/// much smaller than a full [`ChannelMonitor`]. However, for large single commitment transaction
/// updates (e.g. ones during which there are hundreds of HTLCs pending on the commitment
/// transaction), a single update may reach upwards of 1 MiB in serialized size.
-#[cfg_attr(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq, Eq))]
-#[derive(Clone)]
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
#[must_use]
pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
pub(crate) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
/// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this
/// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly
- /// increasing and increase by one for each new update, with one exception specified below.
+ /// increasing and increase by one for each new update, with two exceptions specified below.
///
/// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned
/// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`] have been applied to all copies of a given
/// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called.
///
- /// The only instance where update_id values are not strictly increasing is the case where we
- /// allow post-force-close updates with a special update ID of [`CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID`]. See
- /// its docs for more details.
+ /// The only instances we allow where update_id values are not strictly increasing have a
+ /// special update ID of [`CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID`]. This update ID is used for updates that
+ /// will force close the channel by broadcasting the latest commitment transaction or
+ /// special post-force-close updates, like providing preimages necessary to claim outputs on the
+ /// broadcast commitment transaction. See its docs for more details.
///
/// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
pub update_id: u64,
}
-/// If:
-/// (1) a channel has been force closed and
-/// (2) we receive a preimage from a forward link that allows us to spend an HTLC output on
-/// this channel's (the backward link's) broadcasted commitment transaction
-/// then we allow the `ChannelManager` to send a `ChannelMonitorUpdate` with this update ID,
-/// with the update providing said payment preimage. No other update types are allowed after
-/// force-close.
+/// The update ID used for a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] that is either:
+///
+/// (1) attempting to force close the channel by broadcasting our latest commitment transaction or
+/// (2) providing a preimage (after the channel has been force closed) from a forward link that
+/// allows us to spend an HTLC output on this channel's (the backward link's) broadcasted
+/// commitment transaction.
+///
+/// No other [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are allowed after force-close.
pub const CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID: u64 = core::u64::MAX;
impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
);
-#[cfg_attr(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq, Eq))]
-#[derive(Clone)]
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
+ /// Note that LDK after 0.0.115 supports this only containing dust HTLCs (implying the
+ /// `Signature` field is never filled in). At that point, non-dust HTLCs are implied by the
+ /// HTLC fields in `commitment_tx` and the sources passed via `nondust_htlc_sources`.
htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
claimed_htlcs: Vec<(SentHTLCId, PaymentPreimage)>,
+ nondust_htlc_sources: Vec<HTLCSource>,
},
LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
commitment_txid: Txid,
(0, commitment_tx, required),
(1, claimed_htlcs, vec_type),
(2, htlc_outputs, vec_type),
+ (4, nondust_htlc_sources, optional_vec),
},
(1, LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo) => {
(0, commitment_txid, required),
&self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
) -> Result<(), ()> {
- self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(holder_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, &Vec::new()).map_err(|_| ())
+ self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(holder_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, &Vec::new(), Vec::new()).map_err(|_| ())
}
/// This is used to provide payment preimage(s) out-of-band during startup without updating the
payment_hash, payment_preimage, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
}
- pub(crate) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(
- &self,
- broadcaster: &B,
- logger: &L,
- ) where
- B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
- L::Target: Logger,
- {
- self.inner.lock().unwrap().broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger);
- }
-
/// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
/// itself.
///
/// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
/// up-to-date as our holder commitment transaction is updated.
/// Panics if set_on_holder_tx_csv has never been called.
- fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(&mut self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>, claimed_htlcs: &[(SentHTLCId, PaymentPreimage)]) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
+ fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(&mut self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction, mut htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>, claimed_htlcs: &[(SentHTLCId, PaymentPreimage)], nondust_htlc_sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
+ if htlc_outputs.iter().any(|(_, s, _)| s.is_some()) {
+ // If we have non-dust HTLCs in htlc_outputs, ensure they match the HTLCs in the
+ // `holder_commitment_tx`. In the future, we'll no longer provide the redundant data
+ // and just pass in source data via `nondust_htlc_sources`.
+ debug_assert_eq!(htlc_outputs.iter().filter(|(_, s, _)| s.is_some()).count(), holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().len());
+ for (a, b) in htlc_outputs.iter().filter(|(_, s, _)| s.is_some()).map(|(h, _, _)| h).zip(holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().iter()) {
+ debug_assert_eq!(a, b);
+ }
+ debug_assert_eq!(htlc_outputs.iter().filter(|(_, s, _)| s.is_some()).count(), holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.len());
+ for (a, b) in htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(_, s, _)| s.as_ref()).zip(holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter()) {
+ debug_assert_eq!(a, b);
+ }
+ debug_assert!(nondust_htlc_sources.is_empty());
+ } else {
+ // If we don't have any non-dust HTLCs in htlc_outputs, assume they were all passed via
+ // `nondust_htlc_sources`, building up the final htlc_outputs by combining
+ // `nondust_htlc_sources` and the `holder_commitment_tx`
+ #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
+ let mut prev = -1;
+ for htlc in holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().iter() {
+ assert!(htlc.transaction_output_index.unwrap() as i32 > prev);
+ prev = htlc.transaction_output_index.unwrap() as i32;
+ }
+ }
+ debug_assert!(htlc_outputs.iter().all(|(htlc, _, _)| htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none()));
+ debug_assert!(htlc_outputs.iter().all(|(_, sig_opt, _)| sig_opt.is_none()));
+ debug_assert_eq!(holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().len(), holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.len());
+
+ let mut sources_iter = nondust_htlc_sources.into_iter();
+
+ for (htlc, counterparty_sig) in holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().iter()
+ .zip(holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter())
+ {
+ if htlc.offered {
+ let source = sources_iter.next().expect("Non-dust HTLC sources didn't match commitment tx");
+ #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
+ assert!(source.possibly_matches_output(htlc));
+ }
+ htlc_outputs.push((htlc.clone(), Some(counterparty_sig.clone()), Some(source)));
+ } else {
+ htlc_outputs.push((htlc.clone(), Some(counterparty_sig.clone()), None));
+ }
+ }
+ debug_assert!(sources_iter.next().is_none());
+ }
+
let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
{
log_info!(logger, "Applying update to monitor {}, bringing update_id from {} to {} with {} changes.",
log_funding_info!(self), self.latest_update_id, updates.update_id, updates.updates.len());
- // ChannelMonitor updates may be applied after force close if we receive a
- // preimage for a broadcasted commitment transaction HTLC output that we'd
- // like to claim on-chain. If this is the case, we no longer have guaranteed
- // access to the monitor's update ID, so we use a sentinel value instead.
+ // ChannelMonitor updates may be applied after force close if we receive a preimage for a
+ // broadcasted commitment transaction HTLC output that we'd like to claim on-chain. If this
+ // is the case, we no longer have guaranteed access to the monitor's update ID, so we use a
+ // sentinel value instead.
+ //
+ // The `ChannelManager` may also queue redundant `ChannelForceClosed` updates if it still
+ // thinks the channel needs to have its commitment transaction broadcast, so we'll allow
+ // them as well.
if updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
assert_eq!(updates.updates.len(), 1);
match updates.updates[0] {
- ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } => {},
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. } => {},
+ // We should have already seen a `ChannelForceClosed` update if we're trying to
+ // provide a preimage at this point.
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } =>
+ debug_assert_eq!(self.latest_update_id, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID),
_ => {
log_error!(logger, "Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate of type {}", updates.updates[0].variant_name());
panic!("Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate that wasn't providing a payment preimage");
let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&*fee_estimator);
for update in updates.updates.iter() {
match update {
- ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, claimed_htlcs } => {
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, claimed_htlcs, nondust_htlc_sources } => {
log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest holder commitment transaction info");
if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
- if let Err(e) = self.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(commitment_tx.clone(), htlc_outputs.clone(), &claimed_htlcs) {
+ if let Err(e) = self.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(commitment_tx.clone(), htlc_outputs.clone(), &claimed_htlcs, nondust_htlc_sources.clone()) {
log_error!(logger, "Providing latest holder commitment transaction failed/was refused:");
log_error!(logger, " {}", e);
ret = Err(());
},
}
}
+
+ // If the updates succeeded and we were in an already closed channel state, then there's no
+ // need to refuse any updates we expect to receive afer seeing a confirmed commitment.
+ if ret.is_ok() && updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID && self.latest_update_id == updates.update_id {
+ return Ok(());
+ }
+
self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
if ret.is_ok() && self.funding_spend_seen {
}
}
-impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
+impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, M, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for (M, T, F, L)
where
+ M: Deref<Target = ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
}
}
- macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
+ macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlcs {
($preimages_slice: expr) => {
{
let mut res = Vec::new();
cltv_expiry: 0,
payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
- }, None));
+ }, ()));
}
res
}
}
}
- macro_rules! preimages_to_holder_htlcs {
+ macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
($preimages_slice: expr) => {
- {
- let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
- let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
- res
- }
+ preimages_slice_to_htlcs!($preimages_slice).into_iter().map(|(htlc, _)| (htlc, None)).collect()
}
}
+ let dummy_sig = crate::util::crypto::sign(&secp_ctx,
+ &bitcoin::secp256k1::Message::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(),
+ &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
let shutdown_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(Network::Testnet);
let monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(Secp256k1::new(), keys,
- Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(shutdown_pubkey).into_inner()), 0, &Script::new(),
- (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()),
- &channel_parameters,
- Script::new(), 46, 0,
- HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), best_block, dummy_key);
-
- monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])).unwrap();
+ Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(shutdown_pubkey).into_inner()), 0, &Script::new(),
+ (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()),
+ &channel_parameters, Script::new(), 46, 0, HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut Vec::new()),
+ best_block, dummy_key);
+
+ let mut htlcs = preimages_slice_to_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]);
+ let dummy_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut htlcs);
+ monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(dummy_commitment_tx.clone(),
+ htlcs.into_iter().map(|(htlc, _)| (htlc, Some(dummy_sig), None)).collect()).unwrap();
monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_inner(Sha256::hash(b"1").into_inner()),
preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key, &logger);
monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_inner(Sha256::hash(b"2").into_inner()),
// Now update holder commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
// previous commitment tx's preimages too
- monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..5])).unwrap();
+ let mut htlcs = preimages_slice_to_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]);
+ let dummy_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut htlcs);
+ monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(dummy_commitment_tx.clone(),
+ htlcs.into_iter().map(|(htlc, _)| (htlc, Some(dummy_sig), None)).collect()).unwrap();
secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 12);
test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
// But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
- monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..3])).unwrap();
+ let mut htlcs = preimages_slice_to_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]);
+ let dummy_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut htlcs);
+ monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(dummy_commitment_tx,
+ htlcs.into_iter().map(|(htlc, _)| (htlc, Some(dummy_sig), None)).collect()).unwrap();
secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 5);
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff