Merge pull request #2697 from jkczyz/2023-10-offer-functional-tests
[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / chain / channelmonitor.rs
index e862b5cdde52636019dc548e720caa8f145c1352..c81a48b78ac8b4aa6fba1facae191f7190e27d51 100644 (file)
@@ -71,6 +71,15 @@ use crate::sync::{Mutex, LockTestExt};
 #[must_use]
 pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
        pub(crate) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
+       /// Historically, [`ChannelMonitor`]s didn't know their counterparty node id. However,
+       /// `ChannelManager` really wants to know it so that it can easily look up the corresponding
+       /// channel. For now, this results in a temporary map in `ChannelManager` to look up channels
+       /// by only the funding outpoint.
+       ///
+       /// To eventually remove that, we repeat the counterparty node id here so that we can upgrade
+       /// `ChannelMonitor`s to become aware of the counterparty node id if they were generated prior
+       /// to when it was stored directly in them.
+       pub(crate) counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
        /// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this
        /// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly
        /// increasing and increase by one for each new update, with two exceptions specified below.
@@ -107,7 +116,9 @@ impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
                for update_step in self.updates.iter() {
                        update_step.write(w)?;
                }
-               write_tlv_fields!(w, {});
+               write_tlv_fields!(w, {
+                       (1, self.counterparty_node_id, option),
+               });
                Ok(())
        }
 }
@@ -122,8 +133,11 @@ impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
                                updates.push(upd);
                        }
                }
-               read_tlv_fields!(r, {});
-               Ok(Self { update_id, updates })
+               let mut counterparty_node_id = None;
+               read_tlv_fields!(r, {
+                       (1, counterparty_node_id, option),
+               });
+               Ok(Self { update_id, counterparty_node_id, updates })
        }
 }
 
@@ -1382,15 +1396,22 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
        /// Loads the funding txo and outputs to watch into the given `chain::Filter` by repeatedly
        /// calling `chain::Filter::register_output` and `chain::Filter::register_tx` until all outputs
        /// have been registered.
-       pub fn load_outputs_to_watch<F: Deref>(&self, filter: &F) where F::Target: chain::Filter {
+       pub fn load_outputs_to_watch<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&self, filter: &F, logger: &L) 
+       where 
+               F::Target: chain::Filter, L::Target: Logger,
+       {
                let lock = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
+               let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*lock);
+               log_trace!(&logger, "Registering funding outpoint {}", &lock.get_funding_txo().0);
                filter.register_tx(&lock.get_funding_txo().0.txid, &lock.get_funding_txo().1);
                for (txid, outputs) in lock.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() {
                        for (index, script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
                                assert!(*index <= u16::max_value() as u32);
+                               let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: *txid, index: *index as u16 };
+                               log_trace!(logger, "Registering outpoint {} with the filter for monitoring spends", outpoint);
                                filter.register_output(WatchedOutput {
                                        block_hash: None,
-                                       outpoint: OutPoint { txid: *txid, index: *index as u16 },
+                                       outpoint,
                                        script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
                                });
                        }
@@ -2284,7 +2305,7 @@ macro_rules! fail_unbroadcast_htlcs {
                                                        // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
                                                        // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
                                                        // need to here.
-                                                       let confirmed_htlcs_iter: &mut Iterator<Item = (&HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = &mut $confirmed_htlcs_list;
+                                                       let confirmed_htlcs_iter: &mut dyn Iterator<Item = (&HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = &mut $confirmed_htlcs_list;
 
                                                        let mut matched_htlc = false;
                                                        for (ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in confirmed_htlcs_iter {
@@ -2731,6 +2752,15 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
                        log_info!(logger, "Applying update to monitor {}, bringing update_id from {} to {} with {} change(s).",
                                log_funding_info!(self), self.latest_update_id, updates.update_id, updates.updates.len());
                }
+
+               if updates.counterparty_node_id.is_some() {
+                       if self.counterparty_node_id.is_none() {
+                               self.counterparty_node_id = updates.counterparty_node_id;
+                       } else {
+                               debug_assert_eq!(self.counterparty_node_id, updates.counterparty_node_id);
+                       }
+               }
+
                // ChannelMonitor updates may be applied after force close if we receive a preimage for a
                // broadcasted commitment transaction HTLC output that we'd like to claim on-chain. If this
                // is the case, we no longer have guaranteed access to the monitor's update ID, so we use a
@@ -3532,9 +3562,11 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 
                if height > self.best_block.height() {
                        self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
+                       log_trace!(logger, "Connecting new block {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
                        self.block_confirmed(height, block_hash, vec![], vec![], vec![], &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, logger)
                } else if block_hash != self.best_block.block_hash() {
                        self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
+                       log_trace!(logger, "Best block re-orged, replaced with new block {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
                        self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height <= height);
                        self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height + 1, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
                        Vec::new()
@@ -3571,6 +3603,7 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
                let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
                'tx_iter: for tx in &txn_matched {
                        let txid = tx.txid();
+                       log_trace!(logger, "Transaction {} confirmed in block {}", txid , block_hash);
                        // If a transaction has already been confirmed, ensure we don't bother processing it duplicatively.
                        if Some(txid) == self.funding_spend_confirmed {
                                log_debug!(logger, "Skipping redundant processing of funding-spend tx {} as it was previously confirmed", txid);
@@ -4775,7 +4808,7 @@ mod tests {
                                preimages_slice_to_htlcs!($preimages_slice).into_iter().map(|(htlc, _)| (htlc, None)).collect()
                        }
                }
-               let dummy_sig = crate::util::crypto::sign(&secp_ctx,
+               let dummy_sig = crate::crypto::utils::sign(&secp_ctx,
                        &bitcoin::secp256k1::Message::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(),
                        &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());