use prelude::*;
use core::{cmp, mem};
use io::{self, Error};
+use core::convert::TryInto;
use core::ops::Deref;
use sync::Mutex;
txid: Txid,
height: u32,
event: OnchainEvent,
+ transaction: Option<Transaction>, // Added as optional, but always filled in, in LDK 0.0.110
}
impl OnchainEventEntry {
}
}
+/// The (output index, sats value) for the counterparty's output in a commitment transaction.
+///
+/// This was added as an `Option` in 0.0.110.
+type CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo = Option<(u32, u64)>;
+
/// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
/// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
#[derive(PartialEq)]
/// transaction which appeared on chain.
commitment_tx_output_idx: Option<u32>,
},
+ /// An output waiting on [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`] confirmations before we hand the user the
+ /// [`SpendableOutputDescriptor`].
MaturingOutput {
descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
},
/// The CSV delay for the output of the funding spend transaction (implying it is a local
/// commitment transaction, and this is the delay on the to_self output).
on_local_output_csv: Option<u16>,
+ /// If the funding spend transaction was a known remote commitment transaction, we track
+ /// the output index and amount of the counterparty's `to_self` output here.
+ commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo,
},
/// A spend of a commitment transaction HTLC output, set in the cases where *no* `HTLCUpdate`
/// is constructed. This is used when
/// * an inbound HTLC is claimed by us (with a preimage).
/// * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by the revocation
/// signature.
+ /// * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by an
+ /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Failure transaction (and is still claimable with a revocation
+ /// signature).
HTLCSpendConfirmation {
commitment_tx_output_idx: u32,
/// If the claim was made by either party with a preimage, this is filled in
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
(0, self.txid, required),
+ (1, self.transaction, option),
(2, self.height, required),
(4, self.event, required),
});
impl MaybeReadable for OnchainEventEntry {
fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
- let mut txid = Default::default();
+ let mut txid = Txid::all_zeros();
+ let mut transaction = None;
let mut height = 0;
let mut event = None;
read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
(0, txid, required),
+ (1, transaction, option),
(2, height, required),
(4, event, ignorable),
});
if let Some(ev) = event {
- Ok(Some(Self { txid, height, event: ev }))
+ Ok(Some(Self { txid, transaction, height, event: ev }))
} else {
Ok(None)
}
},
(3, FundingSpendConfirmation) => {
(0, on_local_output_csv, option),
+ (1, commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, option),
},
(5, HTLCSpendConfirmation) => {
(0, commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
#[derive(PartialEq)]
struct IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
commitment_tx_output_idx: u32,
+ /// The txid of the transaction which resolved the HTLC, this may be a commitment (if the HTLC
+ /// was not present in the confirmed commitment transaction), HTLC-Success, or HTLC-Timeout
+ /// transaction.
+ resolving_txid: Option<Txid>, // Added as optional, but always filled in, in 0.0.110
/// Only set if the HTLC claim was ours using a payment preimage
payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
}
impl_writeable_tlv_based!(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC, {
(0, commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
+ (1, resolving_txid, option),
(2, payment_preimage, option),
});
funding_spend_seen: bool,
funding_spend_confirmed: Option<Txid>,
+ confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo,
/// The set of HTLCs which have been either claimed or failed on chain and have reached
/// the requisite confirmations on the claim/fail transaction (either ANTI_REORG_DELAY or the
/// spending CSV for revocable outputs).
self.holder_tx_signed != other.holder_tx_signed ||
self.funding_spend_seen != other.funding_spend_seen ||
self.funding_spend_confirmed != other.funding_spend_confirmed ||
+ self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output != other.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output ||
self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain != other.htlcs_resolved_on_chain
{
false
(5, self.pending_monitor_events, vec_type),
(7, self.funding_spend_seen, required),
(9, self.counterparty_node_id, option),
+ (11, self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option),
});
Ok(())
}
impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
+ /// For lockorder enforcement purposes, we need to have a single site which constructs the
+ /// `inner` mutex, otherwise cases where we lock two monitors at the same time (eg in our
+ /// PartialEq implementation) we may decide a lockorder violation has occurred.
+ fn from_impl(imp: ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>) -> Self {
+ ChannelMonitor { inner: Mutex::new(imp) }
+ }
+
pub(crate) fn new(secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, keys: Signer, shutdown_script: Option<Script>,
on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters,
let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::new();
outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![(funding_info.0.index as u32, funding_info.1.clone())]);
- ChannelMonitor {
- inner: Mutex::new(ChannelMonitorImpl {
- latest_update_id: 0,
- commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
+ Self::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
+ latest_update_id: 0,
+ commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
- destination_script: destination_script.clone(),
- broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: None,
- counterparty_payment_script,
- shutdown_script,
+ destination_script: destination_script.clone(),
+ broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: None,
+ counterparty_payment_script,
+ shutdown_script,
- channel_keys_id,
- holder_revocation_basepoint,
- funding_info,
- current_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
- prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
+ channel_keys_id,
+ holder_revocation_basepoint,
+ funding_info,
+ current_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
+ prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
- counterparty_commitment_params,
- funding_redeemscript,
- channel_value_satoshis,
- their_cur_per_commitment_points: None,
+ counterparty_commitment_params,
+ funding_redeemscript,
+ channel_value_satoshis,
+ their_cur_per_commitment_points: None,
- on_holder_tx_csv: counterparty_channel_parameters.selected_contest_delay,
+ on_holder_tx_csv: counterparty_channel_parameters.selected_contest_delay,
- commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
- counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
- counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
- counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
+ commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
+ counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
+ counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
+ counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
- prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: None,
- current_holder_commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
- current_counterparty_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
- current_holder_commitment_number,
+ prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: None,
+ current_holder_commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
+ current_counterparty_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
+ current_holder_commitment_number,
- payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
- pending_monitor_events: Vec::new(),
- pending_events: Vec::new(),
+ payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
+ pending_monitor_events: Vec::new(),
+ pending_events: Vec::new(),
- onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec::new(),
- outputs_to_watch,
+ onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec::new(),
+ outputs_to_watch,
- onchain_tx_handler,
+ onchain_tx_handler,
- lockdown_from_offchain: false,
- holder_tx_signed: false,
- funding_spend_seen: false,
- funding_spend_confirmed: None,
- htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec::new(),
+ lockdown_from_offchain: false,
+ holder_tx_signed: false,
+ funding_spend_seen: false,
+ funding_spend_confirmed: None,
+ confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output: None,
+ htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec::new(),
- best_block,
- counterparty_node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id),
+ best_block,
+ counterparty_node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id),
- secp_ctx,
- }),
- }
+ secp_ctx,
+ })
}
#[cfg(test)]
&self,
updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate,
broadcaster: &B,
- fee_estimator: &F,
+ fee_estimator: F,
logger: &L,
) -> Result<(), ()>
where
self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_holder_commitment_number()
}
+ /// Gets the `node_id` of the counterparty for this channel.
+ ///
+ /// Will be `None` for channels constructed on LDK versions prior to 0.0.110 and always `Some`
+ /// otherwise.
+ pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> Option<PublicKey> {
+ self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_node_id
+ }
+
/// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest holder state if its copy of
/// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable holder toxic tx in case of
/// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our counterparty side knows
/// as long as we examine both the current counterparty commitment transaction and, if it hasn't
/// been revoked yet, the previous one, we we will never "forget" to resolve an HTLC.
macro_rules! fail_unbroadcast_htlcs {
- ($self: expr, $commitment_tx_type: expr, $commitment_txid_confirmed: expr,
+ ($self: expr, $commitment_tx_type: expr, $commitment_txid_confirmed: expr, $commitment_tx_confirmed: expr,
$commitment_tx_conf_height: expr, $confirmed_htlcs_list: expr, $logger: expr) => { {
+ debug_assert_eq!($commitment_tx_confirmed.txid(), $commitment_txid_confirmed);
+
macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = $self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
});
let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
txid: $commitment_txid_confirmed,
+ transaction: Some($commitment_tx_confirmed.clone()),
height: $commitment_tx_conf_height,
event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
source: (**source).clone(),
#[cfg(test)]
pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() -> Vec<u8> {
- let mut ret = [opcodes::all::OP_NOP.into_u8(); 136];
- ret[131] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.into_u8();
- ret[132] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.into_u8();
- ret[133] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.into_u8();
- ret[134] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.into_u8();
- ret[135] = opcodes::OP_TRUE.into_u8();
+ let mut ret = [opcodes::all::OP_NOP.to_u8(); 136];
+ ret[131] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
+ ret[132] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
+ ret[133] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
+ ret[134] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
+ ret[135] = opcodes::OP_TRUE.to_u8();
Vec::from(&ret[..])
}
// First check if a counterparty commitment transaction has been broadcasted:
macro_rules! claim_htlcs {
($commitment_number: expr, $txid: expr) => {
- let htlc_claim_reqs = self.get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs($commitment_number, $txid, None);
+ let (htlc_claim_reqs, _) = self.get_counterparty_output_claim_info($commitment_number, $txid, None);
self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), htlc_claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
}
}
self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(self.funding_info.0));
}
- pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()>
+ pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()>
where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
- F::Target: FeeEstimator,
- L::Target: Logger,
+ F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+ L::Target: Logger,
{
log_info!(logger, "Applying update to monitor {}, bringing update_id from {} to {} with {} changes.",
log_funding_info!(self), self.latest_update_id, updates.update_id, updates.updates.len());
},
ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } => {
log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with payment preimage");
- let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
+ let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&*fee_estimator);
self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
},
ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } => {
/// data in counterparty_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
/// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
/// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
- /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
- /// revoked counterparty commitment tx
- fn check_spend_counterparty_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs) where L::Target: Logger {
+ ///
+ /// Returns packages to claim the revoked output(s), as well as additional outputs to watch and
+ /// general information about the output that is to the counterparty in the commitment
+ /// transaction.
+ fn check_spend_counterparty_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L)
+ -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs, CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo)
+ where L::Target: Logger {
// Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
// a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
+ let mut to_counterparty_output_info = None;
let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
let per_commitment_option = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
( $thing : expr ) => {
match $thing {
Ok(a) => a,
- Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
+ Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), to_counterparty_output_info)
}
};
}
- let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
+ let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence.0 as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time.0 as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, outp.value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv);
let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, idx as u32, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp), height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, true, height);
claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
+ to_counterparty_output_info =
+ Some((idx.try_into().expect("Txn can't have more than 2^32 outputs"), outp.value));
}
}
if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
- return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
+ // per_commitment_data is corrupt or our commitment signing key leaked!
+ return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs),
+ to_counterparty_output_info);
}
let revk_htlc_outp = RevokedHTLCOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(revk_htlc_outp), htlc.cltv_expiry, true, height);
self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
- fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked_counterparty", commitment_txid, height,
+ fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked_counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
(htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
), logger);
} else {
debug_assert!(false, "We should have per-commitment option for any recognized old commitment txn");
- fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked counterparty", commitment_txid, height,
+ fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
[].iter().map(|reference| *reference), logger);
}
}
self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked counterparty commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
- fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "counterparty", commitment_txid, height,
+ fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
(htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
), logger);
- let htlc_claim_reqs = self.get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs(commitment_number, commitment_txid, Some(tx));
+ let (htlc_claim_reqs, counterparty_output_info) =
+ self.get_counterparty_output_claim_info(commitment_number, commitment_txid, Some(tx));
+ to_counterparty_output_info = counterparty_output_info;
for req in htlc_claim_reqs {
claimable_outpoints.push(req);
}
}
- (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
+ (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), to_counterparty_output_info)
}
- fn get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs(&self, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: Txid, tx: Option<&Transaction>) -> Vec<PackageTemplate> {
+ /// Returns the HTLC claim package templates and the counterparty output info
+ fn get_counterparty_output_claim_info(&self, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: Txid, tx: Option<&Transaction>)
+ -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo) {
let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
- if let Some(htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid) {
- if let Some(per_commitment_points) = self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
- let per_commitment_point_option =
- // If the counterparty commitment tx is the latest valid state, use their latest
- // per-commitment point
- if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&per_commitment_points.1) }
- else if let Some(point) = per_commitment_points.2.as_ref() {
- // If counterparty commitment tx is the state previous to the latest valid state, use
- // their previous per-commitment point (non-atomicity of revocation means it's valid for
- // them to temporarily have two valid commitment txns from our viewpoint)
- if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
- } else { None };
- if let Some(per_commitment_point) = per_commitment_point_option {
- for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in htlc_outputs.iter().enumerate() {
- if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
- if let Some(transaction) = tx {
- if transaction_output_index as usize >= transaction.output.len() ||
- transaction.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
- return claimable_outpoints; // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
- }
- }
- let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
- if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
- let counterparty_htlc_outp = if htlc.offered {
- PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(
- CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
- self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
- self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
- preimage.unwrap(), htlc.clone()))
- } else {
- PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(
- CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
- self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
- self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
- htlc.clone()))
- };
- let aggregation = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
- let counterparty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, counterparty_htlc_outp, htlc.cltv_expiry,aggregation, 0);
- claimable_outpoints.push(counterparty_package);
- }
- }
+ let mut to_counterparty_output_info: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo = None;
+
+ let htlc_outputs = match self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid) {
+ Some(outputs) => outputs,
+ None => return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info),
+ };
+ let per_commitment_points = match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
+ Some(points) => points,
+ None => return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info),
+ };
+
+ let per_commitment_point =
+ // If the counterparty commitment tx is the latest valid state, use their latest
+ // per-commitment point
+ if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number { &per_commitment_points.1 }
+ else if let Some(point) = per_commitment_points.2.as_ref() {
+ // If counterparty commitment tx is the state previous to the latest valid state, use
+ // their previous per-commitment point (non-atomicity of revocation means it's valid for
+ // them to temporarily have two valid commitment txns from our viewpoint)
+ if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
+ point
+ } else { return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info); }
+ } else { return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info); };
+
+ if let Some(transaction) = tx {
+ let revokeable_p2wsh_opt =
+ if let Ok(revocation_pubkey) = chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(
+ &self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint)
+ {
+ if let Ok(delayed_key) = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx,
+ &per_commitment_point,
+ &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key)
+ {
+ Some(chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey,
+ self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv,
+ &delayed_key).to_v0_p2wsh())
+ } else {
+ debug_assert!(false, "Failed to derive a delayed payment key for a commitment state we accepted");
+ None
+ }
+ } else {
+ debug_assert!(false, "Failed to derive a revocation pubkey key for a commitment state we accepted");
+ None
+ };
+ if let Some(revokeable_p2wsh) = revokeable_p2wsh_opt {
+ for (idx, outp) in transaction.output.iter().enumerate() {
+ if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
+ to_counterparty_output_info =
+ Some((idx.try_into().expect("Can't have > 2^32 outputs"), outp.value));
}
}
}
}
- claimable_outpoints
+
+ for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in htlc_outputs.iter().enumerate() {
+ if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
+ if let Some(transaction) = tx {
+ if transaction_output_index as usize >= transaction.output.len() ||
+ transaction.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
+ // per_commitment_data is corrupt or our commitment signing key leaked!
+ return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info);
+ }
+ }
+ let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
+ if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
+ let counterparty_htlc_outp = if htlc.offered {
+ PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(
+ CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
+ self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
+ self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
+ preimage.unwrap(), htlc.clone()))
+ } else {
+ PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(
+ CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
+ self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
+ self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
+ htlc.clone()))
+ };
+ let aggregation = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
+ let counterparty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, counterparty_htlc_outp, htlc.cltv_expiry,aggregation, 0);
+ claimable_outpoints.push(counterparty_package);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info)
}
/// Attempts to claim a counterparty HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, height);
let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, tx);
append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
- fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "latest holder", commitment_txid, height,
+ fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "latest holder", commitment_txid, tx, height,
self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter()
.map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())), logger);
} else if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(holder_tx, height);
let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(holder_tx, tx);
append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
- fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "previous holder", commitment_txid, height,
+ fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "previous holder", commitment_txid, tx, height,
holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())),
logger);
}
log_info!(logger, "Channel {} closed by funding output spend in txid {}.",
log_bytes!(self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id()), tx.txid());
self.funding_spend_seen = true;
- if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
- let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_counterparty_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
+ let mut commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output = None;
+ if (tx.input[0].sequence.0 >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time.0 >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
+ let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs, counterparty_output_idx_sats) =
+ self.check_spend_counterparty_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
+ commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output = counterparty_output_idx_sats;
if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
}
claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
if new_outpoints.is_empty() {
if let Some((mut new_outpoints, new_outputs)) = self.check_spend_holder_transaction(&tx, height, &logger) {
+ debug_assert!(commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output.is_none(),
+ "A commitment transaction matched as both a counterparty and local commitment tx?");
if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
}
let txid = tx.txid();
self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
txid,
+ transaction: Some((*tx).clone()),
height: height,
event: OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation {
on_local_output_csv: balance_spendable_csv,
+ commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output,
},
});
} else {
htlc_value_satoshis,
}));
if let Some(idx) = commitment_tx_output_idx {
- self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC { commitment_tx_output_idx: idx, payment_preimage: None });
+ self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
+ commitment_tx_output_idx: idx, resolving_txid: Some(entry.txid),
+ payment_preimage: None,
+ });
}
},
OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
});
},
OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. } => {
- self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC { commitment_tx_output_idx, payment_preimage: preimage });
+ self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
+ commitment_tx_output_idx, resolving_txid: Some(entry.txid),
+ payment_preimage: preimage,
+ });
},
- OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => {
+ OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, .. } => {
self.funding_spend_confirmed = Some(entry.txid);
+ self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output = commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output;
},
}
}
log_error!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
$tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
- if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
+ if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back. We can likely claim the HTLC output with a revocation claim" });
} else {
log_info!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
$tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
if payment_data.is_none() {
log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, false);
let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == htlc_output.offered;
- if !outbound_htlc || revocation_sig_claim {
- self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
- txid: tx.txid(), height,
- event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
- commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
- preimage: if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim {
- Some(payment_preimage) } else { None },
- // If this is a payment to us (!outbound_htlc, above),
- // wait for the CSV delay before dropping the HTLC from
- // claimable balance if the claim was an HTLC-Success
- // transaction.
- on_to_local_output_csv: if accepted_preimage_claim {
- Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv) } else { None },
- },
- });
- } else {
- // Outbound claims should always have payment_data, unless
- // we've already failed the HTLC as the commitment transaction
- // which was broadcasted was revoked. In that case, we should
- // spend the HTLC output here immediately, and expose that fact
- // as a Balance, something which we do not yet do.
- // TODO: Track the above as claimable!
- }
+ self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
+ txid: tx.txid(), height, transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
+ event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
+ commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
+ preimage: if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim {
+ Some(payment_preimage) } else { None },
+ // If this is a payment to us (ie !outbound_htlc), wait for
+ // the CSV delay before dropping the HTLC from claimable
+ // balance if the claim was an HTLC-Success transaction (ie
+ // accepted_preimage_claim).
+ on_to_local_output_csv: if accepted_preimage_claim && !outbound_htlc {
+ Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv) } else { None },
+ },
+ });
continue 'outer_loop;
}
}
self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
txid: tx.txid(),
height,
+ transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
} else { false }) {
self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
txid: tx.txid(),
+ transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
height,
event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
});
let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
txid: tx.txid(),
+ transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
height,
event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
source, payment_hash,
if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
txid: tx.txid(),
+ transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
height: height,
event: OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output.clone() },
};
let mut htlcs_resolved_on_chain = Some(Vec::new());
let mut funding_spend_seen = Some(false);
let mut counterparty_node_id = None;
+ let mut confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output = None;
read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
(1, funding_spend_confirmed, option),
(3, htlcs_resolved_on_chain, vec_type),
(5, pending_monitor_events, vec_type),
(7, funding_spend_seen, option),
(9, counterparty_node_id, option),
+ (11, confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option),
});
let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
- Ok((best_block.block_hash(), ChannelMonitor {
- inner: Mutex::new(ChannelMonitorImpl {
- latest_update_id,
- commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
+ Ok((best_block.block_hash(), ChannelMonitor::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
+ latest_update_id,
+ commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
- destination_script,
- broadcasted_holder_revokable_script,
- counterparty_payment_script,
- shutdown_script,
+ destination_script,
+ broadcasted_holder_revokable_script,
+ counterparty_payment_script,
+ shutdown_script,
- channel_keys_id,
- holder_revocation_basepoint,
- funding_info,
- current_counterparty_commitment_txid,
- prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
+ channel_keys_id,
+ holder_revocation_basepoint,
+ funding_info,
+ current_counterparty_commitment_txid,
+ prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
- counterparty_commitment_params,
- funding_redeemscript,
- channel_value_satoshis,
- their_cur_per_commitment_points,
+ counterparty_commitment_params,
+ funding_redeemscript,
+ channel_value_satoshis,
+ their_cur_per_commitment_points,
- on_holder_tx_csv,
+ on_holder_tx_csv,
- commitment_secrets,
- counterparty_claimable_outpoints,
- counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain,
- counterparty_hash_commitment_number,
+ commitment_secrets,
+ counterparty_claimable_outpoints,
+ counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain,
+ counterparty_hash_commitment_number,
- prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx,
- current_holder_commitment_tx,
- current_counterparty_commitment_number,
- current_holder_commitment_number,
+ prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx,
+ current_holder_commitment_tx,
+ current_counterparty_commitment_number,
+ current_holder_commitment_number,
- payment_preimages,
- pending_monitor_events: pending_monitor_events.unwrap(),
- pending_events,
+ payment_preimages,
+ pending_monitor_events: pending_monitor_events.unwrap(),
+ pending_events,
- onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf,
- outputs_to_watch,
+ onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf,
+ outputs_to_watch,
- onchain_tx_handler,
+ onchain_tx_handler,
- lockdown_from_offchain,
- holder_tx_signed,
- funding_spend_seen: funding_spend_seen.unwrap(),
- funding_spend_confirmed,
- htlcs_resolved_on_chain: htlcs_resolved_on_chain.unwrap(),
+ lockdown_from_offchain,
+ holder_tx_signed,
+ funding_spend_seen: funding_spend_seen.unwrap(),
+ funding_spend_confirmed,
+ confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output,
+ htlcs_resolved_on_chain: htlcs_resolved_on_chain.unwrap(),
- best_block,
- counterparty_node_id,
+ best_block,
+ counterparty_node_id,
- secp_ctx,
- }),
- }))
+ secp_ctx,
+ })))
}
}
use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
use io;
- use bitcoin::Witness;
+ use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, TxMerkleNode, Witness};
use prelude::*;
fn do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(use_local_txn: bool) {
let new_header = BlockHeader {
version: 2, time: 0, bits: 0, nonce: 0,
prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_info().0,
- merkle_root: Default::default() };
+ merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros() };
let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(&new_header,
&[(0, broadcast_tx)], conf_height);
let broadcaster = TestBroadcaster::new(Arc::clone(&nodes[1].blocks));
assert!(
- pre_update_monitor.update_monitor(&replay_update, &&broadcaster, &&chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &nodes[1].logger)
+ pre_update_monitor.update_monitor(&replay_update, &&broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &nodes[1].logger)
.is_err());
// Even though we error'd on the first update, we should still have generated an HTLC claim
// transaction
let fee_estimator = TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
- let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
+ let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
let mut preimages = Vec::new();
{
delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[47; 32]).unwrap()),
htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[48; 32]).unwrap())
};
- let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: Default::default(), index: u16::max_value() };
+ let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: Txid::all_zeros(), index: u16::max_value() };
let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
holder_pubkeys: keys.holder_channel_pubkeys.clone(),
holder_selected_contest_delay: 66,
// Justice tx with 1 to_holder, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
- let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
+ let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
for i in 0..4 {
claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
vout: i,
},
script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: 0xfffffffd,
+ sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
witness: Witness::new(),
});
}
// Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
- let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
+ let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
for i in 0..4 {
claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
vout: i,
},
script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: 0xfffffffd,
+ sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
witness: Witness::new(),
});
}
// Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
- let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
+ let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
vout: 0,
},
script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: 0xfffffffd,
+ sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
witness: Witness::new(),
});
claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {