//! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
//! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
-use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
+use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxOut,Transaction};
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
/// An update generated by the underlying Channel itself which contains some new information the
/// ChannelMonitor should be made aware of.
-#[cfg_attr(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))]
+#[cfg_attr(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))]
#[derive(Clone)]
#[must_use]
pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
}
}
-/// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
-#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq)]
-pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
- /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower or remote backup of
- /// our state failed, but is expected to succeed at some point in the future).
- ///
- /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
- /// submitting new commitment transactions to the counterparty. Once the update(s) which failed
- /// have been successfully applied, ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated can be used to
- /// restore the channel to an operational state.
- ///
- /// Note that a given ChannelManager will *never* re-generate a given ChannelMonitorUpdate. If
- /// you return a TemporaryFailure you must ensure that it is written to disk safely before
- /// writing out the latest ChannelManager state.
- ///
- /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
- /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
- /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
- /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
- /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
- /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
- /// been "frozen".
- ///
- /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
- /// channel_monitor_updated to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal channel
- /// operation.
- ///
- /// Note that the update being processed here will not be replayed for you when you call
- /// ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated, so you must store the update itself along
- /// with the persisted ChannelMonitor on your own local disk prior to returning a
- /// TemporaryFailure. You may, of course, employ a journaling approach, storing only the
- /// ChannelMonitorUpdate on disk without updating the monitor itself, replaying the journal at
- /// reload-time.
- ///
- /// For deployments where a copy of ChannelMonitors and other local state are backed up in a
- /// remote location (with local copies persisted immediately), it is anticipated that all
- /// updates will return TemporaryFailure until the remote copies could be updated.
- TemporaryFailure,
- /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
- /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
- /// of this channel).
- ///
- /// At reception of this error, ChannelManager will force-close the channel and return at
- /// least a final ChannelMonitorUpdate::ChannelForceClosed which must be delivered to at
- /// least one ChannelMonitor copy. Revocation secret MUST NOT be released and offchain channel
- /// update must be rejected.
- ///
- /// This failure may also signal a failure to update the local persisted copy of one of
- /// the channel monitor instance.
- ///
- /// Note that even when you fail a holder commitment transaction update, you must store the
- /// update to ensure you can claim from it in case of a duplicate copy of this ChannelMonitor
- /// broadcasts it (e.g distributed channel-monitor deployment)
- ///
- /// In case of distributed watchtowers deployment, the new version must be written to disk, as
- /// state may have been stored but rejected due to a block forcing a commitment broadcast. This
- /// storage is used to claim outputs of rejected state confirmed onchain by another watchtower,
- /// lagging behind on block processing.
- PermanentFailure,
-}
-
-/// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
-/// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::update_monitor this
-/// means you tried to update a monitor for a different channel or the ChannelMonitorUpdate was
-/// corrupted.
-/// Contains a developer-readable error message.
-#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
-pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
-
/// An event to be processed by the ChannelManager.
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
pub enum MonitorEvent {
/// A monitor event containing an HTLCUpdate.
HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate),
- /// A monitor event that the Channel's commitment transaction was broadcasted.
- CommitmentTxBroadcasted(OutPoint),
+ /// A monitor event that the Channel's commitment transaction was confirmed.
+ CommitmentTxConfirmed(OutPoint),
+
+ /// Indicates a [`ChannelMonitor`] update has completed. See
+ /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure`] for more information on how this is used.
+ ///
+ /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure
+ UpdateCompleted {
+ /// The funding outpoint of the [`ChannelMonitor`] that was updated
+ funding_txo: OutPoint,
+ /// The Update ID from [`ChannelMonitorUpdate::update_id`] which was applied or
+ /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_update_id`].
+ ///
+ /// Note that this should only be set to a given update's ID if all previous updates for the
+ /// same [`ChannelMonitor`] have been applied and persisted.
+ monitor_update_id: u64,
+ },
+
+ /// Indicates a [`ChannelMonitor`] update has failed. See
+ /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure`] for more information on how this is used.
+ ///
+ /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure
+ UpdateFailed(OutPoint),
}
+impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorEvent,
+ // Note that UpdateCompleted and UpdateFailed are currently never serialized to disk as they are
+ // generated only in ChainMonitor
+ (0, UpdateCompleted) => {
+ (0, funding_txo, required),
+ (2, monitor_update_id, required),
+ },
+;
+ (2, HTLCEvent),
+ (4, CommitmentTxConfirmed),
+ (6, UpdateFailed),
+);
/// Simple structure sent back by `chain::Watch` when an HTLC from a forward channel is detected on
/// chain. Used to update the corresponding HTLC in the backward channel. Failing to pass the
/// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
/// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
-/// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding inbound
-/// HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us losing money.
+/// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding
+/// inbound HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us
+/// losing money.
+///
+/// Note that this is a library-wide security assumption. If a reorg deeper than this number of
+/// blocks occurs, counterparties may be able to steal funds or claims made by and balances exposed
+/// by a [`ChannelMonitor`] may be incorrect.
// We also use this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
// It may cause spurious generation of bumped claim txn but that's alright given the outpoint is already
// solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
/// fail this HTLC,
/// 2) if we receive an HTLC within this many blocks of its expiry (plus one to avoid a race
/// condition with the above), we will fail this HTLC without telling the user we received it,
-/// 3) if we are waiting on a connection or a channel state update to send an HTLC to a peer, and
-/// that HTLC expires within this many blocks, we will simply fail the HTLC instead.
///
/// (1) is all about protecting us - we need enough time to update the channel state before we hit
/// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, at which point we'd go on chain to claim the HTLC with the preimage.
/// (2) is the same, but with an additional buffer to avoid accepting an HTLC which is immediately
/// in a race condition between the user connecting a block (which would fail it) and the user
/// providing us the preimage (which would claim it).
-///
-/// (3) is about our counterparty - we don't want to relay an HTLC to a counterparty when they may
-/// end up force-closing the channel on us to claim it.
pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER: u32 = CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
// TODO(devrandom) replace this with HolderCommitmentTransaction
b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
- feerate_per_kw: u32,
htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
+ to_self_value_sat: u64,
+ feerate_per_kw: u32,
}
impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HolderSignedTx, {
(0, txid, required),
+ // Note that this is filled in with data from OnchainTxHandler if it's missing.
+ // For HolderSignedTx objects serialized with 0.0.100+, this should be filled in.
+ (1, to_self_value_sat, (default_value, u64::max_value())),
(2, revocation_key, required),
(4, a_htlc_key, required),
(6, b_htlc_key, required),
(14, htlc_outputs, vec_type)
});
-/// We use this to track counterparty commitment transactions and htlcs outputs and
-/// use it to generate any justice or 2nd-stage preimage/timeout transactions.
+/// We use this to track static counterparty commitment transaction data and to generate any
+/// justice or 2nd-stage preimage/timeout transactions.
#[derive(PartialEq)]
-struct CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
+struct CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
- per_htlc: HashMap<Txid, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>>
}
-impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
+impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
- w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_htlc.len() as u64))?;
- for (ref txid, ref htlcs) in self.per_htlc.iter() {
- w.write_all(&txid[..])?;
- w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlcs.len() as u64))?;
- for &ref htlc in htlcs.iter() {
- htlc.write(w)?;
- }
- }
+ w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
write_tlv_fields!(w, {
(0, self.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
(2, self.counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
Ok(())
}
}
-impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
+impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
let counterparty_commitment_transaction = {
+ // Versions prior to 0.0.100 had some per-HTLC state stored here, which is no longer
+ // used. Read it for compatibility.
let per_htlc_len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
- let mut per_htlc = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(per_htlc_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
for _ in 0..per_htlc_len {
- let txid: Txid = Readable::read(r)?;
+ let _txid: Txid = Readable::read(r)?;
let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
- let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
- let htlc = Readable::read(r)?;
- htlcs.push(htlc);
- }
- if let Some(_) = per_htlc.insert(txid, htlcs) {
- return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
+ let _htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment = Readable::read(r)?;
}
}
+
let mut counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = OptionDeserWrapper(None);
let mut counterparty_htlc_base_key = OptionDeserWrapper(None);
let mut on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16 = 0;
(2, counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
(4, on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
});
- CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
+ CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.0.unwrap(),
counterparty_htlc_base_key: counterparty_htlc_base_key.0.unwrap(),
on_counterparty_tx_csv,
- per_htlc,
}
};
Ok(counterparty_commitment_transaction)
impl OnchainEventEntry {
fn confirmation_threshold(&self) -> u32 {
let mut conf_threshold = self.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
- if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
- descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(ref descriptor)
- } = self.event {
- // A CSV'd transaction is confirmable in block (input height) + CSV delay, which means
- // it's broadcastable when we see the previous block.
- conf_threshold = cmp::max(conf_threshold, self.height + descriptor.to_self_delay as u32 - 1);
+ match self.event {
+ OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
+ descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(ref descriptor)
+ } => {
+ // A CSV'd transaction is confirmable in block (input height) + CSV delay, which means
+ // it's broadcastable when we see the previous block.
+ conf_threshold = cmp::max(conf_threshold, self.height + descriptor.to_self_delay as u32 - 1);
+ },
+ OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { on_local_output_csv: Some(csv), .. } |
+ OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { on_to_local_output_csv: Some(csv), .. } => {
+ // A CSV'd transaction is confirmable in block (input height) + CSV delay, which means
+ // it's broadcastable when we see the previous block.
+ conf_threshold = cmp::max(conf_threshold, self.height + csv as u32 - 1);
+ },
+ _ => {},
}
conf_threshold
}
/// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
#[derive(PartialEq)]
enum OnchainEvent {
- /// HTLC output getting solved by a timeout, at maturation we pass upstream payment source information to solve
- /// inbound HTLC in backward channel. Note, in case of preimage, we pass info to upstream without delay as we can
- /// only win from it, so it's never an OnchainEvent
+ /// An outbound HTLC failing after a transaction is confirmed. Used
+ /// * when an outbound HTLC output is spent by us after the HTLC timed out
+ /// * an outbound HTLC which was not present in the commitment transaction which appeared
+ /// on-chain (either because it was not fully committed to or it was dust).
+ /// Note that this is *not* used for preimage claims, as those are passed upstream immediately,
+ /// appearing only as an `HTLCSpendConfirmation`, below.
HTLCUpdate {
source: HTLCSource,
payment_hash: PaymentHash,
onchain_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
+ /// None in the second case, above, ie when there is no relevant output in the commitment
+ /// transaction which appeared on chain.
+ input_idx: Option<u32>,
},
MaturingOutput {
descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
},
+ /// A spend of the funding output, either a commitment transaction or a cooperative closing
+ /// transaction.
+ FundingSpendConfirmation {
+ /// The CSV delay for the output of the funding spend transaction (implying it is a local
+ /// commitment transaction, and this is the delay on the to_self output).
+ on_local_output_csv: Option<u16>,
+ },
+ /// A spend of a commitment transaction HTLC output, set in the cases where *no* `HTLCUpdate`
+ /// is constructed. This is used when
+ /// * an outbound HTLC is claimed by our counterparty with a preimage, causing us to
+ /// immediately claim the HTLC on the inbound edge and track the resolution here,
+ /// * an inbound HTLC is claimed by our counterparty (with a timeout),
+ /// * an inbound HTLC is claimed by us (with a preimage).
+ /// * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by the revocation
+ /// signature.
+ HTLCSpendConfirmation {
+ input_idx: u32,
+ /// If the claim was made by either party with a preimage, this is filled in
+ preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
+ /// If the claim was made by us on an inbound HTLC against a local commitment transaction,
+ /// we set this to the output CSV value which we will have to wait until to spend the
+ /// output (and generate a SpendableOutput event).
+ on_to_local_output_csv: Option<u16>,
+ },
}
impl Writeable for OnchainEventEntry {
(0, source, required),
(1, onchain_value_satoshis, option),
(2, payment_hash, required),
+ (3, input_idx, option),
},
(1, MaturingOutput) => {
(0, descriptor, required),
},
+ (3, FundingSpendConfirmation) => {
+ (0, on_local_output_csv, option),
+ },
+ (5, HTLCSpendConfirmation) => {
+ (0, input_idx, required),
+ (2, preimage, option),
+ (4, on_to_local_output_csv, option),
+ },
+
);
-#[cfg_attr(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))]
+#[cfg_attr(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))]
#[derive(Clone)]
pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
},
}
+impl ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
+ fn variant_name(&self) -> &'static str {
+ match self {
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { .. } => "LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo",
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { .. } => "LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo",
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } => "PaymentPreimage",
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { .. } => "CommitmentSecret",
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. } => "ChannelForceClosed",
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript { .. } => "ShutdownScript",
+ }
+ }
+}
+
impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep,
(0, LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo) => {
(0, commitment_tx, required),
},
);
+/// Details about the balance(s) available for spending once the channel appears on chain.
+///
+/// See [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] for more details on when these will or will not
+/// be provided.
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
+#[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialOrd, Ord))]
+pub enum Balance {
+ /// The channel is not yet closed (or the commitment or closing transaction has not yet
+ /// appeared in a block). The given balance is claimable (less on-chain fees) if the channel is
+ /// force-closed now.
+ ClaimableOnChannelClose {
+ /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
+ /// required to do so.
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
+ },
+ /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance is ours but awaiting confirmations until
+ /// we consider it spendable.
+ ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, possibly excluding the on-chain fees which
+ /// were spent in broadcasting the transaction.
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
+ /// The height at which an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event will be generated for this
+ /// amount.
+ confirmation_height: u32,
+ },
+ /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance should be ours but awaiting spending
+ /// transaction confirmation. If the spending transaction does not confirm in time, it is
+ /// possible our counterparty can take the funds by broadcasting an HTLC timeout on-chain.
+ ///
+ /// Once the spending transaction confirms, before it has reached enough confirmations to be
+ /// considered safe from chain reorganizations, the balance will instead be provided via
+ /// [`Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`].
+ ContentiousClaimable {
+ /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
+ /// required to do so.
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
+ /// The height at which the counterparty may be able to claim the balance if we have not
+ /// done so.
+ timeout_height: u32,
+ },
+ /// HTLCs which we sent to our counterparty which are claimable after a timeout (less on-chain
+ /// fees) if the counterparty does not know the preimage for the HTLCs. These are somewhat
+ /// likely to be claimed by our counterparty before we do.
+ MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
+ /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
+ /// required to do so.
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
+ /// The height at which we will be able to claim the balance if our counterparty has not
+ /// done so.
+ claimable_height: u32,
+ },
+}
+
+/// An HTLC which has been irrevocably resolved on-chain, and has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
+#[derive(PartialEq)]
+struct IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
+ input_idx: u32,
+ /// Only set if the HTLC claim was ours using a payment preimage
+ payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
+}
+
+impl_writeable_tlv_based!(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC, {
+ (0, input_idx, required),
+ (2, payment_preimage, option),
+});
+
/// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
/// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
///
current_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
- counterparty_tx_cache: CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction,
+ counterparty_commitment_params: CounterpartyCommitmentParameters,
funding_redeemscript: Script,
channel_value_satoshis: u64,
// first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
+ // Note that `MonitorEvent`s MUST NOT be generated during update processing, only generated
+ // during chain data processing. This prevents a race in `ChainMonitor::update_channel` (and
+ // presumably user implementations thereof as well) where we update the in-memory channel
+ // object, then before the persistence finishes (as it's all under a read-lock), we return
+ // pending events to the user or to the relevant `ChannelManager`. Then, on reload, we'll have
+ // the pre-event state here, but have processed the event in the `ChannelManager`.
+ // Note that because the `event_lock` in `ChainMonitor` is only taken in
+ // block/transaction-connected events and *not* during block/transaction-disconnected events,
+ // we further MUST NOT generate events during block/transaction-disconnection.
pending_monitor_events: Vec<MonitorEvent>,
+
pending_events: Vec<Event>,
// Used to track on-chain events (i.e., transactions part of channels confirmed on chain) on
// remote monitor out-of-order with regards to the block view.
holder_tx_signed: bool,
+ // If a spend of the funding output is seen, we set this to true and reject any further
+ // updates. This prevents any further changes in the offchain state no matter the order
+ // of block connection between ChannelMonitors and the ChannelManager.
+ funding_spend_seen: bool,
+
+ funding_spend_confirmed: Option<Txid>,
+ /// The set of HTLCs which have been either claimed or failed on chain and have reached
+ /// the requisite confirmations on the claim/fail transaction (either ANTI_REORG_DELAY or the
+ /// spending CSV for revocable outputs).
+ htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec<IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC>,
+
// We simply modify best_block in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
// consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
// (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep
/// Transaction outputs to watch for on-chain spends.
pub type TransactionOutputs = (Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>);
-#[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
-/// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
-/// underlying object
+#[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
+/// Used only in testing and fuzzing to check serialization roundtrips don't change the underlying
+/// object
impl<Signer: Sign> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
}
}
-#[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
-/// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
-/// underlying object
+#[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
+/// Used only in testing and fuzzing to check serialization roundtrips don't change the underlying
+/// object
impl<Signer: Sign> PartialEq for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
if self.latest_update_id != other.latest_update_id ||
self.funding_info != other.funding_info ||
self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.current_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
- self.counterparty_tx_cache != other.counterparty_tx_cache ||
+ self.counterparty_commitment_params != other.counterparty_commitment_params ||
self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript ||
self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis ||
self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf ||
self.outputs_to_watch != other.outputs_to_watch ||
self.lockdown_from_offchain != other.lockdown_from_offchain ||
- self.holder_tx_signed != other.holder_tx_signed
+ self.holder_tx_signed != other.holder_tx_signed ||
+ self.funding_spend_seen != other.funding_spend_seen ||
+ self.funding_spend_confirmed != other.funding_spend_confirmed ||
+ self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain != other.htlcs_resolved_on_chain
{
false
} else {
self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
- self.counterparty_tx_cache.write(writer)?;
+ self.counterparty_commitment_params.write(writer)?;
self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
}
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_monitor_events.len() as u64))?;
+ writer.write_all(&(self.pending_monitor_events.iter().filter(|ev| match ev {
+ MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(_) => true,
+ MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(_) => true,
+ _ => false,
+ }).count() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
for event in self.pending_monitor_events.iter() {
match event {
MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(upd) => {
0u8.write(writer)?;
upd.write(writer)?;
},
- MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?
+ MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
+ _ => {}, // Covered in the TLV writes below
}
}
self.lockdown_from_offchain.write(writer)?;
self.holder_tx_signed.write(writer)?;
- write_tlv_fields!(writer, {});
+ write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
+ (1, self.funding_spend_confirmed, option),
+ (3, self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain, vec_type),
+ (5, self.pending_monitor_events, vec_type),
+ (7, self.funding_spend_seen, required),
+ });
Ok(())
}
let counterparty_channel_parameters = channel_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap();
let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint;
let counterparty_htlc_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.htlc_basepoint;
- let counterparty_tx_cache = CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction { counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key, on_counterparty_tx_csv, per_htlc: HashMap::new() };
+ let counterparty_commitment_params = CounterpartyCommitmentParameters { counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key, on_counterparty_tx_csv };
let channel_keys_id = keys.channel_keys_id();
let holder_revocation_basepoint = keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
- feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
htlc_outputs: Vec::new(), // There are never any HTLCs in the initial commitment transactions
+ to_self_value_sat: initial_holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
+ feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
};
(holder_commitment_tx, trusted_tx.commitment_number())
};
current_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
- counterparty_tx_cache,
+ counterparty_commitment_params,
funding_redeemscript,
channel_value_satoshis,
their_cur_revocation_points: None,
lockdown_from_offchain: false,
holder_tx_signed: false,
+ funding_spend_seen: false,
+ funding_spend_confirmed: None,
+ htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec::new(),
best_block,
}
#[cfg(test)]
- fn provide_secret(&self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
+ fn provide_secret(&self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_secret(idx, secret)
}
#[cfg(test)]
fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(
- &self,
- holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
+ &self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
- ) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
- self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(
- holder_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs)
+ ) -> Result<(), ()> {
+ self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(holder_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs).map_err(|_| ())
}
#[cfg(test)]
broadcaster: &B,
fee_estimator: &F,
logger: &L,
- ) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError>
+ ) -> Result<(), ()>
where
B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block.clone()
}
+
+ /// Gets the balances in this channel which are either claimable by us if we were to
+ /// force-close the channel now or which are claimable on-chain (possibly awaiting
+ /// confirmation).
+ ///
+ /// Any balances in the channel which are available on-chain (excluding on-chain fees) are
+ /// included here until an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event has been generated for the
+ /// balance, or until our counterparty has claimed the balance and accrued several
+ /// confirmations on the claim transaction.
+ ///
+ /// Note that the balances available when you or your counterparty have broadcasted revoked
+ /// state(s) may not be fully captured here.
+ // TODO, fix that ^
+ ///
+ /// See [`Balance`] for additional details on the types of claimable balances which
+ /// may be returned here and their meanings.
+ pub fn get_claimable_balances(&self) -> Vec<Balance> {
+ let mut res = Vec::new();
+ let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
+
+ let mut confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed;
+ let mut pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = None;
+ let funding_spend_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
+ if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } = event.event {
+ Some((event.txid, event.confirmation_threshold()))
+ } else { None }
+ });
+ if let Some((txid, conf_thresh)) = funding_spend_pending {
+ debug_assert!(us.funding_spend_confirmed.is_none(),
+ "We have a pending funding spend awaiting anti-reorg confirmation, we can't have confirmed it already!");
+ confirmed_txid = Some(txid);
+ pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = Some(conf_thresh);
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
+ ($holder_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
+ for htlc in $htlc_iter {
+ if let Some(htlc_input_idx) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
+ if let Some(conf_thresh) = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
+ if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(descriptor) } = &event.event {
+ if descriptor.outpoint.index as u32 == htlc_input_idx { Some(event.confirmation_threshold()) } else { None }
+ } else { None }
+ }) {
+ debug_assert!($holder_commitment);
+ res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+ confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
+ });
+ } else if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| v.input_idx == htlc_input_idx) {
+ // Funding transaction spends should be fully confirmed by the time any
+ // HTLC transactions are resolved, unless we're talking about a holder
+ // commitment tx, whose resolution is delayed until the CSV timeout is
+ // reached, even though HTLCs may be resolved after only
+ // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
+ debug_assert!($holder_commitment || us.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some());
+ } else if htlc.offered == $holder_commitment {
+ // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
+ // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
+ // and awaiting confirmations on it.
+ let htlc_update_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
+ if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { input_idx: Some(input_idx), .. } = event.event {
+ if input_idx == htlc_input_idx { Some(event.confirmation_threshold()) } else { None }
+ } else { None }
+ });
+ if let Some(conf_thresh) = htlc_update_pending {
+ res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+ confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
+ });
+ } else {
+ res.push(Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+ claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
+ });
+ }
+ } else if us.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() {
+ // Otherwise (the payment was inbound), only expose it as claimable if
+ // we know the preimage.
+ // Note that if there is a pending claim, but it did not use the
+ // preimage, we lost funds to our counterparty! We will then continue
+ // to show it as ContentiousClaimable until ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
+ let htlc_spend_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
+ if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { input_idx, preimage, .. } = event.event {
+ if input_idx == htlc_input_idx {
+ Some((event.confirmation_threshold(), preimage.is_some()))
+ } else { None }
+ } else { None }
+ });
+ if let Some((conf_thresh, true)) = htlc_spend_pending {
+ res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+ confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
+ });
+ } else {
+ res.push(Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+ timeout_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
+ });
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if let Some(txid) = confirmed_txid {
+ let mut found_commitment_tx = false;
+ if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
+ walk_htlcs!(false, us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap().iter().map(|(a, _)| a));
+ if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
+ if let Some(value) = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
+ if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
+ descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(descriptor)
+ } = &event.event {
+ Some(descriptor.output.value)
+ } else { None }
+ }) {
+ res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: value,
+ confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
+ });
+ } else {
+ // If a counterparty commitment transaction is awaiting confirmation, we
+ // should either have a StaticPaymentOutput MaturingOutput event awaiting
+ // confirmation with the same height or have never met our dust amount.
+ }
+ }
+ found_commitment_tx = true;
+ } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
+ walk_htlcs!(true, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
+ if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
+ res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
+ confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
+ });
+ }
+ found_commitment_tx = true;
+ } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
+ if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
+ walk_htlcs!(true, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
+ if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
+ res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: prev_commitment.to_self_value_sat,
+ confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
+ });
+ }
+ found_commitment_tx = true;
+ }
+ }
+ if !found_commitment_tx {
+ if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
+ // We blindly assume this is a cooperative close transaction here, and that
+ // neither us nor our counterparty misbehaved. At worst we've under-estimated
+ // the amount we can claim as we'll punish a misbehaving counterparty.
+ res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
+ confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
+ });
+ }
+ }
+ // TODO: Add logic to provide claimable balances for counterparty broadcasting revoked
+ // outputs.
+ } else {
+ let mut claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat = 0;
+ for (htlc, _, _) in us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
+ if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() { continue; }
+ if htlc.offered {
+ res.push(Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+ claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
+ });
+ } else if us.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() {
+ claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
+ }
+ }
+ res.push(Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat + claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat,
+ });
+ }
+
+ res
+ }
+
+ /// Gets the set of outbound HTLCs which are pending resolution in this channel.
+ /// This is used to reconstruct pending outbound payments on restart in the ChannelManager.
+ pub(crate) fn get_pending_outbound_htlcs(&self) -> HashMap<HTLCSource, HTLCOutputInCommitment> {
+ let mut res = HashMap::new();
+ let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
+
+ macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
+ ($holder_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
+ for (htlc, source) in $htlc_iter {
+ if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| Some(v.input_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index) {
+ // We should assert that funding_spend_confirmed is_some() here, but we
+ // have some unit tests which violate HTLC transaction CSVs entirely and
+ // would fail.
+ // TODO: Once tests all connect transactions at consensus-valid times, we
+ // should assert here like we do in `get_claimable_balances`.
+ } else if htlc.offered == $holder_commitment {
+ // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
+ // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
+ // and awaiting confirmations on it.
+ let htlc_update_confd = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().any(|event| {
+ if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { input_idx: Some(input_idx), .. } = event.event {
+ // If the HTLC was timed out, we wait for ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks
+ // before considering it "no longer pending" - this matches when we
+ // provide the ChannelManager an HTLC failure event.
+ Some(input_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index &&
+ us.best_block.height() >= event.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1
+ } else if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { input_idx, .. } = event.event {
+ // If the HTLC was fulfilled with a preimage, we consider the HTLC
+ // immediately non-pending, matching when we provide ChannelManager
+ // the preimage.
+ Some(input_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index
+ } else { false }
+ });
+ if !htlc_update_confd {
+ res.insert(source.clone(), htlc.clone());
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ // We're only concerned with the confirmation count of HTLC transactions, and don't
+ // actually care how many confirmations a commitment transaction may or may not have. Thus,
+ // we look for either a FundingSpendConfirmation event or a funding_spend_confirmed.
+ let confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed.or_else(|| {
+ us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
+ if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } = event.event {
+ Some(event.txid)
+ } else { None }
+ })
+ });
+ if let Some(txid) = confirmed_txid {
+ if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
+ walk_htlcs!(false, us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap().iter().filter_map(|(a, b)| {
+ if let &Some(ref source) = b {
+ Some((a, &**source))
+ } else { None }
+ }));
+ } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
+ walk_htlcs!(true, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(a, _, c)| {
+ if let Some(source) = c { Some((a, source)) } else { None }
+ }));
+ } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
+ if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
+ walk_htlcs!(true, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(a, _, c)| {
+ if let Some(source) = c { Some((a, source)) } else { None }
+ }));
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ // If we have not seen a commitment transaction on-chain (ie the channel is not yet
+ // closed), just examine the available counterparty commitment transactions. See docs
+ // on `fail_unbroadcast_htlcs`, below, for justification.
+ macro_rules! walk_counterparty_commitment {
+ ($txid: expr) => {
+ if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
+ for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
+ if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
+ res.insert((**source).clone(), htlc.clone());
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if let Some(ref txid) = us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
+ walk_counterparty_commitment!(txid);
+ }
+ if let Some(ref txid) = us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
+ walk_counterparty_commitment!(txid);
+ }
+ }
+
+ res
+ }
}
/// Compares a broadcasted commitment transaction's HTLCs with those in the latest state,
source: (**source).clone(),
payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash.clone(),
onchain_value_satoshis: Some(htlc.amount_msat / 1000),
+ input_idx: None,
},
};
log_trace!($logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of {} commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})",
/// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
/// needed by holder commitment transactions HTCLs nor by counterparty ones. Unless we haven't already seen
/// counterparty commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
- fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
+ fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) {
- return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
+ return Err("Previous secret did not match new one");
}
// Prune HTLCs from the previous counterparty commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
htlcs.push(htlc.0);
}
}
- self.counterparty_tx_cache.per_htlc.insert(txid, htlcs);
}
/// Informs this monitor of the latest holder (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
/// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
/// up-to-date as our holder commitment transaction is updated.
/// Panics if set_on_holder_tx_csv has never been called.
- fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(&mut self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
+ fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(&mut self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
// block for Rust 1.34 compat
let mut new_holder_commitment_tx = {
let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
- feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
htlc_outputs,
+ to_self_value_sat: holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
+ feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
}
};
self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(holder_commitment_tx);
mem::swap(&mut new_holder_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = Some(new_holder_commitment_tx);
if self.holder_tx_signed {
- return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Latest holder commitment signed has already been signed, update is rejected"));
+ return Err("Latest holder commitment signed has already been signed, update is rejected");
}
Ok(())
}
log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting local {}", log_tx!(tx));
broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
}
- self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(self.funding_info.0));
+ self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(self.funding_info.0));
}
- pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError>
+ pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()>
where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
{
+ log_info!(logger, "Applying update to monitor {}, bringing update_id from {} to {} with {} changes.",
+ log_funding_info!(self), self.latest_update_id, updates.update_id, updates.updates.len());
// ChannelMonitor updates may be applied after force close if we receive a
// preimage for a broadcasted commitment transaction HTLC output that we'd
// like to claim on-chain. If this is the case, we no longer have guaranteed
// access to the monitor's update ID, so we use a sentinel value instead.
if updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
+ assert_eq!(updates.updates.len(), 1);
match updates.updates[0] {
ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } => {},
- _ => panic!("Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate that wasn't providing a payment preimage"),
+ _ => {
+ log_error!(logger, "Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate of type {}", updates.updates[0].variant_name());
+ panic!("Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate that wasn't providing a payment preimage");
+ },
}
- assert_eq!(updates.updates.len(), 1);
} else if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
}
+ let mut ret = Ok(());
for update in updates.updates.iter() {
match update {
ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest holder commitment transaction info");
if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
- self.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(commitment_tx.clone(), htlc_outputs.clone())?
+ if let Err(e) = self.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(commitment_tx.clone(), htlc_outputs.clone()) {
+ log_error!(logger, "Providing latest holder commitment transaction failed/was refused:");
+ log_error!(logger, " {}", e);
+ ret = Err(());
+ }
}
ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } => {
log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest counterparty commitment transaction info");
},
ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } => {
log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with commitment secret");
- self.provide_secret(*idx, *secret)?
+ if let Err(e) = self.provide_secret(*idx, *secret) {
+ log_error!(logger, "Providing latest counterparty commitment secret failed/was refused:");
+ log_error!(logger, " {}", e);
+ ret = Err(());
+ }
},
ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } => {
log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor: channel force closed, should broadcast: {}", should_broadcast);
} else if !self.holder_tx_signed {
log_error!(logger, "You have a toxic holder commitment transaction avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take");
} else {
- // If we generated a MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted, the ChannelManager
+ // If we generated a MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed, the ChannelManager
// will still give us a ChannelForceClosed event with !should_broadcast, but we
// shouldn't print the scary warning above.
log_info!(logger, "Channel off-chain state closed after we broadcasted our latest commitment transaction.");
}
}
self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
- Ok(())
+
+ if ret.is_ok() && self.funding_spend_seen {
+ log_error!(logger, "Refusing Channel Monitor Update as counterparty attempted to update commitment after funding was spent");
+ Err(())
+ } else { ret }
}
pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint));
- let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key));
+ let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key));
- let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
+ let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
// First, process non-htlc outputs (to_holder & to_counterparty)
for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
- let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, outp.value, self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv);
- let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, idx as u32, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp), height + self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, true, height);
+ let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, outp.value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv);
+ let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, idx as u32, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp), height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, true, height);
claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
}
}
tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
}
- let revk_htlc_outp = RevokedHTLCOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc.clone());
+ let revk_htlc_outp = RevokedHTLCOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(revk_htlc_outp), htlc.cltv_expiry, true, height);
claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
}
}
let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
- let counterparty_htlc_outp = if htlc.offered { PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(*revocation_point, self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, preimage.unwrap(), htlc.clone())) } else { PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(*revocation_point, self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, htlc.clone())) };
+ let counterparty_htlc_outp = if htlc.offered { PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(*revocation_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, preimage.unwrap(), htlc.clone())) } else { PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(*revocation_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, htlc.clone())) };
let aggregation = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
let counterparty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, counterparty_htlc_outp, htlc.cltv_expiry,aggregation, 0);
claimable_outpoints.push(counterparty_package);
let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty HTLC transaction, spending {}:{}", htlc_txid, 0);
- let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, tx.output[0].value, self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv);
- let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(htlc_txid, 0, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp), height + self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, true, height);
+ let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, tx.output[0].value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv);
+ let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(htlc_txid, 0, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp), height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, true, height);
let claimable_outpoints = vec!(justice_package);
let outputs = vec![(0, tx.output[0].clone())];
(claimable_outpoints, Some((htlc_txid, outputs)))
/// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
/// revoked using data in holder_claimable_outpoints.
/// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
- fn check_spend_holder_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs) where L::Target: Logger {
+ /// Returns None unless the transaction is definitely one of our commitment transactions.
+ fn check_spend_holder_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> Option<(Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs)> where L::Target: Logger {
let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
let mut claim_requests = Vec::new();
let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
}
if is_holder_tx {
+ Some((claim_requests, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)))
+ } else {
+ None
}
-
- (claim_requests, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
}
pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
L::Target: Logger,
{
let block_hash = header.block_hash();
- log_trace!(logger, "New best block {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
L::Target: Logger,
{
let block_hash = header.block_hash();
- log_trace!(logger, "New best block {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
if height > self.best_block.height() {
self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
}
let block_hash = header.block_hash();
- log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", block_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
// filters.
let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 {
+ let mut balance_spendable_csv = None;
+ log_info!(logger, "Channel {} closed by funding output spend in txid {}.",
+ log_bytes!(self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id()), tx.txid());
+ self.funding_spend_seen = true;
if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_counterparty_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
}
+ claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
if new_outpoints.is_empty() {
- let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_holder_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
- if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
- watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
+ if let Some((mut new_outpoints, new_outputs)) = self.check_spend_holder_transaction(&tx, height, &logger) {
+ if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
+ watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
+ }
+ claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
+ balance_spendable_csv = Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv);
}
- claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
}
- claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
}
+ let txid = tx.txid();
+ self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
+ txid,
+ height: height,
+ event: OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation {
+ on_local_output_csv: balance_spendable_csv,
+ },
+ });
} else {
if let Some(&commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_counterparty_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, &logger);
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
{
+ log_trace!(logger, "Processing {} matched transactions for block at height {}.", txn_matched.len(), conf_height);
debug_assert!(self.best_block.height() >= conf_height);
let should_broadcast = self.should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn(logger);
let funding_outp = HolderFundingOutput::build(self.funding_redeemscript.clone());
let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32, PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_outp), self.best_block.height(), false, self.best_block.height());
claimable_outpoints.push(commitment_package);
- self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(self.funding_info.0));
+ self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(self.funding_info.0));
let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
self.holder_tx_signed = true;
// Because we're broadcasting a commitment transaction, we should construct the package
.iter()
.filter_map(|entry| match &entry.event {
OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source, .. } => Some(source),
- OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { .. } => None,
+ _ => None,
})
.collect();
#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
// Produce actionable events from on-chain events having reached their threshold.
for entry in onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.drain(..) {
match entry.event {
- OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref source, payment_hash, onchain_value_satoshis } => {
+ OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref source, payment_hash, onchain_value_satoshis, input_idx } => {
// Check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
{
source: source.clone(),
onchain_value_satoshis,
}));
+ if let Some(idx) = input_idx {
+ self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC { input_idx: idx, payment_preimage: None });
+ }
},
OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
log_debug!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
self.pending_events.push(Event::SpendableOutputs {
outputs: vec![descriptor]
});
- }
+ },
+ OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { input_idx, preimage, .. } => {
+ self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC { input_idx, payment_preimage: preimage });
+ },
+ OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => {
+ self.funding_spend_confirmed = Some(entry.txid);
+ },
}
}
let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
|| (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[4].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
- let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);
+ #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
+ let accepted_timeout_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && !revocation_sig_claim;
+ let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && !revocation_sig_claim;
+ #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
+ let offered_timeout_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[4].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);
+
+ let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
+ if accepted_preimage_claim {
+ payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
+ } else if offered_preimage_claim {
+ payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
+ }
macro_rules! log_claim {
($tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
- // We found the output in question, but aren't failing it backwards
- // as we have no corresponding source and no valid counterparty commitment txid
- // to try a weak source binding with same-hash, same-value still-valid offered HTLC.
- // This implies either it is an inbound HTLC or an outbound HTLC on a revoked transaction.
let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == $htlc.offered;
+ // HTLCs must either be claimed by a matching script type or through the
+ // revocation path:
+ #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
+ debug_assert!(!$htlc.offered || offered_preimage_claim || offered_timeout_claim || revocation_sig_claim);
+ #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
+ debug_assert!($htlc.offered || accepted_preimage_claim || accepted_timeout_claim || revocation_sig_claim);
+ // Further, only exactly one of the possible spend paths should have been
+ // matched by any HTLC spend:
+ #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
+ debug_assert_eq!(accepted_preimage_claim as u8 + accepted_timeout_claim as u8 +
+ offered_preimage_claim as u8 + offered_timeout_claim as u8 +
+ revocation_sig_claim as u8, 1);
if ($holder_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
(outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
log_error!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
// resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash, htlc_output.amount_msat));
} else if !$holder_tx {
- check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
+ check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
if payment_data.is_none() {
check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
}
}
if payment_data.is_none() {
log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, false);
+ let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == htlc_output.offered;
+ if !outbound_htlc || revocation_sig_claim {
+ self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
+ txid: tx.txid(), height,
+ event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
+ input_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
+ preimage: if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim {
+ Some(payment_preimage) } else { None },
+ // If this is a payment to us (!outbound_htlc, above),
+ // wait for the CSV delay before dropping the HTLC from
+ // claimable balance if the claim was an HTLC-Success
+ // transaction.
+ on_to_local_output_csv: if accepted_preimage_claim {
+ Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv) } else { None },
+ },
+ });
+ } else {
+ // Outbound claims should always have payment_data, unless
+ // we've already failed the HTLC as the commitment transaction
+ // which was broadcasted was revoked. In that case, we should
+ // spend the HTLC output here immediately, and expose that fact
+ // as a Balance, something which we do not yet do.
+ // TODO: Track the above as claimable!
+ }
continue 'outer_loop;
}
}
// Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
// HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
if let Some((source, payment_hash, amount_msat)) = payment_data {
- let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
if accepted_preimage_claim {
if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
|update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update { upd.source == source } else { false }) {
- payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
+ self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
+ txid: tx.txid(),
+ height,
+ event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
+ input_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
+ preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
+ on_to_local_output_csv: None,
+ },
+ });
self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
source,
payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
|update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update {
upd.source == source
} else { false }) {
- payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
+ self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
+ txid: tx.txid(),
+ height,
+ event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
+ input_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
+ preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
+ on_to_local_output_csv: None,
+ },
+ });
self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
source,
payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
source, payment_hash,
onchain_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
+ input_idx: Some(input.previous_output.vout),
},
};
log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), entry.confirmation_threshold());
}
}
-/// `Persist` defines behavior for persisting channel monitors: this could mean
-/// writing once to disk, and/or uploading to one or more backup services.
-///
-/// Note that for every new monitor, you **must** persist the new `ChannelMonitor`
-/// to disk/backups. And, on every update, you **must** persist either the
-/// `ChannelMonitorUpdate` or the updated monitor itself. Otherwise, there is risk
-/// of situations such as revoking a transaction, then crashing before this
-/// revocation can be persisted, then unintentionally broadcasting a revoked
-/// transaction and losing money. This is a risk because previous channel states
-/// are toxic, so it's important that whatever channel state is persisted is
-/// kept up-to-date.
-pub trait Persist<ChannelSigner: Sign> {
- /// Persist a new channel's data. The data can be stored any way you want, but
- /// the identifier provided by Rust-Lightning is the channel's outpoint (and
- /// it is up to you to maintain a correct mapping between the outpoint and the
- /// stored channel data). Note that you **must** persist every new monitor to
- /// disk. See the `Persist` trait documentation for more details.
- ///
- /// See [`ChannelMonitor::write`] for writing out a `ChannelMonitor`,
- /// and [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr`] for requirements when returning errors.
- fn persist_new_channel(&self, id: OutPoint, data: &ChannelMonitor<ChannelSigner>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
-
- /// Update one channel's data. The provided `ChannelMonitor` has already
- /// applied the given update.
- ///
- /// Note that on every update, you **must** persist either the
- /// `ChannelMonitorUpdate` or the updated monitor itself to disk/backups. See
- /// the `Persist` trait documentation for more details.
- ///
- /// If an implementer chooses to persist the updates only, they need to make
- /// sure that all the updates are applied to the `ChannelMonitors` *before*
- /// the set of channel monitors is given to the `ChannelManager`
- /// deserialization routine. See [`ChannelMonitor::update_monitor`] for
- /// applying a monitor update to a monitor. If full `ChannelMonitors` are
- /// persisted, then there is no need to persist individual updates.
- ///
- /// Note that there could be a performance tradeoff between persisting complete
- /// channel monitors on every update vs. persisting only updates and applying
- /// them in batches. The size of each monitor grows `O(number of state updates)`
- /// whereas updates are small and `O(1)`.
- ///
- /// See [`ChannelMonitor::write`] for writing out a `ChannelMonitor`,
- /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate::write`] for writing out an update, and
- /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr`] for requirements when returning errors.
- fn update_persisted_channel(&self, id: OutPoint, update: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, data: &ChannelMonitor<ChannelSigner>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
-}
-
impl<Signer: Sign, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
where
T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
{
- fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
- let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
- self.0.block_connected(&block.header, &txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
+ fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
+ self.0.block_connected(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
}
fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
let current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
let prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let counterparty_tx_cache = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let counterparty_commitment_params = Readable::read(reader)?;
let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
}
}
- let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
- 0 => None,
- 1 => {
- Some(Readable::read(reader)?)
- },
- _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- };
- let current_holder_commitment_tx = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx> =
+ match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => None,
+ 1 => {
+ Some(Readable::read(reader)?)
+ },
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ };
+ let mut current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx = Readable::read(reader)?;
let current_counterparty_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
let current_holder_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
}
let pending_monitor_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut pending_monitor_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_monitor_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3)));
+ let mut pending_monitor_events = Some(
+ Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_monitor_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3))));
for _ in 0..pending_monitor_events_len {
let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
0 => MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(Readable::read(reader)?),
- 1 => MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_info.0),
+ 1 => MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_info.0),
_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
};
- pending_monitor_events.push(ev);
+ pending_monitor_events.as_mut().unwrap().push(ev);
}
let pending_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
}
- let onchain_tx_handler = ReadableArgs::read(reader, keys_manager)?;
+ let onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer> = ReadableArgs::read(reader, keys_manager)?;
let lockdown_from_offchain = Readable::read(reader)?;
let holder_tx_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
- read_tlv_fields!(reader, {});
+ if let Some(prev_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_mut() {
+ let prev_holder_value = onchain_tx_handler.get_prev_holder_commitment_to_self_value();
+ if prev_holder_value.is_none() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
+ if prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat == u64::max_value() {
+ prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat = prev_holder_value.unwrap();
+ } else if prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat != prev_holder_value.unwrap() {
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
+ }
+ }
+
+ let cur_holder_value = onchain_tx_handler.get_cur_holder_commitment_to_self_value();
+ if current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat == u64::max_value() {
+ current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat = cur_holder_value;
+ } else if current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat != cur_holder_value {
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
+ }
+
+ let mut funding_spend_confirmed = None;
+ let mut htlcs_resolved_on_chain = Some(Vec::new());
+ let mut funding_spend_seen = Some(false);
+ read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
+ (1, funding_spend_confirmed, option),
+ (3, htlcs_resolved_on_chain, vec_type),
+ (5, pending_monitor_events, vec_type),
+ (7, funding_spend_seen, option),
+ });
let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
current_counterparty_commitment_txid,
prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
- counterparty_tx_cache,
+ counterparty_commitment_params,
funding_redeemscript,
channel_value_satoshis,
their_cur_revocation_points,
current_holder_commitment_number,
payment_preimages,
- pending_monitor_events,
+ pending_monitor_events: pending_monitor_events.unwrap(),
pending_events,
onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf,
lockdown_from_offchain,
holder_tx_signed,
+ funding_spend_seen: funding_spend_seen.unwrap(),
+ funding_spend_confirmed,
+ htlcs_resolved_on_chain: htlcs_resolved_on_chain.unwrap(),
best_block,
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
- use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
+ use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
+ use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
+ use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
+
use hex;
- use chain::BestBlock;
+
+ use super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStep;
+ use ::{check_added_monitors, check_closed_broadcast, check_closed_event, check_spends, get_local_commitment_txn, get_monitor, get_route_and_payment_hash, unwrap_send_err};
+ use chain::{BestBlock, Confirm};
use chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
- use chain::package::{WEIGHT_OFFERED_HTLC, WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC, WEIGHT_REVOKED_RECEIVED_HTLC, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT};
+ use chain::package::{weight_offered_htlc, weight_received_htlc, weight_revoked_offered_htlc, weight_revoked_received_htlc, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT};
use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
+ use chain::keysinterface::InMemorySigner;
use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
use ln::chan_utils;
use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, ChannelPublicKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
+ use ln::channelmanager::PaymentSendFailure;
+ use ln::features::InitFeatures;
+ use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
use ln::script::ShutdownScript;
+ use util::errors::APIError;
+ use util::events::{ClosureReason, MessageSendEventsProvider};
use util::test_utils::{TestLogger, TestBroadcaster, TestFeeEstimator};
- use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
- use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
+ use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
- use chain::keysinterface::InMemorySigner;
+ use io;
use prelude::*;
+ fn do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(use_local_txn: bool) {
+ // Previously, monitor updates were allowed freely even after a funding-spend transaction
+ // confirmed. This would allow a race condition where we could receive a payment (including
+ // the counterparty revoking their broadcasted state!) and accept it without recourse as
+ // long as the ChannelMonitor receives the block first, the full commitment update dance
+ // occurs after the block is connected, and before the ChannelManager receives the block.
+ // Obviously this is an incredibly contrived race given the counterparty would be risking
+ // their full channel balance for it, but its worth fixing nonetheless as it makes the
+ // potential ChannelMonitor states simpler to reason about.
+ //
+ // This test checks said behavior, as well as ensuring a ChannelMonitorUpdate with multiple
+ // updates is handled correctly in such conditions.
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
+ let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+ let channel = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(
+ &nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(
+ &nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
+
+ // Rebalance somewhat
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);
+
+ // First route two payments for testing at the end
+ let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000).0;
+ let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000).0;
+
+ let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel.2);
+ assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
+ let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], channel.2);
+ assert_eq!(remote_txn.len(), 3); // Commitment and two HTLC-Timeouts
+ check_spends!(remote_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
+ check_spends!(remote_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
+ let broadcast_tx = if use_local_txn { &local_txn[0] } else { &remote_txn[0] };
+
+ // Connect a commitment transaction, but only to the ChainMonitor/ChannelMonitor. The
+ // channel is now closed, but the ChannelManager doesn't know that yet.
+ let new_header = BlockHeader {
+ version: 2, time: 0, bits: 0, nonce: 0,
+ prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_info().0,
+ merkle_root: Default::default() };
+ let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(&new_header,
+ &[(0, broadcast_tx)], conf_height);
+
+ let (_, pre_update_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<InMemorySigner>)>::read(
+ &mut io::Cursor::new(&get_monitor!(nodes[1], channel.2).encode()),
+ &nodes[1].keys_manager.backing).unwrap();
+
+ // If the ChannelManager tries to update the channel, however, the ChainMonitor will pass
+ // the update through to the ChannelMonitor which will refuse it (as the channel is closed).
+ let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 100_000);
+ unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)),
+ true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
+ assert!(err.contains("ChannelMonitor storage failure")));
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2); // After the failure we generate a close-channel monitor update
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_string() });
+
+ // Build a new ChannelMonitorUpdate which contains both the failing commitment tx update
+ // and provides the claim preimages for the two pending HTLCs. The first update generates
+ // an error, but the point of this test is to ensure the later updates are still applied.
+ let monitor_updates = nodes[1].chain_monitor.monitor_updates.lock().unwrap();
+ let mut replay_update = monitor_updates.get(&channel.2).unwrap().iter().rev().skip(1).next().unwrap().clone();
+ assert_eq!(replay_update.updates.len(), 1);
+ if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { .. } = replay_update.updates[0] {
+ } else { panic!(); }
+ replay_update.updates.push(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage: payment_preimage_1 });
+ replay_update.updates.push(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage: payment_preimage_2 });
+
+ let broadcaster = TestBroadcaster::new(Arc::clone(&nodes[1].blocks));
+ assert!(
+ pre_update_monitor.update_monitor(&replay_update, &&broadcaster, &&chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &nodes[1].logger)
+ .is_err());
+ // Even though we error'd on the first update, we should still have generated an HTLC claim
+ // transaction
+ let txn_broadcasted = broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+ assert!(txn_broadcasted.len() >= 2);
+ let htlc_txn = txn_broadcasted.iter().filter(|tx| {
+ assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1);
+ tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == broadcast_tx.txid()
+ }).collect::<Vec<_>>();
+ assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
+ check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], broadcast_tx);
+ check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], broadcast_tx);
+ }
+ #[test]
+ fn test_funding_spend_refuses_updates() {
+ do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(true);
+ do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(false);
+ }
+
#[test]
fn test_prune_preimages() {
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
[41; 32],
0,
[0; 32]
selected_contest_delay: 67,
}),
funding_outpoint: Some(funding_outpoint),
+ opt_anchors: None,
};
// Prune with one old state and a holder commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
// old state.
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
- let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
macro_rules! sign_input {
- ($sighash_parts: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $weight: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr) => {
+ ($sighash_parts: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $weight: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr, $opt_anchors: expr) => {
let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
- offered: if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC || *$weight == WEIGHT_OFFERED_HTLC { true } else { false },
+ offered: if *$weight == weight_revoked_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) || *$weight == weight_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) { true } else { false },
amount_msat: 0,
cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
transaction_output_index: Some($idx as u32),
};
- let redeem_script = if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
+ let redeem_script = if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.signature_hash($idx, &redeem_script, $amount, SigHashType::All)[..]);
let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &privkey);
$sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
$sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
- sum_actual_sigs += $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].len();
+ $sum_actual_sigs += $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].len();
if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT {
$sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(vec!(1));
- } else if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC || *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_RECEIVED_HTLC {
+ } else if *$weight == weight_revoked_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) || *$weight == weight_revoked_received_htlc($opt_anchors) {
$sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
- } else if *$weight == WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC {
+ } else if *$weight == weight_received_htlc($opt_anchors) {
$sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(vec![0]);
} else {
$sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
let txid = Txid::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
// Justice tx with 1 to_holder, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
- let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
- for i in 0..4 {
- claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
- previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
- txid,
- vout: i,
- },
- script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: 0xfffffffd,
- witness: Vec::new(),
+ for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
+ let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
+ let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
+ for i in 0..4 {
+ claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
+ previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
+ txid,
+ vout: i,
+ },
+ script_sig: Script::new(),
+ sequence: 0xfffffffd,
+ witness: Vec::new(),
+ });
+ }
+ claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
+ script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
+ value: 0,
});
- }
- claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
- script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
- value: 0,
- });
- let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
- let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC, WEIGHT_REVOKED_RECEIVED_HTLC];
- let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
- {
- let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
- for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
- sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
- inputs_total_weight += inp;
+ let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
+ let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT, weight_revoked_offered_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_revoked_offered_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_revoked_received_htlc(opt_anchors)];
+ let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
+ {
+ let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
+ for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
+ sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, opt_anchors);
+ inputs_total_weight += inp;
+ }
}
+ assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
}
- assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
// Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
- claim_tx.input.clear();
- sum_actual_sigs = 0;
- for i in 0..4 {
+ for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
+ let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
+ let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
+ for i in 0..4 {
+ claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
+ previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
+ txid,
+ vout: i,
+ },
+ script_sig: Script::new(),
+ sequence: 0xfffffffd,
+ witness: Vec::new(),
+ });
+ }
+ claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
+ script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
+ value: 0,
+ });
+ let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
+ let inputs_weight = vec![weight_offered_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors)];
+ let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
+ {
+ let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
+ for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
+ sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, opt_anchors);
+ inputs_total_weight += inp;
+ }
+ }
+ assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
+ }
+
+ // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
+ for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
+ let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
+ let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
txid,
- vout: i,
+ vout: 0,
},
script_sig: Script::new(),
sequence: 0xfffffffd,
witness: Vec::new(),
});
- }
- let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
- let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_OFFERED_HTLC, WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC, WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC, WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC];
- let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
- {
- let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
- for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
- sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
- inputs_total_weight += inp;
- }
- }
- assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
-
- // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
- claim_tx.input.clear();
- sum_actual_sigs = 0;
- claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
- previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
- txid,
- vout: 0,
- },
- script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: 0xfffffffd,
- witness: Vec::new(),
- });
- let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
- let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT];
- let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
- {
- let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
- for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
- sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
- inputs_total_weight += inp;
+ claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
+ script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
+ value: 0,
+ });
+ let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
+ let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT];
+ let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
+ {
+ let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
+ for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
+ sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, opt_anchors);
+ inputs_total_weight += inp;
+ }
}
+ assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
}
- assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
}
// Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff