/// An update generated by the underlying Channel itself which contains some new information the
/// ChannelMonitor should be made aware of.
-#[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq))]
+#[cfg_attr(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))]
#[derive(Clone)]
#[must_use]
pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
pub(crate) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
/// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this
/// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly
- /// increasing and increase by one for each new update.
+ /// increasing and increase by one for each new update, with one exception specified below.
///
/// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned
/// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure have been applied to all copies of a given
/// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called.
+ ///
+ /// The only instance where update_id values are not strictly increasing is the case where we
+ /// allow post-force-close updates with a special update ID of [`CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID`]. See
+ /// its docs for more details.
+ ///
+ /// [`CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID`]: constant.CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID.html
pub update_id: u64,
}
+/// If:
+/// (1) a channel has been force closed and
+/// (2) we receive a preimage from a forward link that allows us to spend an HTLC output on
+/// this channel's (the backward link's) broadcasted commitment transaction
+/// then we allow the `ChannelManager` to send a `ChannelMonitorUpdate` with this update ID,
+/// with the update providing said payment preimage. No other update types are allowed after
+/// force-close.
+pub const CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID: u64 = std::u64::MAX;
+
impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
self.update_id.write(w)?;
}
/// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
-#[derive(Clone)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
/// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower or remote backup of
/// our state failed, but is expected to succeed at some point in the future).
/// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::update_monitor this
/// means you tried to update a monitor for a different channel or the ChannelMonitorUpdate was
/// corrupted.
-/// Contains a human-readable error message.
+/// Contains a developer-readable error message.
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
/// An event to be processed by the ChannelManager.
-#[derive(PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
pub enum MonitorEvent {
/// A monitor event containing an HTLCUpdate.
HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate),
const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
-#[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq))]
+#[cfg_attr(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))]
#[derive(Clone)]
pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
}
-#[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+#[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
/// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
/// underlying object
impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
/// the "reorg path" (ie disconnecting blocks until you find a common ancestor from both the
/// returned block hash and the the current chain and then reconnecting blocks to get to the
/// best chain) upon deserializing the object!
- pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
+ pub fn serialize_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
//TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
//serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
/// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
/// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
- pub(crate) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage) {
+ pub(crate) fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L)
+ where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
+ F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+ L::Target: Logger,
+ {
self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
+
+ // If the channel is force closed, try to claim the output from this preimage.
+ // First check if a counterparty commitment transaction has been broadcasted:
+ macro_rules! claim_htlcs {
+ ($commitment_number: expr, $txid: expr) => {
+ let htlc_claim_reqs = self.get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs($commitment_number, $txid, None);
+ self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), htlc_claim_reqs, None, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
+ }
+ }
+ if let Some(txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
+ if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
+ claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+ if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
+ if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
+ claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Then if a holder commitment transaction has been seen on-chain, broadcast transactions
+ // claiming the HTLC output from each of the holder commitment transactions.
+ // Note that we can't just use `self.holder_tx_signed`, because that only covers the case where
+ // *we* sign a holder commitment transaction, not when e.g. a watchtower broadcasts one of our
+ // holder commitment transactions.
+ if self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.is_some() {
+ let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
+ self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), claim_reqs, None, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
+ if let Some(ref tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
+ let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&tx);
+ self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), claim_reqs, None, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
+ }
+ }
}
pub(crate) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L)
/// itself.
///
/// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id.
- pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, mut updates: ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError>
- where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
- L::Target: Logger,
+ pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError>
+ where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
+ F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+ L::Target: Logger,
{
- if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
+ // ChannelMonitor updates may be applied after force close if we receive a
+ // preimage for a broadcasted commitment transaction HTLC output that we'd
+ // like to claim on-chain. If this is the case, we no longer have guaranteed
+ // access to the monitor's update ID, so we use a sentinel value instead.
+ if updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
+ match updates.updates[0] {
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate that wasn't providing a payment preimage"),
+ }
+ assert_eq!(updates.updates.len(), 1);
+ } else if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
}
- for update in updates.updates.drain(..) {
+ for update in updates.updates.iter() {
match update {
ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
+ log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest holder commitment transaction info");
if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
- self.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx_info(commitment_tx, htlc_outputs)?
+ self.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx_info(commitment_tx.clone(), htlc_outputs.clone())?
+ },
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } => {
+ log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest counterparty commitment transaction info");
+ self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs.clone(), *commitment_number, *their_revocation_point, logger)
+ },
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } => {
+ log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with payment preimage");
+ self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
+ },
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } => {
+ log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with commitment secret");
+ self.provide_secret(*idx, *secret)?
},
- ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } =>
- self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point, logger),
- ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } =>
- self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage),
- ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } =>
- self.provide_secret(idx, secret)?,
ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } => {
+ log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor: channel force closed, should broadcast: {}", should_broadcast);
self.lockdown_from_offchain = true;
- if should_broadcast {
+ if *should_broadcast {
self.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger);
} else {
log_error!(logger, "You have a toxic holder commitment transaction avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take");
check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop);
}
+ let htlc_claim_reqs = self.get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs(commitment_number, commitment_txid, Some(tx));
+ for req in htlc_claim_reqs {
+ claimable_outpoints.push(req);
+ }
+
+ }
+ (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
+ }
+
+ fn get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs(&self, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: Txid, tx: Option<&Transaction>) -> Vec<ClaimRequest> {
+ let mut claims = Vec::new();
+ if let Some(htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid) {
if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
let revocation_point_option =
+ // If the counterparty commitment tx is the latest valid state, use their latest
+ // per-commitment point
if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
+ // If counterparty commitment tx is the state previous to the latest valid state, use
+ // their previous per-commitment point (non-atomicity of revocation means it's valid for
+ // them to temporarily have two valid commitment txns from our viewpoint)
if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
} else { None };
if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
- self.counterparty_payment_script = {
- // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
- // script_pubkey version
- let payment_hash160 = WPubkeyHash::hash(&self.keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
- Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script()
- };
-
- // Then, try to find htlc outputs
- for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
+ for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in htlc_outputs.iter().enumerate() {
if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
- if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
- tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
- return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
+ if let Some(transaction) = tx {
+ if transaction_output_index as usize >= transaction.output.len() ||
+ transaction.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
+ return claims; // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
+ }
}
- let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
+ let preimage =
+ if htlc.offered {
+ if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
+ Some(*p)
+ } else { None }
+ } else { None };
let aggregable = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
let witness_data = InputMaterial::CounterpartyHTLC { per_commitment_point: *revocation_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, preimage, htlc: htlc.clone() };
- claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data });
+ claims.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data });
}
}
}
}
}
}
- (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
+ claims
}
/// Attempts to claim a counterparty HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
(claimable_outpoints, Some((htlc_txid, outputs)))
}
- fn broadcast_by_holder_state(&self, commitment_tx: &Transaction, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>, Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>) {
+ // Returns (1) `ClaimRequest`s that can be given to the OnChainTxHandler, so that the handler can
+ // broadcast transactions claiming holder HTLC commitment outputs and (2) a holder revokable
+ // script so we can detect whether a holder transaction has been seen on-chain.
+ fn get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>) {
let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
- let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&holder_tx.revocation_key, self.on_holder_tx_csv, &holder_tx.delayed_payment_key);
let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = Some((redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(), holder_tx.per_commitment_point.clone(), holder_tx.revocation_key.clone()));
} else { None },
amount: htlc.amount_msat,
}});
- watch_outputs.push((transaction_output_index, commitment_tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone()));
}
}
- (claim_requests, watch_outputs, broadcasted_holder_revokable_script)
+ (claim_requests, broadcasted_holder_revokable_script)
+ }
+
+ // Returns holder HTLC outputs to watch and react to in case of spending.
+ fn get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, commitment_tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<(u32, TxOut)> {
+ let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
+ for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
+ if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
+ watch_outputs.push((transaction_output_index, commitment_tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone()));
+ }
+ }
+ watch_outputs
}
/// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
}
macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
- ($updates: expr) => {
+ ($updates: expr, $to_watch: expr) => {
claim_requests = $updates.0;
- watch_outputs.append(&mut $updates.1);
- self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = $updates.2;
+ self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = $updates.1;
+ watch_outputs.append(&mut $to_watch);
}
}
if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
is_holder_tx = true;
log_trace!(logger, "Got latest holder commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
- let mut res = self.broadcast_by_holder_state(tx, &self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
- append_onchain_update!(res);
+ let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
+ let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, tx);
+ append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
} else if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
if holder_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
is_holder_tx = true;
log_trace!(logger, "Got previous holder commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
- let mut res = self.broadcast_by_holder_state(tx, holder_tx);
- append_onchain_update!(res);
+ let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(holder_tx);
+ let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(holder_tx, tx);
+ append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
}
}
self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(self.funding_info.0));
if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
self.holder_tx_signed = true;
- let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs, _) = self.broadcast_by_holder_state(&commitment_tx, &self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
+ let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
+ let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &commitment_tx);
if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
}
}
}
- self.onchain_tx_handler.block_connected(&txn_matched, claimable_outpoints, height, &*broadcaster, &*fee_estimator, &*logger);
+ self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&txn_matched, claimable_outpoints, Some(height), &&*broadcaster, &&*fee_estimator, &&*logger);
self.last_block_hash = block_hash;
// Determine new outputs to watch by comparing against previously known outputs to watch,
let idx_and_scripts = txouts.iter().map(|o| (o.0, o.1.script_pubkey.clone())).collect();
self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), idx_and_scripts).is_none()
});
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ {
+ // If we see a transaction for which we registered outputs previously,
+ // make sure the registered scriptpubkey at the expected index match
+ // the actual transaction output one. We failed this case before #653.
+ for tx in &txn_matched {
+ if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&tx.txid()) {
+ for idx_and_script in outputs.iter() {
+ assert!((idx_and_script.0 as usize) < tx.output.len());
+ assert_eq!(tx.output[idx_and_script.0 as usize].script_pubkey, idx_and_script.1);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
watch_outputs
}
if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
for (idx, _script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
if *idx == input.previous_output.vout {
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ {
+ // If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
+ // appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
+ // actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
+ if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
+ assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&Script::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().clone()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
+ } else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
+ assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
+ } else { panic!(); }
+ }
return true;
}
}
}
}
+/// `Persist` defines behavior for persisting channel monitors: this could mean
+/// writing once to disk, and/or uploading to one or more backup services.
+///
+/// Note that for every new monitor, you **must** persist the new `ChannelMonitor`
+/// to disk/backups. And, on every update, you **must** persist either the
+/// `ChannelMonitorUpdate` or the updated monitor itself. Otherwise, there is risk
+/// of situations such as revoking a transaction, then crashing before this
+/// revocation can be persisted, then unintentionally broadcasting a revoked
+/// transaction and losing money. This is a risk because previous channel states
+/// are toxic, so it's important that whatever channel state is persisted is
+/// kept up-to-date.
+pub trait Persist<Keys: ChannelKeys>: Send + Sync {
+ /// Persist a new channel's data. The data can be stored any way you want, but
+ /// the identifier provided by Rust-Lightning is the channel's outpoint (and
+ /// it is up to you to maintain a correct mapping between the outpoint and the
+ /// stored channel data). Note that you **must** persist every new monitor to
+ /// disk. See the `Persist` trait documentation for more details.
+ ///
+ /// See [`ChannelMonitor::serialize_for_disk`] for writing out a `ChannelMonitor`,
+ /// and [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr`] for requirements when returning errors.
+ ///
+ /// [`ChannelMonitor::serialize_for_disk`]: struct.ChannelMonitor.html#method.serialize_for_disk
+ /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr`]: enum.ChannelMonitorUpdateErr.html
+ fn persist_new_channel(&self, id: OutPoint, data: &ChannelMonitor<Keys>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
+
+ /// Update one channel's data. The provided `ChannelMonitor` has already
+ /// applied the given update.
+ ///
+ /// Note that on every update, you **must** persist either the
+ /// `ChannelMonitorUpdate` or the updated monitor itself to disk/backups. See
+ /// the `Persist` trait documentation for more details.
+ ///
+ /// If an implementer chooses to persist the updates only, they need to make
+ /// sure that all the updates are applied to the `ChannelMonitors` *before*
+ /// the set of channel monitors is given to the `ChannelManager`
+ /// deserialization routine. See [`ChannelMonitor::update_monitor`] for
+ /// applying a monitor update to a monitor. If full `ChannelMonitors` are
+ /// persisted, then there is no need to persist individual updates.
+ ///
+ /// Note that there could be a performance tradeoff between persisting complete
+ /// channel monitors on every update vs. persisting only updates and applying
+ /// them in batches. The size of each monitor grows `O(number of state updates)`
+ /// whereas updates are small and `O(1)`.
+ ///
+ /// See [`ChannelMonitor::serialize_for_disk`] for writing out a `ChannelMonitor`,
+ /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate::write`] for writing out an update, and
+ /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr`] for requirements when returning errors.
+ ///
+ /// [`ChannelMonitor::update_monitor`]: struct.ChannelMonitor.html#impl-1
+ /// [`ChannelMonitor::serialize_for_disk`]: struct.ChannelMonitor.html#method.serialize_for_disk
+ /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate::write`]: struct.ChannelMonitorUpdate.html#method.write
+ /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr`]: enum.ChannelMonitorUpdateErr.html
+ fn update_persisted_channel(&self, id: OutPoint, update: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, data: &ChannelMonitor<Keys>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
+}
+
const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable> Readable for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) {
use ln::onchaintx::{OnchainTxHandler, InputDescriptors};
use ln::chan_utils;
use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, HolderCommitmentTransaction};
- use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
+ use util::test_utils::{TestLogger, TestBroadcaster, TestFeeEstimator};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
- use std::sync::Arc;
+ use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
use chain::keysinterface::InMemoryChannelKeys;
#[test]
fn test_prune_preimages() {
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
+ let broadcaster = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
+ let fee_estimator = Arc::new(TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
- monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
+ monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger);
}
// Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff