+// This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
+// history.
+//
+// This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
+// or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
+// <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
+// You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
+// licenses.
+
//! keysinterface provides keys into rust-lightning and defines some useful enums which describe
//! spendable on-chain outputs which the user owns and is responsible for using just as any other
//! on-chain output which is theirs.
-use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, OutPoint, TxOut};
+use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, SigHashType};
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
use util::byte_utils;
use util::ser::{Writeable, Writer, Readable};
+use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use ln::chan_utils;
-use ln::chan_utils::{TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, LocalCommitmentTransaction};
-use ln::msgs;
+use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CommitmentTransaction};
+use ln::msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement;
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
use std::io::Error;
/// spend on-chain. The information needed to do this is provided in this enum, including the
/// outpoint describing which txid and output index is available, the full output which exists at
/// that txid/index, and any keys or other information required to sign.
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
pub enum SpendableOutputDescriptor {
/// An output to a script which was provided via KeysInterface, thus you should already know
/// how to spend it. No keys are provided as rust-lightning was never given any keys - only the
/// it is an output from an old state which we broadcast (which should never happen).
///
/// To derive the delayed_payment key which is used to sign for this input, you must pass the
- /// local delayed_payment_base_key (ie the private key which corresponds to the pubkey in
+ /// holder delayed_payment_base_key (ie the private key which corresponds to the pubkey in
/// ChannelKeys::pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint) and the provided per_commitment_point to
/// chan_utils::derive_private_key. The public key can be generated without the secret key
/// using chan_utils::derive_public_key and only the delayed_payment_basepoint which appears in
/// ChannelKeys::pubkeys().
///
- /// To derive the remote_revocation_pubkey provided here (which is used in the witness
- /// script generation), you must pass the remote revocation_basepoint (which appears in the
- /// call to ChannelKeys::set_remote_channel_pubkeys) and the provided per_commitment point
+ /// To derive the revocation_pubkey provided here (which is used in the witness
+ /// script generation), you must pass the counterparty revocation_basepoint (which appears in the
+ /// call to ChannelKeys::ready_channel) and the provided per_commitment point
/// to chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key.
///
/// The witness script which is hashed and included in the output script_pubkey may be
/// The channel keys state used to proceed to derivation of signing key. Must
/// be pass to KeysInterface::derive_channel_keys.
key_derivation_params: (u64, u64),
- /// The remote_revocation_pubkey used to derive witnessScript
- remote_revocation_pubkey: PublicKey
+ /// The revocation_pubkey used to derive witnessScript
+ revocation_pubkey: PublicKey
},
/// An output to a P2WPKH, spendable exclusively by our payment key (ie the private key which
/// corresponds to the public key in ChannelKeys::pubkeys().payment_point).
///
/// These are generally the result of our counterparty having broadcast the current state,
/// allowing us to claim the non-HTLC-encumbered outputs immediately.
- StaticOutputRemotePayment {
+ StaticOutputCounterpartyPayment {
/// The outpoint which is spendable
outpoint: OutPoint,
/// The output which is reference by the given outpoint
outpoint.write(writer)?;
output.write(writer)?;
},
- &SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH { ref outpoint, ref per_commitment_point, ref to_self_delay, ref output, ref key_derivation_params, ref remote_revocation_pubkey } => {
+ &SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH { ref outpoint, ref per_commitment_point, ref to_self_delay, ref output, ref key_derivation_params, ref revocation_pubkey } => {
1u8.write(writer)?;
outpoint.write(writer)?;
per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
output.write(writer)?;
key_derivation_params.0.write(writer)?;
key_derivation_params.1.write(writer)?;
- remote_revocation_pubkey.write(writer)?;
+ revocation_pubkey.write(writer)?;
},
- &SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutputRemotePayment { ref outpoint, ref output, ref key_derivation_params } => {
+ &SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutputCounterpartyPayment { ref outpoint, ref output, ref key_derivation_params } => {
2u8.write(writer)?;
outpoint.write(writer)?;
output.write(writer)?;
to_self_delay: Readable::read(reader)?,
output: Readable::read(reader)?,
key_derivation_params: (Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?),
- remote_revocation_pubkey: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ revocation_pubkey: Readable::read(reader)?,
}),
- 2u8 => Ok(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutputRemotePayment {
+ 2u8 => Ok(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutputCounterpartyPayment {
outpoint: Readable::read(reader)?,
output: Readable::read(reader)?,
key_derivation_params: (Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?),
// routine).
// TODO: We should remove Clone by instead requesting a new ChannelKeys copy when we create
// ChannelMonitors instead of expecting to clone the one out of the Channel into the monitors.
-pub trait ChannelKeys : Send+Clone {
- /// Gets the commitment seed
- fn commitment_seed<'a>(&'a self) -> &'a [u8; 32];
- /// Gets the local channel public keys and basepoints
- fn pubkeys<'a>(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelPublicKeys;
+pub trait ChannelKeys : Send+Clone + Writeable {
+ /// Gets the per-commitment point for a specific commitment number
+ ///
+ /// Note that the commitment number starts at (1 << 48) - 1 and counts backwards.
+ fn get_per_commitment_point<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, idx: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> PublicKey;
+ /// Gets the commitment secret for a specific commitment number as part of the revocation process
+ ///
+ /// An external signer implementation should error here if the commitment was already signed
+ /// and should refuse to sign it in the future.
+ ///
+ /// May be called more than once for the same index.
+ ///
+ /// Note that the commitment number starts at (1 << 48) - 1 and counts backwards.
+ /// TODO: return a Result so we can signal a validation error
+ fn release_commitment_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32];
+ /// Gets the holder's channel public keys and basepoints
+ fn pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys;
/// Gets arbitrary identifiers describing the set of keys which are provided back to you in
/// some SpendableOutputDescriptor types. These should be sufficient to identify this
/// ChannelKeys object uniquely and lookup or re-derive its keys.
fn key_derivation_params(&self) -> (u64, u64);
- /// Create a signature for a remote commitment transaction and associated HTLC transactions.
+ /// Create a signature for a counterparty's commitment transaction and associated HTLC transactions.
///
/// Note that if signing fails or is rejected, the channel will be force-closed.
//
// TODO: Document the things someone using this interface should enforce before signing.
- // TODO: Add more input vars to enable better checking (preferably removing commitment_tx and
- // making the callee generate it via some util function we expose)!
- fn sign_remote_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, feerate_per_kw: u32, commitment_tx: &Transaction, keys: &TxCreationKeys, htlcs: &[&HTLCOutputInCommitment], to_self_delay: u16, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()>;
-
- /// Create a signature for a local commitment transaction. This will only ever be called with
- /// the same local_commitment_tx (or a copy thereof), though there are currently no guarantees
- /// that it will not be called multiple times.
+ fn sign_counterparty_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &CommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()>;
+
+ /// Create a signatures for a holder's commitment transaction and its claiming HTLC transactions.
+ /// This will only ever be called with a non-revoked commitment_tx. This will be called with the
+ /// latest commitment_tx when we initiate a force-close.
+ /// This will be called with the previous latest, just to get claiming HTLC signatures, if we are
+ /// reacting to a ChannelMonitor replica that decided to broadcast before it had been updated to
+ /// the latest.
+ /// This may be called multiple times for the same transaction.
+ ///
+ /// An external signer implementation should check that the commitment has not been revoked.
+ ///
+ /// May return Err if key derivation fails. Callers, such as ChannelMonitor, will panic in such a case.
//
// TODO: Document the things someone using this interface should enforce before signing.
- // TODO: Add more input vars to enable better checking (preferably removing commitment_tx and
- fn sign_local_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, local_commitment_tx: &LocalCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
+ // TODO: Key derivation failure should panic rather than Err
+ fn sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()>;
- /// Same as sign_local_commitment, but exists only for tests to get access to local commitment
+ /// Same as sign_holder_commitment, but exists only for tests to get access to holder commitment
/// transactions which will be broadcasted later, after the channel has moved on to a newer
- /// state. Thus, needs its own method as sign_local_commitment may enforce that we only ever
+ /// state. Thus, needs its own method as sign_holder_commitment may enforce that we only ever
/// get called once.
- #[cfg(test)]
- fn unsafe_sign_local_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, local_commitment_tx: &LocalCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
-
- /// Create a signature for each HTLC transaction spending a local commitment transaction.
- ///
- /// Unlike sign_local_commitment, this may be called multiple times with *different*
- /// local_commitment_tx values. While this will never be called with a revoked
- /// local_commitment_tx, it is possible that it is called with the second-latest
- /// local_commitment_tx (only if we haven't yet revoked it) if some watchtower/secondary
- /// ChannelMonitor decided to broadcast before it had been updated to the latest.
- ///
- /// Either an Err should be returned, or a Vec with one entry for each HTLC which exists in
- /// local_commitment_tx. For those HTLCs which have transaction_output_index set to None
- /// (implying they were considered dust at the time the commitment transaction was negotiated),
- /// a corresponding None should be included in the return value. All other positions in the
- /// return value must contain a signature.
- fn sign_local_commitment_htlc_transactions<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, local_commitment_tx: &LocalCommitmentTransaction, local_csv: u16, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Option<Signature>>, ()>;
+ #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
+ fn unsafe_sign_holder_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
/// Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending an HTLC or commitment
/// transaction output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
/// Amount is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
///
/// per_commitment_key is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
- /// revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _local_ secret key and does
- /// not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our local revocation_secret to do
+ /// revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
+ /// not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder revocation_secret to do
/// so).
///
/// htlc holds HTLC elements (hash, timelock) if the output being spent is a HTLC output, thus
/// changing the format of the witness script (which is committed to in the BIP 143
/// signatures).
- ///
- /// on_remote_tx_csv is the relative lock-time that that our counterparty would have to set on
- /// their transaction were they to spend the same output. It is included in the witness script
- /// and thus committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
- fn sign_justice_transaction<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, htlc: &Option<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, on_remote_tx_csv: u16, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
+ fn sign_justice_transaction<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, htlc: &Option<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
- /// Create a signature for a claiming transaction for a HTLC output on a remote commitment
+ /// Create a signature for a claiming transaction for a HTLC output on a counterparty's commitment
/// transaction, either offered or received.
///
/// Such a transaction may claim multiples offered outputs at same time if we know the
/// detected onchain. It has been generated by our counterparty and is used to derive
/// channel state keys, which are then included in the witness script and committed to in the
/// BIP 143 signature.
- fn sign_remote_htlc_transaction<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, htlc_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
+ fn sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, htlc_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
/// Create a signature for a (proposed) closing transaction.
///
/// Note that if this fails or is rejected, the channel will not be publicly announced and
/// our counterparty may (though likely will not) close the channel on us for violating the
/// protocol.
- fn sign_channel_announcement<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
+ fn sign_channel_announcement<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, msg: &UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
- /// Set the remote channel basepoints. This is done immediately on incoming channels
- /// and as soon as the channel is accepted on outgoing channels.
+ /// Set the counterparty static channel data, including basepoints,
+ /// counterparty_selected/holder_selected_contest_delay and funding outpoint.
+ /// This is done as soon as the funding outpoint is known. Since these are static channel data,
+ /// they MUST NOT be allowed to change to different values once set.
+ ///
+ /// channel_parameters.is_populated() MUST be true.
+ ///
+ /// We bind holder_selected_contest_delay late here for API convenience.
///
/// Will be called before any signatures are applied.
- fn set_remote_channel_pubkeys(&mut self, channel_points: &ChannelPublicKeys);
+ fn ready_channel(&mut self, channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters);
}
/// A trait to describe an object which can get user secrets and key material.
/// Get a new set of ChannelKeys for per-channel secrets. These MUST be unique even if you
/// restarted with some stale data!
fn get_channel_keys(&self, inbound: bool, channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> Self::ChanKeySigner;
- /// Get a secret and PRNG seed for constructing an onion packet
- fn get_onion_rand(&self) -> (SecretKey, [u8; 32]);
- /// Get a unique temporary channel id. Channels will be referred to by this until the funding
- /// transaction is created, at which point they will use the outpoint in the funding
- /// transaction.
- fn get_channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32];
+ /// Gets a unique, cryptographically-secure, random 32 byte value. This is used for encrypting
+ /// onion packets and for temporary channel IDs. There is no requirement that these be
+ /// persisted anywhere, though they must be unique across restarts.
+ fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32];
+
+ /// Reads a `ChanKeySigner` for this `KeysInterface` from the given input stream.
+ /// This is only called during deserialization of other objects which contain
+ /// `ChannelKeys`-implementing objects (ie `ChannelMonitor`s and `ChannelManager`s).
+ /// The bytes are exactly those which `<Self::ChanKeySigner as Writeable>::write()` writes, and
+ /// contain no versioning scheme. You may wish to include your own version prefix and ensure
+ /// you've read all of the provided bytes to ensure no corruption occurred.
+ fn read_chan_signer(&self, reader: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::ChanKeySigner, DecodeError>;
}
#[derive(Clone)]
/// A simple implementation of ChannelKeys that just keeps the private keys in memory.
+///
+/// This implementation performs no policy checks and is insufficient by itself as
+/// a secure external signer.
pub struct InMemoryChannelKeys {
/// Private key of anchor tx
pub funding_key: SecretKey,
- /// Local secret key for blinded revocation pubkey
+ /// Holder secret key for blinded revocation pubkey
pub revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
- /// Local secret key used for our balance in remote-broadcasted commitment transactions
+ /// Holder secret key used for our balance in counterparty-broadcasted commitment transactions
pub payment_key: SecretKey,
- /// Local secret key used in HTLC tx
+ /// Holder secret key used in HTLC tx
pub delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey,
- /// Local htlc secret key used in commitment tx htlc outputs
+ /// Holder htlc secret key used in commitment tx htlc outputs
pub htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
/// Commitment seed
pub commitment_seed: [u8; 32],
- /// Local public keys and basepoints
- pub(crate) local_channel_pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
- /// Remote public keys and base points
- pub(crate) remote_channel_pubkeys: Option<ChannelPublicKeys>,
+ /// Holder public keys and basepoints
+ pub(crate) holder_channel_pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
+ /// Counterparty public keys and counterparty/holder selected_contest_delay, populated on channel acceptance
+ channel_parameters: Option<ChannelTransactionParameters>,
/// The total value of this channel
channel_value_satoshis: u64,
/// Key derivation parameters
commitment_seed: [u8; 32],
channel_value_satoshis: u64,
key_derivation_params: (u64, u64)) -> InMemoryChannelKeys {
- let local_channel_pubkeys =
- InMemoryChannelKeys::make_local_keys(secp_ctx, &funding_key, &revocation_base_key,
+ let holder_channel_pubkeys =
+ InMemoryChannelKeys::make_holder_keys(secp_ctx, &funding_key, &revocation_base_key,
&payment_key, &delayed_payment_base_key,
&htlc_base_key);
InMemoryChannelKeys {
htlc_base_key,
commitment_seed,
channel_value_satoshis,
- local_channel_pubkeys,
- remote_channel_pubkeys: None,
+ holder_channel_pubkeys,
+ channel_parameters: None,
key_derivation_params,
}
}
- fn make_local_keys<C: Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>,
+ fn make_holder_keys<C: Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>,
funding_key: &SecretKey,
revocation_base_key: &SecretKey,
payment_key: &SecretKey,
}
}
- fn remote_pubkeys<'a>(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelPublicKeys { self.remote_channel_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap() }
+ /// Counterparty pubkeys.
+ /// Will panic if ready_channel wasn't called.
+ pub fn counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys { &self.get_channel_parameters().counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys }
+
+ /// The contest_delay value specified by our counterparty and applied on holder-broadcastable
+ /// transactions, ie the amount of time that we have to wait to recover our funds if we
+ /// broadcast a transaction.
+ /// Will panic if ready_channel wasn't called.
+ pub fn counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 { self.get_channel_parameters().counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().selected_contest_delay }
+
+ /// The contest_delay value specified by us and applied on transactions broadcastable
+ /// by our counterparty, ie the amount of time that they have to wait to recover their funds
+ /// if they broadcast a transaction.
+ /// Will panic if ready_channel wasn't called.
+ pub fn holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 { self.get_channel_parameters().holder_selected_contest_delay }
+
+ /// Whether the holder is the initiator
+ /// Will panic if ready_channel wasn't called.
+ pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool { self.get_channel_parameters().is_outbound_from_holder }
+
+ /// Funding outpoint
+ /// Will panic if ready_channel wasn't called.
+ pub fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> &OutPoint { self.get_channel_parameters().funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap() }
+
+ /// Obtain a ChannelTransactionParameters for this channel, to be used when verifying or
+ /// building transactions.
+ ///
+ /// Will panic if ready_channel wasn't called.
+ pub fn get_channel_parameters(&self) -> &ChannelTransactionParameters {
+ self.channel_parameters.as_ref().unwrap()
+ }
}
impl ChannelKeys for InMemoryChannelKeys {
- fn commitment_seed(&self) -> &[u8; 32] { &self.commitment_seed }
- fn pubkeys<'a>(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelPublicKeys { &self.local_channel_pubkeys }
+ fn get_per_commitment_point<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, idx: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> PublicKey {
+ let commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&self.commitment_seed, idx)).unwrap();
+ PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &commitment_secret)
+ }
+
+ fn release_commitment_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
+ chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&self.commitment_seed, idx)
+ }
+
+ fn pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys { &self.holder_channel_pubkeys }
fn key_derivation_params(&self) -> (u64, u64) { self.key_derivation_params }
- fn sign_remote_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, feerate_per_kw: u32, commitment_tx: &Transaction, keys: &TxCreationKeys, htlcs: &[&HTLCOutputInCommitment], to_self_delay: u16, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()> {
- if commitment_tx.input.len() != 1 { return Err(()); }
+ fn sign_counterparty_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &CommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()> {
+ let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
+ let keys = trusted_tx.keys();
let funding_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &self.funding_key);
- let remote_channel_pubkeys = self.remote_channel_pubkeys.as_ref().expect("must set remote channel pubkeys before signing");
- let channel_funding_redeemscript = make_funding_redeemscript(&funding_pubkey, &remote_channel_pubkeys.funding_pubkey);
-
- let commitment_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&commitment_tx).sighash_all(&commitment_tx.input[0], &channel_funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
- let commitment_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&commitment_sighash, &self.funding_key);
-
- let commitment_txid = commitment_tx.txid();
-
- let mut htlc_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs.len());
- for ref htlc in htlcs {
- if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
- let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, feerate_per_kw, to_self_delay, htlc, &keys.a_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
- let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
- let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]);
- let our_htlc_key = match chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &keys.per_commitment_point, &self.htlc_base_key) {
- Ok(s) => s,
- Err(_) => return Err(()),
- };
- htlc_sigs.push(secp_ctx.sign(&htlc_sighash, &our_htlc_key));
- }
+ let channel_funding_redeemscript = make_funding_redeemscript(&funding_pubkey, &self.counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey);
+
+ let built_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
+ let commitment_sig = built_tx.sign(&self.funding_key, &channel_funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, secp_ctx);
+ let commitment_txid = built_tx.txid;
+
+ let mut htlc_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_tx.htlcs().len());
+ for htlc in commitment_tx.htlcs() {
+ let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(), self.holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
+ let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
+ let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]);
+ let holder_htlc_key = match chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &keys.per_commitment_point, &self.htlc_base_key) {
+ Ok(s) => s,
+ Err(_) => return Err(()),
+ };
+ htlc_sigs.push(secp_ctx.sign(&htlc_sighash, &holder_htlc_key));
}
Ok((commitment_sig, htlc_sigs))
}
- fn sign_local_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, local_commitment_tx: &LocalCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
+ fn sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()> {
let funding_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &self.funding_key);
- let remote_channel_pubkeys = self.remote_channel_pubkeys.as_ref().expect("must set remote channel pubkeys before signing");
- let channel_funding_redeemscript = make_funding_redeemscript(&funding_pubkey, &remote_channel_pubkeys.funding_pubkey);
-
- Ok(local_commitment_tx.get_local_sig(&self.funding_key, &channel_funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, secp_ctx))
+ let funding_redeemscript = make_funding_redeemscript(&funding_pubkey, &self.counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey);
+ let sig = commitment_tx.trust().built_transaction().sign(&self.funding_key, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, secp_ctx);
+ let channel_parameters = self.get_channel_parameters();
+ let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
+ let htlc_sigs = trusted_tx.get_htlc_sigs(&self.htlc_base_key, &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable(), secp_ctx)?;
+ Ok((sig, htlc_sigs))
}
- #[cfg(test)]
- fn unsafe_sign_local_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, local_commitment_tx: &LocalCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
+ #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
+ fn unsafe_sign_holder_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
let funding_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &self.funding_key);
- let remote_channel_pubkeys = self.remote_channel_pubkeys.as_ref().expect("must set remote channel pubkeys before signing");
- let channel_funding_redeemscript = make_funding_redeemscript(&funding_pubkey, &remote_channel_pubkeys.funding_pubkey);
-
- Ok(local_commitment_tx.get_local_sig(&self.funding_key, &channel_funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, secp_ctx))
- }
-
- fn sign_local_commitment_htlc_transactions<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, local_commitment_tx: &LocalCommitmentTransaction, local_csv: u16, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Option<Signature>>, ()> {
- local_commitment_tx.get_htlc_sigs(&self.htlc_base_key, local_csv, secp_ctx)
+ let channel_funding_redeemscript = make_funding_redeemscript(&funding_pubkey, &self.counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey);
+ Ok(commitment_tx.trust().built_transaction().sign(&self.funding_key, &channel_funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, secp_ctx))
}
- fn sign_justice_transaction<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, htlc: &Option<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, on_remote_tx_csv: u16, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
+ fn sign_justice_transaction<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, htlc: &Option<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
let revocation_key = match chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &self.revocation_base_key) {
Ok(revocation_key) => revocation_key,
Err(_) => return Err(())
Err(_) => return Err(())
};
let witness_script = if let &Some(ref htlc) = htlc {
- let remote_htlcpubkey = match chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.remote_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint) {
- Ok(remote_htlcpubkey) => remote_htlcpubkey,
+ let counterparty_htlcpubkey = match chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.counterparty_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint) {
+ Ok(counterparty_htlcpubkey) => counterparty_htlcpubkey,
Err(_) => return Err(())
};
- let local_htlcpubkey = match chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint) {
- Ok(local_htlcpubkey) => local_htlcpubkey,
+ let holder_htlcpubkey = match chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint) {
+ Ok(holder_htlcpubkey) => holder_htlcpubkey,
Err(_) => return Err(())
};
- chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &remote_htlcpubkey, &local_htlcpubkey, &revocation_pubkey)
+ chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &counterparty_htlcpubkey, &holder_htlcpubkey, &revocation_pubkey)
} else {
- let remote_delayedpubkey = match chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.remote_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint) {
- Ok(remote_delayedpubkey) => remote_delayedpubkey,
+ let counterparty_delayedpubkey = match chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.counterparty_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint) {
+ Ok(counterparty_delayedpubkey) => counterparty_delayedpubkey,
Err(_) => return Err(())
};
- chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, on_remote_tx_csv, &remote_delayedpubkey)
+ chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.holder_selected_contest_delay(), &counterparty_delayedpubkey)
};
- let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&justice_tx);
- let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&justice_tx.input[input], &witness_script, amount)[..]);
+ let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(justice_tx);
+ let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.signature_hash(input, &witness_script, amount, SigHashType::All)[..]);
return Ok(secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key))
}
- fn sign_remote_htlc_transaction<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, htlc_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
+ fn sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, htlc_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
if let Ok(htlc_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.htlc_base_key) {
let witness_script = if let Ok(revocation_pubkey) = chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint) {
- if let Ok(remote_htlcpubkey) = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.remote_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint) {
- if let Ok(local_htlcpubkey) = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint) {
- chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &remote_htlcpubkey, &local_htlcpubkey, &revocation_pubkey)
+ if let Ok(counterparty_htlcpubkey) = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.counterparty_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint) {
+ if let Ok(htlcpubkey) = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint) {
+ chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &counterparty_htlcpubkey, &htlcpubkey, &revocation_pubkey)
} else { return Err(()) }
} else { return Err(()) }
} else { return Err(()) };
- let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx);
- let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[input], &witness_script, amount)[..]);
+ let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(htlc_tx);
+ let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.signature_hash(input, &witness_script, amount, SigHashType::All)[..]);
return Ok(secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key))
}
Err(())
if closing_tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { return Err(()); }
if closing_tx.output.len() > 2 { return Err(()); }
- let remote_channel_pubkeys = self.remote_channel_pubkeys.as_ref().expect("must set remote channel pubkeys before signing");
let funding_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &self.funding_key);
- let channel_funding_redeemscript = make_funding_redeemscript(&funding_pubkey, &remote_channel_pubkeys.funding_pubkey);
+ let channel_funding_redeemscript = make_funding_redeemscript(&funding_pubkey, &self.counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey);
- let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(closing_tx)
- .sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &channel_funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
+ let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(closing_tx)
+ .signature_hash(0, &channel_funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
Ok(secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.funding_key))
}
- fn sign_channel_announcement<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
+ fn sign_channel_announcement<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, msg: &UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]);
Ok(secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.funding_key))
}
- fn set_remote_channel_pubkeys(&mut self, channel_pubkeys: &ChannelPublicKeys) {
- assert!(self.remote_channel_pubkeys.is_none(), "Already set remote channel pubkeys");
- self.remote_channel_pubkeys = Some(channel_pubkeys.clone());
+ fn ready_channel(&mut self, channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters) {
+ assert!(self.channel_parameters.is_none(), "Acceptance already noted");
+ assert!(channel_parameters.is_populated(), "Channel parameters must be fully populated");
+ self.channel_parameters = Some(channel_parameters.clone());
}
}
self.delayed_payment_base_key.write(writer)?;
self.htlc_base_key.write(writer)?;
self.commitment_seed.write(writer)?;
- self.remote_channel_pubkeys.write(writer)?;
+ self.channel_parameters.write(writer)?;
self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
self.key_derivation_params.0.write(writer)?;
self.key_derivation_params.1.write(writer)?;
let delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
let htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
let commitment_seed = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let remote_channel_pubkeys = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let counterparty_channel_data = Readable::read(reader)?;
let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
- let local_channel_pubkeys =
- InMemoryChannelKeys::make_local_keys(&secp_ctx, &funding_key, &revocation_base_key,
+ let holder_channel_pubkeys =
+ InMemoryChannelKeys::make_holder_keys(&secp_ctx, &funding_key, &revocation_base_key,
&payment_key, &delayed_payment_base_key,
&htlc_base_key);
let params_1 = Readable::read(reader)?;
htlc_base_key,
commitment_seed,
channel_value_satoshis,
- local_channel_pubkeys,
- remote_channel_pubkeys,
+ holder_channel_pubkeys,
+ channel_parameters: counterparty_channel_data,
key_derivation_params: (params_1, params_2),
})
}
shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
channel_master_key: ExtendedPrivKey,
channel_child_index: AtomicUsize,
- session_master_key: ExtendedPrivKey,
- session_child_index: AtomicUsize,
- channel_id_master_key: ExtendedPrivKey,
- channel_id_child_index: AtomicUsize,
+ rand_bytes_master_key: ExtendedPrivKey,
+ rand_bytes_child_index: AtomicUsize,
seed: [u8; 32],
starting_time_secs: u64,
impl KeysManager {
/// Constructs a KeysManager from a 32-byte seed. If the seed is in some way biased (eg your
- /// RNG is busted) this may panic (but more importantly, you will possibly lose funds).
+ /// CSRNG is busted) this may panic (but more importantly, you will possibly lose funds).
/// starting_time isn't strictly required to actually be a time, but it must absolutely,
/// without a doubt, be unique to this instance. ie if you start multiple times with the same
/// seed, starting_time must be unique to each run. Thus, the easiest way to achieve this is to
Err(_) => panic!("Your RNG is busted"),
};
let channel_master_key = master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(3).unwrap()).expect("Your RNG is busted");
- let session_master_key = master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(4).unwrap()).expect("Your RNG is busted");
- let channel_id_master_key = master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(5).unwrap()).expect("Your RNG is busted");
+ let rand_bytes_master_key = master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(4).unwrap()).expect("Your RNG is busted");
KeysManager {
secp_ctx,
shutdown_pubkey,
channel_master_key,
channel_child_index: AtomicUsize::new(0),
- session_master_key,
- session_child_index: AtomicUsize::new(0),
- channel_id_master_key,
- channel_id_child_index: AtomicUsize::new(0),
+ rand_bytes_master_key,
+ rand_bytes_child_index: AtomicUsize::new(0),
seed: *seed,
starting_time_secs,
self.shutdown_pubkey.clone()
}
- fn get_channel_keys(&self, _inbound: bool, channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemoryChannelKeys {
+ fn get_channel_keys(&self, _inbound: bool, channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> Self::ChanKeySigner {
let child_ix = self.channel_child_index.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
let ix_and_nanos: u64 = (child_ix as u64) << 32 | (self.starting_time_nanos as u64);
self.derive_channel_keys(channel_value_satoshis, ix_and_nanos, self.starting_time_secs)
}
- fn get_onion_rand(&self) -> (SecretKey, [u8; 32]) {
+ fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
let mut sha = self.derive_unique_start();
- let child_ix = self.session_child_index.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
- let child_privkey = self.session_master_key.ckd_priv(&self.secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(child_ix as u32).expect("key space exhausted")).expect("Your RNG is busted");
+ let child_ix = self.rand_bytes_child_index.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
+ let child_privkey = self.rand_bytes_master_key.ckd_priv(&self.secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(child_ix as u32).expect("key space exhausted")).expect("Your RNG is busted");
sha.input(&child_privkey.private_key.key[..]);
- let mut rng_seed = sha.clone();
- // Not exactly the most ideal construction, but the second value will get fed into
- // ChaCha so it is another step harder to break.
- rng_seed.input(b"RNG Seed Salt");
- sha.input(b"Session Key Salt");
- (SecretKey::from_slice(&Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()).expect("Your RNG is busted"),
- Sha256::from_engine(rng_seed).into_inner())
+ sha.input(b"Unique Secure Random Bytes Salt");
+ Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
}
- fn get_channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
- let mut sha = self.derive_unique_start();
-
- let child_ix = self.channel_id_child_index.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
- let child_privkey = self.channel_id_master_key.ckd_priv(&self.secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(child_ix as u32).expect("key space exhausted")).expect("Your RNG is busted");
- sha.input(&child_privkey.private_key.key[..]);
-
- Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
+ fn read_chan_signer(&self, reader: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::ChanKeySigner, DecodeError> {
+ InMemoryChannelKeys::read(&mut std::io::Cursor::new(reader))
}
}
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff