writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
+ debug_assert!(htlc_source.is_none() || Some(**txid) == self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid
+ || Some(**txid) == self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
+ "HTLC Sources for all revoked commitment transactions should be none!");
serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
htlc_source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(writer)?;
}
// cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
// need to here.
let confirmed_htlcs_iter: &mut Iterator<Item = (&HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = &mut $confirmed_htlcs_list;
+
let mut matched_htlc = false;
for (ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in confirmed_htlcs_iter {
- if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(&**source) == *broadcast_source {
+ if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() &&
+ (Some(&**source) == *broadcast_source ||
+ (broadcast_source.is_none() &&
+ broadcast_htlc.payment_hash == htlc.payment_hash &&
+ broadcast_htlc.amount_msat == htlc.amount_msat)) {
matched_htlc = true;
break;
}
} }
}
+// In the `test_invalid_funding_tx` test, we need a bogus script which matches the HTLC-Accepted
+// witness length match (ie is 136 bytes long). We generate one here which we also use in some
+// in-line tests later.
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() -> Vec<u8> {
+ let mut ret = [opcodes::all::OP_NOP.into_u8(); 136];
+ ret[131] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.into_u8();
+ ret[132] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.into_u8();
+ ret[133] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.into_u8();
+ ret[134] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.into_u8();
+ ret[135] = opcodes::OP_TRUE.into_u8();
+ Vec::from(&ret[..])
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness() -> Vec<Vec<u8>> {
+ vec![Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program().into()].into()
+}
+
impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
/// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
/// needed by holder commitment transactions HTCLs nor by counterparty ones. Unless we haven't already seen
}
self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
- fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked counterparty", commitment_txid, height,
- [].iter().map(|a| *a), logger);
+ if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
+ fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked_counterparty", commitment_txid, height,
+ per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
+ (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
+ ), logger);
+ } else {
+ debug_assert!(false, "We should have per-commitment option for any recognized old commitment txn");
+ fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked counterparty", commitment_txid, height,
+ [].iter().map(|reference| *reference), logger);
+ }
}
} else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
// While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
if *idx == input.previous_output.vout {
#[cfg(test)]
{
- // If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
- // appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
- // actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
- if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
- assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&Script::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
- } else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
- assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
- } else { panic!(); }
+ // If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
+ // appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
+ // actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
+ if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
+ if input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec() == deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() {
+ // In at least one test we use a deliberately bogus witness
+ // script which hit an old panic. Thus, we check for that here
+ // and avoid the assert if its the expected bogus script.
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&Script::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
+ } else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
+ assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
+ } else { panic!(); }
}
return true;
}
let prev_last_witness_len = input.witness.second_to_last().map(|w| w.len()).unwrap_or(0);
let revocation_sig_claim = (witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && prev_last_witness_len == 33)
|| (witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && prev_last_witness_len == 33);
- let accepted_preimage_claim = witness_items == 5 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
+ let accepted_preimage_claim = witness_items == 5 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC)
+ && input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap().len() == 32;
#[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
let accepted_timeout_claim = witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && !revocation_sig_claim;
- let offered_preimage_claim = witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && !revocation_sig_claim;
+ let offered_preimage_claim = witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) &&
+ !revocation_sig_claim && input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap().len() == 32;
+
#[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
let offered_timeout_claim = witness_items == 5 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff