//! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
//! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
-use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint, TxOut, Transaction};
-use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
-use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf};
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
-use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
+use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
-use bitcoin::{secp256k1, EcdsaSighashType};
+use bitcoin::secp256k1;
+use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
use crate::ln::channel::INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER;
use crate::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
use crate::chain::{BestBlock, WatchedOutput};
use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
-use crate::sign::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor, DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, SignerProvider, EntropySource};
+use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, SpendableOutputDescriptor, StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor, DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, SignerProvider, EntropySource};
use crate::chain::onchaintx::{ClaimEvent, OnchainTxHandler};
use crate::chain::package::{CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput, CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput, HolderFundingOutput, HolderHTLCOutput, PackageSolvingData, PackageTemplate, RevokedOutput, RevokedHTLCOutput};
use crate::chain::Filter;
use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, RequiredWrapper, MaybeReadable, UpgradableRequired, Writer, Writeable, U48};
use crate::util::byte_utils;
use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler};
-use crate::events::bump_transaction::{ChannelDerivationParameters, AnchorDescriptor, HTLCDescriptor, BumpTransactionEvent};
+use crate::events::bump_transaction::{AnchorDescriptor, BumpTransactionEvent};
use crate::prelude::*;
use core::{cmp, mem};
/// A monitor event containing an HTLCUpdate.
HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate),
- /// A monitor event that the Channel's commitment transaction was confirmed.
- CommitmentTxConfirmed(OutPoint),
+ /// Indicates we broadcasted the channel's latest commitment transaction and thus closed the
+ /// channel.
+ HolderForceClosed(OutPoint),
/// Indicates a [`ChannelMonitor`] update has completed. See
/// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`] for more information on how this is used.
/// same [`ChannelMonitor`] have been applied and persisted.
monitor_update_id: u64,
},
-
- /// Indicates a [`ChannelMonitor`] update has failed. See
- /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure`] for more information on how this is used.
- ///
- /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure
- UpdateFailed(OutPoint),
}
impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorEvent,
- // Note that Completed and UpdateFailed are currently never serialized to disk as they are
- // generated only in ChainMonitor
+ // Note that Completed is currently never serialized to disk as it is generated only in
+ // ChainMonitor.
(0, Completed) => {
(0, funding_txo, required),
(2, monitor_update_id, required),
},
;
(2, HTLCEvent),
- (4, CommitmentTxConfirmed),
- (6, UpdateFailed),
+ (4, HolderForceClosed),
+ // 6 was `UpdateFailed` until LDK 0.0.117
);
/// Simple structure sent back by `chain::Watch` when an HTLC from a forward channel is detected on
should_broadcast: bool,
},
ShutdownScript {
- scriptpubkey: Script,
+ scriptpubkey: ScriptBuf,
},
}
latest_update_id: u64,
commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
- destination_script: Script,
- broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>,
- counterparty_payment_script: Script,
- shutdown_script: Option<Script>,
+ destination_script: ScriptBuf,
+ broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: Option<(ScriptBuf, PublicKey, PublicKey)>,
+ counterparty_payment_script: ScriptBuf,
+ shutdown_script: Option<ScriptBuf>,
channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
holder_revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
- funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
+ funding_info: (OutPoint, ScriptBuf),
current_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
counterparty_commitment_params: CounterpartyCommitmentParameters,
- funding_redeemscript: Script,
+ funding_redeemscript: ScriptBuf,
channel_value_satoshis: u64,
// first is the idx of the first of the two per-commitment points
their_cur_per_commitment_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
// interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
// be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
// Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
- outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>>,
+ outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, ScriptBuf)>>,
#[cfg(test)]
pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
self.counterparty_payment_script.write(writer)?;
match &self.shutdown_script {
Some(script) => script.write(writer)?,
- None => Script::new().write(writer)?,
+ None => ScriptBuf::new().write(writer)?,
}
self.channel_keys_id.write(writer)?;
writer.write_all(&(self.pending_monitor_events.iter().filter(|ev| match ev {
MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(_) => true,
- MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(_) => true,
+ MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_) => true,
_ => false,
}).count() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
for event in self.pending_monitor_events.iter() {
0u8.write(writer)?;
upd.write(writer)?;
},
- MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
+ MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
_ => {}, // Covered in the TLV writes below
}
}
ChannelMonitor { inner: Mutex::new(imp) }
}
- pub(crate) fn new(secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, keys: Signer, shutdown_script: Option<Script>,
- on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
+ pub(crate) fn new(secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, keys: Signer, shutdown_script: Option<ScriptBuf>,
+ on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, ScriptBuf),
channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters,
- funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
+ funding_redeemscript: ScriptBuf, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
initial_holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
best_block: BestBlock, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey) -> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
- let payment_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
- let counterparty_payment_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_key_hash[..]).into_script();
+ let counterparty_payment_script = chan_utils::get_counterparty_payment_script(
+ &channel_parameters.channel_type_features, &keys.pubkeys().payment_point
+ );
let counterparty_channel_parameters = channel_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap();
let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint;
(holder_commitment_tx, trusted_tx.commitment_number())
};
- let onchain_tx_handler =
- OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys,
- channel_parameters.clone(), initial_holder_commitment_tx, secp_ctx);
+ let onchain_tx_handler = OnchainTxHandler::new(
+ channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id, destination_script.into(), keys,
+ channel_parameters.clone(), initial_holder_commitment_tx, secp_ctx
+ );
let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::new();
outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![(funding_info.0.index as u32, funding_info.1.clone())]);
latest_update_id: 0,
commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
- destination_script: destination_script.clone(),
+ destination_script: destination_script.into(),
broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: None,
counterparty_payment_script,
shutdown_script,
&self,
updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate,
broadcaster: &B,
- fee_estimator: F,
+ fee_estimator: &F,
logger: &L,
) -> Result<(), ()>
where
}
/// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
- pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> (OutPoint, Script) {
+ pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> (OutPoint, ScriptBuf) {
self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_funding_txo().clone()
}
/// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
/// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
- pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>)> {
+ pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Vec<(u32, ScriptBuf)>)> {
self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_outputs_to_watch()
.iter().map(|(txid, outputs)| (*txid, outputs.clone())).collect()
}
self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_node_id
}
- /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest holder state if its copy of
- /// the Channel was out-of-date.
+ /// Used by [`ChannelManager`] deserialization to broadcast the latest holder state if its copy
+ /// of the channel state was out-of-date.
///
/// You may also use this to broadcast the latest local commitment transaction, either because
- /// a monitor update failed with [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure`] or because we've
- /// fallen behind (i.e. we've received proof that our counterparty side knows a revocation
- /// secret we gave them that they shouldn't know).
+ /// a monitor update failed or because we've fallen behind (i.e. we've received proof that our
+ /// counterparty side knows a revocation secret we gave them that they shouldn't know).
///
/// Broadcasting these transactions in the second case is UNSAFE, as they allow counterparty
/// side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to broadcast them if counterparty doesn't
/// close channel with their commitment transaction after a substantial amount of time. Best
/// may be to contact the other node operator out-of-band to coordinate other options available
- /// to you. In any-case, the choice is up to you.
+ /// to you.
///
- /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure
+ /// [`ChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager
pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
where L::Target: Logger {
self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger)
/// [`get_outputs_to_watch`]: #method.get_outputs_to_watch
pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
&self,
- header: &BlockHeader,
+ header: &Header,
txdata: &TransactionData,
height: u32,
broadcaster: B,
/// appropriately.
pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
&self,
- header: &BlockHeader,
+ header: &Header,
height: u32,
broadcaster: B,
fee_estimator: F,
/// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
pub fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
&self,
- header: &BlockHeader,
+ header: &Header,
txdata: &TransactionData,
height: u32,
broadcaster: B,
/// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
pub fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
&self,
- header: &BlockHeader,
+ header: &Header,
height: u32,
broadcaster: B,
fee_estimator: F,
current_height, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger,
);
}
+
+ /// Returns the descriptors for relevant outputs (i.e., those that we can spend) within the
+ /// transaction if they exist and the transaction has at least [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`]
+ /// confirmations. For [`SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput`] descriptors to be
+ /// returned, the transaction must have at least `max(ANTI_REORG_DELAY, to_self_delay)`
+ /// confirmations.
+ ///
+ /// Descriptors returned by this method are primarily exposed via [`Event::SpendableOutputs`]
+ /// once they are no longer under reorg risk. This method serves as a way to retrieve these
+ /// descriptors at a later time, either for historical purposes, or to replay any
+ /// missed/unhandled descriptors. For the purpose of gathering historical records, if the
+ /// channel close has fully resolved (i.e., [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] returns
+ /// an empty set), you can retrieve all spendable outputs by providing all descendant spending
+ /// transactions starting from the channel's funding transaction and going down three levels.
+ ///
+ /// `tx` is a transaction we'll scan the outputs of. Any transaction can be provided. If any
+ /// outputs which can be spent by us are found, at least one descriptor is returned.
+ ///
+ /// `confirmation_height` must be the height of the block in which `tx` was included in.
+ pub fn get_spendable_outputs(&self, tx: &Transaction, confirmation_height: u32) -> Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
+ let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
+ let current_height = inner.best_block.height;
+ let mut spendable_outputs = inner.get_spendable_outputs(tx);
+ spendable_outputs.retain(|descriptor| {
+ let mut conf_threshold = current_height.saturating_sub(ANTI_REORG_DELAY) + 1;
+ if let SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(descriptor) = descriptor {
+ conf_threshold = cmp::min(conf_threshold,
+ current_height.saturating_sub(descriptor.to_self_delay as u32) + 1);
+ }
+ conf_threshold >= confirmation_height
+ });
+ spendable_outputs
+ }
+
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub fn get_counterparty_payment_script(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
+ self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_payment_script.clone()
+ }
+
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub fn set_counterparty_payment_script(&self, script: ScriptBuf) {
+ self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_payment_script = script;
+ }
}
impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
},
OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(ref descriptor) }
- if descriptor.outpoint.index as u32 == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx => {
+ if event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx| tx.input.iter().enumerate()
+ .any(|(input_idx, inp)|
+ Some(inp.previous_output.txid) == confirmed_txid &&
+ inp.previous_output.vout == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx &&
+ // A maturing output for an HTLC claim will always be at the same
+ // index as the HTLC input. This is true pre-anchors, as there's
+ // only 1 input and 1 output. This is also true post-anchors,
+ // because we have a SIGHASH_SINGLE|ANYONECANPAY signature from our
+ // channel counterparty.
+ descriptor.outpoint.index as usize == input_idx
+ ))
+ .unwrap_or(false)
+ => {
debug_assert!(holder_delayed_output_pending.is_none());
holder_delayed_output_pending = Some(event.confirmation_threshold());
},
/// confirmations on the claim transaction.
///
/// Note that for `ChannelMonitors` which track a channel which went on-chain with versions of
- /// LDK prior to 0.0.111, balances may not be fully captured if our counterparty broadcasted
- /// a revoked state.
+ /// LDK prior to 0.0.111, not all or excess balances may be included.
///
/// See [`Balance`] for additional details on the types of claimable balances which
/// may be returned here and their meanings.
#[cfg(test)]
pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() -> Vec<u8> {
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
let mut ret = [opcodes::all::OP_NOP.to_u8(); 136];
ret[131] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
ret[132] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
{
self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
+ let confirmed_spend_txid = self.funding_spend_confirmed.or_else(|| {
+ self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| match event.event {
+ OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => Some(event.txid),
+ _ => None,
+ })
+ });
+ let confirmed_spend_txid = if let Some(txid) = confirmed_spend_txid {
+ txid
+ } else {
+ return;
+ };
+
// If the channel is force closed, try to claim the output from this preimage.
// First check if a counterparty commitment transaction has been broadcasted:
macro_rules! claim_htlcs {
}
}
if let Some(txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
- if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
- claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
+ if txid == confirmed_spend_txid {
+ if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
+ claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
+ } else {
+ debug_assert!(false);
+ log_error!(logger, "Detected counterparty commitment tx on-chain without tracking commitment number");
+ }
return;
}
}
if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
- if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
- claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
+ if txid == confirmed_spend_txid {
+ if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
+ claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
+ } else {
+ debug_assert!(false);
+ log_error!(logger, "Detected counterparty commitment tx on-chain without tracking commitment number");
+ }
return;
}
}
// *we* sign a holder commitment transaction, not when e.g. a watchtower broadcasts one of our
// holder commitment transactions.
if self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.is_some() {
- // Assume that the broadcasted commitment transaction confirmed in the current best
- // block. Even if not, its a reasonable metric for the bump criteria on the HTLC
- // transactions.
- let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height());
- self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
- if let Some(ref tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
- let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&tx, self.best_block.height());
+ let holder_commitment_tx = if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid == confirmed_spend_txid {
+ Some(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx)
+ } else if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
+ if prev_holder_commitment_tx.txid == confirmed_spend_txid {
+ Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx)
+ } else {
+ None
+ }
+ } else {
+ None
+ };
+ if let Some(holder_commitment_tx) = holder_commitment_tx {
+ // Assume that the broadcasted commitment transaction confirmed in the current best
+ // block. Even if not, its a reasonable metric for the bump criteria on the HTLC
+ // transactions.
+ let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height());
self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
}
}
txs.push(tx);
}
broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&txs);
- self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(self.funding_info.0));
+ self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(self.funding_info.0));
}
- pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()>
+ pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()>
where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
}
let mut ret = Ok(());
- let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&*fee_estimator);
+ let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&**fee_estimator);
for update in updates.updates.iter() {
match update {
ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, claimed_htlcs, nondust_htlc_sources } => {
},
ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } => {
log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with payment preimage");
- self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
+ self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array()), &payment_preimage, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
},
ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } => {
log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with commitment secret");
if let Err(e) = self.provide_secret(*idx, *secret) {
+ debug_assert!(false, "Latest counterparty commitment secret was invalid");
log_error!(logger, "Providing latest counterparty commitment secret failed/was refused:");
log_error!(logger, " {}", e);
ret = Err(());
log_error!(logger, " in channel monitor for channel {}!", &self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id());
log_error!(logger, " Read the docs for ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn and take manual action!");
} else {
- // If we generated a MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed, the ChannelManager
+ // If we generated a MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed, the ChannelManager
// will still give us a ChannelForceClosed event with !should_broadcast, but we
// shouldn't print the scary warning above.
log_info!(logger, "Channel off-chain state closed after we broadcasted our latest commitment transaction.");
self.latest_update_id
}
- pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> &(OutPoint, Script) {
+ pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> &(OutPoint, ScriptBuf) {
&self.funding_info
}
- pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>> {
+ pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, ScriptBuf)>> {
// If we've detected a counterparty commitment tx on chain, we must include it in the set
// of outputs to watch for spends of, otherwise we're likely to lose user funds. Because
// its trivial to do, double-check that here.
per_commitment_point: self.onchain_tx_handler.signer.get_per_commitment_point(
htlc.per_commitment_number, &self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx,
),
+ feerate_per_kw: 0,
htlc: htlc.htlc,
preimage: htlc.preimage,
counterparty_sig: htlc.counterparty_sig,
};
}
- let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence.0 as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time.0 as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
+ let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence.0 as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
// Returns (1) `PackageTemplate`s that can be given to the OnchainTxHandler, so that the handler can
// broadcast transactions claiming holder HTLC commitment outputs and (2) a holder revokable
// script so we can detect whether a holder transaction has been seen on-chain.
- fn get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, conf_height: u32) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>) {
+ fn get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, conf_height: u32) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<(ScriptBuf, PublicKey, PublicKey)>) {
let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&holder_tx.revocation_key, self.on_holder_tx_csv, &holder_tx.delayed_payment_key);
continue;
}
} else { None };
- if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
+ if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
&::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
holder_transactions.push(htlc_tx);
}
holder_transactions
}
- pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
+ pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
&mut self,
- header: &BlockHeader,
+ header: &Header,
height: u32,
broadcaster: B,
fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
&mut self,
- header: &BlockHeader,
+ header: &Header,
txdata: &TransactionData,
height: u32,
broadcaster: B,
&self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id(), txid);
self.funding_spend_seen = true;
let mut commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output = None;
- if (tx.input[0].sequence.0 >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time.0 >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
+ if (tx.input[0].sequence.0 >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs, counterparty_output_idx_sats) =
self.check_spend_counterparty_transaction(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger);
commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output = counterparty_output_idx_sats;
}
self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger);
- self.is_paying_spendable_output(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger);
+ self.check_tx_and_push_spendable_outputs(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger);
}
}
let funding_outp = HolderFundingOutput::build(self.funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis, self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone());
let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32, PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_outp), self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height());
claimable_outpoints.push(commitment_package);
- self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(self.funding_info.0));
- let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
+ self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(self.funding_info.0));
+ // Although we aren't signing the transaction directly here, the transaction will be signed
+ // in the claim that is queued to OnchainTxHandler. We set holder_tx_signed here to reject
+ // new channel updates.
self.holder_tx_signed = true;
// We can't broadcast our HTLC transactions while the commitment transaction is
// unconfirmed. We'll delay doing so until we detect the confirmed commitment in
// assuming it gets confirmed in the next block. Sadly, we have code which considers
// "not yet confirmed" things as discardable, so we cannot do that here.
let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height());
- let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &commitment_tx);
+ let unsigned_commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_unsigned_holder_commitment_tx();
+ let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &unsigned_commitment_tx);
if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
}
watch_outputs
}
- pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)
+ pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &Header, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)
where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
return true;
}
- assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&Script::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
+ assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&ScriptBuf::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
} else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
} else { panic!(); }
}
}
- /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is paying fund back to some address we can assume to own
- fn is_paying_spendable_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
- let mut spendable_output = None;
- for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { // There is max one spendable output for any channel tx, including ones generated by us
- if i > ::core::u16::MAX as usize {
- // While it is possible that an output exists on chain which is greater than the
- // 2^16th output in a given transaction, this is only possible if the output is not
- // in a lightning transaction and was instead placed there by some third party who
- // wishes to give us money for no reason.
- // Namely, any lightning transactions which we pre-sign will never have anywhere
- // near 2^16 outputs both because such transactions must have ~2^16 outputs who's
- // scripts are not longer than one byte in length and because they are inherently
- // non-standard due to their size.
- // Thus, it is completely safe to ignore such outputs, and while it may result in
- // us ignoring non-lightning fund to us, that is only possible if someone fills
- // nearly a full block with garbage just to hit this case.
- continue;
- }
+ fn get_spendable_outputs(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
+ let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
+ for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
if outp.script_pubkey == self.destination_script {
- spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
+ spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
output: outp.clone(),
});
- break;
}
if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
if broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
- spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor {
+ spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor {
outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
per_commitment_point: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1,
to_self_delay: self.on_holder_tx_csv,
channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
}));
- break;
}
}
if self.counterparty_payment_script == outp.script_pubkey {
- spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor {
+ spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor {
outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
output: outp.clone(),
channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
+ channel_transaction_parameters: Some(self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.clone()),
}));
- break;
}
if self.shutdown_script.as_ref() == Some(&outp.script_pubkey) {
- spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
+ spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
output: outp.clone(),
});
- break;
}
}
- if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
+ spendable_outputs
+ }
+
+ /// Checks if the confirmed transaction is paying funds back to some address we can assume to
+ /// own.
+ fn check_tx_and_push_spendable_outputs<L: Deref>(
+ &mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &L,
+ ) where L::Target: Logger {
+ for spendable_output in self.get_spendable_outputs(tx) {
let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
txid: tx.txid(),
transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
{
- fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
+ fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
self.0.block_connected(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
}
- fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
+ fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
self.0.block_disconnected(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
}
}
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
{
- fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
+ fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
self.0.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
}
self.0.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
}
- fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
+ fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
self.0.best_block_updated(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
}
1 => { None },
_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
};
- let counterparty_payment_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut counterparty_payment_script: ScriptBuf = Readable::read(reader)?;
let shutdown_script = {
- let script = <Script as Readable>::read(reader)?;
+ let script = <ScriptBuf as Readable>::read(reader)?;
if script.is_empty() { None } else { Some(script) }
};
let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
+ let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
for _ in 0..pending_monitor_events_len {
let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
0 => MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(Readable::read(reader)?),
- 1 => MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_info.0),
+ 1 => MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_info.0),
_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
};
pending_monitor_events.as_mut().unwrap().push(ev);
}
let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Txid>() + mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<Script>>())));
+ let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Txid>() + mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<ScriptBuf>>())));
for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Script>())));
+ let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<ScriptBuf>())));
for _ in 0..outputs_len {
outputs.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
}
(17, initial_counterparty_commitment_info, option),
});
+ // Monitors for anchor outputs channels opened in v0.0.116 suffered from a bug in which the
+ // wrong `counterparty_payment_script` was being tracked. Fix it now on deserialization to
+ // give them a chance to recognize the spendable output.
+ if onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() &&
+ counterparty_payment_script.is_v0_p2wpkh()
+ {
+ let payment_point = onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys.payment_point;
+ counterparty_payment_script =
+ chan_utils::get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript(&payment_point).to_v0_p2wsh();
+ }
+
Ok((best_block.block_hash(), ChannelMonitor::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
latest_update_id,
commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
- use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{ScriptBuf, Builder};
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
- use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, EcdsaSighashType};
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut};
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
- use bitcoin::util::sighash;
+ use bitcoin::sighash;
+ use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
-
- use hex;
+ use bitcoin::{Sequence, Witness};
use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
use super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStep;
- use crate::{check_added_monitors, check_closed_broadcast, check_closed_event, check_spends, get_local_commitment_txn, get_monitor, get_route_and_payment_hash, unwrap_send_err};
+ use crate::{check_added_monitors, check_spends, get_local_commitment_txn, get_monitor, get_route_and_payment_hash, unwrap_send_err};
use crate::chain::{BestBlock, Confirm};
use crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
use crate::chain::package::{weight_offered_htlc, weight_received_htlc, weight_revoked_offered_htlc, weight_revoked_received_htlc, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT};
use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use crate::sign::InMemorySigner;
- use crate::events::ClosureReason;
use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
use crate::ln::chan_utils;
use crate::ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, ChannelPublicKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
use crate::io;
- use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, Witness};
use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
use crate::prelude::*;
+ use std::str::FromStr;
+
fn do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(use_local_txn: bool) {
// Previously, monitor updates were allowed freely even after a funding-spend transaction
// confirmed. This would allow a race condition where we could receive a payment (including
let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 100_000);
unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
- ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
- assert!(err.contains("ChannelMonitor storage failure")));
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2); // After the failure we generate a close-channel monitor update
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_string() },
- [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
+ ), false, APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress, {});
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
// Build a new ChannelMonitorUpdate which contains both the failing commitment tx update
// and provides the claim preimages for the two pending HTLCs. The first update generates
// an error, but the point of this test is to ensure the later updates are still applied.
let monitor_updates = nodes[1].chain_monitor.monitor_updates.lock().unwrap();
- let mut replay_update = monitor_updates.get(&channel.2).unwrap().iter().rev().skip(1).next().unwrap().clone();
+ let mut replay_update = monitor_updates.get(&channel.2).unwrap().iter().rev().next().unwrap().clone();
assert_eq!(replay_update.updates.len(), 1);
if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { .. } = replay_update.updates[0] {
} else { panic!(); }
let broadcaster = TestBroadcaster::with_blocks(Arc::clone(&nodes[1].blocks));
assert!(
- pre_update_monitor.update_monitor(&replay_update, &&broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &nodes[1].logger)
+ pre_update_monitor.update_monitor(&replay_update, &&broadcaster, &&chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &nodes[1].logger)
.is_err());
// Even though we error'd on the first update, we should still have generated an HTLC claim
// transaction
{
for i in 0..20 {
let preimage = PaymentPreimage([i; 32]);
- let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
+ let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
preimages.push((preimage, hash));
}
}
let shutdown_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(Network::Testnet);
let monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(Secp256k1::new(), keys,
- Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(shutdown_pubkey).into_inner()), 0, &Script::new(),
- (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()),
- &channel_parameters, Script::new(), 46, 0, HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut Vec::new()),
+ Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(shutdown_pubkey).into_inner()), 0, &ScriptBuf::new(),
+ (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, ScriptBuf::new()),
+ &channel_parameters, ScriptBuf::new(), 46, 0, HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut Vec::new()),
best_block, dummy_key);
let mut htlcs = preimages_slice_to_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]);
let dummy_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut htlcs);
monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(dummy_commitment_tx.clone(),
htlcs.into_iter().map(|(htlc, _)| (htlc, Some(dummy_sig), None)).collect()).unwrap();
- monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_inner(Sha256::hash(b"1").into_inner()),
+ monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_byte_array(Sha256::hash(b"1").to_byte_array()),
preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key, &logger);
- monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_inner(Sha256::hash(b"2").into_inner()),
+ monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_byte_array(Sha256::hash(b"2").to_byte_array()),
preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key, &logger);
for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_estimator);
// Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
let mut secret = [0; 32];
- secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
+ secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 15);
test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
- monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_inner(Sha256::hash(b"3").into_inner()),
+ monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_byte_array(Sha256::hash(b"3").to_byte_array()),
preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
// Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
- secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
+ secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 13);
test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
- monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_inner(Sha256::hash(b"4").into_inner()),
+ monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_byte_array(Sha256::hash(b"4").to_byte_array()),
preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
// Now update holder commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
let dummy_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut htlcs);
monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(dummy_commitment_tx.clone(),
htlcs.into_iter().map(|(htlc, _)| (htlc, Some(dummy_sig), None)).collect()).unwrap();
- secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
+ secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 12);
test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
let dummy_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut htlcs);
monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(dummy_commitment_tx,
htlcs.into_iter().map(|(htlc, _)| (htlc, Some(dummy_sig), None)).collect()).unwrap();
- secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
+ secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 5);
test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
// not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
macro_rules! sign_input {
let sig = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&sighash, &privkey);
let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
- $sum_actual_sigs += ser_sig.len();
+ $sum_actual_sigs += ser_sig.len() as u64;
let witness = $sighash_parts.witness_mut($idx).unwrap();
witness.push(ser_sig);
if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT {
}
let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
- let txid = Txid::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
+ let txid = Txid::from_str("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
// Justice tx with 1 to_holder, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
for channel_type_features in [ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies()].iter() {
- let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
+ let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
for i in 0..4 {
claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
txid,
vout: i,
},
- script_sig: Script::new(),
+ script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(),
sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
witness: Witness::new(),
});
script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
value: 0,
});
- let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
+ let base_weight = claim_tx.weight().to_wu();
let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT, weight_revoked_offered_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_revoked_offered_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_revoked_received_htlc(channel_type_features)];
let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
{
inputs_total_weight += inp;
}
}
- assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
+ assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight, claim_tx.weight().to_wu() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() as u64 - sum_actual_sigs));
}
// Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
for channel_type_features in [ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies()].iter() {
- let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
+ let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
for i in 0..4 {
claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
txid,
vout: i,
},
- script_sig: Script::new(),
+ script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(),
sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
witness: Witness::new(),
});
script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
value: 0,
});
- let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
+ let base_weight = claim_tx.weight().to_wu();
let inputs_weight = vec![weight_offered_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_received_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_received_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_received_htlc(channel_type_features)];
let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
{
inputs_total_weight += inp;
}
}
- assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
+ assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight, claim_tx.weight().to_wu() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() as u64 - sum_actual_sigs));
}
// Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
for channel_type_features in [ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies()].iter() {
- let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
+ let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
txid,
vout: 0,
},
- script_sig: Script::new(),
+ script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(),
sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
witness: Witness::new(),
});
script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
value: 0,
});
- let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
+ let base_weight = claim_tx.weight().to_wu();
let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT];
let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
{
inputs_total_weight += inp;
}
}
- assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
+ assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight, claim_tx.weight().to_wu() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() as u64 - sum_actual_sigs));
}
}
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff