//! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
-use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxOut,Transaction};
-use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint, TxOut, Transaction};
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
use bitcoin::secp256k1;
-use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
-use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
-use ln::chan_utils;
-use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLCClaim, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction};
-use ln::channelmanager::HTLCSource;
-use chain;
-use chain::{BestBlock, WatchedOutput};
-use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
-use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
-use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor, DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, Sign, KeysInterface};
-use chain::onchaintx::OnchainTxHandler;
-use chain::package::{CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput, CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput, HolderFundingOutput, HolderHTLCOutput, PackageSolvingData, PackageTemplate, RevokedOutput, RevokedHTLCOutput};
-use chain::Filter;
-use util::logger::Logger;
-use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, U48, OptionDeserWrapper};
-use util::byte_utils;
-use util::events::Event;
-
-use prelude::*;
+use crate::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
+use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
+use crate::ln::chan_utils;
+use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLCClaim, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction};
+use crate::ln::channelmanager::HTLCSource;
+use crate::chain;
+use crate::chain::{BestBlock, WatchedOutput};
+use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
+use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
+use crate::chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor, DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, SignerProvider, EntropySource};
+#[cfg(anchors)]
+use crate::chain::onchaintx::ClaimEvent;
+use crate::chain::onchaintx::OnchainTxHandler;
+use crate::chain::package::{CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput, CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput, HolderFundingOutput, HolderHTLCOutput, PackageSolvingData, PackageTemplate, RevokedOutput, RevokedHTLCOutput};
+use crate::chain::Filter;
+use crate::util::logger::Logger;
+use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, U48, OptionDeserWrapper};
+use crate::util::byte_utils;
+use crate::util::events::Event;
+#[cfg(anchors)]
+use crate::util::events::{AnchorDescriptor, HTLCDescriptor, BumpTransactionEvent};
+
+use crate::prelude::*;
use core::{cmp, mem};
-use io::{self, Error};
+use crate::io::{self, Error};
use core::convert::TryInto;
use core::ops::Deref;
-use sync::Mutex;
+use crate::sync::Mutex;
/// An update generated by the underlying channel itself which contains some new information the
/// [`ChannelMonitor`] should be made aware of.
(14, htlc_outputs, vec_type)
});
+#[cfg(anchors)]
+impl HolderSignedTx {
+ fn non_dust_htlcs(&self) -> Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment> {
+ self.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(htlc, _, _)| {
+ if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
+ Some(htlc.clone())
+ } else {
+ None
+ }
+ })
+ .collect()
+ }
+}
+
/// We use this to track static counterparty commitment transaction data and to generate any
/// justice or 2nd-stage preimage/timeout transactions.
#[derive(PartialEq, Eq)]
impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
- w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
+ w.write_all(&(0 as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
write_tlv_fields!(w, {
(0, self.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
(2, self.counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
}
}
-/// An entry for an [`OnchainEvent`], stating the block height when the event was observed and the
-/// transaction causing it.
+/// An entry for an [`OnchainEvent`], stating the block height and hash when the event was
+/// observed, as well as the transaction causing it.
///
/// Used to determine when the on-chain event can be considered safe from a chain reorganization.
#[derive(PartialEq, Eq)]
struct OnchainEventEntry {
txid: Txid,
height: u32,
+ block_hash: Option<BlockHash>, // Added as optional, will be filled in for any entry generated on 0.0.113 or after
event: OnchainEvent,
transaction: Option<Transaction>, // Added as optional, but always filled in, in LDK 0.0.110
}
(0, self.txid, required),
(1, self.transaction, option),
(2, self.height, required),
+ (3, self.block_hash, option),
(4, self.event, required),
});
Ok(())
fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
let mut txid = Txid::all_zeros();
let mut transaction = None;
+ let mut block_hash = None;
let mut height = 0;
let mut event = None;
read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
(0, txid, required),
(1, transaction, option),
(2, height, required),
+ (3, block_hash, option),
(4, event, ignorable),
});
if let Some(ev) = event {
- Ok(Some(Self { txid, transaction, height, event: ev }))
+ Ok(Some(Self { txid, transaction, height, block_hash, event: ev }))
} else {
Ok(None)
}
/// was not present in the confirmed commitment transaction), HTLC-Success, or HTLC-Timeout
/// transaction.
resolving_txid: Option<Txid>, // Added as optional, but always filled in, in 0.0.110
+ resolving_tx: Option<Transaction>,
/// Only set if the HTLC claim was ours using a payment preimage
payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
}
(0, mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
(1, self.resolving_txid, option),
(2, self.payment_preimage, option),
+ (3, self.resolving_tx, option),
});
Ok(())
}
let mut mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx = 0;
let mut resolving_txid = None;
let mut payment_preimage = None;
+ let mut resolving_tx = None;
read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
(0, mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
(1, resolving_txid, option),
(2, payment_preimage, option),
+ (3, resolving_tx, option),
});
Ok(Self {
commitment_tx_output_idx: if mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx == u32::max_value() { None } else { Some(mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx) },
resolving_txid,
payment_preimage,
+ resolving_tx,
})
}
}
/// the "reorg path" (ie disconnecting blocks until you find a common ancestor from both the
/// returned block hash and the the current chain and then reconnecting blocks to get to the
/// best chain) upon deserializing the object!
-pub struct ChannelMonitor<Signer: Sign> {
+pub struct ChannelMonitor<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> {
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
#[cfg(not(test))]
inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
}
-pub(crate) struct ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer: Sign> {
+#[derive(PartialEq)]
+pub(crate) struct ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> {
latest_update_id: u64,
commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
/// spending CSV for revocable outputs).
htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec<IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC>,
+ /// The set of `SpendableOutput` events which we have already passed upstream to be claimed.
+ /// These are tracked explicitly to ensure that we don't generate the same events redundantly
+ /// if users duplicatively confirm old transactions. Specifically for transactions claiming a
+ /// revoked remote outpoint we otherwise have no tracking at all once they've reached
+ /// [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`], so we have to track them here.
+ spendable_txids_confirmed: Vec<Txid>,
+
// We simply modify best_block in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
// consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
// (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep
/// The node_id of our counterparty
counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
-
- secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
}
/// Transaction outputs to watch for on-chain spends.
pub type TransactionOutputs = (Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>);
-#[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
-/// Used only in testing and fuzzing to check serialization roundtrips don't change the underlying
-/// object
-impl<Signer: Sign> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
+impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<Signer> where Signer: PartialEq {
fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
let other = other.inner.lock().unwrap();
}
}
-#[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
-/// Used only in testing and fuzzing to check serialization roundtrips don't change the underlying
-/// object
-impl<Signer: Sign> PartialEq for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
- fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
- if self.latest_update_id != other.latest_update_id ||
- self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
- self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
- self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script != other.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script ||
- self.counterparty_payment_script != other.counterparty_payment_script ||
- self.channel_keys_id != other.channel_keys_id ||
- self.holder_revocation_basepoint != other.holder_revocation_basepoint ||
- self.funding_info != other.funding_info ||
- self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.current_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
- self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
- self.counterparty_commitment_params != other.counterparty_commitment_params ||
- self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript ||
- self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis ||
- self.their_cur_per_commitment_points != other.their_cur_per_commitment_points ||
- self.on_holder_tx_csv != other.on_holder_tx_csv ||
- self.commitment_secrets != other.commitment_secrets ||
- self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints != other.counterparty_claimable_outpoints ||
- self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
- self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number != other.counterparty_hash_commitment_number ||
- self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx ||
- self.current_counterparty_commitment_number != other.current_counterparty_commitment_number ||
- self.current_holder_commitment_number != other.current_holder_commitment_number ||
- self.current_holder_commitment_tx != other.current_holder_commitment_tx ||
- self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
- self.pending_monitor_events != other.pending_monitor_events ||
- self.pending_events.len() != other.pending_events.len() || // We trust events to round-trip properly
- self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf ||
- self.outputs_to_watch != other.outputs_to_watch ||
- self.lockdown_from_offchain != other.lockdown_from_offchain ||
- self.holder_tx_signed != other.holder_tx_signed ||
- self.funding_spend_seen != other.funding_spend_seen ||
- self.funding_spend_confirmed != other.funding_spend_confirmed ||
- self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output != other.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output ||
- self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain != other.htlcs_resolved_on_chain
- {
- false
- } else {
- true
- }
- }
-}
-
-impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
+impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
self.inner.lock().unwrap().write(writer)
}
const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
-impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
+impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
self.channel_keys_id.write(writer)?;
self.holder_revocation_basepoint.write(writer)?;
writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.txid[..])?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.funding_info.0.index))?;
+ writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.index.to_be_bytes())?;
self.funding_info.1.write(writer)?;
self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
},
}
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_holder_tx_csv))?;
+ writer.write_all(&self.on_holder_tx_csv.to_be_bytes())?;
self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
($htlc_output: expr) => {
writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
+ writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.amount_msat.to_be_bytes())?;
+ writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes())?;
writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
$htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
}
}
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
+ writer.write_all(&(self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
+ writer.write_all(&(htlc_infos.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
debug_assert!(htlc_source.is_none() || Some(**txid) == self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid
|| Some(**txid) == self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
}
}
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
+ writer.write_all(&(self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
for (ref txid, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
}
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
+ writer.write_all(&(self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_counterparty_commitment_number))?;
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_holder_commitment_number))?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
+ writer.write_all(&(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
}
}
}
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_events.len() as u64))?;
+ writer.write_all(&(self.pending_events.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
for event in self.pending_events.iter() {
event.write(writer)?;
}
self.best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.height()))?;
+ writer.write_all(&self.best_block.height().to_be_bytes())?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
+ writer.write_all(&(self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
for ref entry in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
entry.write(writer)?;
}
(7, self.funding_spend_seen, required),
(9, self.counterparty_node_id, option),
(11, self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option),
+ (13, self.spendable_txids_confirmed, vec_type),
});
Ok(())
}
}
-impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
+impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
/// For lockorder enforcement purposes, we need to have a single site which constructs the
/// `inner` mutex, otherwise cases where we lock two monitors at the same time (eg in our
/// PartialEq implementation) we may decide a lockorder violation has occurred.
let onchain_tx_handler =
OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys,
- channel_parameters.clone(), initial_holder_commitment_tx, secp_ctx.clone());
+ channel_parameters.clone(), initial_holder_commitment_tx, secp_ctx);
let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::new();
outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![(funding_info.0.index as u32, funding_info.1.clone())]);
funding_spend_confirmed: None,
confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output: None,
htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec::new(),
+ spendable_txids_confirmed: Vec::new(),
best_block,
counterparty_node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id),
-
- secp_ctx,
})
}
B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
L::Target: Logger,
{
- self.inner.lock().unwrap().broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger)
+ self.inner.lock().unwrap().broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger);
}
/// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
/// Gets the list of pending events which were generated by previous actions, clearing the list
/// in the process.
///
- /// This is called by ChainMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_events() and is equivalent to
- /// EventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_events() except that it requires &mut self as we do
- /// no internal locking in ChannelMonitors.
+ /// This is called by the [`EventsProvider::process_pending_events`] implementation for
+ /// [`ChainMonitor`].
+ ///
+ /// [`EventsProvider::process_pending_events`]: crate::util::events::EventsProvider::process_pending_events
+ /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_and_clear_pending_events()
}
}
/// Returns the set of txids that should be monitored for re-organization out of the chain.
- pub fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
+ pub fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
- let mut txids: Vec<Txid> = inner.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
+ let mut txids: Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> = inner.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
.iter()
- .map(|entry| entry.txid)
+ .map(|entry| (entry.txid, entry.block_hash))
.chain(inner.onchain_tx_handler.get_relevant_txids().into_iter())
.collect();
txids.sort_unstable();
}
}
-impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
+impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
/// Helper for get_claimable_balances which does the work for an individual HTLC, generating up
/// to one `Balance` for the HTLC.
fn get_htlc_balance(&self, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, holder_commitment: bool,
if let Some(v) = htlc.transaction_output_index { v } else { return None; };
let mut htlc_spend_txid_opt = None;
+ let mut htlc_spend_tx_opt = None;
let mut holder_timeout_spend_pending = None;
let mut htlc_spend_pending = None;
let mut holder_delayed_output_pending = None;
OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx, htlc_value_satoshis, .. }
if commitment_tx_output_idx == Some(htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) => {
debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
- htlc_spend_txid_opt = event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx| tx.txid());
+ htlc_spend_txid_opt = Some(&event.txid);
+ debug_assert!(htlc_spend_tx_opt.is_none());
+ htlc_spend_tx_opt = event.transaction.as_ref();
debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none());
debug_assert_eq!(htlc_value_satoshis.unwrap(), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
holder_timeout_spend_pending = Some(event.confirmation_threshold());
OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. }
if commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx => {
debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
- htlc_spend_txid_opt = event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx| tx.txid());
+ htlc_spend_txid_opt = Some(&event.txid);
+ debug_assert!(htlc_spend_tx_opt.is_none());
+ htlc_spend_tx_opt = event.transaction.as_ref();
debug_assert!(htlc_spend_pending.is_none());
htlc_spend_pending = Some((event.confirmation_threshold(), preimage.is_some()));
},
let htlc_resolved = self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter()
.find(|v| if v.commitment_tx_output_idx == Some(htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) {
debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
- htlc_spend_txid_opt = v.resolving_txid;
+ htlc_spend_txid_opt = v.resolving_txid.as_ref();
+ debug_assert!(htlc_spend_tx_opt.is_none());
+ htlc_spend_tx_opt = v.resolving_tx.as_ref();
true
} else { false });
debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_some() as u8 + htlc_spend_pending.is_some() as u8 + htlc_resolved.is_some() as u8 <= 1);
+ let htlc_commitment_outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint::new(confirmed_txid.unwrap(), htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx);
let htlc_output_to_spend =
if let Some(txid) = htlc_spend_txid_opt {
- debug_assert!(
- self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_none(),
- "This code needs updating for anchors");
- BitcoinOutPoint::new(txid, 0)
+ // Because HTLC transactions either only have 1 input and 1 output (pre-anchors) or
+ // are signed with SIGHASH_SINGLE|ANYONECANPAY under BIP-0143 (post-anchors), we can
+ // locate the correct output by ensuring its adjacent input spends the HTLC output
+ // in the commitment.
+ if let Some(ref tx) = htlc_spend_tx_opt {
+ let htlc_input_idx_opt = tx.input.iter().enumerate()
+ .find(|(_, input)| input.previous_output == htlc_commitment_outpoint)
+ .map(|(idx, _)| idx as u32);
+ debug_assert!(htlc_input_idx_opt.is_some());
+ BitcoinOutPoint::new(*txid, htlc_input_idx_opt.unwrap_or(0))
+ } else {
+ debug_assert!(!self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors());
+ BitcoinOutPoint::new(*txid, 0)
+ }
} else {
- BitcoinOutPoint::new(confirmed_txid.unwrap(), htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx)
+ htlc_commitment_outpoint
};
let htlc_output_spend_pending = self.onchain_tx_handler.is_output_spend_pending(&htlc_output_to_spend);
} = &event.event {
if event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| {
if let Some(htlc_spend_txid) = htlc_spend_txid_opt {
- Some(tx.txid()) == htlc_spend_txid_opt ||
- inp.previous_output.txid == htlc_spend_txid
+ tx.txid() == *htlc_spend_txid || inp.previous_output.txid == *htlc_spend_txid
} else {
Some(inp.previous_output.txid) == confirmed_txid &&
inp.previous_output.vout == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx
}
}
-impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
+impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
/// Gets the balances in this channel which are either claimable by us if we were to
/// force-close the channel now or which are claimable on-chain (possibly awaiting
/// confirmation).
res
}
+ /// Gets the set of outbound HTLCs which can be (or have been) resolved by this
+ /// `ChannelMonitor`. This is used to determine if an HTLC was removed from the channel prior
+ /// to the `ChannelManager` having been persisted.
+ ///
+ /// This is similar to [`Self::get_pending_outbound_htlcs`] except it includes HTLCs which were
+ /// resolved by this `ChannelMonitor`.
+ pub(crate) fn get_all_current_outbound_htlcs(&self) -> HashMap<HTLCSource, HTLCOutputInCommitment> {
+ let mut res = HashMap::new();
+ // Just examine the available counterparty commitment transactions. See docs on
+ // `fail_unbroadcast_htlcs`, below, for justification.
+ let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
+ macro_rules! walk_counterparty_commitment {
+ ($txid: expr) => {
+ if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
+ for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
+ if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
+ res.insert((**source).clone(), htlc.clone());
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if let Some(ref txid) = us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
+ walk_counterparty_commitment!(txid);
+ }
+ if let Some(ref txid) = us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
+ walk_counterparty_commitment!(txid);
+ }
+ res
+ }
+
/// Gets the set of outbound HTLCs which are pending resolution in this channel.
/// This is used to reconstruct pending outbound payments on restart in the ChannelManager.
pub(crate) fn get_pending_outbound_htlcs(&self) -> HashMap<HTLCSource, HTLCOutputInCommitment> {
- let mut res = HashMap::new();
let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
+ // We're only concerned with the confirmation count of HTLC transactions, and don't
+ // actually care how many confirmations a commitment transaction may or may not have. Thus,
+ // we look for either a FundingSpendConfirmation event or a funding_spend_confirmed.
+ let confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed.or_else(|| {
+ us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
+ if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } = event.event {
+ Some(event.txid)
+ } else { None }
+ })
+ });
+ if confirmed_txid.is_none() {
+ // If we have not seen a commitment transaction on-chain (ie the channel is not yet
+ // closed), just get the full set.
+ mem::drop(us);
+ return self.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs();
+ }
+
+ let mut res = HashMap::new();
macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
($holder_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
for (htlc, source) in $htlc_iter {
}
}
- // We're only concerned with the confirmation count of HTLC transactions, and don't
- // actually care how many confirmations a commitment transaction may or may not have. Thus,
- // we look for either a FundingSpendConfirmation event or a funding_spend_confirmed.
- let confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed.or_else(|| {
- us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
- if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } = event.event {
- Some(event.txid)
+ let txid = confirmed_txid.unwrap();
+ if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
+ walk_htlcs!(false, us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap().iter().filter_map(|(a, b)| {
+ if let &Some(ref source) = b {
+ Some((a, &**source))
} else { None }
- })
- });
- if let Some(txid) = confirmed_txid {
- if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
- walk_htlcs!(false, us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap().iter().filter_map(|(a, b)| {
- if let &Some(ref source) = b {
- Some((a, &**source))
- } else { None }
- }));
- } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
- walk_htlcs!(true, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(a, _, c)| {
+ }));
+ } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
+ walk_htlcs!(true, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(a, _, c)| {
+ if let Some(source) = c { Some((a, source)) } else { None }
+ }));
+ } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
+ if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
+ walk_htlcs!(true, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(a, _, c)| {
if let Some(source) = c { Some((a, source)) } else { None }
}));
- } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
- if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
- walk_htlcs!(true, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(a, _, c)| {
- if let Some(source) = c { Some((a, source)) } else { None }
- }));
- }
- }
- } else {
- // If we have not seen a commitment transaction on-chain (ie the channel is not yet
- // closed), just examine the available counterparty commitment transactions. See docs
- // on `fail_unbroadcast_htlcs`, below, for justification.
- macro_rules! walk_counterparty_commitment {
- ($txid: expr) => {
- if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
- for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
- if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
- res.insert((**source).clone(), htlc.clone());
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
- if let Some(ref txid) = us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
- walk_counterparty_commitment!(txid);
- }
- if let Some(ref txid) = us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
- walk_counterparty_commitment!(txid);
}
}
/// been revoked yet, the previous one, we we will never "forget" to resolve an HTLC.
macro_rules! fail_unbroadcast_htlcs {
($self: expr, $commitment_tx_type: expr, $commitment_txid_confirmed: expr, $commitment_tx_confirmed: expr,
- $commitment_tx_conf_height: expr, $confirmed_htlcs_list: expr, $logger: expr) => { {
+ $commitment_tx_conf_height: expr, $commitment_tx_conf_hash: expr, $confirmed_htlcs_list: expr, $logger: expr) => { {
debug_assert_eq!($commitment_tx_confirmed.txid(), $commitment_txid_confirmed);
macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
txid: $commitment_txid_confirmed,
transaction: Some($commitment_tx_confirmed.clone()),
height: $commitment_tx_conf_height,
+ block_hash: Some(*$commitment_tx_conf_hash),
event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
source: (**source).clone(),
payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash.clone(),
vec![Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program().into()].into()
}
-impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
+impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
/// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
/// needed by holder commitment transactions HTCLs nor by counterparty ones. Unless we haven't already seen
/// counterparty commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
macro_rules! claim_htlcs {
($commitment_number: expr, $txid: expr) => {
let (htlc_claim_reqs, _) = self.get_counterparty_output_claim_info($commitment_number, $txid, None);
- self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), htlc_claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
+ self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(htlc_claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
}
}
if let Some(txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
// block. Even if not, its a reasonable metric for the bump criteria on the HTLC
// transactions.
let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height());
- self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
+ self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
if let Some(ref tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&tx, self.best_block.height());
- self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
+ self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
}
}
}
panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
}
let mut ret = Ok(());
+ let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&*fee_estimator);
for update in updates.updates.iter() {
match update {
ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
},
ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } => {
log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with payment preimage");
- let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&*fee_estimator);
self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
},
ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } => {
log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor: channel force closed, should broadcast: {}", should_broadcast);
self.lockdown_from_offchain = true;
if *should_broadcast {
+ // There's no need to broadcast our commitment transaction if we've seen one
+ // confirmed (even with 1 confirmation) as it'll be rejected as
+ // duplicate/conflicting.
+ let detected_funding_spend = self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some() ||
+ self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find(|event| match event.event {
+ OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => true,
+ _ => false,
+ }).is_some();
+ if detected_funding_spend {
+ continue;
+ }
self.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger);
+ // If the channel supports anchor outputs, we'll need to emit an external
+ // event to be consumed such that a child transaction is broadcast with a
+ // high enough feerate for the parent commitment transaction to confirm.
+ if self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors() {
+ let funding_output = HolderFundingOutput::build(
+ self.funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
+ self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors(),
+ );
+ let best_block_height = self.best_block.height();
+ let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(
+ self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32,
+ PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_output),
+ best_block_height, false, best_block_height,
+ );
+ self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(
+ vec![commitment_package], best_block_height, best_block_height,
+ broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger,
+ );
+ }
} else if !self.holder_tx_signed {
log_error!(logger, "WARNING: You have a potentially-unsafe holder commitment transaction available to broadcast");
log_error!(logger, " in channel monitor for channel {}!", log_bytes!(self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id()));
pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&mut self) -> Vec<Event> {
let mut ret = Vec::new();
mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_events);
+ #[cfg(anchors)]
+ for claim_event in self.onchain_tx_handler.get_and_clear_pending_claim_events().drain(..) {
+ match claim_event {
+ ClaimEvent::BumpCommitment {
+ package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, commitment_tx, anchor_output_idx,
+ } => {
+ let commitment_txid = commitment_tx.txid();
+ debug_assert_eq!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid, commitment_txid);
+ let pending_htlcs = self.current_holder_commitment_tx.non_dust_htlcs();
+ let commitment_tx_fee_satoshis = self.channel_value_satoshis -
+ commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0u64, |sum, output| sum + output.value);
+ ret.push(Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose {
+ package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
+ commitment_tx,
+ commitment_tx_fee_satoshis,
+ anchor_descriptor: AnchorDescriptor {
+ channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
+ channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
+ outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint {
+ txid: commitment_txid,
+ vout: anchor_output_idx,
+ },
+ },
+ pending_htlcs,
+ }));
+ },
+ ClaimEvent::BumpHTLC {
+ target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, htlcs,
+ } => {
+ let mut htlc_descriptors = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs.len());
+ for htlc in htlcs {
+ htlc_descriptors.push(HTLCDescriptor {
+ channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
+ channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
+ channel_parameters: self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
+ commitment_txid: htlc.commitment_txid,
+ per_commitment_number: htlc.per_commitment_number,
+ htlc: htlc.htlc,
+ preimage: htlc.preimage,
+ counterparty_sig: htlc.counterparty_sig,
+ });
+ }
+ ret.push(Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution {
+ target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
+ htlc_descriptors,
+ }));
+ }
+ }
+ }
ret
}
/// Returns packages to claim the revoked output(s), as well as additional outputs to watch and
/// general information about the output that is to the counterparty in the commitment
/// transaction.
- fn check_spend_counterparty_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L)
+ fn check_spend_counterparty_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &L)
-> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs, CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo)
where L::Target: Logger {
// Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
- let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
- let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint));
- let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key));
+ let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
+ let revocation_pubkey = chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint);
+ let delayed_key = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key);
let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked_counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
- per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
+ block_hash, per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
(htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
), logger);
} else {
debug_assert!(false, "We should have per-commitment option for any recognized old commitment txn");
fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
- [].iter().map(|reference| *reference), logger);
+ block_hash, [].iter().map(|reference| *reference), logger);
}
}
} else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked counterparty commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
- fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
+ fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height, block_hash,
per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
(htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
), logger);
} else { return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info); };
if let Some(transaction) = tx {
- let revokeable_p2wsh_opt =
- if let Ok(revocation_pubkey) = chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(
- &self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint)
- {
- if let Ok(delayed_key) = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx,
- &per_commitment_point,
- &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key)
- {
- Some(chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey,
- self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv,
- &delayed_key).to_v0_p2wsh())
- } else {
- debug_assert!(false, "Failed to derive a delayed payment key for a commitment state we accepted");
- None
- }
- } else {
- debug_assert!(false, "Failed to derive a revocation pubkey key for a commitment state we accepted");
- None
- };
- if let Some(revokeable_p2wsh) = revokeable_p2wsh_opt {
- for (idx, outp) in transaction.output.iter().enumerate() {
- if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
- to_counterparty_output_info =
- Some((idx.try_into().expect("Can't have > 2^32 outputs"), outp.value));
- }
+ let revocation_pubkey = chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(
+ &self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint);
+ let delayed_key = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx,
+ &per_commitment_point,
+ &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key);
+ let revokeable_p2wsh = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey,
+ self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv,
+ &delayed_key).to_v0_p2wsh();
+ for (idx, outp) in transaction.output.iter().enumerate() {
+ if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
+ to_counterparty_output_info =
+ Some((idx.try_into().expect("Can't have > 2^32 outputs"), outp.value));
}
}
}
CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
- preimage.unwrap(), htlc.clone()))
+ preimage.unwrap(), htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors()))
} else {
PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(
CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
- htlc.clone()))
+ htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors()))
};
let aggregation = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
let counterparty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, counterparty_htlc_outp, htlc.cltv_expiry,aggregation, 0);
}
/// Attempts to claim a counterparty HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
- fn check_spend_counterparty_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<TransactionOutputs>) where L::Target: Logger {
- let htlc_txid = tx.txid();
- if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 || tx.input[0].witness.len() != 5 {
- return (Vec::new(), None)
- }
+ fn check_spend_counterparty_htlc<L: Deref>(
+ &mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: &Txid, height: u32, logger: &L
+ ) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<TransactionOutputs>) where L::Target: Logger {
+ let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (Vec::new(), None); };
+ let per_commitment_key = match SecretKey::from_slice(&secret) {
+ Ok(key) => key,
+ Err(_) => return (Vec::new(), None)
+ };
+ let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
- macro_rules! ignore_error {
- ( $thing : expr ) => {
- match $thing {
- Ok(a) => a,
- Err(_) => return (Vec::new(), None)
+ let htlc_txid = tx.txid();
+ let mut claimable_outpoints = vec![];
+ let mut outputs_to_watch = None;
+ // Previously, we would only claim HTLCs from revoked HTLC transactions if they had 1 input
+ // with a witness of 5 elements and 1 output. This wasn't enough for anchor outputs, as the
+ // counterparty can now aggregate multiple HTLCs into a single transaction thanks to
+ // `SIGHASH_SINGLE` remote signatures, leading us to not claim any HTLCs upon seeing a
+ // confirmed revoked HTLC transaction (for more details, see
+ // https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2022-April/003561.html).
+ //
+ // We make sure we're not vulnerable to this case by checking all inputs of the transaction,
+ // and claim those which spend the commitment transaction, have a witness of 5 elements, and
+ // have a corresponding output at the same index within the transaction.
+ for (idx, input) in tx.input.iter().enumerate() {
+ if input.previous_output.txid == *commitment_txid && input.witness.len() == 5 && tx.output.get(idx).is_some() {
+ log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty HTLC transaction, spending {}:{}", htlc_txid, idx);
+ let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(
+ per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
+ self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key,
+ tx.output[idx].value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv
+ );
+ let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(
+ htlc_txid, idx as u32, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp),
+ height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, true, height
+ );
+ claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
+ if outputs_to_watch.is_none() {
+ outputs_to_watch = Some((htlc_txid, vec![]));
}
- };
+ outputs_to_watch.as_mut().unwrap().1.push((idx as u32, tx.output[idx].clone()));
+ }
}
-
- let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (Vec::new(), None); };
- let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
- let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
-
- log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty HTLC transaction, spending {}:{}", htlc_txid, 0);
- let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, tx.output[0].value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv);
- let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(htlc_txid, 0, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp), height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, true, height);
- let claimable_outpoints = vec!(justice_package);
- let outputs = vec![(0, tx.output[0].clone())];
- (claimable_outpoints, Some((htlc_txid, outputs)))
+ (claimable_outpoints, outputs_to_watch)
}
- // Returns (1) `PackageTemplate`s that can be given to the OnChainTxHandler, so that the handler can
+ // Returns (1) `PackageTemplate`s that can be given to the OnchainTxHandler, so that the handler can
// broadcast transactions claiming holder HTLC commitment outputs and (2) a holder revokable
// script so we can detect whether a holder transaction has been seen on-chain.
fn get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, conf_height: u32) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>) {
for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
- let htlc_output = if htlc.offered {
- HolderHTLCOutput::build_offered(htlc.amount_msat, htlc.cltv_expiry)
+ let (htlc_output, aggregable) = if htlc.offered {
+ let htlc_output = HolderHTLCOutput::build_offered(
+ htlc.amount_msat, htlc.cltv_expiry, self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors()
+ );
+ (htlc_output, false)
+ } else {
+ let payment_preimage = if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
+ preimage.clone()
} else {
- let payment_preimage = if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
- preimage.clone()
- } else {
- // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
- continue;
- };
- HolderHTLCOutput::build_accepted(payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat)
+ // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
+ continue;
};
- let htlc_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(holder_tx.txid, transaction_output_index, PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(htlc_output), htlc.cltv_expiry, false, conf_height);
+ let htlc_output = HolderHTLCOutput::build_accepted(
+ payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat, self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors()
+ );
+ (htlc_output, self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors())
+ };
+ let htlc_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(
+ holder_tx.txid, transaction_output_index,
+ PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(htlc_output),
+ htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable, conf_height
+ );
claim_requests.push(htlc_package);
}
}
/// revoked using data in holder_claimable_outpoints.
/// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
/// Returns None unless the transaction is definitely one of our commitment transactions.
- fn check_spend_holder_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> Option<(Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs)> where L::Target: Logger {
+ fn check_spend_holder_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32,
block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &L) -> Option<(Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs)> where L::Target: Logger {
let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
let mut claim_requests = Vec::new();
let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, tx);
append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "latest holder", commitment_txid, tx, height,
- self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter()
+ block_hash, self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter()
.map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())), logger);
} else if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
if holder_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(holder_tx, height);
let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(holder_tx, tx);
append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
- fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "previous holder", commitment_txid, tx, height,
+ fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "previous holder", commitment_txid, tx, height, block_hash,
holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())),
logger);
}
if height > self.best_block.height() {
self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
- self.block_confirmed(height, vec![], vec![], vec![], &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger)
+ self.block_confirmed(height, block_hash, vec![], vec![], vec![], &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger)
} else if block_hash != self.best_block.block_hash() {
self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height <= height);
let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
- for tx in &txn_matched {
+ 'tx_iter: for tx in &txn_matched {
+ let txid = tx.txid();
+ // If a transaction has already been confirmed, ensure we don't bother processing it duplicatively.
+ if Some(txid) == self.funding_spend_confirmed {
+ log_debug!(logger, "Skipping redundant processing of funding-spend tx {} as it was previously confirmed", txid);
+ continue 'tx_iter;
+ }
+ for ev in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
+ if ev.txid == txid {
+ if let Some(conf_hash) = ev.block_hash {
+ assert_eq!(header.block_hash(), conf_hash,
+ "Transaction {} was already confirmed and is being re-confirmed in a different block.\n\
+ This indicates a severe bug in the transaction connection logic - a reorg should have been processed first!", ev.txid);
+ }
+ log_debug!(logger, "Skipping redundant processing of confirming tx {} as it was previously confirmed", txid);
+ continue 'tx_iter;
+ }
+ }
+ for htlc in self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter() {
+ if Some(txid) == htlc.resolving_txid {
+ log_debug!(logger, "Skipping redundant processing of HTLC resolution tx {} as it was previously confirmed", txid);
+ continue 'tx_iter;
+ }
+ }
+ for spendable_txid in self.spendable_txids_confirmed.iter() {
+ if txid == *spendable_txid {
+ log_debug!(logger, "Skipping redundant processing of spendable tx {} as it was previously confirmed", txid);
+ continue 'tx_iter;
+ }
+ }
+
if tx.input.len() == 1 {
// Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
- // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
- // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
- // filters.
+ // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input
+ // (except for HTLC transactions for channels with anchor outputs), which is an easy
+ // way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy filters.
let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 {
let mut balance_spendable_csv = None;
log_info!(logger, "Channel {} closed by funding output spend in txid {}.",
- log_bytes!(self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id()), tx.txid());
+ log_bytes!(self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id()), txid);
self.funding_spend_seen = true;
let mut commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output = None;
if (tx.input[0].sequence.0 >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time.0 >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs, counterparty_output_idx_sats) =
- self.check_spend_counterparty_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
+ self.check_spend_counterparty_transaction(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger);
commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output = counterparty_output_idx_sats;
if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
}
claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
if new_outpoints.is_empty() {
- if let Some((mut new_outpoints, new_outputs)) = self.check_spend_holder_transaction(&tx, height, &logger) {
+ if let Some((mut new_outpoints, new_outputs)) = self.check_spend_holder_transaction(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger) {
debug_assert!(commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output.is_none(),
"A commitment transaction matched as both a counterparty and local commitment tx?");
if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
}
}
}
- let txid = tx.txid();
self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
txid,
transaction: Some((*tx).clone()),
height,
+ block_hash: Some(block_hash),
event: OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation {
on_local_output_csv: balance_spendable_csv,
commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output,
},
});
- } else {
- if let Some(&commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
- let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_counterparty_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, &logger);
+ }
+ }
+ if tx.input.len() >= 1 {
+ // While all commitment transactions have one input, HTLC transactions may have more
+ // if the HTLC was present in an anchor channel. HTLCs can also be resolved in a few
+ // other ways which can have more than one output.
+ for tx_input in &tx.input {
+ let commitment_txid = tx_input.previous_output.txid;
+ if let Some(&commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&commitment_txid) {
+ let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_counterparty_htlc(
+ &tx, commitment_number, &commitment_txid, height, &logger
+ );
claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option {
watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
}
+ // Since there may be multiple HTLCs for this channel (all spending the
+ // same commitment tx) being claimed by the counterparty within the same
+ // transaction, and `check_spend_counterparty_htlc` already checks all the
+ // ones relevant to this channel, we can safely break from our loop.
+ break;
}
}
- }
- // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
- // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
- // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
- self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height, &logger);
+ self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger);
- self.is_paying_spendable_output(&tx, height, &logger);
+ self.is_paying_spendable_output(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger);
+ }
}
if height > self.best_block.height() {
self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
}
- self.block_confirmed(height, txn_matched, watch_outputs, claimable_outpoints, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger)
+ self.block_confirmed(height, block_hash, txn_matched, watch_outputs, claimable_outpoints, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger)
}
/// Update state for new block(s)/transaction(s) confirmed. Note that the caller must update
/// `self.best_block` before calling if a new best blockchain tip is available. More
/// concretely, `self.best_block` must never be at a lower height than `conf_height`, avoiding
- /// complexity especially in `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`.
+ /// complexity especially in
+ /// `OnchainTx::update_claims_view_from_requests`/`OnchainTx::update_claims_view_from_matched_txn`.
///
/// `conf_height` should be set to the height at which any new transaction(s)/block(s) were
/// confirmed at, even if it is not the current best height.
fn block_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
&mut self,
conf_height: u32,
+ conf_hash: BlockHash,
txn_matched: Vec<&Transaction>,
mut watch_outputs: Vec<TransactionOutputs>,
mut claimable_outpoints: Vec<PackageTemplate>,
let should_broadcast = self.should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn(logger);
if should_broadcast {
- let funding_outp = HolderFundingOutput::build(self.funding_redeemscript.clone());
+ let funding_outp = HolderFundingOutput::build(self.funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis, self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors());
let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32, PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_outp), self.best_block.height(), false, self.best_block.height());
claimable_outpoints.push(commitment_package);
self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(self.funding_info.0));
let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
self.holder_tx_signed = true;
- // Because we're broadcasting a commitment transaction, we should construct the package
- // assuming it gets confirmed in the next block. Sadly, we have code which considers
- // "not yet confirmed" things as discardable, so we cannot do that here.
- let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height());
- let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &commitment_tx);
- if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
- watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
+ // We can't broadcast our HTLC transactions while the commitment transaction is
+ // unconfirmed. We'll delay doing so until we detect the confirmed commitment in
+ // `transactions_confirmed`.
+ if !self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors() {
+ // Because we're broadcasting a commitment transaction, we should construct the package
+ // assuming it gets confirmed in the next block. Sadly, we have code which considers
+ // "not yet confirmed" things as discardable, so we cannot do that here.
+ let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height());
+ let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &commitment_tx);
+ if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
+ watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
+ }
+ claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
}
- claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
}
// Find which on-chain events have reached their confirmation threshold.
htlc_value_satoshis,
}));
self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
- commitment_tx_output_idx, resolving_txid: Some(entry.txid),
+ commitment_tx_output_idx,
+ resolving_txid: Some(entry.txid),
+ resolving_tx: entry.transaction,
payment_preimage: None,
});
},
self.pending_events.push(Event::SpendableOutputs {
outputs: vec![descriptor]
});
+ self.spendable_txids_confirmed.push(entry.txid);
},
OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. } => {
self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
- commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx), resolving_txid: Some(entry.txid),
+ commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx),
+ resolving_txid: Some(entry.txid),
+ resolving_tx: entry.transaction,
payment_preimage: preimage,
});
},
}
}
- self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&txn_matched, claimable_outpoints, conf_height, self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
+ self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(claimable_outpoints, conf_height, self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
+ self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_matched_txn(&txn_matched, conf_height, conf_hash, self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
// Determine new outputs to watch by comparing against previously known outputs to watch,
// updating the latter in the process.
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
{
- self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| if entry.txid == *txid {
- log_info!(logger, "Removing onchain event with txid {}", txid);
- false
- } else { true });
+ let mut removed_height = None;
+ for entry in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
+ if entry.txid == *txid {
+ removed_height = Some(entry.height);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if let Some(removed_height) = removed_height {
+ log_info!(logger, "transaction_unconfirmed of txid {} implies height {} was reorg'd out", txid, removed_height);
+ self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| if entry.height >= removed_height {
+ log_info!(logger, "Transaction {} reorg'd out", entry.txid);
+ false
+ } else { true });
+ }
+
+ debug_assert!(!self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().any(|ref entry| entry.txid == *txid));
+
self.onchain_tx_handler.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
}
/// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a holder
/// or counterparty commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
- fn is_resolving_htlc_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
+ fn is_resolving_htlc_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
let mut payment_data = None;
let htlc_claim = HTLCClaim::from_witness(&input.witness);
log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, false);
let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == htlc_output.offered;
self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
- txid: tx.txid(), height, transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
+ txid: tx.txid(), height, block_hash: Some(*block_hash), transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
preimage: if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim {
self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
txid: tx.txid(),
height,
+ block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
txid: tx.txid(),
transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
height,
+ block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
txid: tx.txid(),
transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
height,
+ block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
source, payment_hash,
htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
}
/// Check if any transaction broadcasted is paying fund back to some address we can assume to own
- fn is_paying_spendable_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
+ fn is_paying_spendable_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
let mut spendable_output = None;
for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { // There is max one spendable output for any channel tx, including ones generated by us
if i > ::core::u16::MAX as usize {
txid: tx.txid(),
transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
height,
+ block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
event: OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output.clone() },
};
log_info!(logger, "Received spendable output {}, spendable at height {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), entry.confirmation_threshold());
}
}
-impl<Signer: Sign, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
+impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
where
T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
}
}
-impl<Signer: Sign, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
+impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
where
T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
self.0.best_block_updated(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
}
- fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
+ fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
self.0.get_relevant_txids()
}
}
const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
-impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>> ReadableArgs<&'a K>
- for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<Signer>) {
- fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_manager: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+impl<'a, 'b, ES: EntropySource, SP: SignerProvider> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP)>
+ for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<SP::Signer>) {
+ fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
($key: expr) => {
match $key {
}
}
+ let (entropy_source, signer_provider) = args;
+
let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
let latest_update_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
}
- let onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer> = ReadableArgs::read(reader, keys_manager)?;
+ let onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<SP::Signer> = ReadableArgs::read(
+ reader, (entropy_source, signer_provider, channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id)
+ )?;
let lockdown_from_offchain = Readable::read(reader)?;
let holder_tx_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
let mut funding_spend_seen = Some(false);
let mut counterparty_node_id = None;
let mut confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output = None;
+ let mut spendable_txids_confirmed = Some(Vec::new());
read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
(1, funding_spend_confirmed, option),
(3, htlcs_resolved_on_chain, vec_type),
(7, funding_spend_seen, option),
(9, counterparty_node_id, option),
(11, confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option),
+ (13, spendable_txids_confirmed, vec_type),
});
- let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
-
Ok((best_block.block_hash(), ChannelMonitor::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
latest_update_id,
commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
funding_spend_confirmed,
confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output,
htlcs_resolved_on_chain: htlcs_resolved_on_chain.unwrap(),
+ spendable_txids_confirmed: spendable_txids_confirmed.unwrap(),
best_block,
counterparty_node_id,
-
- secp_ctx,
})))
}
}
use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
use super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStep;
- use ::{check_added_monitors, check_closed_broadcast, check_closed_event, check_spends, get_local_commitment_txn, get_monitor, get_route_and_payment_hash, unwrap_send_err};
- use chain::{BestBlock, Confirm};
- use chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
- use chain::package::{weight_offered_htlc, weight_received_htlc, weight_revoked_offered_htlc, weight_revoked_received_htlc, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT};
- use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
- use chain::keysinterface::InMemorySigner;
- use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
- use ln::chan_utils;
- use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, ChannelPublicKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
- use ln::channelmanager::{self, PaymentSendFailure};
- use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
- use ln::script::ShutdownScript;
- use util::errors::APIError;
- use util::events::{ClosureReason, MessageSendEventsProvider};
- use util::test_utils::{TestLogger, TestBroadcaster, TestFeeEstimator};
- use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
- use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
- use io;
+ use crate::{check_added_monitors, check_closed_broadcast, check_closed_event, check_spends, get_local_commitment_txn, get_monitor, get_route_and_payment_hash, unwrap_send_err};
+ use crate::chain::{BestBlock, Confirm};
+ use crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
+ use crate::chain::package::{weight_offered_htlc, weight_received_htlc, weight_revoked_offered_htlc, weight_revoked_received_htlc, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT};
+ use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
+ use crate::chain::keysinterface::InMemorySigner;
+ use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
+ use crate::ln::chan_utils;
+ use crate::ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, ChannelPublicKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
+ use crate::ln::channelmanager::{PaymentSendFailure, PaymentId};
+ use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
+ use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
+ use crate::util::errors::APIError;
+ use crate::util::events::{ClosureReason, MessageSendEventsProvider};
+ use crate::util::test_utils::{TestLogger, TestBroadcaster, TestFeeEstimator};
+ use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
+ use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
+ use crate::io;
use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, TxMerkleNode, Witness};
- use prelude::*;
+ use crate::prelude::*;
fn do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(use_local_txn: bool) {
// Previously, monitor updates were allowed freely even after a funding-spend transaction
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- let channel = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(
- &nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(
- &nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
+ let channel = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
// Rebalance somewhat
send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);
let (_, pre_update_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<InMemorySigner>)>::read(
&mut io::Cursor::new(&get_monitor!(nodes[1], channel.2).encode()),
- &nodes[1].keys_manager.backing).unwrap();
+ (&nodes[1].keys_manager.backing, &nodes[1].keys_manager.backing)).unwrap();
// If the ChannelManager tries to update the channel, however, the ChainMonitor will pass
// the update through to the ChannelMonitor which will refuse it (as the channel is closed).
let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 100_000);
- unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)),
+ unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)),
true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
assert!(err.contains("ChannelMonitor storage failure")));
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2); // After the failure we generate a close-channel monitor update
SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
- SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
[41; 32],
0,
- [0; 32]
+ [0; 32],
);
let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
}),
funding_outpoint: Some(funding_outpoint),
opt_anchors: None,
+ opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None,
};
// Prune with one old state and a holder commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
// old state.
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff