Merge branch '2022-02-bal-panic' into 2022-02-0.0.105-sec

[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / chain / channelmonitor.rs

diff --git a/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs b/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs
index 91544f11334e4eb5bcf4683da632262cfd7dce82..fb2cbaddf533a9aa56cbc8586ba7f68f997345f7 100644 (file)
--- a/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs
@@ -1392,8 +1392,23 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
                        ($holder_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
                                for htlc in $htlc_iter {
                                        if let Some(htlc_input_idx) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
-                                               if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| v.input_idx == htlc_input_idx) {
-                                                       assert!(us.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some());
+                                               if let Some(conf_thresh) = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
+                                                       if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(descriptor) } = &event.event {
+                                                               if descriptor.outpoint.index as u32 == htlc_input_idx { Some(event.confirmation_threshold()) } else { None }
+                                                       } else { None }
+                                               }) {
+                                                       debug_assert!($holder_commitment);
+                                                       res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+                                                               claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+                                                               confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
+                                                       });
+                                               } else if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| v.input_idx == htlc_input_idx) {
+                                                       // Funding transaction spends should be fully confirmed by the time any
+                                                       // HTLC transactions are resolved, unless we're talking about a holder
+                                                       // commitment tx, whose resolution is delayed until the CSV timeout is
+                                                       // reached, even though HTLCs may be resolved after only
+                                                       // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
+                                                       debug_assert!($holder_commitment || us.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some());
                                                } else if htlc.offered == $holder_commitment {
                                                        // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
                                                        // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back