Merge pull request #2625 from tnull/2023-09-moar-tests-n-fixes
[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / chain / channelmonitor.rs
index 9fa947a82da1d9c9cbe42dbc98e57e33f3161955..bd0c15484283b5a12d0c815d13afb9310acb688e 100644 (file)
 
 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint, TxOut, Transaction};
-use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
-use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
 
 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
-use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
+use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
 
 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
@@ -1141,8 +1140,9 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
                          best_block: BestBlock, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey) -> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 
                assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
-               let payment_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
-               let counterparty_payment_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_key_hash[..]).into_script();
+               let counterparty_payment_script = chan_utils::get_counterparty_payment_script(
+                       &channel_parameters.channel_type_features, &keys.pubkeys().payment_point
+               );
 
                let counterparty_channel_parameters = channel_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap();
                let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint;
@@ -1311,7 +1311,7 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
                &self,
                updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate,
                broadcaster: &B,
-               fee_estimator: F,
+               fee_estimator: &F,
                logger: &L,
        ) -> Result<(), ()>
        where
@@ -1672,6 +1672,8 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 
        /// Returns the descriptors for relevant outputs (i.e., those that we can spend) within the
        /// transaction if they exist and the transaction has at least [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`]
+       /// confirmations. For [`SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput`] descriptors to be
+       /// returned, the transaction must have at least `max(ANTI_REORG_DELAY, to_self_delay)`
        /// confirmations.
        ///
        /// Descriptors returned by this method are primarily exposed via [`Event::SpendableOutputs`]
@@ -1680,8 +1682,7 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
        /// missed/unhandled descriptors. For the purpose of gathering historical records, if the
        /// channel close has fully resolved (i.e., [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] returns
        /// an empty set), you can retrieve all spendable outputs by providing all descendant spending
-       /// transactions starting from the channel's funding or closing transaction that have at least
-       /// [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`] confirmations.
+       /// transactions starting from the channel's funding transaction and going down three levels.
        ///
        /// `tx` is a transaction we'll scan the outputs of. Any transaction can be provided. If any
        /// outputs which can be spent by us are found, at least one descriptor is returned.
@@ -1690,11 +1691,26 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
        pub fn get_spendable_outputs(&self, tx: &Transaction, confirmation_height: u32) -> Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
                let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
                let current_height = inner.best_block.height;
-               if current_height.saturating_sub(ANTI_REORG_DELAY) + 1 >= confirmation_height {
-                       inner.get_spendable_outputs(tx)
-               } else {
-                       Vec::new()
-               }
+               let mut spendable_outputs = inner.get_spendable_outputs(tx);
+               spendable_outputs.retain(|descriptor| {
+                       let mut conf_threshold = current_height.saturating_sub(ANTI_REORG_DELAY) + 1;
+                       if let SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(descriptor) = descriptor {
+                               conf_threshold = cmp::min(conf_threshold,
+                                       current_height.saturating_sub(descriptor.to_self_delay as u32) + 1);
+                       }
+                       conf_threshold >= confirmation_height
+               });
+               spendable_outputs
+       }
+
+       #[cfg(test)]
+       pub fn get_counterparty_payment_script(&self) -> Script{
+               self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_payment_script.clone()
+       }
+
+       #[cfg(test)]
+       pub fn set_counterparty_payment_script(&self, script: Script) {
+               self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_payment_script = script;
        }
 }
 
@@ -1735,7 +1751,19 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
                                },
                                OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
                                        descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(ref descriptor) }
-                               if descriptor.outpoint.index as u32 == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx => {
+                               if event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx| tx.input.iter().enumerate()
+                                       .any(|(input_idx, inp)|
+                                                Some(inp.previous_output.txid) == confirmed_txid &&
+                                                       inp.previous_output.vout == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx &&
+                                                               // A maturing output for an HTLC claim will always be at the same
+                                                               // index as the HTLC input. This is true pre-anchors, as there's
+                                                               // only 1 input and 1 output. This is also true post-anchors,
+                                                               // because we have a SIGHASH_SINGLE|ANYONECANPAY signature from our
+                                                               // channel counterparty.
+                                                               descriptor.outpoint.index as usize == input_idx
+                                       ))
+                                       .unwrap_or(false)
+                               => {
                                        debug_assert!(holder_delayed_output_pending.is_none());
                                        holder_delayed_output_pending = Some(event.confirmation_threshold());
                                },
@@ -1876,8 +1904,7 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
        /// confirmations on the claim transaction.
        ///
        /// Note that for `ChannelMonitors` which track a channel which went on-chain with versions of
-       /// LDK prior to 0.0.111, balances may not be fully captured if our counterparty broadcasted
-       /// a revoked state.
+       /// LDK prior to 0.0.111, not all or excess balances may be included.
        ///
        /// See [`Balance`] for additional details on the types of claimable balances which
        /// may be returned here and their meanings.
@@ -2263,6 +2290,7 @@ macro_rules! fail_unbroadcast_htlcs {
 
 #[cfg(test)]
 pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() -> Vec<u8> {
+       use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
        let mut ret = [opcodes::all::OP_NOP.to_u8(); 136];
        ret[131] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
        ret[132] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
@@ -2587,7 +2615,7 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
                self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(self.funding_info.0));
        }
 
-       pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()>
+       pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()>
        where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
                F::Target: FeeEstimator,
                L::Target: Logger,
@@ -2627,7 +2655,7 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
                        panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
                }
                let mut ret = Ok(());
-               let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&*fee_estimator);
+               let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&**fee_estimator);
                for update in updates.updates.iter() {
                        match update {
                                ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, claimed_htlcs, nondust_htlc_sources } => {
@@ -4073,6 +4101,7 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
                                        output: outp.clone(),
                                        channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
                                        channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
+                                       channel_transaction_parameters: Some(self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.clone()),
                                }));
                        }
                        if self.shutdown_script.as_ref() == Some(&outp.script_pubkey) {
@@ -4175,7 +4204,7 @@ impl<'a, 'b, ES: EntropySource, SP: SignerProvider> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP
                        1 => { None },
                        _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
                };
-               let counterparty_payment_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
+               let mut counterparty_payment_script: Script = Readable::read(reader)?;
                let shutdown_script = {
                        let script = <Script as Readable>::read(reader)?;
                        if script.is_empty() { None } else { Some(script) }
@@ -4376,6 +4405,17 @@ impl<'a, 'b, ES: EntropySource, SP: SignerProvider> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP
                        (17, initial_counterparty_commitment_info, option),
                });
 
+               // Monitors for anchor outputs channels opened in v0.0.116 suffered from a bug in which the
+               // wrong `counterparty_payment_script` was being tracked. Fix it now on deserialization to
+               // give them a chance to recognize the spendable output.
+               if onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() &&
+                       counterparty_payment_script.is_v0_p2wpkh()
+               {
+                       let payment_point = onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys.payment_point;
+                       counterparty_payment_script =
+                               chan_utils::get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript(&payment_point).to_v0_p2wsh();
+               }
+
                Ok((best_block.block_hash(), ChannelMonitor::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
                        latest_update_id,
                        commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
@@ -4541,7 +4581,7 @@ mod tests {
 
                let broadcaster = TestBroadcaster::with_blocks(Arc::clone(&nodes[1].blocks));
                assert!(
-                       pre_update_monitor.update_monitor(&replay_update, &&broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &nodes[1].logger)
+                       pre_update_monitor.update_monitor(&replay_update, &&broadcaster, &&chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &nodes[1].logger)
                        .is_err());
                // Even though we error'd on the first update, we should still have generated an HTLC claim
                // transaction