use crate::chain::{BestBlock, WatchedOutput};
use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
-use crate::chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor, DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, Sign, KeysInterface};
+use crate::chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor, DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, SignerProvider, EntropySource};
#[cfg(anchors)]
use crate::chain::onchaintx::ClaimEvent;
use crate::chain::onchaintx::OnchainTxHandler;
use crate::chain::package::{CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput, CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput, HolderFundingOutput, HolderHTLCOutput, PackageSolvingData, PackageTemplate, RevokedOutput, RevokedHTLCOutput};
use crate::chain::Filter;
use crate::util::logger::Logger;
-use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, U48, OptionDeserWrapper};
+use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, RequiredWrapper, MaybeReadable, UpgradableRequired, Writer, Writeable, U48};
use crate::util::byte_utils;
use crate::util::events::Event;
#[cfg(anchors)]
-use crate::util::events::{AnchorDescriptor, BumpTransactionEvent};
+use crate::util::events::{AnchorDescriptor, HTLCDescriptor, BumpTransactionEvent};
use crate::prelude::*;
use core::{cmp, mem};
use crate::io::{self, Error};
use core::convert::TryInto;
use core::ops::Deref;
-use crate::sync::Mutex;
+use crate::sync::{Mutex, LockTestExt};
/// An update generated by the underlying channel itself which contains some new information the
/// [`ChannelMonitor`] should be made aware of.
impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
- w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
+ w.write_all(&(0 as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
write_tlv_fields!(w, {
(0, self.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
(2, self.counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
}
}
- let mut counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = OptionDeserWrapper(None);
- let mut counterparty_htlc_base_key = OptionDeserWrapper(None);
+ let mut counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = RequiredWrapper(None);
+ let mut counterparty_htlc_base_key = RequiredWrapper(None);
let mut on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16 = 0;
read_tlv_fields!(r, {
(0, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
let mut transaction = None;
let mut block_hash = None;
let mut height = 0;
- let mut event = None;
+ let mut event = UpgradableRequired(None);
read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
(0, txid, required),
(1, transaction, option),
(2, height, required),
(3, block_hash, option),
- (4, event, ignorable),
+ (4, event, upgradable_required),
});
- if let Some(ev) = event {
- Ok(Some(Self { txid, transaction, height, block_hash, event: ev }))
- } else {
- Ok(None)
- }
+ Ok(Some(Self { txid, transaction, height, block_hash, event: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(event, upgradable_required) }))
}
}
/// was not present in the confirmed commitment transaction), HTLC-Success, or HTLC-Timeout
/// transaction.
resolving_txid: Option<Txid>, // Added as optional, but always filled in, in 0.0.110
+ resolving_tx: Option<Transaction>,
/// Only set if the HTLC claim was ours using a payment preimage
payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
}
(0, mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
(1, self.resolving_txid, option),
(2, self.payment_preimage, option),
+ (3, self.resolving_tx, option),
});
Ok(())
}
let mut mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx = 0;
let mut resolving_txid = None;
let mut payment_preimage = None;
+ let mut resolving_tx = None;
read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
(0, mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
(1, resolving_txid, option),
(2, payment_preimage, option),
+ (3, resolving_tx, option),
});
Ok(Self {
commitment_tx_output_idx: if mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx == u32::max_value() { None } else { Some(mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx) },
resolving_txid,
payment_preimage,
+ resolving_tx,
})
}
}
/// the "reorg path" (ie disconnecting blocks until you find a common ancestor from both the
/// returned block hash and the the current chain and then reconnecting blocks to get to the
/// best chain) upon deserializing the object!
-pub struct ChannelMonitor<Signer: Sign> {
+pub struct ChannelMonitor<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> {
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
#[cfg(not(test))]
inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
}
-pub(crate) struct ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer: Sign> {
+#[derive(PartialEq)]
+pub(crate) struct ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> {
latest_update_id: u64,
commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
/// The node_id of our counterparty
counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
-
- secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
}
/// Transaction outputs to watch for on-chain spends.
pub type TransactionOutputs = (Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>);
-#[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
-/// Used only in testing and fuzzing to check serialization roundtrips don't change the underlying
-/// object
-impl<Signer: Sign> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
- fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
- let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
- let other = other.inner.lock().unwrap();
- inner.eq(&other)
- }
-}
-
-#[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
-/// Used only in testing and fuzzing to check serialization roundtrips don't change the underlying
-/// object
-impl<Signer: Sign> PartialEq for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
+impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<Signer> where Signer: PartialEq {
fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
- if self.latest_update_id != other.latest_update_id ||
- self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
- self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
- self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script != other.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script ||
- self.counterparty_payment_script != other.counterparty_payment_script ||
- self.channel_keys_id != other.channel_keys_id ||
- self.holder_revocation_basepoint != other.holder_revocation_basepoint ||
- self.funding_info != other.funding_info ||
- self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.current_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
- self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
- self.counterparty_commitment_params != other.counterparty_commitment_params ||
- self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript ||
- self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis ||
- self.their_cur_per_commitment_points != other.their_cur_per_commitment_points ||
- self.on_holder_tx_csv != other.on_holder_tx_csv ||
- self.commitment_secrets != other.commitment_secrets ||
- self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints != other.counterparty_claimable_outpoints ||
- self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
- self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number != other.counterparty_hash_commitment_number ||
- self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx ||
- self.current_counterparty_commitment_number != other.current_counterparty_commitment_number ||
- self.current_holder_commitment_number != other.current_holder_commitment_number ||
- self.current_holder_commitment_tx != other.current_holder_commitment_tx ||
- self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
- self.pending_monitor_events != other.pending_monitor_events ||
- self.pending_events.len() != other.pending_events.len() || // We trust events to round-trip properly
- self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf ||
- self.outputs_to_watch != other.outputs_to_watch ||
- self.lockdown_from_offchain != other.lockdown_from_offchain ||
- self.holder_tx_signed != other.holder_tx_signed ||
- self.funding_spend_seen != other.funding_spend_seen ||
- self.funding_spend_confirmed != other.funding_spend_confirmed ||
- self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output != other.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output ||
- self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain != other.htlcs_resolved_on_chain
- {
- false
- } else {
- true
- }
+ // We need some kind of total lockorder. Absent a better idea, we sort by position in
+ // memory and take locks in that order (assuming that we can't move within memory while a
+ // lock is held).
+ let ord = ((self as *const _) as usize) < ((other as *const _) as usize);
+ let a = if ord { self.inner.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self() } else { other.inner.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self() };
+ let b = if ord { other.inner.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self() } else { self.inner.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self() };
+ a.eq(&b)
}
}
-impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
+impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
self.inner.lock().unwrap().write(writer)
}
const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
-impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
+impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
self.channel_keys_id.write(writer)?;
self.holder_revocation_basepoint.write(writer)?;
writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.txid[..])?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.funding_info.0.index))?;
+ writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.index.to_be_bytes())?;
self.funding_info.1.write(writer)?;
self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
},
}
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_holder_tx_csv))?;
+ writer.write_all(&self.on_holder_tx_csv.to_be_bytes())?;
self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
($htlc_output: expr) => {
writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
+ writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.amount_msat.to_be_bytes())?;
+ writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes())?;
writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
$htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
}
}
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
+ writer.write_all(&(self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
+ writer.write_all(&(htlc_infos.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
debug_assert!(htlc_source.is_none() || Some(**txid) == self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid
|| Some(**txid) == self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
}
}
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
+ writer.write_all(&(self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
for (ref txid, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
}
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
+ writer.write_all(&(self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_counterparty_commitment_number))?;
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_holder_commitment_number))?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
+ writer.write_all(&(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
}
}
}
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_events.len() as u64))?;
+ writer.write_all(&(self.pending_events.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
for event in self.pending_events.iter() {
event.write(writer)?;
}
self.best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.height()))?;
+ writer.write_all(&self.best_block.height().to_be_bytes())?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
+ writer.write_all(&(self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
for ref entry in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
entry.write(writer)?;
}
}
}
-impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
+impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
/// For lockorder enforcement purposes, we need to have a single site which constructs the
/// `inner` mutex, otherwise cases where we lock two monitors at the same time (eg in our
/// PartialEq implementation) we may decide a lockorder violation has occurred.
let onchain_tx_handler =
OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys,
- channel_parameters.clone(), initial_holder_commitment_tx, secp_ctx.clone());
+ channel_parameters.clone(), initial_holder_commitment_tx, secp_ctx);
let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::new();
outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![(funding_info.0.index as u32, funding_info.1.clone())]);
best_block,
counterparty_node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id),
-
- secp_ctx,
})
}
}
}
-impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
+impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
/// Helper for get_claimable_balances which does the work for an individual HTLC, generating up
/// to one `Balance` for the HTLC.
fn get_htlc_balance(&self, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, holder_commitment: bool,
if let Some(v) = htlc.transaction_output_index { v } else { return None; };
let mut htlc_spend_txid_opt = None;
+ let mut htlc_spend_tx_opt = None;
let mut holder_timeout_spend_pending = None;
let mut htlc_spend_pending = None;
let mut holder_delayed_output_pending = None;
OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx, htlc_value_satoshis, .. }
if commitment_tx_output_idx == Some(htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) => {
debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
- htlc_spend_txid_opt = event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx| tx.txid());
+ htlc_spend_txid_opt = Some(&event.txid);
+ debug_assert!(htlc_spend_tx_opt.is_none());
+ htlc_spend_tx_opt = event.transaction.as_ref();
debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none());
debug_assert_eq!(htlc_value_satoshis.unwrap(), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
holder_timeout_spend_pending = Some(event.confirmation_threshold());
OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. }
if commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx => {
debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
- htlc_spend_txid_opt = event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx| tx.txid());
+ htlc_spend_txid_opt = Some(&event.txid);
+ debug_assert!(htlc_spend_tx_opt.is_none());
+ htlc_spend_tx_opt = event.transaction.as_ref();
debug_assert!(htlc_spend_pending.is_none());
htlc_spend_pending = Some((event.confirmation_threshold(), preimage.is_some()));
},
let htlc_resolved = self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter()
.find(|v| if v.commitment_tx_output_idx == Some(htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) {
debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
- htlc_spend_txid_opt = v.resolving_txid;
+ htlc_spend_txid_opt = v.resolving_txid.as_ref();
+ debug_assert!(htlc_spend_tx_opt.is_none());
+ htlc_spend_tx_opt = v.resolving_tx.as_ref();
true
} else { false });
debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_some() as u8 + htlc_spend_pending.is_some() as u8 + htlc_resolved.is_some() as u8 <= 1);
+ let htlc_commitment_outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint::new(confirmed_txid.unwrap(), htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx);
let htlc_output_to_spend =
if let Some(txid) = htlc_spend_txid_opt {
- debug_assert!(
- self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_none(),
- "This code needs updating for anchors");
- BitcoinOutPoint::new(txid, 0)
+ // Because HTLC transactions either only have 1 input and 1 output (pre-anchors) or
+ // are signed with SIGHASH_SINGLE|ANYONECANPAY under BIP-0143 (post-anchors), we can
+ // locate the correct output by ensuring its adjacent input spends the HTLC output
+ // in the commitment.
+ if let Some(ref tx) = htlc_spend_tx_opt {
+ let htlc_input_idx_opt = tx.input.iter().enumerate()
+ .find(|(_, input)| input.previous_output == htlc_commitment_outpoint)
+ .map(|(idx, _)| idx as u32);
+ debug_assert!(htlc_input_idx_opt.is_some());
+ BitcoinOutPoint::new(*txid, htlc_input_idx_opt.unwrap_or(0))
+ } else {
+ debug_assert!(!self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors());
+ BitcoinOutPoint::new(*txid, 0)
+ }
} else {
- BitcoinOutPoint::new(confirmed_txid.unwrap(), htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx)
+ htlc_commitment_outpoint
};
let htlc_output_spend_pending = self.onchain_tx_handler.is_output_spend_pending(&htlc_output_to_spend);
} = &event.event {
if event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| {
if let Some(htlc_spend_txid) = htlc_spend_txid_opt {
- Some(tx.txid()) == htlc_spend_txid_opt ||
- inp.previous_output.txid == htlc_spend_txid
+ tx.txid() == *htlc_spend_txid || inp.previous_output.txid == *htlc_spend_txid
} else {
Some(inp.previous_output.txid) == confirmed_txid &&
inp.previous_output.vout == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx
}
}
-impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
+impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
/// Gets the balances in this channel which are either claimable by us if we were to
/// force-close the channel now or which are claimable on-chain (possibly awaiting
/// confirmation).
vec![Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program().into()].into()
}
-impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
+impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
/// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
/// needed by holder commitment transactions HTCLs nor by counterparty ones. Unless we haven't already seen
/// counterparty commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor: channel force closed, should broadcast: {}", should_broadcast);
self.lockdown_from_offchain = true;
if *should_broadcast {
+ // There's no need to broadcast our commitment transaction if we've seen one
+ // confirmed (even with 1 confirmation) as it'll be rejected as
+ // duplicate/conflicting.
+ let detected_funding_spend = self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some() ||
+ self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find(|event| match event.event {
+ OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => true,
+ _ => false,
+ }).is_some();
+ if detected_funding_spend {
+ continue;
+ }
self.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger);
// If the channel supports anchor outputs, we'll need to emit an external
// event to be consumed such that a child transaction is broadcast with a
pending_htlcs,
}));
},
+ ClaimEvent::BumpHTLC {
+ target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, htlcs,
+ } => {
+ let mut htlc_descriptors = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs.len());
+ for htlc in htlcs {
+ htlc_descriptors.push(HTLCDescriptor {
+ channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
+ channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
+ channel_parameters: self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
+ commitment_txid: htlc.commitment_txid,
+ per_commitment_number: htlc.per_commitment_number,
+ htlc: htlc.htlc,
+ preimage: htlc.preimage,
+ counterparty_sig: htlc.counterparty_sig,
+ });
+ }
+ ret.push(Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution {
+ target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
+ htlc_descriptors,
+ }));
+ }
}
}
ret
if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
- let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
- let revocation_pubkey = chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint);
- let delayed_key = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key);
+ let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
+ let revocation_pubkey = chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint);
+ let delayed_key = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key);
let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
if let Some(transaction) = tx {
let revocation_pubkey = chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(
- &self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint);
- let delayed_key = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx,
+ &self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint);
+ let delayed_key = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx,
&per_commitment_point,
&self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key);
let revokeable_p2wsh = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey,
}
/// Attempts to claim a counterparty HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
- fn check_spend_counterparty_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<TransactionOutputs>) where L::Target: Logger {
- let htlc_txid = tx.txid();
- if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 || tx.input[0].witness.len() != 5 {
- return (Vec::new(), None)
- }
+ fn check_spend_counterparty_htlc<L: Deref>(
+ &mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: &Txid, height: u32, logger: &L
+ ) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<TransactionOutputs>) where L::Target: Logger {
+ let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (Vec::new(), None); };
+ let per_commitment_key = match SecretKey::from_slice(&secret) {
+ Ok(key) => key,
+ Err(_) => return (Vec::new(), None)
+ };
+ let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
- macro_rules! ignore_error {
- ( $thing : expr ) => {
- match $thing {
- Ok(a) => a,
- Err(_) => return (Vec::new(), None)
+ let htlc_txid = tx.txid();
+ let mut claimable_outpoints = vec![];
+ let mut outputs_to_watch = None;
+ // Previously, we would only claim HTLCs from revoked HTLC transactions if they had 1 input
+ // with a witness of 5 elements and 1 output. This wasn't enough for anchor outputs, as the
+ // counterparty can now aggregate multiple HTLCs into a single transaction thanks to
+ // `SIGHASH_SINGLE` remote signatures, leading us to not claim any HTLCs upon seeing a
+ // confirmed revoked HTLC transaction (for more details, see
+ // https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2022-April/003561.html).
+ //
+ // We make sure we're not vulnerable to this case by checking all inputs of the transaction,
+ // and claim those which spend the commitment transaction, have a witness of 5 elements, and
+ // have a corresponding output at the same index within the transaction.
+ for (idx, input) in tx.input.iter().enumerate() {
+ if input.previous_output.txid == *commitment_txid && input.witness.len() == 5 && tx.output.get(idx).is_some() {
+ log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty HTLC transaction, spending {}:{}", htlc_txid, idx);
+ let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(
+ per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
+ self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key,
+ tx.output[idx].value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv
+ );
+ let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(
+ htlc_txid, idx as u32, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp),
+ height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, true, height
+ );
+ claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
+ if outputs_to_watch.is_none() {
+ outputs_to_watch = Some((htlc_txid, vec![]));
}
- };
+ outputs_to_watch.as_mut().unwrap().1.push((idx as u32, tx.output[idx].clone()));
+ }
}
-
- let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (Vec::new(), None); };
- let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
- let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
-
- log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty HTLC transaction, spending {}:{}", htlc_txid, 0);
- let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, tx.output[0].value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv);
- let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(htlc_txid, 0, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp), height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, true, height);
- let claimable_outpoints = vec!(justice_package);
- let outputs = vec![(0, tx.output[0].clone())];
- (claimable_outpoints, Some((htlc_txid, outputs)))
+ (claimable_outpoints, outputs_to_watch)
}
// Returns (1) `PackageTemplate`s that can be given to the OnchainTxHandler, so that the handler can
for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
- let htlc_output = if htlc.offered {
- HolderHTLCOutput::build_offered(htlc.amount_msat, htlc.cltv_expiry)
+ let (htlc_output, aggregable) = if htlc.offered {
+ let htlc_output = HolderHTLCOutput::build_offered(
+ htlc.amount_msat, htlc.cltv_expiry, self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors()
+ );
+ (htlc_output, false)
+ } else {
+ let payment_preimage = if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
+ preimage.clone()
} else {
- let payment_preimage = if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
- preimage.clone()
- } else {
- // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
- continue;
- };
- HolderHTLCOutput::build_accepted(payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat)
+ // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
+ continue;
};
- let htlc_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(holder_tx.txid, transaction_output_index, PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(htlc_output), htlc.cltv_expiry, false, conf_height);
+ let htlc_output = HolderHTLCOutput::build_accepted(
+ payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat, self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors()
+ );
+ (htlc_output, self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors())
+ };
+ let htlc_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(
+ holder_tx.txid, transaction_output_index,
+ PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(htlc_output),
+ htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable, conf_height
+ );
claim_requests.push(htlc_package);
}
}
if tx.input.len() == 1 {
// Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
- // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
- // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
- // filters.
+ // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input
+ // (except for HTLC transactions for channels with anchor outputs), which is an easy
+ // way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy filters.
let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 {
let mut balance_spendable_csv = None;
commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output,
},
});
- } else {
- if let Some(&commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
- let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_counterparty_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, &logger);
+ }
+ }
+ if tx.input.len() >= 1 {
+ // While all commitment transactions have one input, HTLC transactions may have more
+ // if the HTLC was present in an anchor channel. HTLCs can also be resolved in a few
+ // other ways which can have more than one output.
+ for tx_input in &tx.input {
+ let commitment_txid = tx_input.previous_output.txid;
+ if let Some(&commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&commitment_txid) {
+ let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_counterparty_htlc(
+ &tx, commitment_number, &commitment_txid, height, &logger
+ );
claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option {
watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
}
+ // Since there may be multiple HTLCs for this channel (all spending the
+ // same commitment tx) being claimed by the counterparty within the same
+ // transaction, and `check_spend_counterparty_htlc` already checks all the
+ // ones relevant to this channel, we can safely break from our loop.
+ break;
}
}
- }
- // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
- // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
- // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
- self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger);
+ self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger);
- self.is_paying_spendable_output(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger);
+ self.is_paying_spendable_output(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger);
+ }
}
if height > self.best_block.height() {
htlc_value_satoshis,
}));
self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
- commitment_tx_output_idx, resolving_txid: Some(entry.txid),
+ commitment_tx_output_idx,
+ resolving_txid: Some(entry.txid),
+ resolving_tx: entry.transaction,
payment_preimage: None,
});
},
},
OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. } => {
self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
- commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx), resolving_txid: Some(entry.txid),
+ commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx),
+ resolving_txid: Some(entry.txid),
+ resolving_tx: entry.transaction,
payment_preimage: preimage,
});
},
}
}
-impl<Signer: Sign, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
+impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
where
T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
}
}
-impl<Signer: Sign, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
+impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
where
T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
-impl<'a, K: KeysInterface> ReadableArgs<&'a K>
- for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<K::Signer>) {
- fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_manager: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+impl<'a, 'b, ES: EntropySource, SP: SignerProvider> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP)>
+ for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<SP::Signer>) {
+ fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
($key: expr) => {
match $key {
}
}
+ let (entropy_source, signer_provider) = args;
+
let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
let latest_update_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
}
- let onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<K::Signer> = ReadableArgs::read(reader, keys_manager)?;
+ let onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<SP::Signer> = ReadableArgs::read(
+ reader, (entropy_source, signer_provider, channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id)
+ )?;
let lockdown_from_offchain = Readable::read(reader)?;
let holder_tx_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
(13, spendable_txids_confirmed, vec_type),
});
- let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
-
Ok((best_block.block_hash(), ChannelMonitor::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
latest_update_id,
commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
best_block,
counterparty_node_id,
-
- secp_ctx,
})))
}
}
use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
use crate::ln::chan_utils;
use crate::ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, ChannelPublicKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
- use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PaymentSendFailure, PaymentId};
+ use crate::ln::channelmanager::{PaymentSendFailure, PaymentId};
use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
use crate::util::errors::APIError;
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- let channel = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(
- &nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(
- &nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
+ let channel = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
// Rebalance somewhat
send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);
let (_, pre_update_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<InMemorySigner>)>::read(
&mut io::Cursor::new(&get_monitor!(nodes[1], channel.2).encode()),
- &nodes[1].keys_manager.backing).unwrap();
+ (&nodes[1].keys_manager.backing, &nodes[1].keys_manager.backing)).unwrap();
// If the ChannelManager tries to update the channel, however, the ChainMonitor will pass
// the update through to the ChannelMonitor which will refuse it (as the channel is closed).
fn test_prune_preimages() {
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
- let broadcaster = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))});
+ let broadcaster = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster {
+ txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
+ blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))
+ });
let fee_estimator = TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
- SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
[41; 32],
0,
[0; 32],
// Prune with one old state and a holder commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
// old state.
let shutdown_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
- let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(Network::Testnet);
+ let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(Network::Testnet);
let monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(Secp256k1::new(), keys,
Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(shutdown_pubkey).into_inner()), 0, &Script::new(),
(OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()),
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff