#[must_use]
pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
pub(crate) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
+ /// Historically, [`ChannelMonitor`]s didn't know their counterparty node id. However,
+ /// `ChannelManager` really wants to know it so that it can easily look up the corresponding
+ /// channel. For now, this results in a temporary map in `ChannelManager` to look up channels
+ /// by only the funding outpoint.
+ ///
+ /// To eventually remove that, we repeat the counterparty node id here so that we can upgrade
+ /// `ChannelMonitor`s to become aware of the counterparty node id if they were generated prior
+ /// to when it was stored directly in them.
+ pub(crate) counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
/// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this
/// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly
/// increasing and increase by one for each new update, with two exceptions specified below.
///
/// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
pub update_id: u64,
+ /// The channel ID associated with these updates.
+ ///
+ /// Will be `None` for `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s constructed on LDK versions prior to 0.0.121 and
+ /// always `Some` otherwise.
+ pub channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
}
/// The update ID used for a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] that is either:
for update_step in self.updates.iter() {
update_step.write(w)?;
}
- write_tlv_fields!(w, {});
+ write_tlv_fields!(w, {
+ (1, self.counterparty_node_id, option),
+ (3, self.channel_id, option),
+ });
Ok(())
}
}
updates.push(upd);
}
}
- read_tlv_fields!(r, {});
- Ok(Self { update_id, updates })
+ let mut counterparty_node_id = None;
+ let mut channel_id = None;
+ read_tlv_fields!(r, {
+ (1, counterparty_node_id, option),
+ (3, channel_id, option),
+ });
+ Ok(Self { update_id, counterparty_node_id, updates, channel_id })
}
}
Completed {
/// The funding outpoint of the [`ChannelMonitor`] that was updated
funding_txo: OutPoint,
+ /// The channel ID of the channel associated with the [`ChannelMonitor`]
+ channel_id: ChannelId,
/// The Update ID from [`ChannelMonitorUpdate::update_id`] which was applied or
/// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_update_id`].
///
(0, Completed) => {
(0, funding_txo, required),
(2, monitor_update_id, required),
+ (4, channel_id, required),
},
;
(2, HTLCEvent),
channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
holder_revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint,
+ channel_id: ChannelId,
funding_info: (OutPoint, ScriptBuf),
current_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
(13, self.spendable_txids_confirmed, required_vec),
(15, self.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs, required),
(17, self.initial_counterparty_commitment_info, option),
+ (19, self.channel_id, required),
});
Ok(())
pub(crate) fn from_impl<S: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(logger: &'a L, monitor_impl: &ChannelMonitorImpl<S>) -> Self {
let peer_id = monitor_impl.counterparty_node_id;
- let channel_id = Some(monitor_impl.funding_info.0.to_channel_id());
+ let channel_id = Some(monitor_impl.channel_id());
WithChannelMonitor {
logger, peer_id, channel_id,
}
funding_redeemscript: ScriptBuf, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
initial_holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
- best_block: BestBlock, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey) -> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
+ best_block: BestBlock, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId,
+ ) -> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
let counterparty_payment_script = chan_utils::get_counterparty_payment_script(
channel_keys_id,
holder_revocation_basepoint,
+ channel_id,
funding_info,
current_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_funding_txo().clone()
}
+ /// Gets the channel_id of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
+ pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
+ self.inner.lock().unwrap().channel_id()
+ }
+
/// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
/// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Vec<(u32, ScriptBuf)>)> {
}
}
- fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, broadcaster: &B, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>)
- where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
- L::Target: Logger,
- {
- let commit_txs = self.get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger);
- let mut txs = vec![];
- for tx in commit_txs.iter() {
- log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting local {}", log_tx!(tx));
- txs.push(tx);
- }
- broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&txs);
+ fn generate_claimable_outpoints_and_watch_outputs(&mut self) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Vec<TransactionOutputs>) {
+ let funding_outp = HolderFundingOutput::build(
+ self.funding_redeemscript.clone(),
+ self.channel_value_satoshis,
+ self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()
+ );
+ let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(
+ self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32,
+ PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_outp),
+ self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height()
+ );
+ let mut claimable_outpoints = vec![commitment_package];
self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(self.funding_info.0));
+ // Although we aren't signing the transaction directly here, the transaction will be signed
+ // in the claim that is queued to OnchainTxHandler. We set holder_tx_signed here to reject
+ // new channel updates.
+ self.holder_tx_signed = true;
+ let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
+ // We can't broadcast our HTLC transactions while the commitment transaction is
+ // unconfirmed. We'll delay doing so until we detect the confirmed commitment in
+ // `transactions_confirmed`.
+ if !self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
+ // Because we're broadcasting a commitment transaction, we should construct the package
+ // assuming it gets confirmed in the next block. Sadly, we have code which considers
+ // "not yet confirmed" things as discardable, so we cannot do that here.
+ let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(
+ &self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height()
+ );
+ let unsigned_commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_unsigned_holder_commitment_tx();
+ let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(
+ &self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &unsigned_commitment_tx
+ );
+ if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
+ watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
+ }
+ claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
+ }
+ (claimable_outpoints, watch_outputs)
+ }
+
+ pub(crate) fn queue_latest_holder_commitment_txn_for_broadcast<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
+ &mut self, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>
+ )
+ where
+ B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
+ F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+ L::Target: Logger,
+ {
+ let (claimable_outpoints, _) = self.generate_claimable_outpoints_and_watch_outputs();
+ self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(
+ claimable_outpoints, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster,
+ fee_estimator, logger
+ );
}
fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
log_info!(logger, "Applying update to monitor {}, bringing update_id from {} to {} with {} change(s).",
log_funding_info!(self), self.latest_update_id, updates.update_id, updates.updates.len());
}
+
+ if updates.counterparty_node_id.is_some() {
+ if self.counterparty_node_id.is_none() {
+ self.counterparty_node_id = updates.counterparty_node_id;
+ } else {
+ debug_assert_eq!(self.counterparty_node_id, updates.counterparty_node_id);
+ }
+ }
+
// ChannelMonitor updates may be applied after force close if we receive a preimage for a
// broadcasted commitment transaction HTLC output that we'd like to claim on-chain. If this
// is the case, we no longer have guaranteed access to the monitor's update ID, so we use a
log_trace!(logger, "Avoiding commitment broadcast, already detected confirmed spend onchain");
continue;
}
- self.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger);
- // If the channel supports anchor outputs, we'll need to emit an external
- // event to be consumed such that a child transaction is broadcast with a
- // high enough feerate for the parent commitment transaction to confirm.
- if self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
- let funding_output = HolderFundingOutput::build(
- self.funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
- self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone(),
- );
- let best_block_height = self.best_block.height();
- let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(
- self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32,
- PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_output),
- best_block_height, best_block_height
- );
- self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(
- vec![commitment_package], best_block_height, best_block_height,
- broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger,
- );
- }
+ self.queue_latest_holder_commitment_txn_for_broadcast(broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger);
} else if !self.holder_tx_signed {
log_error!(logger, "WARNING: You have a potentially-unsafe holder commitment transaction available to broadcast");
- log_error!(logger, " in channel monitor for channel {}!", &self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id());
+ log_error!(logger, " in channel monitor for channel {}!", &self.channel_id());
log_error!(logger, " Read the docs for ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn and take manual action!");
} else {
// If we generated a MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed, the ChannelManager
&self.funding_info
}
+ pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
+ self.channel_id
+ }
+
fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, ScriptBuf)>> {
// If we've detected a counterparty commitment tx on chain, we must include it in the set
// of outputs to watch for spends of, otherwise we're likely to lose user funds. Because
}
}
+ /// Cancels any existing pending claims for a commitment that previously confirmed and has now
+ /// been replaced by another.
+ pub fn cancel_prev_commitment_claims<L: Deref>(
+ &mut self, logger: &L, confirmed_commitment_txid: &Txid
+ ) where L::Target: Logger {
+ for (counterparty_commitment_txid, _) in &self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain {
+ // Cancel any pending claims for counterparty commitments we've seen confirm.
+ if counterparty_commitment_txid == confirmed_commitment_txid {
+ continue;
+ }
+ for (htlc, _) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(counterparty_commitment_txid).unwrap_or(&vec![]) {
+ log_trace!(logger, "Canceling claims for previously confirmed counterparty commitment {}",
+ counterparty_commitment_txid);
+ let mut outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: *counterparty_commitment_txid, vout: 0 };
+ if let Some(vout) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
+ outpoint.vout = vout;
+ self.onchain_tx_handler.abandon_claim(&outpoint);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if self.holder_tx_signed {
+ // If we've signed, we may have broadcast either commitment (prev or current), and
+ // attempted to claim from it immediately without waiting for a confirmation.
+ if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid != *confirmed_commitment_txid {
+ log_trace!(logger, "Canceling claims for previously broadcast holder commitment {}",
+ self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid);
+ let mut outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid, vout: 0 };
+ for (htlc, _, _) in &self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
+ if let Some(vout) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
+ outpoint.vout = vout;
+ self.onchain_tx_handler.abandon_claim(&outpoint);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
+ if prev_holder_commitment_tx.txid != *confirmed_commitment_txid {
+ log_trace!(logger, "Canceling claims for previously broadcast holder commitment {}",
+ prev_holder_commitment_tx.txid);
+ let mut outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: prev_holder_commitment_tx.txid, vout: 0 };
+ for (htlc, _, _) in &prev_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
+ if let Some(vout) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
+ outpoint.vout = vout;
+ self.onchain_tx_handler.abandon_claim(&outpoint);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ // No previous claim.
+ }
+ }
+
fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(
&mut self, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 {
let mut balance_spendable_csv = None;
log_info!(logger, "Channel {} closed by funding output spend in txid {}.",
- &self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id(), txid);
+ &self.channel_id(), txid);
self.funding_spend_seen = true;
let mut commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output = None;
if (tx.input[0].sequence.0 >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output,
},
});
+ // Now that we've detected a confirmed commitment transaction, attempt to cancel
+ // pending claims for any commitments that were previously confirmed such that
+ // we don't continue claiming inputs that no longer exist.
+ self.cancel_prev_commitment_claims(&logger, &txid);
}
}
if tx.input.len() >= 1 {
let should_broadcast = self.should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn(logger);
if should_broadcast {
- let funding_outp = HolderFundingOutput::build(self.funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis, self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone());
- let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32, PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_outp), self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height());
- claimable_outpoints.push(commitment_package);
- self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(self.funding_info.0));
- // Although we aren't signing the transaction directly here, the transaction will be signed
- // in the claim that is queued to OnchainTxHandler. We set holder_tx_signed here to reject
- // new channel updates.
- self.holder_tx_signed = true;
- // We can't broadcast our HTLC transactions while the commitment transaction is
- // unconfirmed. We'll delay doing so until we detect the confirmed commitment in
- // `transactions_confirmed`.
- if !self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
- // Because we're broadcasting a commitment transaction, we should construct the package
- // assuming it gets confirmed in the next block. Sadly, we have code which considers
- // "not yet confirmed" things as discardable, so we cannot do that here.
- let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height());
- let unsigned_commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_unsigned_holder_commitment_tx();
- let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &unsigned_commitment_tx);
- if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
- watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
- }
- claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
- }
+ let (mut new_outpoints, mut new_outputs) = self.generate_claimable_outpoints_and_watch_outputs();
+ claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
+ watch_outputs.append(&mut new_outputs);
}
// Find which on-chain events have reached their confirmation threshold.
log_debug!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
self.pending_events.push(Event::SpendableOutputs {
outputs: vec![descriptor],
- channel_id: Some(self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id()),
+ channel_id: Some(self.channel_id()),
});
self.spendable_txids_confirmed.push(entry.txid);
},
let mut spendable_txids_confirmed = Some(Vec::new());
let mut counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs = Some(HashMap::new());
let mut initial_counterparty_commitment_info = None;
+ let mut channel_id = None;
read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
(1, funding_spend_confirmed, option),
(3, htlcs_resolved_on_chain, optional_vec),
(13, spendable_txids_confirmed, optional_vec),
(15, counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs, option),
(17, initial_counterparty_commitment_info, option),
+ (19, channel_id, option),
});
// Monitors for anchor outputs channels opened in v0.0.116 suffered from a bug in which the
channel_keys_id,
holder_revocation_basepoint,
+ channel_id: channel_id.unwrap_or(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint)),
funding_info,
current_counterparty_commitment_txid,
prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
use crate::chain::package::{weight_offered_htlc, weight_received_htlc, weight_revoked_offered_htlc, weight_revoked_received_htlc, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT};
use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use crate::sign::InMemorySigner;
- use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
+ use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, ChannelId};
use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, DelayedPaymentKey, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationBasepoint, RevocationKey};
use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self,HTLCOutputInCommitment, ChannelPublicKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
use crate::ln::channelmanager::{PaymentSendFailure, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
preimages_slice_to_htlcs!($preimages_slice).into_iter().map(|(htlc, _)| (htlc, None)).collect()
}
}
- let dummy_sig = crate::util::crypto::sign(&secp_ctx,
+ let dummy_sig = crate::crypto::utils::sign(&secp_ctx,
&bitcoin::secp256k1::Message::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(),
&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[48; 32]).unwrap()))
};
let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: Txid::all_zeros(), index: u16::max_value() };
+ let channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint);
let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
holder_pubkeys: keys.holder_channel_pubkeys.clone(),
holder_selected_contest_delay: 66,
Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(shutdown_pubkey).into_inner()), 0, &ScriptBuf::new(),
(OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, ScriptBuf::new()),
&channel_parameters, ScriptBuf::new(), 46, 0, HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut Vec::new()),
- best_block, dummy_key);
+ best_block, dummy_key, channel_id);
let mut htlcs = preimages_slice_to_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]);
let dummy_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut htlcs);
htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[48; 32]).unwrap())),
};
let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: Txid::all_zeros(), index: u16::max_value() };
+ let channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint);
let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
holder_pubkeys: keys.holder_channel_pubkeys.clone(),
holder_selected_contest_delay: 66,
Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(shutdown_pubkey).into_inner()), 0, &ScriptBuf::new(),
(OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, ScriptBuf::new()),
&channel_parameters, ScriptBuf::new(), 46, 0, HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut Vec::new()),
- best_block, dummy_key);
+ best_block, dummy_key, channel_id);
- let chan_id = monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().funding_info.0.to_channel_id().clone();
+ let chan_id = monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().channel_id();
let context_logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&logger, &monitor);
log_error!(context_logger, "This is an error");
log_warn!(context_logger, "This is an error");
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff