use ln::channelmanager::HTLCSource;
use chain;
use chain::{BestBlock, WatchedOutput};
-use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
+use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor, DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, Sign, KeysInterface};
use chain::onchaintx::OnchainTxHandler;
// deserialization
current_holder_commitment_number: u64,
+ /// The set of payment hashes from inbound payments for which we know the preimage. Payment
+ /// preimages that are not included in any unrevoked local commitment transaction or unrevoked
+ /// remote commitment transactions are automatically removed when commitment transactions are
+ /// revoked.
payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
// Note that `MonitorEvent`s MUST NOT be generated during update processing, only generated
// the full block_connected).
best_block: BestBlock,
+ /// The node_id of our counterparty
+ counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
+
secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
}
writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
+ debug_assert!(htlc_source.is_none() || Some(**txid) == self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid
+ || Some(**txid) == self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
+ "HTLC Sources for all revoked commitment transactions should be none!");
serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
htlc_source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(writer)?;
}
(3, self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain, vec_type),
(5, self.pending_monitor_events, vec_type),
(7, self.funding_spend_seen, required),
+ (9, self.counterparty_node_id, option),
});
Ok(())
funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
initial_holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
- best_block: BestBlock) -> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
+ best_block: BestBlock, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey) -> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
let payment_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec::new(),
best_block,
+ counterparty_node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id),
secp_ctx,
}),
self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(holder_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs).map_err(|_| ())
}
- #[cfg(test)]
+ /// This is used to provide payment preimage(s) out-of-band during startup without updating the
+ /// off-chain state with a new commitment transaction.
pub(crate) fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
&self,
payment_hash: &PaymentHash,
payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage,
broadcaster: &B,
- fee_estimator: &F,
+ fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
logger: &L,
) where
B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
{
+ let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
self.inner.lock().unwrap().transactions_confirmed(
- header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
+ header, txdata, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
}
/// Processes a transaction that was reorganized out of the chain.
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
{
+ let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
self.inner.lock().unwrap().transaction_unconfirmed(
- txid, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
+ txid, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger);
}
/// Updates the monitor with the current best chain tip, returning new outputs to watch. See
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
{
+ let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block_updated(
- header, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
+ header, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
}
/// Returns the set of txids that should be monitored for re-organization out of the chain.
res
}
+
+ pub(crate) fn get_stored_preimages(&self) -> HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage> {
+ self.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.clone()
+ }
}
/// Compares a broadcasted commitment transaction's HTLCs with those in the latest state,
/// as long as we examine both the current counterparty commitment transaction and, if it hasn't
/// been revoked yet, the previous one, we we will never "forget" to resolve an HTLC.
macro_rules! fail_unbroadcast_htlcs {
- ($self: expr, $commitment_tx_type: expr, $commitment_tx_conf_height: expr, $confirmed_htlcs_list: expr, $logger: expr) => { {
+ ($self: expr, $commitment_tx_type: expr, $commitment_txid_confirmed: expr,
+ $commitment_tx_conf_height: expr, $confirmed_htlcs_list: expr, $logger: expr) => { {
macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = $self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
// cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
// need to here.
let confirmed_htlcs_iter: &mut Iterator<Item = (&HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = &mut $confirmed_htlcs_list;
+
let mut matched_htlc = false;
for (ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in confirmed_htlcs_iter {
- if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(&**source) == *broadcast_source {
+ if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() &&
+ (Some(&**source) == *broadcast_source ||
+ (broadcast_source.is_none() &&
+ broadcast_htlc.payment_hash == htlc.payment_hash &&
+ broadcast_htlc.amount_msat == htlc.amount_msat)) {
matched_htlc = true;
break;
}
}
});
let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
- txid: *$txid,
+ txid: $commitment_txid_confirmed,
height: $commitment_tx_conf_height,
event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
source: (**source).clone(),
commitment_tx_output_idx: None,
},
};
- log_trace!($logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of {} commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})",
- log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, $commitment_tx_type, entry.confirmation_threshold());
+ log_trace!($logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of {} commitment transaction {}, waiting for confirmation (at height {})",
+ log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, $commitment_tx_type,
+ $commitment_txid_confirmed, entry.confirmation_threshold());
$self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
}
}
} }
}
+// In the `test_invalid_funding_tx` test, we need a bogus script which matches the HTLC-Accepted
+// witness length match (ie is 136 bytes long). We generate one here which we also use in some
+// in-line tests later.
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() -> Vec<u8> {
+ let mut ret = [opcodes::all::OP_NOP.into_u8(); 136];
+ ret[131] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.into_u8();
+ ret[132] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.into_u8();
+ ret[133] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.into_u8();
+ ret[134] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.into_u8();
+ ret[135] = opcodes::OP_TRUE.into_u8();
+ Vec::from(&ret[..])
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness() -> Vec<Vec<u8>> {
+ vec![Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program().into()].into()
+}
+
impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
/// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
/// needed by holder commitment transactions HTCLs nor by counterparty ones. Unless we haven't already seen
/// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
/// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
- fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L)
+ fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
+ &mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage, broadcaster: &B,
+ fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
},
ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } => {
log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with payment preimage");
- self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
+ let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
+ self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
},
ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } => {
log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with commitment secret");
}
self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
- fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked counterparty", height, [].iter().map(|a| *a), logger);
+ if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
+ fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked_counterparty", commitment_txid, height,
+ per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
+ (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
+ ), logger);
+ } else {
+ debug_assert!(false, "We should have per-commitment option for any recognized old commitment txn");
+ fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked counterparty", commitment_txid, height,
+ [].iter().map(|reference| *reference), logger);
+ }
}
} else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
// While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked counterparty commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
- fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "counterparty", height, per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(a, b)| (a, b.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()))), logger);
+ fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "counterparty", commitment_txid, height,
+ per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
+ (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
+ ), logger);
let htlc_claim_reqs = self.get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs(commitment_number, commitment_txid, Some(tx));
for req in htlc_claim_reqs {
let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, height);
let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, tx);
append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
- fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "latest holder", height, self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, c)| (a, c.as_ref())), logger);
+ fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "latest holder", commitment_txid, height,
+ self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter()
+ .map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())), logger);
} else if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
if holder_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
is_holder_tx = true;
let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(holder_tx, height);
let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(holder_tx, tx);
append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
- fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "previous holder", height, holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, c)| (a, c.as_ref())), logger);
+ fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "previous holder", commitment_txid, height,
+ holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())),
+ logger);
}
}
let block_hash = header.block_hash();
self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
- self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
+ let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
+ self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
}
fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
header: &BlockHeader,
height: u32,
broadcaster: B,
- fee_estimator: F,
+ fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
logger: L,
) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
where
txdata: &TransactionData,
height: u32,
broadcaster: B,
- fee_estimator: F,
+ fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
logger: L,
) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
where
mut watch_outputs: Vec<TransactionOutputs>,
mut claimable_outpoints: Vec<PackageTemplate>,
broadcaster: &B,
- fee_estimator: &F,
+ fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
logger: &L,
) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
where
matured_htlcs.push(source.clone());
}
- log_debug!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
+ log_debug!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update in {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream",
+ log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), entry.txid);
self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
payment_hash,
payment_preimage: None,
//- maturing spendable output has transaction paying us has been disconnected
self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height < height);
- self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
+ let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
+ self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger);
self.best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, height - 1);
}
&mut self,
txid: &Txid,
broadcaster: B,
- fee_estimator: F,
+ fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
logger: L,
) where
B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
{
- self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.txid != *txid);
+ self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| if entry.txid == *txid {
+ log_info!(logger, "Removing onchain event with txid {}", txid);
+ false
+ } else { true });
self.onchain_tx_handler.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
}
if *idx == input.previous_output.vout {
#[cfg(test)]
{
- // If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
- // appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
- // actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
- if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
- assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&Script::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
- } else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
- assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
- } else { panic!(); }
+ // If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
+ // appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
+ // actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
+ if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
+ if input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec() == deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() {
+ // In at least one test we use a deliberately bogus witness
+ // script which hit an old panic. Thus, we check for that here
+ // and avoid the assert if its the expected bogus script.
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&Script::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
+ } else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
+ assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
+ } else { panic!(); }
}
return true;
}
let prev_last_witness_len = input.witness.second_to_last().map(|w| w.len()).unwrap_or(0);
let revocation_sig_claim = (witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && prev_last_witness_len == 33)
|| (witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && prev_last_witness_len == 33);
- let accepted_preimage_claim = witness_items == 5 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
+ let accepted_preimage_claim = witness_items == 5 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC)
+ && input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap().len() == 32;
#[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
let accepted_timeout_claim = witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && !revocation_sig_claim;
- let offered_preimage_claim = witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && !revocation_sig_claim;
+ let offered_preimage_claim = witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) &&
+ !revocation_sig_claim && input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap().len() == 32;
+
#[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
let offered_timeout_claim = witness_items == 5 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);
let mut funding_spend_confirmed = None;
let mut htlcs_resolved_on_chain = Some(Vec::new());
let mut funding_spend_seen = Some(false);
+ let mut counterparty_node_id = None;
read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
(1, funding_spend_confirmed, option),
(3, htlcs_resolved_on_chain, vec_type),
(5, pending_monitor_events, vec_type),
(7, funding_spend_seen, option),
+ (9, counterparty_node_id, option),
});
let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
htlcs_resolved_on_chain: htlcs_resolved_on_chain.unwrap(),
best_block,
+ counterparty_node_id,
secp_ctx,
}),
use hex;
+ use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
+
use super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStep;
use ::{check_added_monitors, check_closed_broadcast, check_closed_event, check_spends, get_local_commitment_txn, get_monitor, get_route_and_payment_hash, unwrap_send_err};
use chain::{BestBlock, Confirm};
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
let broadcaster = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))});
- let fee_estimator = Arc::new(TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) });
+ let fee_estimator = TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
(OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()),
&channel_parameters,
Script::new(), 46, 0,
- HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), best_block);
+ HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), best_block, dummy_key);
monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])).unwrap();
let dummy_txid = dummy_tx.txid();
monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
- monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger);
+ let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_estimator);
+ monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage, &broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &logger);
}
// Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff