use util::ser::{Writeable, Writer, Readable};
use ln::chan_utils;
-use ln::chan_utils::{TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys};
+use ln::chan_utils::{TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, LocalCommitmentTransaction};
use ln::msgs;
use std::sync::Arc;
/// The private key which should be used to sign the transaction is provided, as well as the
/// full witness redeemScript which is hashed in the output script_pubkey.
/// The witness in the spending input should be:
- /// <BIP 143 signature generated with the given key> <one zero byte aka OP_0>
+ /// <BIP 143 signature generated with the given key> <empty vector> (MINIMALIF standard rule)
/// <witness_script as provided>
/// Note that the nSequence field in the input must be set to_self_delay (which corresponds to
/// the transaction not being broadcastable until at least to_self_delay blocks after the input
/// making the callee generate it via some util function we expose)!
fn sign_remote_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, feerate_per_kw: u64, commitment_tx: &Transaction, keys: &TxCreationKeys, htlcs: &[&HTLCOutputInCommitment], to_self_delay: u16, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()>;
+ /// Create a signature for a local commitment transaction
+ ///
+ /// TODO: Document the things someone using this interface should enforce before signing.
+ /// TODO: Add more input vars to enable better checking (preferably removing commitment_tx and
+ /// TODO: Ensure test-only version doesn't enforce uniqueness of signature when it's enforced in this method
+ /// making the callee generate it via some util function we expose)!
+ fn sign_local_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, local_commitment_tx: &mut LocalCommitmentTransaction, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>);
+
+ /// Create a signature for a local commitment transaction without enforcing one-time signing.
+ ///
+ /// Testing revocation logic by our test framework needs to sign multiple local commitment
+ /// transactions. This unsafe test-only version doesn't enforce one-time signing security
+ /// requirement.
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ fn unsafe_sign_local_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, local_commitment_tx: &mut LocalCommitmentTransaction, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>);
+
/// Create a signature for a (proposed) closing transaction.
///
/// Note that, due to rounding, there may be one "missing" satoshi, and either party may have
Ok((commitment_sig, htlc_sigs))
}
+ fn sign_local_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, local_commitment_tx: &mut LocalCommitmentTransaction, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) {
+ local_commitment_tx.add_local_sig(&self.funding_key, funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis, secp_ctx);
+ }
+
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ fn unsafe_sign_local_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, local_commitment_tx: &mut LocalCommitmentTransaction, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) {
+ local_commitment_tx.add_local_sig(&self.funding_key, funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis, secp_ctx);
+ }
+
fn sign_closing_transaction<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, closing_tx: &Transaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
if closing_tx.input.len() != 1 { return Err(()); }
if closing_tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { return Err(()); }