+// This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
+// history.
+//
+// This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
+// or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
+// <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
+// You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
+// licenses.
+
//! keysinterface provides keys into rust-lightning and defines some useful enums which describe
//! spendable on-chain outputs which the user owns and is responsible for using just as any other
//! on-chain output which is theirs.
-use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, OutPoint, TxOut};
+use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, SigHashType};
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
use bitcoin::util::bip32::{ExtendedPrivKey, ExtendedPubKey, ChildNumber};
use bitcoin::util::bip143;
-use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
-use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::HashEngine as Sha256State;
-use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
-use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
-use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
+use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
+use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::HashEngine as Sha256State;
+use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
+use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
+use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
-use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
-use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature, Signing};
-use secp256k1;
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature, Signing};
+use bitcoin::secp256k1;
use util::byte_utils;
-use util::logger::Logger;
use util::ser::{Writeable, Writer, Readable};
+use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use ln::chan_utils;
-use ln::chan_utils::{TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys};
-use ln::msgs;
+use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CommitmentTransaction};
+use ln::msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement;
-use std::sync::Arc;
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
use std::io::Error;
use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
/// spend on-chain. The information needed to do this is provided in this enum, including the
/// outpoint describing which txid and output index is available, the full output which exists at
/// that txid/index, and any keys or other information required to sign.
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
pub enum SpendableOutputDescriptor {
/// An output to a script which was provided via KeysInterface, thus you should already know
/// how to spend it. No keys are provided as rust-lightning was never given any keys - only the
output: TxOut,
},
/// An output to a P2WSH script which can be spent with a single signature after a CSV delay.
- /// The private key which should be used to sign the transaction is provided, as well as the
- /// full witness redeemScript which is hashed in the output script_pubkey.
+ ///
/// The witness in the spending input should be:
- /// <BIP 143 signature generated with the given key> <one zero byte aka OP_0>
- /// <witness_script as provided>
- /// Note that the nSequence field in the input must be set to_self_delay (which corresponds to
- /// the transaction not being broadcastable until at least to_self_delay blocks after the input
- /// confirms).
+ /// <BIP 143 signature> <empty vector> (MINIMALIF standard rule) <provided witnessScript>
+ ///
+ /// Note that the nSequence field in the spending input must be set to to_self_delay
+ /// (which means the transaction is not broadcastable until at least to_self_delay
+ /// blocks after the outpoint confirms).
+ ///
/// These are generally the result of a "revocable" output to us, spendable only by us unless
- /// it is an output from us having broadcast an old state (which should never happen).
+ /// it is an output from an old state which we broadcast (which should never happen).
+ ///
+ /// To derive the delayed_payment key which is used to sign for this input, you must pass the
+ /// holder delayed_payment_base_key (ie the private key which corresponds to the pubkey in
+ /// ChannelKeys::pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint) and the provided per_commitment_point to
+ /// chan_utils::derive_private_key. The public key can be generated without the secret key
+ /// using chan_utils::derive_public_key and only the delayed_payment_basepoint which appears in
+ /// ChannelKeys::pubkeys().
+ ///
+ /// To derive the revocation_pubkey provided here (which is used in the witness
+ /// script generation), you must pass the counterparty revocation_basepoint (which appears in the
+ /// call to ChannelKeys::ready_channel) and the provided per_commitment point
+ /// to chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key.
+ ///
+ /// The witness script which is hashed and included in the output script_pubkey may be
+ /// regenerated by passing the revocation_pubkey (derived as above), our delayed_payment pubkey
+ /// (derived as above), and the to_self_delay contained here to
+ /// chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript.
+ //
+ // TODO: we need to expose utility methods in KeyManager to do all the relevant derivation.
DynamicOutputP2WSH {
/// The outpoint which is spendable
outpoint: OutPoint,
- /// The secret key which must be used to sign the spending transaction
- key: SecretKey,
- /// The witness redeemScript which is hashed to create the script_pubkey in the given output
- witness_script: Script,
+ /// Per commitment point to derive delayed_payment_key by key holder
+ per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
/// The nSequence value which must be set in the spending input to satisfy the OP_CSV in
/// the witness_script.
to_self_delay: u16,
/// The output which is referenced by the given outpoint
output: TxOut,
+ /// The channel keys state used to proceed to derivation of signing key. Must
+ /// be pass to KeysInterface::derive_channel_keys.
+ key_derivation_params: (u64, u64),
+ /// The revocation_pubkey used to derive witnessScript
+ revocation_pubkey: PublicKey
},
- /// An output to a P2WPKH, spendable exclusively by the given private key.
+ /// An output to a P2WPKH, spendable exclusively by our payment key (ie the private key which
+ /// corresponds to the public key in ChannelKeys::pubkeys().payment_point).
/// The witness in the spending input, is, thus, simply:
- /// <BIP 143 signature generated with the given key> <public key derived from the given key>
+ /// <BIP 143 signature> <payment key>
+ ///
/// These are generally the result of our counterparty having broadcast the current state,
/// allowing us to claim the non-HTLC-encumbered outputs immediately.
- DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
+ StaticOutputCounterpartyPayment {
/// The outpoint which is spendable
outpoint: OutPoint,
- /// The secret key which must be used to sign the spending transaction
- key: SecretKey,
/// The output which is reference by the given outpoint
output: TxOut,
+ /// The channel keys state used to proceed to derivation of signing key. Must
+ /// be pass to KeysInterface::derive_channel_keys.
+ key_derivation_params: (u64, u64),
}
}
outpoint.write(writer)?;
output.write(writer)?;
},
- &SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH { ref outpoint, ref key, ref witness_script, ref to_self_delay, ref output } => {
+ &SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH { ref outpoint, ref per_commitment_point, ref to_self_delay, ref output, ref key_derivation_params, ref revocation_pubkey } => {
1u8.write(writer)?;
outpoint.write(writer)?;
- key.write(writer)?;
- witness_script.write(writer)?;
+ per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
to_self_delay.write(writer)?;
output.write(writer)?;
+ key_derivation_params.0.write(writer)?;
+ key_derivation_params.1.write(writer)?;
+ revocation_pubkey.write(writer)?;
},
- &SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH { ref outpoint, ref key, ref output } => {
+ &SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutputCounterpartyPayment { ref outpoint, ref output, ref key_derivation_params } => {
2u8.write(writer)?;
outpoint.write(writer)?;
- key.write(writer)?;
output.write(writer)?;
+ key_derivation_params.0.write(writer)?;
+ key_derivation_params.1.write(writer)?;
},
}
Ok(())
}),
1u8 => Ok(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
outpoint: Readable::read(reader)?,
- key: Readable::read(reader)?,
- witness_script: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ per_commitment_point: Readable::read(reader)?,
to_self_delay: Readable::read(reader)?,
output: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ key_derivation_params: (Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?),
+ revocation_pubkey: Readable::read(reader)?,
}),
- 2u8 => Ok(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
+ 2u8 => Ok(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutputCounterpartyPayment {
outpoint: Readable::read(reader)?,
- key: Readable::read(reader)?,
output: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ key_derivation_params: (Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?),
}),
_ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
}
}
}
-/// A trait to describe an object which can get user secrets and key material.
-pub trait KeysInterface: Send + Sync {
- /// A type which implements ChannelKeys which will be returned by get_channel_keys.
- type ChanKeySigner : ChannelKeys;
-
- /// Get node secret key (aka node_id or network_key)
- fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey;
- /// Get destination redeemScript to encumber static protocol exit points.
- fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script;
- /// Get shutdown_pubkey to use as PublicKey at channel closure
- fn get_shutdown_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey;
- /// Get a new set of ChannelKeys for per-channel secrets. These MUST be unique even if you
- /// restarted with some stale data!
- fn get_channel_keys(&self, inbound: bool, channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> Self::ChanKeySigner;
- /// Get a secret and PRNG seed for construting an onion packet
- fn get_onion_rand(&self) -> (SecretKey, [u8; 32]);
- /// Get a unique temporary channel id. Channels will be referred to by this until the funding
- /// transaction is created, at which point they will use the outpoint in the funding
- /// transaction.
- fn get_channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32];
-}
-
/// Set of lightning keys needed to operate a channel as described in BOLT 3.
///
/// Signing services could be implemented on a hardware wallet. In this case,
/// Readable/Writable to serialize out a unique reference to this set of keys so
/// that you can serialize the full ChannelManager object.
///
-/// (TODO: We shouldn't require that, and should have an API to get them at deser time, due mostly
-/// to the possibility of reentrancy issues by calling the user's code during our deserialization
-/// routine).
-/// TODO: We should remove Clone by instead requesting a new ChannelKeys copy when we create
-/// ChannelMonitors instead of expecting to clone the one out of the Channel into the monitors.
-pub trait ChannelKeys : Send+Clone {
- /// Gets the private key for the anchor tx
- fn funding_key<'a>(&'a self) -> &'a SecretKey;
- /// Gets the local secret key for blinded revocation pubkey
- fn revocation_base_key<'a>(&'a self) -> &'a SecretKey;
- /// Gets the local secret key used in to_remote output of remote commitment tx
- /// (and also as part of obscured commitment number)
- fn payment_base_key<'a>(&'a self) -> &'a SecretKey;
- /// Gets the local secret key used in HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout txn and to_local output
- fn delayed_payment_base_key<'a>(&'a self) -> &'a SecretKey;
- /// Gets the local htlc secret key used in commitment tx htlc outputs
- fn htlc_base_key<'a>(&'a self) -> &'a SecretKey;
- /// Gets the commitment seed
- fn commitment_seed<'a>(&'a self) -> &'a [u8; 32];
- /// Gets the local channel public keys and basepoints
- fn pubkeys<'a>(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelPublicKeys;
-
- /// Create a signature for a remote commitment transaction and associated HTLC transactions.
+// (TODO: We shouldn't require that, and should have an API to get them at deser time, due mostly
+// to the possibility of reentrancy issues by calling the user's code during our deserialization
+// routine).
+// TODO: We should remove Clone by instead requesting a new ChannelKeys copy when we create
+// ChannelMonitors instead of expecting to clone the one out of the Channel into the monitors.
+pub trait ChannelKeys : Send+Clone + Writeable {
+ /// Gets the per-commitment point for a specific commitment number
+ ///
+ /// Note that the commitment number starts at (1 << 48) - 1 and counts backwards.
+ fn get_per_commitment_point<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, idx: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> PublicKey;
+ /// Gets the commitment secret for a specific commitment number as part of the revocation process
+ ///
+ /// An external signer implementation should error here if the commitment was already signed
+ /// and should refuse to sign it in the future.
+ ///
+ /// May be called more than once for the same index.
+ ///
+ /// Note that the commitment number starts at (1 << 48) - 1 and counts backwards.
+ /// TODO: return a Result so we can signal a validation error
+ fn release_commitment_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32];
+ /// Gets the holder's channel public keys and basepoints
+ fn pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys;
+ /// Gets arbitrary identifiers describing the set of keys which are provided back to you in
+ /// some SpendableOutputDescriptor types. These should be sufficient to identify this
+ /// ChannelKeys object uniquely and lookup or re-derive its keys.
+ fn key_derivation_params(&self) -> (u64, u64);
+
+ /// Create a signature for a counterparty's commitment transaction and associated HTLC transactions.
///
/// Note that if signing fails or is rejected, the channel will be force-closed.
+ //
+ // TODO: Document the things someone using this interface should enforce before signing.
+ fn sign_counterparty_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &CommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()>;
+
+ /// Create a signatures for a holder's commitment transaction and its claiming HTLC transactions.
+ /// This will only ever be called with a non-revoked commitment_tx. This will be called with the
+ /// latest commitment_tx when we initiate a force-close.
+ /// This will be called with the previous latest, just to get claiming HTLC signatures, if we are
+ /// reacting to a ChannelMonitor replica that decided to broadcast before it had been updated to
+ /// the latest.
+ /// This may be called multiple times for the same transaction.
+ ///
+ /// An external signer implementation should check that the commitment has not been revoked.
+ ///
+ /// May return Err if key derivation fails. Callers, such as ChannelMonitor, will panic in such a case.
+ //
+ // TODO: Document the things someone using this interface should enforce before signing.
+ // TODO: Key derivation failure should panic rather than Err
+ fn sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()>;
+
+ /// Same as sign_holder_commitment, but exists only for tests to get access to holder commitment
+ /// transactions which will be broadcasted later, after the channel has moved on to a newer
+ /// state. Thus, needs its own method as sign_holder_commitment may enforce that we only ever
+ /// get called once.
+ #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
+ fn unsafe_sign_holder_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
+
+ /// Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending an HTLC or commitment
+ /// transaction output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
+ ///
+ /// A justice transaction may claim multiples outputs at the same time if timelocks are
+ /// similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
+ /// It may be called multiples time for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
+ /// to an upcoming timelock expiration.
///
- /// TODO: Document the things someone using this interface should enforce before signing.
- /// TODO: Add more input vars to enable better checking (preferably removing commitment_tx and
- /// making the callee generate it via some util function we expose)!
- fn sign_remote_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, feerate_per_kw: u64, commitment_tx: &Transaction, keys: &TxCreationKeys, htlcs: &[&HTLCOutputInCommitment], to_self_delay: u16, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()>;
+ /// Amount is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
+ ///
+ /// per_commitment_key is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
+ /// revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
+ /// not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder revocation_secret to do
+ /// so).
+ ///
+ /// htlc holds HTLC elements (hash, timelock) if the output being spent is a HTLC output, thus
+ /// changing the format of the witness script (which is committed to in the BIP 143
+ /// signatures).
+ fn sign_justice_transaction<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, htlc: &Option<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
+
+ /// Create a signature for a claiming transaction for a HTLC output on a counterparty's commitment
+ /// transaction, either offered or received.
+ ///
+ /// Such a transaction may claim multiples offered outputs at same time if we know the
+ /// preimage for each when we create it, but only the input at index `input` should be
+ /// signed for here. It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is
+ /// needed with regards to an upcoming timelock expiration.
+ ///
+ /// Witness_script is either a offered or received script as defined in BOLT3 for HTLC
+ /// outputs.
+ ///
+ /// Amount is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
+ ///
+ /// Per_commitment_point is the dynamic point corresponding to the channel state
+ /// detected onchain. It has been generated by our counterparty and is used to derive
+ /// channel state keys, which are then included in the witness script and committed to in the
+ /// BIP 143 signature.
+ fn sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, htlc_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
/// Create a signature for a (proposed) closing transaction.
///
/// Note that if this fails or is rejected, the channel will not be publicly announced and
/// our counterparty may (though likely will not) close the channel on us for violating the
/// protocol.
- fn sign_channel_announcement<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
+ fn sign_channel_announcement<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, msg: &UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
- /// Set the remote channel basepoints. This is done immediately on incoming channels
- /// and as soon as the channel is accepted on outgoing channels.
+ /// Set the counterparty static channel data, including basepoints,
+ /// counterparty_selected/holder_selected_contest_delay and funding outpoint.
+ /// This is done as soon as the funding outpoint is known. Since these are static channel data,
+ /// they MUST NOT be allowed to change to different values once set.
+ ///
+ /// channel_parameters.is_populated() MUST be true.
+ ///
+ /// We bind holder_selected_contest_delay late here for API convenience.
///
/// Will be called before any signatures are applied.
- fn set_remote_channel_pubkeys(&mut self, channel_points: &ChannelPublicKeys);
+ fn ready_channel(&mut self, channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters);
+}
+
+/// A trait to describe an object which can get user secrets and key material.
+pub trait KeysInterface: Send + Sync {
+ /// A type which implements ChannelKeys which will be returned by get_channel_keys.
+ type ChanKeySigner : ChannelKeys;
+
+ /// Get node secret key (aka node_id or network_key)
+ fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey;
+ /// Get destination redeemScript to encumber static protocol exit points.
+ fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script;
+ /// Get shutdown_pubkey to use as PublicKey at channel closure
+ fn get_shutdown_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey;
+ /// Get a new set of ChannelKeys for per-channel secrets. These MUST be unique even if you
+ /// restarted with some stale data!
+ fn get_channel_keys(&self, inbound: bool, channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> Self::ChanKeySigner;
+ /// Gets a unique, cryptographically-secure, random 32 byte value. This is used for encrypting
+ /// onion packets and for temporary channel IDs. There is no requirement that these be
+ /// persisted anywhere, though they must be unique across restarts.
+ fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32];
+
+ /// Reads a `ChanKeySigner` for this `KeysInterface` from the given input stream.
+ /// This is only called during deserialization of other objects which contain
+ /// `ChannelKeys`-implementing objects (ie `ChannelMonitor`s and `ChannelManager`s).
+ /// The bytes are exactly those which `<Self::ChanKeySigner as Writeable>::write()` writes, and
+ /// contain no versioning scheme. You may wish to include your own version prefix and ensure
+ /// you've read all of the provided bytes to ensure no corruption occurred.
+ fn read_chan_signer(&self, reader: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::ChanKeySigner, DecodeError>;
}
#[derive(Clone)]
/// A simple implementation of ChannelKeys that just keeps the private keys in memory.
+///
+/// This implementation performs no policy checks and is insufficient by itself as
+/// a secure external signer.
pub struct InMemoryChannelKeys {
/// Private key of anchor tx
- funding_key: SecretKey,
- /// Local secret key for blinded revocation pubkey
- revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
- /// Local secret key used in commitment tx htlc outputs
- payment_base_key: SecretKey,
- /// Local secret key used in HTLC tx
- delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey,
- /// Local htlc secret key used in commitment tx htlc outputs
- htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
+ pub funding_key: SecretKey,
+ /// Holder secret key for blinded revocation pubkey
+ pub revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
+ /// Holder secret key used for our balance in counterparty-broadcasted commitment transactions
+ pub payment_key: SecretKey,
+ /// Holder secret key used in HTLC tx
+ pub delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey,
+ /// Holder htlc secret key used in commitment tx htlc outputs
+ pub htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
/// Commitment seed
- commitment_seed: [u8; 32],
- /// Local public keys and basepoints
- pub(crate) local_channel_pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
- /// Remote public keys and base points
- pub(crate) remote_channel_pubkeys: Option<ChannelPublicKeys>,
+ pub commitment_seed: [u8; 32],
+ /// Holder public keys and basepoints
+ pub(crate) holder_channel_pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
+ /// Counterparty public keys and counterparty/holder selected_contest_delay, populated on channel acceptance
+ channel_parameters: Option<ChannelTransactionParameters>,
/// The total value of this channel
channel_value_satoshis: u64,
+ /// Key derivation parameters
+ key_derivation_params: (u64, u64),
}
impl InMemoryChannelKeys {
secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>,
funding_key: SecretKey,
revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
- payment_base_key: SecretKey,
+ payment_key: SecretKey,
delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey,
htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
commitment_seed: [u8; 32],
- channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemoryChannelKeys {
- let local_channel_pubkeys =
- InMemoryChannelKeys::make_local_keys(secp_ctx, &funding_key, &revocation_base_key,
- &payment_base_key, &delayed_payment_base_key,
+ channel_value_satoshis: u64,
+ key_derivation_params: (u64, u64)) -> InMemoryChannelKeys {
+ let holder_channel_pubkeys =
+ InMemoryChannelKeys::make_holder_keys(secp_ctx, &funding_key, &revocation_base_key,
+ &payment_key, &delayed_payment_base_key,
&htlc_base_key);
InMemoryChannelKeys {
funding_key,
revocation_base_key,
- payment_base_key,
+ payment_key,
delayed_payment_base_key,
htlc_base_key,
commitment_seed,
channel_value_satoshis,
- local_channel_pubkeys,
- remote_channel_pubkeys: None,
+ holder_channel_pubkeys,
+ channel_parameters: None,
+ key_derivation_params,
}
}
- fn make_local_keys<C: Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>,
+ fn make_holder_keys<C: Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>,
funding_key: &SecretKey,
revocation_base_key: &SecretKey,
- payment_base_key: &SecretKey,
+ payment_key: &SecretKey,
delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey,
htlc_base_key: &SecretKey) -> ChannelPublicKeys {
let from_secret = |s: &SecretKey| PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, s);
ChannelPublicKeys {
funding_pubkey: from_secret(&funding_key),
revocation_basepoint: from_secret(&revocation_base_key),
- payment_basepoint: from_secret(&payment_base_key),
+ payment_point: from_secret(&payment_key),
delayed_payment_basepoint: from_secret(&delayed_payment_base_key),
htlc_basepoint: from_secret(&htlc_base_key),
}
}
+
+ /// Counterparty pubkeys.
+ /// Will panic if ready_channel wasn't called.
+ pub fn counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys { &self.get_channel_parameters().counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys }
+
+ /// The contest_delay value specified by our counterparty and applied on holder-broadcastable
+ /// transactions, ie the amount of time that we have to wait to recover our funds if we
+ /// broadcast a transaction.
+ /// Will panic if ready_channel wasn't called.
+ pub fn counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 { self.get_channel_parameters().counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().selected_contest_delay }
+
+ /// The contest_delay value specified by us and applied on transactions broadcastable
+ /// by our counterparty, ie the amount of time that they have to wait to recover their funds
+ /// if they broadcast a transaction.
+ /// Will panic if ready_channel wasn't called.
+ pub fn holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 { self.get_channel_parameters().holder_selected_contest_delay }
+
+ /// Whether the holder is the initiator
+ /// Will panic if ready_channel wasn't called.
+ pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool { self.get_channel_parameters().is_outbound_from_holder }
+
+ /// Funding outpoint
+ /// Will panic if ready_channel wasn't called.
+ pub fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> &OutPoint { self.get_channel_parameters().funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap() }
+
+ /// Obtain a ChannelTransactionParameters for this channel, to be used when verifying or
+ /// building transactions.
+ ///
+ /// Will panic if ready_channel wasn't called.
+ pub fn get_channel_parameters(&self) -> &ChannelTransactionParameters {
+ self.channel_parameters.as_ref().unwrap()
+ }
}
impl ChannelKeys for InMemoryChannelKeys {
- fn funding_key(&self) -> &SecretKey { &self.funding_key }
- fn revocation_base_key(&self) -> &SecretKey { &self.revocation_base_key }
- fn payment_base_key(&self) -> &SecretKey { &self.payment_base_key }
- fn delayed_payment_base_key(&self) -> &SecretKey { &self.delayed_payment_base_key }
- fn htlc_base_key(&self) -> &SecretKey { &self.htlc_base_key }
- fn commitment_seed(&self) -> &[u8; 32] { &self.commitment_seed }
- fn pubkeys<'a>(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelPublicKeys { &self.local_channel_pubkeys }
+ fn get_per_commitment_point<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, idx: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> PublicKey {
+ let commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&self.commitment_seed, idx)).unwrap();
+ PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &commitment_secret)
+ }
+
+ fn release_commitment_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
+ chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&self.commitment_seed, idx)
+ }
+
+ fn pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys { &self.holder_channel_pubkeys }
+ fn key_derivation_params(&self) -> (u64, u64) { self.key_derivation_params }
- fn sign_remote_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, feerate_per_kw: u64, commitment_tx: &Transaction, keys: &TxCreationKeys, htlcs: &[&HTLCOutputInCommitment], to_self_delay: u16, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()> {
- if commitment_tx.input.len() != 1 { return Err(()); }
+ fn sign_counterparty_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &CommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()> {
+ let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
+ let keys = trusted_tx.keys();
let funding_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &self.funding_key);
- let remote_channel_pubkeys = self.remote_channel_pubkeys.as_ref().expect("must set remote channel pubkeys before signing");
- let channel_funding_redeemscript = make_funding_redeemscript(&funding_pubkey, &remote_channel_pubkeys.funding_pubkey);
-
- let commitment_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&commitment_tx).sighash_all(&commitment_tx.input[0], &channel_funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
- let commitment_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&commitment_sighash, &self.funding_key);
-
- let commitment_txid = commitment_tx.txid();
-
- let mut htlc_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs.len());
- for ref htlc in htlcs {
- if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
- let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, feerate_per_kw, to_self_delay, htlc, &keys.a_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
- let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
- let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]);
- let our_htlc_key = match chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &keys.per_commitment_point, &self.htlc_base_key) {
- Ok(s) => s,
- Err(_) => return Err(()),
- };
- htlc_sigs.push(secp_ctx.sign(&htlc_sighash, &our_htlc_key));
- }
+ let channel_funding_redeemscript = make_funding_redeemscript(&funding_pubkey, &self.counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey);
+
+ let built_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
+ let commitment_sig = built_tx.sign(&self.funding_key, &channel_funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, secp_ctx);
+ let commitment_txid = built_tx.txid;
+
+ let mut htlc_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_tx.htlcs().len());
+ for htlc in commitment_tx.htlcs() {
+ let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(), self.holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
+ let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
+ let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]);
+ let holder_htlc_key = match chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &keys.per_commitment_point, &self.htlc_base_key) {
+ Ok(s) => s,
+ Err(_) => return Err(()),
+ };
+ htlc_sigs.push(secp_ctx.sign(&htlc_sighash, &holder_htlc_key));
}
Ok((commitment_sig, htlc_sigs))
}
+ fn sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()> {
+ let funding_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &self.funding_key);
+ let funding_redeemscript = make_funding_redeemscript(&funding_pubkey, &self.counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey);
+ let sig = commitment_tx.trust().built_transaction().sign(&self.funding_key, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, secp_ctx);
+ let channel_parameters = self.get_channel_parameters();
+ let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
+ let htlc_sigs = trusted_tx.get_htlc_sigs(&self.htlc_base_key, &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable(), secp_ctx)?;
+ Ok((sig, htlc_sigs))
+ }
+
+ #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
+ fn unsafe_sign_holder_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
+ let funding_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &self.funding_key);
+ let channel_funding_redeemscript = make_funding_redeemscript(&funding_pubkey, &self.counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey);
+ Ok(commitment_tx.trust().built_transaction().sign(&self.funding_key, &channel_funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, secp_ctx))
+ }
+
+ fn sign_justice_transaction<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, htlc: &Option<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
+ let revocation_key = match chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &self.revocation_base_key) {
+ Ok(revocation_key) => revocation_key,
+ Err(_) => return Err(())
+ };
+ let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
+ let revocation_pubkey = match chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint) {
+ Ok(revocation_pubkey) => revocation_pubkey,
+ Err(_) => return Err(())
+ };
+ let witness_script = if let &Some(ref htlc) = htlc {
+ let counterparty_htlcpubkey = match chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.counterparty_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint) {
+ Ok(counterparty_htlcpubkey) => counterparty_htlcpubkey,
+ Err(_) => return Err(())
+ };
+ let holder_htlcpubkey = match chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint) {
+ Ok(holder_htlcpubkey) => holder_htlcpubkey,
+ Err(_) => return Err(())
+ };
+ chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &counterparty_htlcpubkey, &holder_htlcpubkey, &revocation_pubkey)
+ } else {
+ let counterparty_delayedpubkey = match chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.counterparty_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint) {
+ Ok(counterparty_delayedpubkey) => counterparty_delayedpubkey,
+ Err(_) => return Err(())
+ };
+ chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.holder_selected_contest_delay(), &counterparty_delayedpubkey)
+ };
+ let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(justice_tx);
+ let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.signature_hash(input, &witness_script, amount, SigHashType::All)[..]);
+ return Ok(secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key))
+ }
+
+ fn sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, htlc_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
+ if let Ok(htlc_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.htlc_base_key) {
+ let witness_script = if let Ok(revocation_pubkey) = chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint) {
+ if let Ok(counterparty_htlcpubkey) = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.counterparty_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint) {
+ if let Ok(htlcpubkey) = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint) {
+ chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &counterparty_htlcpubkey, &htlcpubkey, &revocation_pubkey)
+ } else { return Err(()) }
+ } else { return Err(()) }
+ } else { return Err(()) };
+ let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(htlc_tx);
+ let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.signature_hash(input, &witness_script, amount, SigHashType::All)[..]);
+ return Ok(secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key))
+ }
+ Err(())
+ }
+
fn sign_closing_transaction<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, closing_tx: &Transaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
if closing_tx.input.len() != 1 { return Err(()); }
if closing_tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { return Err(()); }
if closing_tx.output.len() > 2 { return Err(()); }
- let remote_channel_pubkeys = self.remote_channel_pubkeys.as_ref().expect("must set remote channel pubkeys before signing");
let funding_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &self.funding_key);
- let channel_funding_redeemscript = make_funding_redeemscript(&funding_pubkey, &remote_channel_pubkeys.funding_pubkey);
+ let channel_funding_redeemscript = make_funding_redeemscript(&funding_pubkey, &self.counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey);
- let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(closing_tx)
- .sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &channel_funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
+ let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(closing_tx)
+ .signature_hash(0, &channel_funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
Ok(secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.funding_key))
}
- fn sign_channel_announcement<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
+ fn sign_channel_announcement<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, msg: &UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]);
Ok(secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.funding_key))
}
- fn set_remote_channel_pubkeys(&mut self, channel_pubkeys: &ChannelPublicKeys) {
- assert!(self.remote_channel_pubkeys.is_none(), "Already set remote channel pubkeys");
- self.remote_channel_pubkeys = Some(channel_pubkeys.clone());
+ fn ready_channel(&mut self, channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters) {
+ assert!(self.channel_parameters.is_none(), "Acceptance already noted");
+ assert!(channel_parameters.is_populated(), "Channel parameters must be fully populated");
+ self.channel_parameters = Some(channel_parameters.clone());
}
}
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
self.funding_key.write(writer)?;
self.revocation_base_key.write(writer)?;
- self.payment_base_key.write(writer)?;
+ self.payment_key.write(writer)?;
self.delayed_payment_base_key.write(writer)?;
self.htlc_base_key.write(writer)?;
self.commitment_seed.write(writer)?;
- self.remote_channel_pubkeys.write(writer)?;
+ self.channel_parameters.write(writer)?;
self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
+ self.key_derivation_params.0.write(writer)?;
+ self.key_derivation_params.1.write(writer)?;
Ok(())
}
fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
let funding_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
let revocation_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
let delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
let htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
let commitment_seed = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let remote_channel_pubkeys = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let counterparty_channel_data = Readable::read(reader)?;
let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
- let local_channel_pubkeys =
- InMemoryChannelKeys::make_local_keys(&secp_ctx, &funding_key, &revocation_base_key,
- &payment_base_key, &delayed_payment_base_key,
+ let holder_channel_pubkeys =
+ InMemoryChannelKeys::make_holder_keys(&secp_ctx, &funding_key, &revocation_base_key,
+ &payment_key, &delayed_payment_base_key,
&htlc_base_key);
+ let params_1 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let params_2 = Readable::read(reader)?;
Ok(InMemoryChannelKeys {
funding_key,
revocation_base_key,
- payment_base_key,
+ payment_key,
delayed_payment_base_key,
htlc_base_key,
commitment_seed,
channel_value_satoshis,
- local_channel_pubkeys,
- remote_channel_pubkeys
+ holder_channel_pubkeys,
+ channel_parameters: counterparty_channel_data,
+ key_derivation_params: (params_1, params_2),
})
}
}
shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
channel_master_key: ExtendedPrivKey,
channel_child_index: AtomicUsize,
- session_master_key: ExtendedPrivKey,
- session_child_index: AtomicUsize,
- channel_id_master_key: ExtendedPrivKey,
- channel_id_child_index: AtomicUsize,
+ rand_bytes_master_key: ExtendedPrivKey,
+ rand_bytes_child_index: AtomicUsize,
- unique_start: Sha256State,
- logger: Arc<Logger>,
+ seed: [u8; 32],
+ starting_time_secs: u64,
+ starting_time_nanos: u32,
}
impl KeysManager {
/// Constructs a KeysManager from a 32-byte seed. If the seed is in some way biased (eg your
- /// RNG is busted) this may panic (but more importantly, you will possibly lose funds).
+ /// CSRNG is busted) this may panic (but more importantly, you will possibly lose funds).
/// starting_time isn't strictly required to actually be a time, but it must absolutely,
/// without a doubt, be unique to this instance. ie if you start multiple times with the same
/// seed, starting_time must be unique to each run. Thus, the easiest way to achieve this is to
/// Note that until the 0.1 release there is no guarantee of backward compatibility between
/// versions. Once the library is more fully supported, the docs will be updated to include a
/// detailed description of the guarantee.
- pub fn new(seed: &[u8; 32], network: Network, logger: Arc<Logger>, starting_time_secs: u64, starting_time_nanos: u32) -> KeysManager {
+ pub fn new(seed: &[u8; 32], network: Network, starting_time_secs: u64, starting_time_nanos: u32) -> Self {
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
match ExtendedPrivKey::new_master(network.clone(), seed) {
Ok(master_key) => {
let node_secret = master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(0).unwrap()).expect("Your RNG is busted").private_key.key;
let destination_script = match master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(1).unwrap()) {
Ok(destination_key) => {
- let pubkey_hash160 = Hash160::hash(&ExtendedPubKey::from_private(&secp_ctx, &destination_key).public_key.key.serialize()[..]);
+ let wpubkey_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&ExtendedPubKey::from_private(&secp_ctx, &destination_key).public_key.to_bytes());
Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
- .push_slice(&pubkey_hash160.into_inner())
+ .push_slice(&wpubkey_hash.into_inner())
.into_script()
},
Err(_) => panic!("Your RNG is busted"),
Err(_) => panic!("Your RNG is busted"),
};
let channel_master_key = master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(3).unwrap()).expect("Your RNG is busted");
- let session_master_key = master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(4).unwrap()).expect("Your RNG is busted");
- let channel_id_master_key = master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(5).unwrap()).expect("Your RNG is busted");
-
- let mut unique_start = Sha256::engine();
- unique_start.input(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(starting_time_secs));
- unique_start.input(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(starting_time_nanos));
- unique_start.input(seed);
+ let rand_bytes_master_key = master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(4).unwrap()).expect("Your RNG is busted");
KeysManager {
secp_ctx,
shutdown_pubkey,
channel_master_key,
channel_child_index: AtomicUsize::new(0),
- session_master_key,
- session_child_index: AtomicUsize::new(0),
- channel_id_master_key,
- channel_id_child_index: AtomicUsize::new(0),
+ rand_bytes_master_key,
+ rand_bytes_child_index: AtomicUsize::new(0),
- unique_start,
- logger,
+ seed: *seed,
+ starting_time_secs,
+ starting_time_nanos,
}
},
Err(_) => panic!("Your rng is busted"),
}
}
-}
-
-impl KeysInterface for KeysManager {
- type ChanKeySigner = InMemoryChannelKeys;
-
- fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey {
- self.node_secret.clone()
+ fn derive_unique_start(&self) -> Sha256State {
+ let mut unique_start = Sha256::engine();
+ unique_start.input(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.starting_time_secs));
+ unique_start.input(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.starting_time_nanos));
+ unique_start.input(&self.seed);
+ unique_start
}
+ /// Derive an old set of ChannelKeys for per-channel secrets based on a key derivation
+ /// parameters.
+ /// Key derivation parameters are accessible through a per-channel secrets
+ /// ChannelKeys::key_derivation_params and is provided inside DynamicOuputP2WSH in case of
+ /// onchain output detection for which a corresponding delayed_payment_key must be derived.
+ pub fn derive_channel_keys(&self, channel_value_satoshis: u64, params_1: u64, params_2: u64) -> InMemoryChannelKeys {
+ let chan_id = ((params_1 & 0xFFFF_FFFF_0000_0000) >> 32) as u32;
+ let mut unique_start = Sha256::engine();
+ unique_start.input(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(params_2));
+ unique_start.input(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(params_1 as u32));
+ unique_start.input(&self.seed);
- fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
- self.destination_script.clone()
- }
-
- fn get_shutdown_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey {
- self.shutdown_pubkey.clone()
- }
-
- fn get_channel_keys(&self, _inbound: bool, channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemoryChannelKeys {
// We only seriously intend to rely on the channel_master_key for true secure
// entropy, everything else just ensures uniqueness. We rely on the unique_start (ie
// starting_time provided in the constructor) to be unique.
- let mut sha = self.unique_start.clone();
+ let child_privkey = self.channel_master_key.ckd_priv(&self.secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(chan_id).expect("key space exhausted")).expect("Your RNG is busted");
+ unique_start.input(&child_privkey.private_key.key[..]);
- let child_ix = self.channel_child_index.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
- let child_privkey = self.channel_master_key.ckd_priv(&self.secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(child_ix as u32).expect("key space exhausted")).expect("Your RNG is busted");
- sha.input(&child_privkey.private_key.key[..]);
-
- let seed = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
+ let seed = Sha256::from_engine(unique_start).into_inner();
let commitment_seed = {
let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
}
let funding_key = key_step!(b"funding key", commitment_seed);
let revocation_base_key = key_step!(b"revocation base key", funding_key);
- let payment_base_key = key_step!(b"payment base key", revocation_base_key);
- let delayed_payment_base_key = key_step!(b"delayed payment base key", payment_base_key);
+ let payment_key = key_step!(b"payment key", revocation_base_key);
+ let delayed_payment_base_key = key_step!(b"delayed payment base key", payment_key);
let htlc_base_key = key_step!(b"HTLC base key", delayed_payment_base_key);
InMemoryChannelKeys::new(
&self.secp_ctx,
funding_key,
revocation_base_key,
- payment_base_key,
+ payment_key,
delayed_payment_base_key,
htlc_base_key,
commitment_seed,
- channel_value_satoshis
+ channel_value_satoshis,
+ (params_1, params_2),
)
}
+}
+
+impl KeysInterface for KeysManager {
+ type ChanKeySigner = InMemoryChannelKeys;
+
+ fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey {
+ self.node_secret.clone()
+ }
- fn get_onion_rand(&self) -> (SecretKey, [u8; 32]) {
- let mut sha = self.unique_start.clone();
+ fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
+ self.destination_script.clone()
+ }
- let child_ix = self.session_child_index.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
- let child_privkey = self.session_master_key.ckd_priv(&self.secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(child_ix as u32).expect("key space exhausted")).expect("Your RNG is busted");
- sha.input(&child_privkey.private_key.key[..]);
+ fn get_shutdown_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey {
+ self.shutdown_pubkey.clone()
+ }
- let mut rng_seed = sha.clone();
- // Not exactly the most ideal construction, but the second value will get fed into
- // ChaCha so it is another step harder to break.
- rng_seed.input(b"RNG Seed Salt");
- sha.input(b"Session Key Salt");
- (SecretKey::from_slice(&Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()).expect("Your RNG is busted"),
- Sha256::from_engine(rng_seed).into_inner())
+ fn get_channel_keys(&self, _inbound: bool, channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> Self::ChanKeySigner {
+ let child_ix = self.channel_child_index.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
+ let ix_and_nanos: u64 = (child_ix as u64) << 32 | (self.starting_time_nanos as u64);
+ self.derive_channel_keys(channel_value_satoshis, ix_and_nanos, self.starting_time_secs)
}
- fn get_channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
- let mut sha = self.unique_start.clone();
+ fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
+ let mut sha = self.derive_unique_start();
- let child_ix = self.channel_id_child_index.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
- let child_privkey = self.channel_id_master_key.ckd_priv(&self.secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(child_ix as u32).expect("key space exhausted")).expect("Your RNG is busted");
+ let child_ix = self.rand_bytes_child_index.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
+ let child_privkey = self.rand_bytes_master_key.ckd_priv(&self.secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(child_ix as u32).expect("key space exhausted")).expect("Your RNG is busted");
sha.input(&child_privkey.private_key.key[..]);
- (Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner())
+ sha.input(b"Unique Secure Random Bytes Salt");
+ Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
+ }
+
+ fn read_chan_signer(&self, reader: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::ChanKeySigner, DecodeError> {
+ InMemoryChannelKeys::read(&mut std::io::Cursor::new(reader))
}
}
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff