Correct `outbound_payment` route-fetch calls to pass the hash + ID

[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / chain / channelmonitor.rs

diff --git a/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs b/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs
index b830a7417734d29f602c5892f21027736dec940f..00c96104c834fcaaeafec4152cb0eb7ecb7e8601 100644 (file)
--- a/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs
@@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ impl HolderSignedTx {
 
 /// We use this to track static counterparty commitment transaction data and to generate any
 /// justice or 2nd-stage preimage/timeout transactions.
-#[derive(PartialEq, Eq)]
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
 struct CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
        counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
        counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
@@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
 /// observed, as well as the transaction causing it.
 ///
 /// Used to determine when the on-chain event can be considered safe from a chain reorganization.
-#[derive(PartialEq, Eq)]
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
 struct OnchainEventEntry {
        txid: Txid,
        height: u32,
@@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ type CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo = Option<(u32, u64)>;
 
 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
-#[derive(PartialEq, Eq)]
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
 enum OnchainEvent {
        /// An outbound HTLC failing after a transaction is confirmed. Used
        ///  * when an outbound HTLC output is spent by us after the HTLC timed out
@@ -638,7 +638,7 @@ pub enum Balance {
 }
 
 /// An HTLC which has been irrevocably resolved on-chain, and has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
-#[derive(PartialEq, Eq)]
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
 struct IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
        commitment_tx_output_idx: Option<u32>,
        /// The txid of the transaction which resolved the HTLC, this may be a commitment (if the HTLC
@@ -711,7 +711,13 @@ pub struct ChannelMonitor<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> {
        inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
 }
 
-#[derive(PartialEq)]
+impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Clone for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
+       fn clone(&self) -> Self {
+               Self { inner: Mutex::new(self.inner.lock().unwrap().clone()) }
+       }
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
 pub(crate) struct ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> {
        latest_update_id: u64,
        commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
@@ -2161,23 +2167,20 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
        /// up-to-date as our holder commitment transaction is updated.
        /// Panics if set_on_holder_tx_csv has never been called.
        fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(&mut self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>, claimed_htlcs: &[(SentHTLCId, PaymentPreimage)]) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
-               // block for Rust 1.34 compat
-               let mut new_holder_commitment_tx = {
-                       let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
-                       let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
-                       let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
-                       self.current_holder_commitment_number = trusted_tx.commitment_number();
-                       HolderSignedTx {
-                               txid,
-                               revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
-                               a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
-                               b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
-                               delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
-                               per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
-                               htlc_outputs,
-                               to_self_value_sat: holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
-                               feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
-                       }
+               let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
+               let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
+               let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
+               self.current_holder_commitment_number = trusted_tx.commitment_number();
+               let mut new_holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
+                       txid,
+                       revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
+                       a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
+                       b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
+                       delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
+                       per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
+                       htlc_outputs,
+                       to_self_value_sat: holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
+                       feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
                };
                self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(holder_commitment_tx);
                mem::swap(&mut new_holder_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
@@ -3696,8 +3699,8 @@ where
 
 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
 
-impl<'a, 'b, ES: EntropySource, SP: SignerProvider> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP)>
-               for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<SP::Signer>) {
+impl<'a, 'b, ES: EntropySource, SP: SignerProvider<Signer=Signer>, Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP)>
+               for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<Signer>) {
        fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
                macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
                        ($key: expr) => {