending events which were generated by previous actions, clearing the list
- /// in the process.
- ///
- /// This is called by ChainMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_events() and is equivalent to
- /// EventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_events() except that it requires &mut self as we do
- /// no internal locking in ChannelMonitors.
- pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&mut self) -> Vec<Event> {
- let mut ret = Vec::new();
- mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_events);
- ret
- }
-
- /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
- pub(crate) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
- self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx)
- }
-
- pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
- self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret()
- }
-
- pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
- self.current_counterparty_commitment_number
- }
-
- pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
- self.current_holder_commitment_number
- }
-
- /// Attempts to claim a counterparty commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
- /// data in counterparty_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
- /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
- /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
- /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
- /// revoked counterparty commitment tx
- fn check_spend_counterparty_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, (Txid, Vec<TxOut>)) where L::Target: Logger {
- // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
- // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
- let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
- let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
-
- let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
- let per_commitment_option = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
-
- macro_rules! ignore_error {
- ( $thing : expr ) => {
- match $thing {
- Ok(a) => a,
- Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
- }
- };
- }
-
- let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
- if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
- let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
- let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
- let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
- let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint));
- let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key));
-
- let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
- let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
-
- // First, process non-htlc outputs (to_holder & to_counterparty)
- for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
- if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
- let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, amount: outp.value, htlc: None, on_counterparty_tx_csv: self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv};
- claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 }, witness_data});
- }
- }
-
- // Then, try to find revoked htlc outputs
- if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
- for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
- if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
- if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
- tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
- return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
- }
- let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC }, amount: tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc: Some(htlc.clone()), on_counterparty_tx_csv: self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv};
- claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data });
- }
- }
- }
-
- // Last, track onchain revoked commitment transaction and fail backward outgoing HTLCs as payment path is broken
- if !claimable_outpoints.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
- // We're definitely a counterparty commitment transaction!
- log_trace!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len());
- watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
- self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
-
- macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
- ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
- if let Some(ref outpoints) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
- for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in outpoints.iter() {
- if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
- log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
- match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
- let e = entry.get_mut();
- e.retain(|ref event| {
- match **event {
- OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
- return htlc_update.0 != **source
- },
- _ => true
- }
- });
- e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
- }
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
- entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
- if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
- check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
- }
- if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
- check_htlc_fails!(txid, "counterparty");
- }
- // No need to check holder commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on counterparty commitment tx
- }
- } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
- // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
- // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
- // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
- // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
- // already processed the block, resulting in the counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
- // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
- // insert it here.
- watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
- self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
-
- log_trace!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked counterparty commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
-
- macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
- ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $id: tt) => {
- if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
- $id: for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
- if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
- // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
- // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
- // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
- // payment_preimage.
- // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
- // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
- // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
- // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
- // need to here.
- for &(ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in per_commitment_data.iter() {
- if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(source) == broadcast_source.as_ref() {
- continue $id;
- }
- }
- log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of counterparty commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
- match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
- let e = entry.get_mut();
- e.retain(|ref event| {
- match **event {
- OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
- return htlc_update.0 != **source
- },
- _ => true
- }
- });
- e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
- }
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
- entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
- if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
- check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current", 'current_loop);
- }
- if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
- check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop);
- }
-
- if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
- let revocation_point_option =
- if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
- else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
- if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
- } else { None };
- if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
- self.counterparty_payment_script = {
- // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
- // script_pubkey version
- let payment_hash160 = WPubkeyHash::hash(&self.keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
- Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script()
- };
-
- // Then, try to find htlc outputs
- for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
- if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
- if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
- tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
- return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
- }
- let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
- let aggregable = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
- if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
- let witness_data = InputMaterial::CounterpartyHTLC { per_commitment_point: *revocation_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, preimage, htlc: htlc.clone() };
- claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data });
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
- (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
- }
-
- /// Attempts to claim a counterparty HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
- fn check_spend_counterparty_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Option<(Txid, Vec<TxOut>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
- let htlc_txid = tx.txid();
- if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 || tx.input[0].witness.len() != 5 {
- return (Vec::new(), None)
- }
-
- macro_rules! ignore_error {
- ( $thing : expr ) => {
- match $thing {
- Ok(a) => a,
- Err(_) => return (Vec::new(), None)
- }
- };
- }
-
- let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (Vec::new(), None); };
- let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
- let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
-
- log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty HTLC broadcast {}:{}", htlc_txid, 0);
- let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, amount: tx.output[0].value, htlc: None, on_counterparty_tx_csv: self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv };
- let claimable_outpoints = vec!(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: htlc_txid, vout: 0}, witness_data });
- (claimable_outpoints, Some((htlc_txid, tx.output.clone())))
- }
-
- fn broadcast_by_holder_state(&self, commitment_tx: &Transaction, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Vec<TxOut>, Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>) {
- let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
- let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
-
- let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&holder_tx.revocation_key, self.on_holder_tx_csv, &holder_tx.delayed_payment_key);
- let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = Some((redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(), holder_tx.per_commitment_point.clone(), holder_tx.revocation_key.clone()));
-
- for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
- if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
- claim_requests.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: ::std::u32::MAX, aggregable: false, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: holder_tx.txid, vout: transaction_output_index as u32 },
- witness_data: InputMaterial::HolderHTLC {
- preimage: if !htlc.offered {
- if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
- Some(preimage.clone())
- } else {
- // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
- continue;
- }
- } else { None },
- amount: htlc.amount_msat,
- }});
- watch_outputs.push(commitment_tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone());
- }
- }
-
- (claim_requests, watch_outputs, broadcasted_holder_revokable_script)
- }
-
- /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
- /// revoked using data in holder_claimable_outpoints.
- /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
- fn check_spend_holder_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, (Txid, Vec<TxOut>)) where L::Target: Logger {
- let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
- let mut claim_requests = Vec::new();
- let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
-
- macro_rules! wait_threshold_conf {
- ($height: expr, $source: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
- log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} holder commitment tx due to broadcast of transaction, waiting confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!($payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
- match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry($height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
- let e = entry.get_mut();
- e.retain(|ref event| {
- match **event {
- OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
- return htlc_update.0 != $source
- },
- _ => true
- }
- });
- e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)});
- }
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
- entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)}]);
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
- ($updates: expr) => {
- claim_requests = $updates.0;
- watch_outputs.append(&mut $updates.1);
- self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = $updates.2;
- }
- }
-
- // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous holder commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
- let mut is_holder_tx = false;
-
- if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
- is_holder_tx = true;
- log_trace!(logger, "Got latest holder commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
- let mut res = self.broadcast_by_holder_state(tx, &self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
- append_onchain_update!(res);
- } else if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
- if holder_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
- is_holder_tx = true;
- log_trace!(logger, "Got previous holder commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
- let mut res = self.broadcast_by_holder_state(tx, holder_tx);
- append_onchain_update!(res);
- }
- }
-
- macro_rules! fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf {
- ($holder_tx: expr) => {
- for &(ref htlc, _, ref source) in &$holder_tx.htlc_outputs {
- if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() {
- if let &Some(ref source) = source {
- wait_threshold_conf!(height, source.clone(), "lastest", htlc.payment_hash.clone());
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- if is_holder_tx {
- fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
- if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
- fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(holder_tx);
- }
- }
-
- (claim_requests, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
- }
-
- /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest holder state if its copy of
- /// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable holder toxic tx in case of
- /// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our counterparty side knows
- /// a higher revocation secret than the holder commitment number we are aware of. Broadcasting these
- /// transactions are UNSAFE, as they allow counterparty side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to
- /// broadcast them if counterparty don't close channel with his higher commitment transaction after a
- /// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact
- /// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you.
- /// In any-case, choice is up to the user.
- pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
- log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed latest holder commitment transaction!");
- self.holder_tx_signed = true;
- if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
- let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
- let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
- for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
- if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
- let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
- if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
- // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
- continue;
- }
- } else { None };
- if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
- &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
- res.push(htlc_tx);
- }
- }
- }
- // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
- // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_holder_transaction if we get a confirmation.
- return res
- }
- Vec::new()
- }
-
- /// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_holder_commitment_txn used by our test framework
- /// to bypass HolderCommitmentTransaction state update lockdown after signature and generate
- /// revoked commitment transaction.
- #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
- pub fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
- log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest holder commitment transaction!");
- if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
- let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
- let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
- for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
- if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
- let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
- if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
- // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
- continue;
- }
- } else { None };
- if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
- &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
- res.push(htlc_tx);
- }
- }
- }
- return res
- }
- Vec::new()
- }
-
- /// Processes transactions in a newly connected block, which may result in any of the following:
- /// - update the monitor's state against resolved HTLCs
- /// - punish the counterparty in the case of seeing a revoked commitment transaction
- /// - force close the channel and claim/timeout incoming/outgoing HTLCs if near expiration
- /// - detect settled outputs for later spending
- /// - schedule and bump any in-flight claims
- ///
- /// Returns any new outputs to watch from `txdata`; after called, these are also included in
- /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`].
- ///
- /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`]: #method.get_outputs_to_watch
- pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)-> Vec<(Txid, Vec<TxOut>)>
- where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
- F::Target: FeeEstimator,
- L::Target: Logger,
- {
- let txn_matched = self.filter_block(txdata);
- for tx in &txn_matched {
- let mut output_val = 0;
- for out in tx.output.iter() {
- if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
- output_val += out.value;
- if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
- }
- }
-
- let block_hash = header.block_hash();
- log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", block_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
-
- let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
- let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
- for tx in &txn_matched {
- if tx.input.len() == 1 {
- // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
- // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
- // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
- // filters.
- let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
- if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 {
- if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
- let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_counterparty_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
- if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
- watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
- }
- if new_outpoints.is_empty() {
- let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_holder_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
- if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
- watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
- }
- claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
- }
- claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
- }
- } else {
- if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
- let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_counterparty_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, &logger);
- claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
- if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option {
- watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
- }
- }
- }
- }
- // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
- // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
- // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
- self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height, &logger);
-
- self.is_paying_spendable_output(&tx, height, &logger);
- }
- let should_broadcast = self.would_broadcast_at_height(height, &logger);
- if should_broadcast {
- claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height, aggregable: false, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), vout: self.funding_info.0.index as u32 }, witness_data: InputMaterial::Funding { funding_redeemscript: self.funding_redeemscript.clone() }});
- }
- if should_broadcast {
- self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(self.funding_info.0));
- if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
- self.holder_tx_signed = true;
- let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs, _) = self.broadcast_by_holder_state(&commitment_tx, &self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
- if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
- watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
- }
- claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
- }
- }
- if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&height) {
- for ev in events {
- match ev {
- OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => {
- log_trace!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!((htlc_update.1).0));
- self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
- payment_hash: htlc_update.1,
- payment_preimage: None,
- source: htlc_update.0,
- }));
- },
- OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
- log_trace!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
- self.pending_events.push(Event::SpendableOutputs {
- outputs: vec![descriptor]
- });
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- self.onchain_tx_handler.block_connected(&txn_matched, claimable_outpoints, height, &*broadcaster, &*fee_estimator, &*logger);
- self.last_block_hash = block_hash;
-
- // Determine new outputs to watch by comparing against previously known outputs to watch,
- // updating the latter in the process.
- watch_outputs.retain(|&(ref txid, ref txouts)| {
- let output_scripts = txouts.iter().map(|o| o.script_pubkey.clone()).collect();
- self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), output_scripts).is_none()
- });
- watch_outputs
- }
-
- /// Determines if the disconnected block contained any transactions of interest and updates
- /// appropriately.
- pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)
- where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
- F::Target: FeeEstimator,
- L::Target: Logger,
- {
- let block_hash = header.block_hash();
- log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", block_hash, height);
-
- if let Some(_) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1)) {
- //We may discard:
- //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
- //- maturing spendable output has transaction paying us has been disconnected
- }
-
- self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
-
- self.last_block_hash = block_hash;
- }
-
- /// Filters a block's `txdata` for transactions spending watched outputs or for any child
- /// transactions thereof.
- fn filter_block<'a>(&self, txdata: &TransactionData<'a>) -> Vec<&'a Transaction> {
- let mut matched_txn = HashSet::new();
- txdata.iter().filter(|&&(_, tx)| {
- let mut matches = self.spends_watched_output(tx);
- for input in tx.input.iter() {
- if matches { break; }
- if matched_txn.contains(&input.previous_output.txid) {
- matches = true;
- }
- }
- if matches {
- matched_txn.insert(tx.txid());
- }
- matches
- }).map(|(_, tx)| *tx).collect()
- }
-
- /// Checks if a given transaction spends any watched outputs.
- fn spends_watched_output(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> bool {
- for input in tx.input.iter() {
- if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
- for (idx, _script_pubkey) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
- if idx == input.previous_output.vout as usize {
- return true;
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- false
- }
-
- fn would_broadcast_at_height<L: Deref>(&self, height: u32, logger: &L) -> bool where L::Target: Logger {
- // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
- // * in any unrevoked counterparty commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
- // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
- // * are in our latest holder commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
- // broadcast if we go on-chain.
- // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
- // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
- // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
- // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
- // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
- macro_rules! scan_commitment {
- ($htlcs: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
- for ref htlc in $htlcs {
- // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
- // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
- // time out the HTLC first.
- // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
- // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
- // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
- // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
- // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
- // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
- // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
- // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
- // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
- // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
- // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
- // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
- // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
- // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
- // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
- // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
- // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
- // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
- // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
- // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
- let htlc_outbound = $holder_tx == htlc.offered;
- if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
- (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
- log_info!(logger, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
- return true;
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
-
- if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
- if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
- scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
- }
- }
- if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
- if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
- scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
- }
- }
-
- false
- }
-
- /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a holder
- /// or counterparty commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
- fn is_resolving_htlc_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
- 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
- let mut payment_data = None;
- let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
- || (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
- let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[4].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
- let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);
-
- macro_rules! log_claim {
- ($tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
- // We found the output in question, but aren't failing it backwards
- // as we have no corresponding source and no valid counterparty commitment txid
- // to try a weak source binding with same-hash, same-value still-valid offered HTLC.
- // This implies either it is an inbound HTLC or an outbound HTLC on a revoked transaction.
- let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == $htlc.offered;
- if ($holder_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
- (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
- log_error!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
- $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
- if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
- if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
- } else {
- log_info!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
- $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
- if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
- if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
- }
- }
- }
-
- macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_counterparty {
- ($counterparty_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
- if let Some(txid) = $counterparty_txid {
- for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
- if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
- if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
- log_claim!("revoked counterparty commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
- payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash));
- break;
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- macro_rules! scan_commitment {
- ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
- for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
- if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
- if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
- log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, true);
- // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
- // holder commitment transactions or an unrevoked counterparty commitment
- // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
- // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
- // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
- payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash));
- } else if !$holder_tx {
- check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
- if payment_data.is_none() {
- check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
- }
- }
- if payment_data.is_none() {
- log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, false);
- continue 'outer_loop;
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- if input.previous_output.txid == self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
- scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
- "our latest holder commitment tx", true);
- }
- if let Some(ref prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
- if input.previous_output.txid == prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
- scan_commitment!(prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
- "our previous holder commitment tx", true);
- }
- }
- if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
- scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
- "counterparty commitment tx", false);
- }
-
- // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
- // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
- if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data {
- let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
- if accepted_preimage_claim {
- if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
- |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update { upd.source == source } else { false }) {
- payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
- self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
- source,
- payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
- payment_hash
- }));
- }
- } else if offered_preimage_claim {
- if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
- |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update {
- upd.source == source
- } else { false }) {
- payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
- self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
- source,
- payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
- payment_hash
- }));
- }
- } else {
- log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
- match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
- let e = entry.get_mut();
- e.retain(|ref event| {
- match **event {
- OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
- return htlc_update.0 != source
- },
- _ => true
- }
- });
- e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)});
- }
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
- entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)}]);
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is paying fund back to some address we can assume to own
- fn is_paying_spendable_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
- let mut spendable_output = None;
- for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { // There is max one spendable output for any channel tx, including ones generated by us
- if i > ::std::u16::MAX as usize {
- // While it is possible that an output exists on chain which is greater than the
- // 2^16th output in a given transaction, this is only possible if the output is not
- // in a lightning transaction and was instead placed there by some third party who
- // wishes to give us money for no reason.
- // Namely, any lightning transactions which we pre-sign will never have anywhere
- // near 2^16 outputs both because such transactions must have ~2^16 outputs who's
- // scripts are not longer than one byte in length and because they are inherently
- // non-standard due to their size.
- // Thus, it is completely safe to ignore such outputs, and while it may result in
- // us ignoring non-lightning fund to us, that is only possible if someone fills
- // nearly a full block with garbage just to hit this case.
- continue;
- }
- if outp.script_pubkey == self.destination_script {
- spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
- outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
- output: outp.clone(),
- });
- break;
- } else if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
- if broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
- spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
- outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
- per_commitment_point: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1,
- to_self_delay: self.on_holder_tx_csv,
- output: outp.clone(),
- key_derivation_params: self.keys.key_derivation_params(),
- revocation_pubkey: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.clone(),
- });
- break;
- }
- } else if self.counterparty_payment_script == outp.script_pubkey {
- spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutputCounterpartyPayment {
- outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
- output: outp.clone(),
- key_derivation_params: self.keys.key_derivation_params(),
- });
- break;
- } else if outp.script_pubkey == self.shutdown_script {
- spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
- outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
- output: outp.clone(),
- });
- }
- }
- if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
- log_trace!(logger, "Maturing {} until {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
- match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
- let e = entry.get_mut();
- e.push(OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output });
- }
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
- entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output }]);
- }
- }
- }
- }
-}
-
-const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
-
-impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable> Readable for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) {
- fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
- ($key: expr) => {
- match $key {
- Ok(res) => res,
- Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- }
- }
- }
-
- let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
- return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
- }
-
- let latest_update_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
-
- let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
- 0 => {
- let revokable_address = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let revokable_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
- Some((revokable_address, per_commitment_point, revokable_script))
- },
- 1 => { None },
- _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- };
- let counterparty_payment_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let shutdown_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
-
- let keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
- // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
- // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
- let outpoint = OutPoint {
- txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
- index: Readable::read(reader)?,
- };
- let funding_info = (outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?);
- let current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
-
- let counterparty_tx_cache = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
-
- let their_cur_revocation_points = {
- let first_idx = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
- if first_idx == 0 {
- None
- } else {
- let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
- if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
- Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
- } else {
- Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
- }
- }
- };
-
- let on_holder_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
-
- let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
-
- macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
- () => {
- {
- let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
-
- HTLCOutputInCommitment {
- offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- let counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut counterparty_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
- for _ in 0..counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len {
- let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
- for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
- htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
- }
- if let Some(_) = counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
- return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
- }
- }
-
- let counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
- for _ in 0..counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
- let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
- let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable>::read(reader)?;
- let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8));
- for _ in 0..outputs_count {
- outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
- }
- if let Some(_) = counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
- return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
- }
- }
-
- let counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut counterparty_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
- for _ in 0..counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len {
- let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
- if let Some(_) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
- return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
- }
- }
-
- macro_rules! read_holder_tx {
- () => {
- {
- let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let feerate_per_kw: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
-
- let htlcs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
- for _ in 0..htlcs_len {
- let htlc = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
- let sigs = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
- 0 => None,
- 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
- _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- };
- htlcs.push((htlc, sigs, Readable::read(reader)?));
- }
-
- HolderSignedTx {
- txid,
- revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw,
- htlc_outputs: htlcs
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
- 0 => None,
- 1 => {
- Some(read_holder_tx!())
- },
- _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- };
- let current_holder_commitment_tx = read_holder_tx!();
-
- let current_counterparty_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
- let current_holder_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
-
- let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
- for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
- let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
- if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
- return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
- }
- }
-
- let pending_monitor_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut pending_monitor_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_monitor_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3)));
- for _ in 0..pending_monitor_events_len {
- let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
- 0 => MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(Readable::read(reader)?),
- 1 => MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_info.0),
- _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
- };
- pending_monitor_events.push(ev);
- }
-
- let pending_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut pending_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Event>()));
- for _ in 0..pending_events_len {
- if let Some(event) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
- pending_events.push(event);
- }
- }
-
- let last_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
-
- let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
- for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
- let height_target = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
- for _ in 0..events_len {
- let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
- 0 => {
- let htlc_source = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
- OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
- htlc_update: (htlc_source, hash)
- }
- },
- 1 => {
- let descriptor = Readable::read(reader)?;
- OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
- descriptor
- }
- },
- _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- };
- events.push(ev);
- }
- onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.insert(height_target, events);
- }
-
- let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Txid>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<Script>>())));
- for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
- let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Script>()));
- for _ in 0..outputs_len {
- outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
- }
- if let Some(_) = outputs_to_watch.insert(txid, outputs) {
- return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
- }
- }
- let onchain_tx_handler = Readable::read(reader)?;
-
- let lockdown_from_offchain = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let holder_tx_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
-
- Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
- latest_update_id,
- commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
-
- destination_script,
- broadcasted_holder_revokable_script,
- counterparty_payment_script,
- shutdown_script,
-
- keys,
- funding_info,
- current_counterparty_commitment_txid,
- prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
-
- counterparty_tx_cache,
- funding_redeemscript,
- channel_value_satoshis,
- their_cur_revocation_points,
-
- on_holder_tx_csv,
-
- commitment_secrets,
- counterparty_claimable_outpoints,
- counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain,
- counterparty_hash_commitment_number,
-
- prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx,
- current_holder_commitment_tx,
- current_counterparty_commitment_number,
- current_holder_commitment_number,
-
- payment_preimages,
- pending_monitor_events,
- pending_events,
-
- onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf,
- outputs_to_watch,
-
- onchain_tx_handler,
-
- lockdown_from_offchain,
- holder_tx_signed,
-
- last_block_hash,
- secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
- }))
- }
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
- use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
- use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
- use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
- use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
- use bitcoin::util::bip143;
- use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
- use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
- use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
- use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
- use hex;
- use chain::chainmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
- use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
- use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
- use ln::onchaintx::{OnchainTxHandler, InputDescriptors};
- use ln::chan_utils;
- use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, HolderCommitmentTransaction};
- use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
- use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
- use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
- use std::sync::Arc;
- use chain::keysinterface::InMemoryChannelKeys;
+ expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
+ }
#[test]
- fn test_prune_preimages() {
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
-
- let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
- let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
-
- let mut preimages = Vec::new();
- {
- for i in 0..20 {
- let preimage = PaymentPreimage([i; 32]);
- let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
- preimages.push((preimage, hash));
- }
- }
-
- macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
- ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
- {
- let mut res = Vec::new();
- for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
- res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
- offered: true,
- amount_msat: 0,
- cltv_expiry: 0,
- payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
- transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
- }, None));
- }
- res
- }
- }
- }
- macro_rules! preimages_to_holder_htlcs {
- ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
- {
- let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
- let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
- res
- }
- }
- }
-
- macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
- ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
- for preimage in $preimages_slice {
- assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
- }
- }
- }
-
- let keys = InMemoryChannelKeys::new(
- &secp_ctx,
- SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
- SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
- SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
- SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
- SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
- [41; 32],
- 0,
- (0, 0)
- );
-
- // Prune with one old state and a holder commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
- // old state.
- let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys,
- &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()), 0, &Script::new(),
- (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()),
- &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
- &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()),
- 10, Script::new(), 46, 0, HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy());
-
- monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx_info(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])).unwrap();
- monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key, &logger);
- monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key, &logger);
- monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
- monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
- for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
- monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
- }
-
- // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
- let mut secret = [0; 32];
- secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
- test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
- test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
-
- // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
- secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
- test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
- test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
-
- // Now update holder commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
- // previous commitment tx's preimages too
- monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx_info(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..5])).unwrap();
- secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
- test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
- test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
-
- // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
- monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx_info(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..3])).unwrap();
- secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
- test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
+ fn chainsync_pauses_events() {
+ do_chainsync_pauses_events(false);
+ do_chainsync_pauses_events(true);
}
#[test]
- fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
- // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
- // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
-
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
- let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
- let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
-
- macro_rules! sign_input {
- ($sighash_parts: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $input_type: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr) => {
- let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
- offered: if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC { true } else { false },
- amount_msat: 0,
- cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
- payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
- transaction_output_index: Some($idx as u32),
- };
- let redeem_script = if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
- let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.signature_hash($idx, &redeem_script, $amount, SigHashType::All)[..]);
- let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &privkey);
- $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
- sum_actual_sigs += $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].len();
- if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput {
- $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(vec!(1));
- } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC {
- $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
- } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC {
- $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(vec![0]);
- } else {
- $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
- }
- $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
- println!("witness[0] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].len());
- println!("witness[1] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[1].len());
- println!("witness[2] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[2].len());
- }
- }
-
- let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
- let txid = Txid::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
-
- // Justice tx with 1 to_holder, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
- let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
- for i in 0..4 {
- claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
- previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
- txid,
- vout: i,
- },
- script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: 0xfffffffd,
- witness: Vec::new(),
- });
- }
- claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
- script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
- value: 0,
- });
- let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
- let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC];
- {
- let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
- for (idx, inp) in inputs_des.iter().enumerate() {
- sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
- }
- }
- assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
-
- // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
- claim_tx.input.clear();
- sum_actual_sigs = 0;
- for i in 0..4 {
- claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
- previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
- txid,
- vout: i,
- },
- script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: 0xfffffffd,
- witness: Vec::new(),
- });
- }
- let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
- let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC];
- {
- let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
- for (idx, inp) in inputs_des.iter().enumerate() {
- sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
- }
- }
- assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
-
- // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
- claim_tx.input.clear();
- sum_actual_sigs = 0;
- claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
- previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
- txid,
- vout: 0,
- },
- script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: 0xfffffffd,
- witness: Vec::new(),
- });
- let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
- let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput];
- {
- let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
- for (idx, inp) in inputs_des.iter().enumerate() {
- sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
- }
- }
- assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
+ fn update_during_chainsync_fails_channel() {
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
+
+ chanmon_cfgs[0].persister.chain_sync_monitor_persistences.lock().unwrap().clear();
+ chanmon_cfgs[0].persister.set_update_ret(Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure));
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
+ // Before processing events, the ChannelManager will still think the Channel is open and
+ // there won't be any ChannelMonitorUpdates
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
+ // ... however once we get events once, the channel will close, creating a channel-closed
+ // ChannelMonitorUpdate.
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() });
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
}
-
- // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.
}