use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxOut,Transaction};
+use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
use ln::channelmanager::HTLCSource;
use chain;
use chain::{BestBlock, WatchedOutput};
-use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
+use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor, DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, Sign, KeysInterface};
use chain::onchaintx::OnchainTxHandler;
use prelude::*;
use core::{cmp, mem};
use io::{self, Error};
+use core::convert::TryInto;
use core::ops::Deref;
use sync::Mutex;
-/// An update generated by the underlying Channel itself which contains some new information the
-/// ChannelMonitor should be made aware of.
+/// An update generated by the underlying channel itself which contains some new information the
+/// [`ChannelMonitor`] should be made aware of.
+///
+/// Because this represents only a small number of updates to the underlying state, it is generally
+/// much smaller than a full [`ChannelMonitor`]. However, for large single commitment transaction
+/// updates (e.g. ones during which there are hundreds of HTLCs pending on the commitment
+/// transaction), a single update may reach upwards of 1 MiB in serialized size.
#[cfg_attr(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))]
#[derive(Clone)]
#[must_use]
pub(crate) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
pub(crate) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
pub(crate) source: HTLCSource,
- pub(crate) onchain_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
+ pub(crate) htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
}
impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCUpdate, {
(0, payment_hash, required),
- (1, onchain_value_satoshis, option),
+ (1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
(2, source, required),
(4, payment_preimage, option),
});
txid: Txid,
height: u32,
event: OnchainEvent,
+ transaction: Option<Transaction>, // Added as optional, but always filled in, in LDK 0.0.110
}
impl OnchainEventEntry {
}
}
+/// The (output index, sats value) for the counterparty's output in a commitment transaction.
+///
+/// This was added as an `Option` in 0.0.110.
+type CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo = Option<(u32, u64)>;
+
/// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
/// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
#[derive(PartialEq)]
HTLCUpdate {
source: HTLCSource,
payment_hash: PaymentHash,
- onchain_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
+ htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
/// None in the second case, above, ie when there is no relevant output in the commitment
/// transaction which appeared on chain.
commitment_tx_output_idx: Option<u32>,
},
+ /// An output waiting on [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`] confirmations before we hand the user the
+ /// [`SpendableOutputDescriptor`].
MaturingOutput {
descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
},
/// The CSV delay for the output of the funding spend transaction (implying it is a local
/// commitment transaction, and this is the delay on the to_self output).
on_local_output_csv: Option<u16>,
+ /// If the funding spend transaction was a known remote commitment transaction, we track
+ /// the output index and amount of the counterparty's `to_self` output here.
+ ///
+ /// This allows us to generate a [`Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable`] for the
+ /// counterparty output.
+ commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo,
},
/// A spend of a commitment transaction HTLC output, set in the cases where *no* `HTLCUpdate`
/// is constructed. This is used when
/// * an inbound HTLC is claimed by us (with a preimage).
/// * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by the revocation
/// signature.
+ /// * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by an
+ /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Failure transaction (and is still claimable with a revocation
+ /// signature).
HTLCSpendConfirmation {
commitment_tx_output_idx: u32,
/// If the claim was made by either party with a preimage, this is filled in
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
(0, self.txid, required),
+ (1, self.transaction, option),
(2, self.height, required),
(4, self.event, required),
});
impl MaybeReadable for OnchainEventEntry {
fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
- let mut txid = Default::default();
+ let mut txid = Txid::all_zeros();
+ let mut transaction = None;
let mut height = 0;
let mut event = None;
read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
(0, txid, required),
+ (1, transaction, option),
(2, height, required),
(4, event, ignorable),
});
if let Some(ev) = event {
- Ok(Some(Self { txid, height, event: ev }))
+ Ok(Some(Self { txid, transaction, height, event: ev }))
} else {
Ok(None)
}
impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OnchainEvent,
(0, HTLCUpdate) => {
(0, source, required),
- (1, onchain_value_satoshis, option),
+ (1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
(2, payment_hash, required),
(3, commitment_tx_output_idx, option),
},
},
(3, FundingSpendConfirmation) => {
(0, on_local_output_csv, option),
+ (1, commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, option),
},
(5, HTLCSpendConfirmation) => {
(0, commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
commitment_txid: Txid,
htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
commitment_number: u64,
- their_revocation_point: PublicKey,
+ their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
},
PaymentPreimage {
payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
(1, LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo) => {
(0, commitment_txid, required),
(2, commitment_number, required),
- (4, their_revocation_point, required),
+ (4, their_per_commitment_point, required),
(6, htlc_outputs, vec_type),
},
(2, PaymentPreimage) => {
/// HTLCs which we sent to our counterparty which are claimable after a timeout (less on-chain
/// fees) if the counterparty does not know the preimage for the HTLCs. These are somewhat
/// likely to be claimed by our counterparty before we do.
- MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
- /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
- /// required to do so.
+ MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
+ /// The amount potentially available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees
+ /// which will be required to do so.
claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
/// The height at which we will be able to claim the balance if our counterparty has not
/// done so.
claimable_height: u32,
},
+ /// HTLCs which we received from our counterparty which are claimable with a preimage which we
+ /// do not currently have. This will only be claimable if we receive the preimage from the node
+ /// to which we forwarded this HTLC before the timeout.
+ MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
+ /// The amount potentially available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees
+ /// which will be required to do so.
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
+ /// The height at which our counterparty will be able to claim the balance if we have not
+ /// yet received the preimage and claimed it ourselves.
+ expiry_height: u32,
+ },
+ /// The channel has been closed, and our counterparty broadcasted a revoked commitment
+ /// transaction.
+ ///
+ /// Thus, we're able to claim all outputs in the commitment transaction, one of which has the
+ /// following amount.
+ CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
+ /// The amount, in satoshis, of the output which we can claim.
+ ///
+ /// Note that for outputs from HTLC balances this may be excluding some on-chain fees that
+ /// were already spent.
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
+ },
}
/// An HTLC which has been irrevocably resolved on-chain, and has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
#[derive(PartialEq)]
struct IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
- commitment_tx_output_idx: u32,
+ commitment_tx_output_idx: Option<u32>,
+ /// The txid of the transaction which resolved the HTLC, this may be a commitment (if the HTLC
+ /// was not present in the confirmed commitment transaction), HTLC-Success, or HTLC-Timeout
+ /// transaction.
+ resolving_txid: Option<Txid>, // Added as optional, but always filled in, in 0.0.110
/// Only set if the HTLC claim was ours using a payment preimage
payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
}
-impl_writeable_tlv_based!(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC, {
- (0, commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
- (2, payment_preimage, option),
-});
+// In LDK versions prior to 0.0.111 commitment_tx_output_idx was not Option-al and
+// IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC objects only existed for non-dust HTLCs. This was a bug, but to maintain
+// backwards compatibility we must ensure we always write out a commitment_tx_output_idx field,
+// using `u32::max_value()` as a sentinal to indicate the HTLC was dust.
+impl Writeable for IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
+ let mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx = self.commitment_tx_output_idx.unwrap_or(u32::max_value());
+ write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
+ (0, mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
+ (1, self.resolving_txid, option),
+ (2, self.payment_preimage, option),
+ });
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+impl Readable for IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
+ fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ let mut mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx = 0;
+ let mut resolving_txid = None;
+ let mut payment_preimage = None;
+ read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
+ (0, mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
+ (1, resolving_txid, option),
+ (2, payment_preimage, option),
+ });
+ Ok(Self {
+ commitment_tx_output_idx: if mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx == u32::max_value() { None } else { Some(mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx) },
+ resolving_txid,
+ payment_preimage,
+ })
+ }
+}
/// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
/// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
counterparty_commitment_params: CounterpartyCommitmentParameters,
funding_redeemscript: Script,
channel_value_satoshis: u64,
- // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
- their_cur_
revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
+ // first is the idx of the first of the two per-commitment points
+ their_cur_
per_commitment_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
on_holder_tx_csv: u16,
// deserialization
current_holder_commitment_number: u64,
+ /// The set of payment hashes from inbound payments for which we know the preimage. Payment
+ /// preimages that are not included in any unrevoked local commitment transaction or unrevoked
+ /// remote commitment transactions are automatically removed when commitment transactions are
+ /// revoked.
payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
// Note that `MonitorEvent`s MUST NOT be generated during update processing, only generated
// of block connection between ChannelMonitors and the ChannelManager.
funding_spend_seen: bool,
+ /// Set to `Some` of the confirmed transaction spending the funding input of the channel after
+ /// reaching `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` confirmations.
funding_spend_confirmed: Option<Txid>,
+
+ confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo,
/// The set of HTLCs which have been either claimed or failed on chain and have reached
/// the requisite confirmations on the claim/fail transaction (either ANTI_REORG_DELAY or the
/// spending CSV for revocable outputs).
// the full block_connected).
best_block: BestBlock,
+ /// The node_id of our counterparty
+ counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
+
secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
}
self.counterparty_commitment_params != other.counterparty_commitment_params ||
self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript ||
self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis ||
- self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
+ self.their_cur_per_commitment_points != other.their_cur_per_commitment_points ||
self.on_holder_tx_csv != other.on_holder_tx_csv ||
self.commitment_secrets != other.commitment_secrets ||
self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints != other.counterparty_claimable_outpoints ||
self.holder_tx_signed != other.holder_tx_signed ||
self.funding_spend_seen != other.funding_spend_seen ||
self.funding_spend_confirmed != other.funding_spend_confirmed ||
+ self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output != other.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output ||
self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain != other.htlcs_resolved_on_chain
{
false
self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
- match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
+ match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
+ debug_assert!(htlc_source.is_none() || Some(**txid) == self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid
+ || Some(**txid) == self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
+ "HTLC Sources for all revoked commitment transactions should be none!");
serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
htlc_source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(writer)?;
}
(3, self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain, vec_type),
(5, self.pending_monitor_events, vec_type),
(7, self.funding_spend_seen, required),
+ (9, self.counterparty_node_id, option),
+ (11, self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option),
});
Ok(())
}
impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
+ /// For lockorder enforcement purposes, we need to have a single site which constructs the
+ /// `inner` mutex, otherwise cases where we lock two monitors at the same time (eg in our
+ /// PartialEq implementation) we may decide a lockorder violation has occurred.
+ fn from_impl(imp: ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>) -> Self {
+ ChannelMonitor { inner: Mutex::new(imp) }
+ }
+
pub(crate) fn new(secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, keys: Signer, shutdown_script: Option<Script>,
on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters,
funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
initial_holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
- best_block: BestBlock) -> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
+ best_block: BestBlock, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey) -> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
let payment_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::new();
outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![(funding_info.0.index as u32, funding_info.1.clone())]);
- ChannelMonitor {
- inner: Mutex::new(ChannelMonitorImpl {
- latest_update_id: 0,
- commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
+ Self::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
+ latest_update_id: 0,
+ commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
- destination_script: destination_script.clone(),
- broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: None,
- counterparty_payment_script,
- shutdown_script,
+ destination_script: destination_script.clone(),
+ broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: None,
+ counterparty_payment_script,
+ shutdown_script,
- channel_keys_id,
- holder_revocation_basepoint,
- funding_info,
- current_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
- prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
+ channel_keys_id,
+ holder_revocation_basepoint,
+ funding_info,
+ current_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
+ prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
- counterparty_commitment_params,
- funding_redeemscript,
- channel_value_satoshis,
- their_cur_revocation_points: None,
+ counterparty_commitment_params,
+ funding_redeemscript,
+ channel_value_satoshis,
+ their_cur_per_commitment_points: None,
- on_holder_tx_csv: counterparty_channel_parameters.selected_contest_delay,
+ on_holder_tx_csv: counterparty_channel_parameters.selected_contest_delay,
- commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
- counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
- counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
- counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
+ commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
+ counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
+ counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
+ counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
- prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: None,
- current_holder_commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
- current_counterparty_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
- current_holder_commitment_number,
+ prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: None,
+ current_holder_commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
+ current_counterparty_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
+ current_holder_commitment_number,
- payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
- pending_monitor_events: Vec::new(),
- pending_events: Vec::new(),
+ payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
+ pending_monitor_events: Vec::new(),
+ pending_events: Vec::new(),
- onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec::new(),
- outputs_to_watch,
+ onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec::new(),
+ outputs_to_watch,
- onchain_tx_handler,
+ onchain_tx_handler,
- lockdown_from_offchain: false,
- holder_tx_signed: false,
- funding_spend_seen: false,
- funding_spend_confirmed: None,
- htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec::new(),
+ lockdown_from_offchain: false,
+ holder_tx_signed: false,
+ funding_spend_seen: false,
+ funding_spend_confirmed: None,
+ confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output: None,
+ htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec::new(),
- best_block,
+ best_block,
+ counterparty_node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id),
- secp_ctx,
- }),
- }
+ secp_ctx,
+ })
}
#[cfg(test)]
txid: Txid,
htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
commitment_number: u64,
- their_revocation_point: PublicKey,
+ their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
logger: &L,
) where L::Target: Logger {
self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(
- txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point, logger)
+ txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, logger)
}
#[cfg(test)]
self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(holder_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs).map_err(|_| ())
}
- #[cfg(test)]
+ /// This is used to provide payment preimage(s) out-of-band during startup without updating the
+ /// off-chain state with a new commitment transaction.
pub(crate) fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
&self,
payment_hash: &PaymentHash,
payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage,
broadcaster: &B,
- fee_estimator: &F,
+ fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
logger: &L,
) where
B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
&self,
updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate,
broadcaster: &B,
- fee_estimator: &F,
+ fee_estimator: F,
logger: &L,
) -> Result<(), ()>
where
self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_holder_commitment_number()
}
+ /// Gets the `node_id` of the counterparty for this channel.
+ ///
+ /// Will be `None` for channels constructed on LDK versions prior to 0.0.110 and always `Some`
+ /// otherwise.
+ pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> Option<PublicKey> {
+ self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_node_id
+ }
+
/// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest holder state if its copy of
/// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable holder toxic tx in case of
/// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our counterparty side knows
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
{
+ let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
self.inner.lock().unwrap().transactions_confirmed(
- header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
+ header, txdata, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
}
/// Processes a transaction that was reorganized out of the chain.
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
{
+ let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
self.inner.lock().unwrap().transaction_unconfirmed(
- txid, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
+ txid, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger);
}
/// Updates the monitor with the current best chain tip, returning new outputs to watch. See
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
{
+ let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block_updated(
- header, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
+ header, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
}
/// Returns the set of txids that should be monitored for re-organization out of the chain.
pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block.clone()
}
+}
+impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
+ /// Helper for get_claimable_balances which does the work for an individual HTLC, generating up
+ /// to one `Balance` for the HTLC.
+ fn get_htlc_balance(&self, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, holder_commitment: bool,
+ counterparty_revoked_commitment: bool, confirmed_txid: Option<Txid>)
+ -> Option<Balance> {
+ let htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx =
+ if let Some(v) = htlc.transaction_output_index { v } else { return None; };
+
+ let mut htlc_spend_txid_opt = None;
+ let mut holder_timeout_spend_pending = None;
+ let mut htlc_spend_pending = None;
+ let mut holder_delayed_output_pending = None;
+ for event in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
+ match event.event {
+ OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx, htlc_value_satoshis, .. }
+ if commitment_tx_output_idx == Some(htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) => {
+ debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
+ htlc_spend_txid_opt = event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx| tx.txid());
+ debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none());
+ debug_assert_eq!(htlc_value_satoshis.unwrap(), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
+ holder_timeout_spend_pending = Some(event.confirmation_threshold());
+ },
+ OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. }
+ if commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx => {
+ debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
+ htlc_spend_txid_opt = event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx| tx.txid());
+ debug_assert!(htlc_spend_pending.is_none());
+ htlc_spend_pending = Some((event.confirmation_threshold(), preimage.is_some()));
+ },
+ OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
+ descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(ref descriptor) }
+ if descriptor.outpoint.index as u32 == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx => {
+ debug_assert!(holder_delayed_output_pending.is_none());
+ holder_delayed_output_pending = Some(event.confirmation_threshold());
+ },
+ _ => {},
+ }
+ }
+ let htlc_resolved = self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter()
+ .find(|v| if v.commitment_tx_output_idx == Some(htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) {
+ debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
+ htlc_spend_txid_opt = v.resolving_txid;
+ true
+ } else { false });
+ debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_some() as u8 + htlc_spend_pending.is_some() as u8 + htlc_resolved.is_some() as u8 <= 1);
+
+ let htlc_output_to_spend =
+ if let Some(txid) = htlc_spend_txid_opt {
+ debug_assert!(
+ self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_none(),
+ "This code needs updating for anchors");
+ BitcoinOutPoint::new(txid, 0)
+ } else {
+ BitcoinOutPoint::new(confirmed_txid.unwrap(), htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx)
+ };
+ let htlc_output_spend_pending = self.onchain_tx_handler.is_output_spend_pending(&htlc_output_to_spend);
+
+ if let Some(conf_thresh) = holder_delayed_output_pending {
+ debug_assert!(holder_commitment);
+ return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+ confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
+ });
+ } else if htlc_resolved.is_some() && !htlc_output_spend_pending {
+ // Funding transaction spends should be fully confirmed by the time any
+ // HTLC transactions are resolved, unless we're talking about a holder
+ // commitment tx, whose resolution is delayed until the CSV timeout is
+ // reached, even though HTLCs may be resolved after only
+ // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
+ debug_assert!(holder_commitment || self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some());
+ } else if counterparty_revoked_commitment {
+ let htlc_output_claim_pending = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
+ if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
+ descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { .. }
+ } = &event.event {
+ if event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| {
+ if let Some(htlc_spend_txid) = htlc_spend_txid_opt {
+ Some(tx.txid()) == htlc_spend_txid_opt ||
+ inp.previous_output.txid == htlc_spend_txid
+ } else {
+ Some(inp.previous_output.txid) == confirmed_txid &&
+ inp.previous_output.vout == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx
+ }
+ })).unwrap_or(false) {
+ Some(())
+ } else { None }
+ } else { None }
+ });
+ if htlc_output_claim_pending.is_some() {
+ // We already push `Balance`s onto the `res` list for every
+ // `StaticOutput` in a `MaturingOutput` in the revoked
+ // counterparty commitment transaction case generally, so don't
+ // need to do so again here.
+ } else {
+ debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none(),
+ "HTLCUpdate OnchainEvents should never appear for preimage claims");
+ debug_assert!(!htlc.offered || htlc_spend_pending.is_none() || !htlc_spend_pending.unwrap().1,
+ "We don't (currently) generate preimage claims against revoked outputs, where did you get one?!");
+ return Some(Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+ });
+ }
+ } else if htlc.offered == holder_commitment {
+ // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
+ // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
+ // and awaiting confirmations on it.
+ if let Some(conf_thresh) = holder_timeout_spend_pending {
+ return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+ confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
+ });
+ } else {
+ return Some(Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+ claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
+ });
+ }
+ } else if self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() {
+ // Otherwise (the payment was inbound), only expose it as claimable if
+ // we know the preimage.
+ // Note that if there is a pending claim, but it did not use the
+ // preimage, we lost funds to our counterparty! We will then continue
+ // to show it as ContentiousClaimable until ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
+ debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none());
+ if let Some((conf_thresh, true)) = htlc_spend_pending {
+ return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+ confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
+ });
+ } else {
+ return Some(Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+ timeout_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
+ });
+ }
+ } else if htlc_resolved.is_none() {
+ return Some(Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+ expiry_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
+ });
+ }
+ None
+ }
+}
+
+impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
/// Gets the balances in this channel which are either claimable by us if we were to
/// force-close the channel now or which are claimable on-chain (possibly awaiting
/// confirmation).
/// balance, or until our counterparty has claimed the balance and accrued several
/// confirmations on the claim transaction.
///
- /// Note that the balances available when you or your counterparty have broadcasted revoked
- /// state(s) may not be fully captured here.
- // TODO, fix that ^
+ /// Note that for `ChannelMonitors` which track a channel which went on-chain with versions of
+ /// LDK prior to 0.0.111, balances may not be fully captured if our counterparty broadcasted
+ /// a revoked state.
///
/// See [`Balance`] for additional details on the types of claimable balances which
/// may be returned here and their meanings.
let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
let mut confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed;
+ let mut confirmed_counterparty_output = us.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output;
let mut pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = None;
let funding_spend_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
- if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } = event.event {
+ if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, .. } =
+ event.event
+ {
+ confirmed_counterparty_output = commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output;
Some((event.txid, event.confirmation_threshold()))
} else { None }
});
}
macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
- ($holder_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
+ ($holder_commitment: expr, $counterparty_revoked_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
for htlc in $htlc_iter {
- if let Some(htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
- if let Some(conf_thresh) = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
- if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(descriptor) } = &event.event {
- if descriptor.outpoint.index as u32 == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx { Some(event.confirmation_threshold()) } else { None }
- } else { None }
- }) {
- debug_assert!($holder_commitment);
- res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
- claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
- confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
- });
- } else if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| v.commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) {
- // Funding transaction spends should be fully confirmed by the time any
- // HTLC transactions are resolved, unless we're talking about a holder
- // commitment tx, whose resolution is delayed until the CSV timeout is
- // reached, even though HTLCs may be resolved after only
- // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
- debug_assert!($holder_commitment || us.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some());
- } else if htlc.offered == $holder_commitment {
- // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
- // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
- // and awaiting confirmations on it.
- let htlc_update_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
- if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx), .. } = event.event {
- if commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx {
- Some(event.confirmation_threshold()) } else { None }
- } else { None }
- });
- if let Some(conf_thresh) = htlc_update_pending {
- res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
- claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
- confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
- });
- } else {
- res.push(Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
- claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
- claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
- });
- }
- } else if us.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() {
- // Otherwise (the payment was inbound), only expose it as claimable if
- // we know the preimage.
- // Note that if there is a pending claim, but it did not use the
- // preimage, we lost funds to our counterparty! We will then continue
- // to show it as ContentiousClaimable until ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
- let htlc_spend_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
- if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. } = event.event {
- if commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx {
- Some((event.confirmation_threshold(), preimage.is_some()))
- } else { None }
- } else { None }
- });
- if let Some((conf_thresh, true)) = htlc_spend_pending {
- res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
- claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
- confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
- });
- } else {
- res.push(Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
- claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
- timeout_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
- });
- }
+ if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
+
+ if let Some(bal) = us.get_htlc_balance(htlc, $holder_commitment, $counterparty_revoked_commitment, confirmed_txid) {
+ res.push(bal);
}
}
}
if let Some(txid) = confirmed_txid {
let mut found_commitment_tx = false;
- if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
- walk_htlcs!(false, us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap().iter().map(|(a, _)| a));
+ if let Some(counterparty_tx_htlcs) = us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid) {
+ // First look for the to_remote output back to us.
if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
if let Some(value) = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
// confirmation with the same height or have never met our dust amount.
}
}
+ if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
+ walk_htlcs!(false, false, counterparty_tx_htlcs.iter().map(|(a, _)| a));
+ } else {
+ walk_htlcs!(false, true, counterparty_tx_htlcs.iter().map(|(a, _)| a));
+ // The counterparty broadcasted a revoked state!
+ // Look for any StaticOutputs first, generating claimable balances for those.
+ // If any match the confirmed counterparty revoked to_self output, skip
+ // generating a CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable.
+ let mut spent_counterparty_output = false;
+ for event in us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
+ if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
+ descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { output, .. }
+ } = &event.event {
+ res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: output.value,
+ confirmation_height: event.confirmation_threshold(),
+ });
+ if let Some(confirmed_to_self_idx) = confirmed_counterparty_output.map(|(idx, _)| idx) {
+ if event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx|
+ tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.vout == confirmed_to_self_idx)
+ ).unwrap_or(false) {
+ spent_counterparty_output = true;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if spent_counterparty_output {
+ } else if let Some((confirmed_to_self_idx, amt)) = confirmed_counterparty_output {
+ let output_spendable = us.onchain_tx_handler
+ .is_output_spend_pending(&BitcoinOutPoint::new(txid, confirmed_to_self_idx));
+ if output_spendable {
+ res.push(Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: amt,
+ });
+ }
+ } else {
+ // Counterparty output is missing, either it was broadcasted on a
+ // previous version of LDK or the counterparty hadn't met dust.
+ }
+ }
found_commitment_tx = true;
} else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
- walk_htlcs!(true, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
+ walk_htlcs!(true, false, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
found_commitment_tx = true;
} else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
- walk_htlcs!(true, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
+ walk_htlcs!(true, false, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
claimable_amount_satoshis: prev_commitment.to_self_value_sat,
});
}
}
- // TODO: Add logic to provide claimable balances for counterparty broadcasting revoked
- // outputs.
} else {
let mut claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat = 0;
for (htlc, _, _) in us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() { continue; }
if htlc.offered {
- res.push(Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
+ res.push(Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
});
} else if us.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() {
claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
+ } else {
+ // As long as the HTLC is still in our latest commitment state, treat
+ // it as potentially claimable, even if it has long-since expired.
+ res.push(Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+ expiry_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
+ });
}
}
res.push(Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
($holder_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
for (htlc, source) in $htlc_iter {
- if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| Some(v.commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index) {
+ if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| v.commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc.transaction_output_index) {
// We should assert that funding_spend_confirmed is_some() here, but we
// have some unit tests which violate HTLC transaction CSVs entirely and
// would fail.
res
}
+
+ pub(crate) fn get_stored_preimages(&self) -> HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage> {
+ self.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.clone()
+ }
}
/// Compares a broadcasted commitment transaction's HTLCs with those in the latest state,
/// as long as we examine both the current counterparty commitment transaction and, if it hasn't
/// been revoked yet, the previous one, we we will never "forget" to resolve an HTLC.
macro_rules! fail_unbroadcast_htlcs {
- ($self: expr, $commitment_tx_type: expr, $commitment_tx_conf_height: expr, $confirmed_htlcs_list: expr, $logger: expr) => { {
+ ($self: expr, $commitment_tx_type: expr, $commitment_txid_confirmed: expr, $commitment_tx_confirmed: expr,
+ $commitment_tx_conf_height: expr, $confirmed_htlcs_list: expr, $logger: expr) => { {
+ debug_assert_eq!($commitment_tx_confirmed.txid(), $commitment_txid_confirmed);
+
macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = $self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
// cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
// need to here.
let confirmed_htlcs_iter: &mut Iterator<Item = (&HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = &mut $confirmed_htlcs_list;
+
let mut matched_htlc = false;
for (ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in confirmed_htlcs_iter {
- if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(&**source) == *broadcast_source {
+ if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() &&
+ (Some(&**source) == *broadcast_source ||
+ (broadcast_source.is_none() &&
+ broadcast_htlc.payment_hash == htlc.payment_hash &&
+ broadcast_htlc.amount_msat == htlc.amount_msat)) {
matched_htlc = true;
break;
}
}
});
let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
- txid: *$txid,
+ txid: $commitment_txid_confirmed,
+ transaction: Some($commitment_tx_confirmed.clone()),
height: $commitment_tx_conf_height,
event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
source: (**source).clone(),
payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash.clone(),
- onchain_value_satoshis: Some(htlc.amount_msat / 1000),
+ htlc_value_satoshis: Some(htlc.amount_msat / 1000),
commitment_tx_output_idx: None,
},
};
- log_trace!($logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of {} commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})",
- log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, $commitment_tx_type, entry.confirmation_threshold());
+ log_trace!($logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of {} commitment transaction {}, waiting for confirmation (at height {})",
+ log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, $commitment_tx_type,
+ $commitment_txid_confirmed, entry.confirmation_threshold());
$self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
}
}
} }
}
+// In the `test_invalid_funding_tx` test, we need a bogus script which matches the HTLC-Accepted
+// witness length match (ie is 136 bytes long). We generate one here which we also use in some
+// in-line tests later.
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() -> Vec<u8> {
+ let mut ret = [opcodes::all::OP_NOP.to_u8(); 136];
+ ret[131] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
+ ret[132] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
+ ret[133] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
+ ret[134] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
+ ret[135] = opcodes::OP_TRUE.to_u8();
+ Vec::from(&ret[..])
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness() -> Vec<Vec<u8>> {
+ vec![Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program().into()].into()
+}
+
impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
/// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
/// needed by holder commitment transactions HTCLs nor by counterparty ones. Unless we haven't already seen
Ok(())
}
- pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(&mut self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
+ pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(&mut self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
// TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
// so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
// (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlc_outputs.clone());
self.current_counterparty_commitment_number = commitment_number;
//TODO: Merge this into the other per-counterparty-transaction output storage stuff
- match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
+ match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
Some(old_points) => {
if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
- self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
+ self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_per_commitment_point)));
} else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
- self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
+ self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_per_commitment_point)));
} else {
- self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
+ self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
}
} else {
- self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
+ self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
}
},
None => {
- self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
+ self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
}
}
let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs.len());
/// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
/// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
- fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L)
+ fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
+ &mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage, broadcaster: &B,
+ fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
// First check if a counterparty commitment transaction has been broadcasted:
macro_rules! claim_htlcs {
($commitment_number: expr, $txid: expr) => {
- let htlc_claim_reqs = self.get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs($commitment_number, $txid, None);
+ let (htlc_claim_reqs, _) = self.get_counterparty_output_claim_info($commitment_number, $txid, None);
self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), htlc_claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
}
}
self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(self.funding_info.0));
}
- pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()>
+ pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()>
where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
- F::Target: FeeEstimator,
- L::Target: Logger,
+ F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+ L::Target: Logger,
{
log_info!(logger, "Applying update to monitor {}, bringing update_id from {} to {} with {} changes.",
log_funding_info!(self), self.latest_update_id, updates.update_id, updates.updates.len());
ret = Err(());
}
}
- ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } => {
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point } => {
log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest counterparty commitment transaction info");
- self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(*commitment_txid, htlc_outputs.clone(), *commitment_number, *their_revocation_point, logger)
+ self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(*commitment_txid, htlc_outputs.clone(), *commitment_number, *their_per_commitment_point, logger)
},
ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } => {
log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with payment preimage");
- self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
+ let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&*fee_estimator);
+ self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
},
ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } => {
log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with commitment secret");
/// data in counterparty_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
/// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
/// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
- /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
- /// revoked counterparty commitment tx
- fn check_spend_counterparty_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs) where L::Target: Logger {
+ ///
+ /// Returns packages to claim the revoked output(s), as well as additional outputs to watch and
+ /// general information about the output that is to the counterparty in the commitment
+ /// transaction.
+ fn check_spend_counterparty_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L)
+ -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs, CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo)
+ where L::Target: Logger {
// Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
// a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
+ let mut to_counterparty_output_info = None;
let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
let per_commitment_option = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
( $thing : expr ) => {
match $thing {
Ok(a) => a,
- Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
+ Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), to_counterparty_output_info)
}
};
}
- let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
+ let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence.0 as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time.0 as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, outp.value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv);
let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, idx as u32, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp), height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, true, height);
claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
+ to_counterparty_output_info =
+ Some((idx.try_into().expect("Txn can't have more than 2^32 outputs"), outp.value));
}
}
if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
- return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
+ // per_commitment_data is corrupt or our commitment signing key leaked!
+ return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs),
+ to_counterparty_output_info);
}
let revk_htlc_outp = RevokedHTLCOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(revk_htlc_outp), htlc.cltv_expiry, true, height);
}
self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
- fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked counterparty", height, [].iter().map(|a| *a), logger);
+ if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
+ fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked_counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
+ per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
+ (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
+ ), logger);
+ } else {
+ debug_assert!(false, "We should have per-commitment option for any recognized old commitment txn");
+ fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
+ [].iter().map(|reference| *reference), logger);
+ }
}
} else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
// While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked counterparty commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
- fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "counterparty", height, per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(a, b)| (a, b.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()))), logger);
-
- let htlc_claim_reqs = self.get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs(commitment_number, commitment_txid, Some(tx));
+ fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
+ per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
+ (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
+ ), logger);
+
+ let (htlc_claim_reqs, counterparty_output_info) =
+ self.get_counterparty_output_claim_info(commitment_number, commitment_txid, Some(tx));
+ to_counterparty_output_info = counterparty_output_info;
for req in htlc_claim_reqs {
claimable_outpoints.push(req);
}
}
- (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
+ (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), to_counterparty_output_info)
}
- fn get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs(&self, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: Txid, tx: Option<&Transaction>) -> Vec<PackageTemplate> {
+ /// Returns the HTLC claim package templates and the counterparty output info
+ fn get_counterparty_output_claim_info(&self, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: Txid, tx: Option<&Transaction>)
+ -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo) {
let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
- if let Some(htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid) {
- if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
- let revocation_point_option =
- // If the counterparty commitment tx is the latest valid state, use their latest
- // per-commitment point
- if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
- else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
- // If counterparty commitment tx is the state previous to the latest valid state, use
- // their previous per-commitment point (non-atomicity of revocation means it's valid for
- // them to temporarily have two valid commitment txns from our viewpoint)
- if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
- } else { None };
- if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
- for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in htlc_outputs.iter().enumerate() {
- if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
- if let Some(transaction) = tx {
- if transaction_output_index as usize >= transaction.output.len() ||
- transaction.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
- return claimable_outpoints; // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
- }
- }
- let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
- if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
- let counterparty_htlc_outp = if htlc.offered { PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(*revocation_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, preimage.unwrap(), htlc.clone())) } else { PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(*revocation_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, htlc.clone())) };
- let aggregation = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
- let counterparty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, counterparty_htlc_outp, htlc.cltv_expiry,aggregation, 0);
- claimable_outpoints.push(counterparty_package);
- }
- }
+ let mut to_counterparty_output_info: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo = None;
+
+ let htlc_outputs = match self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid) {
+ Some(outputs) => outputs,
+ None => return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info),
+ };
+ let per_commitment_points = match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
+ Some(points) => points,
+ None => return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info),
+ };
+
+ let per_commitment_point =
+ // If the counterparty commitment tx is the latest valid state, use their latest
+ // per-commitment point
+ if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number { &per_commitment_points.1 }
+ else if let Some(point) = per_commitment_points.2.as_ref() {
+ // If counterparty commitment tx is the state previous to the latest valid state, use
+ // their previous per-commitment point (non-atomicity of revocation means it's valid for
+ // them to temporarily have two valid commitment txns from our viewpoint)
+ if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
+ point
+ } else { return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info); }
+ } else { return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info); };
+
+ if let Some(transaction) = tx {
+ let revokeable_p2wsh_opt =
+ if let Ok(revocation_pubkey) = chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(
+ &self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint)
+ {
+ if let Ok(delayed_key) = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx,
+ &per_commitment_point,
+ &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key)
+ {
+ Some(chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey,
+ self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv,
+ &delayed_key).to_v0_p2wsh())
+ } else {
+ debug_assert!(false, "Failed to derive a delayed payment key for a commitment state we accepted");
+ None
+ }
+ } else {
+ debug_assert!(false, "Failed to derive a revocation pubkey key for a commitment state we accepted");
+ None
+ };
+ if let Some(revokeable_p2wsh) = revokeable_p2wsh_opt {
+ for (idx, outp) in transaction.output.iter().enumerate() {
+ if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
+ to_counterparty_output_info =
+ Some((idx.try_into().expect("Can't have > 2^32 outputs"), outp.value));
}
}
}
}
- claimable_outpoints
+
+ for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in htlc_outputs.iter().enumerate() {
+ if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
+ if let Some(transaction) = tx {
+ if transaction_output_index as usize >= transaction.output.len() ||
+ transaction.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
+ // per_commitment_data is corrupt or our commitment signing key leaked!
+ return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info);
+ }
+ }
+ let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
+ if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
+ let counterparty_htlc_outp = if htlc.offered {
+ PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(
+ CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
+ self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
+ self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
+ preimage.unwrap(), htlc.clone()))
+ } else {
+ PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(
+ CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
+ self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
+ self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
+ htlc.clone()))
+ };
+ let aggregation = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
+ let counterparty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, counterparty_htlc_outp, htlc.cltv_expiry,aggregation, 0);
+ claimable_outpoints.push(counterparty_package);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info)
}
/// Attempts to claim a counterparty HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, height);
let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, tx);
append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
- fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "latest holder", height, self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, c)| (a, c.as_ref())), logger);
+ fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "latest holder", commitment_txid, tx, height,
+ self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter()
+ .map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())), logger);
} else if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
if holder_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
is_holder_tx = true;
let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(holder_tx, height);
let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(holder_tx, tx);
append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
- fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "previous holder", height, holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, c)| (a, c.as_ref())), logger);
+ fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "previous holder", commitment_txid, tx, height,
+ holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())),
+ logger);
}
}
let block_hash = header.block_hash();
self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
- self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
+ let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
+ self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
}
fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
header: &BlockHeader,
height: u32,
broadcaster: B,
- fee_estimator: F,
+ fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
logger: L,
) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
where
txdata: &TransactionData,
height: u32,
broadcaster: B,
- fee_estimator: F,
+ fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
logger: L,
) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
where
log_info!(logger, "Channel {} closed by funding output spend in txid {}.",
log_bytes!(self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id()), tx.txid());
self.funding_spend_seen = true;
- if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
- let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_counterparty_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
+ let mut commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output = None;
+ if (tx.input[0].sequence.0 >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time.0 >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
+ let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs, counterparty_output_idx_sats) =
+ self.check_spend_counterparty_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
+ commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output = counterparty_output_idx_sats;
if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
}
claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
if new_outpoints.is_empty() {
if let Some((mut new_outpoints, new_outputs)) = self.check_spend_holder_transaction(&tx, height, &logger) {
+ debug_assert!(commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output.is_none(),
+ "A commitment transaction matched as both a counterparty and local commitment tx?");
if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
}
let txid = tx.txid();
self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
txid,
+ transaction: Some((*tx).clone()),
height: height,
event: OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation {
on_local_output_csv: balance_spendable_csv,
+ commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output,
},
});
} else {
mut watch_outputs: Vec<TransactionOutputs>,
mut claimable_outpoints: Vec<PackageTemplate>,
broadcaster: &B,
- fee_estimator: &F,
+ fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
logger: &L,
) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
where
// Produce actionable events from on-chain events having reached their threshold.
for entry in onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.drain(..) {
match entry.event {
- OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref source, payment_hash, onchain_value_satoshis, commitment_tx_output_idx } => {
+ OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref source, payment_hash, htlc_value_satoshis, commitment_tx_output_idx } => {
// Check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
{
matured_htlcs.push(source.clone());
}
- log_debug!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
+ log_debug!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update in {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream",
+ log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), entry.txid);
self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
payment_hash,
payment_preimage: None,
source: source.clone(),
- onchain_value_satoshis,
+ htlc_value_satoshis,
}));
- if let Some(idx) = commitment_tx_output_idx {
- self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC { commitment_tx_output_idx: idx, payment_preimage: None });
- }
+ self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
+ commitment_tx_output_idx, resolving_txid: Some(entry.txid),
+ payment_preimage: None,
+ });
},
OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
log_debug!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
});
},
OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. } => {
- self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC { commitment_tx_output_idx, payment_preimage: preimage });
+ self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
+ commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx), resolving_txid: Some(entry.txid),
+ payment_preimage: preimage,
+ });
},
- OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => {
+ OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, .. } => {
self.funding_spend_confirmed = Some(entry.txid);
+ self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output = commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output;
},
}
}
//- maturing spendable output has transaction paying us has been disconnected
self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height < height);
- self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
+ let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
+ self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger);
self.best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, height - 1);
}
&mut self,
txid: &Txid,
broadcaster: B,
- fee_estimator: F,
+ fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
logger: L,
) where
B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
{
- self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.txid != *txid);
+ self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| if entry.txid == *txid {
+ log_info!(logger, "Removing onchain event with txid {}", txid);
+ false
+ } else { true });
self.onchain_tx_handler.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
}
if *idx == input.previous_output.vout {
#[cfg(test)]
{
- // If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
- // appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
- // actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
- if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
- assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&Script::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
- } else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
- assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
- } else { panic!(); }
+ // If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
+ // appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
+ // actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
+ if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
+ if input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec() == deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() {
+ // In at least one test we use a deliberately bogus witness
+ // script which hit an old panic. Thus, we check for that here
+ // and avoid the assert if its the expected bogus script.
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&Script::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
+ } else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
+ assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
+ } else { panic!(); }
}
return true;
}
}
fn should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> bool where L::Target: Logger {
+ // There's no need to broadcast our commitment transaction if we've seen one confirmed (even
+ // with 1 confirmation) as it'll be rejected as duplicate/conflicting.
+ if self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some() ||
+ self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find(|event| match event.event {
+ OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => true,
+ _ => false,
+ }).is_some()
+ {
+ return false;
+ }
// We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
// * in any unrevoked counterparty commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
// transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
let prev_last_witness_len = input.witness.second_to_last().map(|w| w.len()).unwrap_or(0);
let revocation_sig_claim = (witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && prev_last_witness_len == 33)
|| (witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && prev_last_witness_len == 33);
- let accepted_preimage_claim = witness_items == 5 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
+ let accepted_preimage_claim = witness_items == 5 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC)
+ && input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap().len() == 32;
#[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
let accepted_timeout_claim = witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && !revocation_sig_claim;
- let offered_preimage_claim = witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && !revocation_sig_claim;
+ let offered_preimage_claim = witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) &&
+ !revocation_sig_claim && input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap().len() == 32;
+
#[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
let offered_timeout_claim = witness_items == 5 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);
log_error!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
$tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
- if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
+ if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back. We can likely claim the HTLC output with a revocation claim" });
} else {
log_info!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
$tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
if payment_data.is_none() {
log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, false);
let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == htlc_output.offered;
- if !outbound_htlc || revocation_sig_claim {
- self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
- txid: tx.txid(), height,
- event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
- commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
- preimage: if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim {
- Some(payment_preimage) } else { None },
- // If this is a payment to us (!outbound_htlc, above),
- // wait for the CSV delay before dropping the HTLC from
- // claimable balance if the claim was an HTLC-Success
- // transaction.
- on_to_local_output_csv: if accepted_preimage_claim {
- Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv) } else { None },
- },
- });
- } else {
- // Outbound claims should always have payment_data, unless
- // we've already failed the HTLC as the commitment transaction
- // which was broadcasted was revoked. In that case, we should
- // spend the HTLC output here immediately, and expose that fact
- // as a Balance, something which we do not yet do.
- // TODO: Track the above as claimable!
- }
+ self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
+ txid: tx.txid(), height, transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
+ event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
+ commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
+ preimage: if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim {
+ Some(payment_preimage) } else { None },
+ // If this is a payment to us (ie !outbound_htlc), wait for
+ // the CSV delay before dropping the HTLC from claimable
+ // balance if the claim was an HTLC-Success transaction (ie
+ // accepted_preimage_claim).
+ on_to_local_output_csv: if accepted_preimage_claim && !outbound_htlc {
+ Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv) } else { None },
+ },
+ });
continue 'outer_loop;
}
}
self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
txid: tx.txid(),
height,
+ transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
source,
payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
payment_hash,
- onchain_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
+ htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
}));
}
} else if offered_preimage_claim {
} else { false }) {
self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
txid: tx.txid(),
+ transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
height,
event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
source,
payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
payment_hash,
- onchain_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
+ htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
}));
}
} else {
});
let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
txid: tx.txid(),
+ transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
height,
event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
source, payment_hash,
- onchain_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
+ htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(input.previous_output.vout),
},
};
if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
txid: tx.txid(),
+ transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
height: height,
event: OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output.clone() },
};
let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let their_cur_revocation_points = {
+ let their_cur_per_commitment_points = {
let first_idx = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
if first_idx == 0 {
None
let mut funding_spend_confirmed = None;
let mut htlcs_resolved_on_chain = Some(Vec::new());
let mut funding_spend_seen = Some(false);
+ let mut counterparty_node_id = None;
+ let mut confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output = None;
read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
(1, funding_spend_confirmed, option),
(3, htlcs_resolved_on_chain, vec_type),
(5, pending_monitor_events, vec_type),
(7, funding_spend_seen, option),
+ (9, counterparty_node_id, option),
+ (11, confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option),
});
let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
- Ok((best_block.block_hash(), ChannelMonitor {
- inner: Mutex::new(ChannelMonitorImpl {
- latest_update_id,
- commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
+ Ok((best_block.block_hash(), ChannelMonitor::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
+ latest_update_id,
+ commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
- destination_script,
- broadcasted_holder_revokable_script,
- counterparty_payment_script,
- shutdown_script,
+ destination_script,
+ broadcasted_holder_revokable_script,
+ counterparty_payment_script,
+ shutdown_script,
- channel_keys_id,
- holder_revocation_basepoint,
- funding_info,
- current_counterparty_commitment_txid,
- prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
+ channel_keys_id,
+ holder_revocation_basepoint,
+ funding_info,
+ current_counterparty_commitment_txid,
+ prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
- counterparty_commitment_params,
- funding_redeemscript,
- channel_value_satoshis,
- their_cur_revocation_points,
+ counterparty_commitment_params,
+ funding_redeemscript,
+ channel_value_satoshis,
+ their_cur_per_commitment_points,
- on_holder_tx_csv,
+ on_holder_tx_csv,
- commitment_secrets,
- counterparty_claimable_outpoints,
- counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain,
- counterparty_hash_commitment_number,
+ commitment_secrets,
+ counterparty_claimable_outpoints,
+ counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain,
+ counterparty_hash_commitment_number,
- prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx,
- current_holder_commitment_tx,
- current_counterparty_commitment_number,
- current_holder_commitment_number,
+ prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx,
+ current_holder_commitment_tx,
+ current_counterparty_commitment_number,
+ current_holder_commitment_number,
- payment_preimages,
- pending_monitor_events: pending_monitor_events.unwrap(),
- pending_events,
+ payment_preimages,
+ pending_monitor_events: pending_monitor_events.unwrap(),
+ pending_events,
- onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf,
- outputs_to_watch,
+ onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf,
+ outputs_to_watch,
- onchain_tx_handler,
+ onchain_tx_handler,
- lockdown_from_offchain,
- holder_tx_signed,
- funding_spend_seen: funding_spend_seen.unwrap(),
- funding_spend_confirmed,
- htlcs_resolved_on_chain: htlcs_resolved_on_chain.unwrap(),
+ lockdown_from_offchain,
+ holder_tx_signed,
+ funding_spend_seen: funding_spend_seen.unwrap(),
+ funding_spend_confirmed,
+ confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output,
+ htlcs_resolved_on_chain: htlcs_resolved_on_chain.unwrap(),
- best_block,
+ best_block,
+ counterparty_node_id,
- secp_ctx,
- }),
- }))
+ secp_ctx,
+ })))
}
}
use hex;
+ use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
+
use super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStep;
use ::{check_added_monitors, check_closed_broadcast, check_closed_event, check_spends, get_local_commitment_txn, get_monitor, get_route_and_payment_hash, unwrap_send_err};
use chain::{BestBlock, Confirm};
use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
use io;
- use bitcoin::Witness;
+ use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, TxMerkleNode, Witness};
use prelude::*;
fn do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(use_local_txn: bool) {
let new_header = BlockHeader {
version: 2, time: 0, bits: 0, nonce: 0,
prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_info().0,
- merkle_root: Default::default() };
+ merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros() };
let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(&new_header,
&[(0, broadcast_tx)], conf_height);
let broadcaster = TestBroadcaster::new(Arc::clone(&nodes[1].blocks));
assert!(
- pre_update_monitor.update_monitor(&replay_update, &&broadcaster, &&chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &nodes[1].logger)
+ pre_update_monitor.update_monitor(&replay_update, &&broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &nodes[1].logger)
.is_err());
// Even though we error'd on the first update, we should still have generated an HTLC claim
// transaction
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
let broadcaster = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))});
- let fee_estimator = Arc::new(TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) });
+ let fee_estimator = TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
- let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
+ let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
let mut preimages = Vec::new();
{
delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[47; 32]).unwrap()),
htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[48; 32]).unwrap())
};
- let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: Default::default(), index: u16::max_value() };
+ let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: Txid::all_zeros(), index: u16::max_value() };
let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
holder_pubkeys: keys.holder_channel_pubkeys.clone(),
holder_selected_contest_delay: 66,
(OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()),
&channel_parameters,
Script::new(), 46, 0,
- HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), best_block);
+ HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), best_block, dummy_key);
monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])).unwrap();
let dummy_txid = dummy_tx.txid();
monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
- monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger);
+ let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_estimator);
+ monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage, &broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &logger);
}
// Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
// Justice tx with 1 to_holder, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
- let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
+ let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
for i in 0..4 {
claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
vout: i,
},
script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: 0xfffffffd,
+ sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
witness: Witness::new(),
});
}
// Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
- let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
+ let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
for i in 0..4 {
claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
vout: i,
},
script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: 0xfffffffd,
+ sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
witness: Witness::new(),
});
}
// Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
- let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
+ let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
vout: 0,
},
script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: 0xfffffffd,
+ sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
witness: Witness::new(),
});
claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff