//!
//! [`chain::Watch`]: ../trait.Watch.html
-use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxOut,Transaction};
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLCType, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction};
use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
use ln::onchaintx::{OnchainTxHandler, InputDescriptors};
+use chain;
use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
-use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, ChannelKeys};
+use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor, DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, Sign, KeysInterface};
use util::logger::Logger;
-use util::ser::{Readable, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, U48};
+use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, U48};
use util::byte_utils;
use util::events::Event;
+use std::cell::RefCell;
use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet, hash_map};
use std::{cmp, mem};
use std::ops::Deref;
/// An update generated by the underlying Channel itself which contains some new information the
/// ChannelMonitor should be made aware of.
-#[cfg_attr(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))]
+#[cfg_attr(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))]
#[derive(Clone)]
#[must_use]
pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
/// means you tried to update a monitor for a different channel or the ChannelMonitorUpdate was
/// corrupted.
/// Contains a developer-readable error message.
-#[derive(Debug)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
/// An event to be processed by the ChannelManager.
const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
-#[cfg_attr(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))]
+#[cfg_attr(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))]
#[derive(Clone)]
pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
/// get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events or get_and_clear_pending_events are serialized to disk and
/// reloaded at deserialize-time. Thus, you must ensure that, when handling events, all events
/// gotten are fully handled before re-serializing the new state.
-pub struct ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
+///
+/// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
+/// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
+/// the "reorg path" (ie disconnecting blocks until you find a common ancestor from both the
+/// returned block hash and the the current chain and then reconnecting blocks to get to the
+/// best chain) upon deserializing the object!
+pub struct ChannelMonitor<Signer: Sign> {
latest_update_id: u64,
commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
counterparty_payment_script: Script,
shutdown_script: Script,
- keys: ChanSigner,
+ channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
+ holder_revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
current_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>>,
#[cfg(test)]
- pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<ChanSigner>,
+ pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
#[cfg(not(test))]
- onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<ChanSigner>,
+ onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
// This is set when the Channel[Manager] generated a ChannelMonitorUpdate which indicated the
// channel has been force-closed. After this is set, no further holder commitment transaction
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
/// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
/// underlying object
-impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
+impl<Signer: Sign> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
if self.latest_update_id != other.latest_update_id ||
self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script != other.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script ||
self.counterparty_payment_script != other.counterparty_payment_script ||
- self.keys.pubkeys() != other.keys.pubkeys() ||
+ self.channel_keys_id != other.channel_keys_id ||
+ self.holder_revocation_basepoint != other.holder_revocation_basepoint ||
self.funding_info != other.funding_info ||
self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.current_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
}
}
-impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
- /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
- ///
- /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
- /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
- /// the "reorg path" (ie disconnecting blocks until you find a common ancestor from both the
- /// returned block hash and the the current chain and then reconnecting blocks to get to the
- /// best chain) upon deserializing the object!
- pub fn serialize_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
+impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
//TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
//serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
self.counterparty_payment_script.write(writer)?;
self.shutdown_script.write(writer)?;
- self.keys.write(writer)?;
+ self.channel_keys_id.write(writer)?;
+ self.holder_revocation_basepoint.write(writer)?;
writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.txid[..])?;
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.funding_info.0.index))?;
self.funding_info.1.write(writer)?;
}
}
-impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
- pub(crate) fn new(keys: ChanSigner, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey,
+impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
+ pub(crate) fn new(secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, keys: Signer, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey,
on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters,
funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
- initial_holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction) -> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
+ initial_holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction) -> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
let our_channel_close_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
let counterparty_htlc_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.htlc_basepoint;
let counterparty_tx_cache = CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction { counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key, on_counterparty_tx_csv, per_htlc: HashMap::new() };
- let mut onchain_tx_handler = OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys.clone(), channel_parameters.clone());
-
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let channel_keys_id = keys.channel_keys_id();
+ let holder_revocation_basepoint = keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
// block for Rust 1.34 compat
let (holder_commitment_tx, current_holder_commitment_number) = {
};
(holder_commitment_tx, trusted_tx.commitment_number())
};
- onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(initial_holder_commitment_tx);
+
+ let onchain_tx_handler =
+ OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys,
+ channel_parameters.clone(), initial_holder_commitment_tx, secp_ctx.clone());
let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::new();
outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![(funding_info.0.index as u32, funding_info.1.clone())]);
counterparty_payment_script,
shutdown_script,
- keys,
+ channel_keys_id,
+ holder_revocation_basepoint,
funding_info,
current_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
- let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint));
+ let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint));
let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key));
let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed latest holder commitment transaction!");
self.holder_tx_signed = true;
- if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
- let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
- let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
- for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
- if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
- let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
- if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
- // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
- continue;
- }
- } else { None };
- if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
- &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
- res.push(htlc_tx);
+ let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
+ let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
+ let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
+ for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
+ if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
+ let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
+ if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
+ // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
+ continue;
}
+ } else { None };
+ if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
+ &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
+ res.push(htlc_tx);
}
}
- // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
- // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_holder_transaction if we get a confirmation.
- return res
}
- Vec::new()
+ // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
+ // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_holder_transaction if we get a confirmation.
+ return res;
}
/// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_holder_commitment_txn used by our test framework
#[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
pub fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest holder commitment transaction!");
- if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
- let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
- let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
- for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
- if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
- let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
- if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
- // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
- continue;
- }
- } else { None };
- if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
- &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
- res.push(htlc_tx);
+ let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
+ let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
+ let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
+ for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
+ if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
+ let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
+ if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
+ // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
+ continue;
}
+ } else { None };
+ if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
+ &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
+ res.push(htlc_tx);
}
}
- return res
}
- Vec::new()
+ return res
}
/// Processes transactions in a newly connected block, which may result in any of the following:
}
if should_broadcast {
self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(self.funding_info.0));
- if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
- self.holder_tx_signed = true;
- let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
- let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &commitment_tx);
- if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
- watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
- }
- claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
+ let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
+ self.holder_tx_signed = true;
+ let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
+ let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &commitment_tx);
+ if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
+ watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
}
+ claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
}
if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&height) {
for ev in events {
break;
} else if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
if broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
- spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
+ spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor {
outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
per_commitment_point: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1,
to_self_delay: self.on_holder_tx_csv,
output: outp.clone(),
- key_derivation_params: self.keys.key_derivation_params(),
revocation_pubkey: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.clone(),
- });
+ channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
+ channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
+ }));
break;
}
} else if self.counterparty_payment_script == outp.script_pubkey {
- spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutputCounterpartyPayment {
+ spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor {
outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
output: outp.clone(),
- key_derivation_params: self.keys.key_derivation_params(),
- });
+ channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
+ channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
+ }));
break;
} else if outp.script_pubkey == self.shutdown_script {
spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
/// transaction and losing money. This is a risk because previous channel states
/// are toxic, so it's important that whatever channel state is persisted is
/// kept up-to-date.
-pub trait Persist<Keys: ChannelKeys>: Send + Sync {
+pub trait Persist<ChannelSigner: Sign>: Send + Sync {
/// Persist a new channel's data. The data can be stored any way you want, but
/// the identifier provided by Rust-Lightning is the channel's outpoint (and
/// it is up to you to maintain a correct mapping between the outpoint and the
///
/// [`ChannelMonitor::serialize_for_disk`]: struct.ChannelMonitor.html#method.serialize_for_disk
/// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr`]: enum.ChannelMonitorUpdateErr.html
- fn persist_new_channel(&self, id: OutPoint, data: &ChannelMonitor<Keys>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
+ fn persist_new_channel(&self, id: OutPoint, data: &ChannelMonitor<ChannelSigner>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
/// Update one channel's data. The provided `ChannelMonitor` has already
/// applied the given update.
/// [`ChannelMonitor::serialize_for_disk`]: struct.ChannelMonitor.html#method.serialize_for_disk
/// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate::write`]: struct.ChannelMonitorUpdate.html#method.write
/// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr`]: enum.ChannelMonitorUpdateErr.html
- fn update_persisted_channel(&self, id: OutPoint, update: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, data: &ChannelMonitor<Keys>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
+ fn update_persisted_channel(&self, id: OutPoint, update: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, data: &ChannelMonitor<ChannelSigner>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
+}
+
+impl<Signer: Sign, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for (RefCell<ChannelMonitor<Signer>>, T, F, L)
+where
+ T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
+ F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+ L::Target: Logger,
+{
+ fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
+ let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
+ self.0.borrow_mut().block_connected(&block.header, &txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
+ }
+
+ fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
+ self.0.borrow_mut().block_disconnected(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
+ }
}
const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
-impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable> Readable for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) {
- fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>> ReadableArgs<&'a K>
+ for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<Signer>) {
+ fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_manager: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
($key: expr) => {
match $key {
let counterparty_payment_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
let shutdown_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let channel_keys_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let holder_revocation_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
// Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
// barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
let outpoint = OutPoint {
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
}
- let onchain_tx_handler = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let onchain_tx_handler = ReadableArgs::read(reader, keys_manager)?;
let lockdown_from_offchain = Readable::read(reader)?;
let holder_tx_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
+
Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
latest_update_id,
commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
counterparty_payment_script,
shutdown_script,
- keys,
+ channel_keys_id,
+ holder_revocation_basepoint,
funding_info,
current_counterparty_commitment_txid,
prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
holder_tx_signed,
last_block_hash,
- secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
+ secp_ctx,
}))
}
}
use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
- use chain::keysinterface::InMemoryChannelKeys;
+ use chain::keysinterface::InMemorySigner;
#[test]
fn test_prune_preimages() {
}
}
- let keys = InMemoryChannelKeys::new(
+ let keys = InMemorySigner::new(
&secp_ctx,
SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
[41; 32],
0,
- (0, 0)
+ [0; 32]
);
let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
};
// Prune with one old state and a holder commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
// old state.
- let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys,
+ let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(Secp256k1::new(), keys,
&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()), 0, &Script::new(),
(OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()),
&channel_parameters,
sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
}
}
- assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
+ assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemorySigner>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
// Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
claim_tx.input.clear();
sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
}
}
- assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
+ assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemorySigner>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
// Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
claim_tx.input.clear();
sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
}
}
- assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
+ assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemorySigner>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
}
// Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff