Remove unnecessary mut from reference
[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / chain / keysinterface.rs
index 7538d0a83033c03f2f92f17a0dab8ff5c9be1ec5..dffe060d91bb71a5f33e8c023de6cac94fb9826d 100644 (file)
@@ -31,10 +31,10 @@ use bitcoin::secp256k1::recovery::RecoverableSignature;
 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
 
 use util::{byte_utils, transaction_utils};
-use util::ser::{Writeable, Writer, Readable};
+use util::ser::{Writeable, Writer, Readable, ReadableArgs};
 
 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
-use ln::chan_utils;
+use ln::{chan_utils, PaymentPreimage};
 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CommitmentTransaction, ClosingTransaction};
 use ln::msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement;
 use ln::script::ShutdownScript;
@@ -226,7 +226,14 @@ pub trait BaseSign {
        /// secret won't leave us without a broadcastable holder transaction.
        /// Policy checks should be implemented in this function, including checking the amount
        /// sent to us and checking the HTLCs.
-       fn validate_holder_commitment(&self, holder_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction) -> Result<(), ()>;
+       ///
+       /// The preimages of outgoing HTLCs that were fulfilled since the last commitment are provided.
+       /// A validating signer should ensure that an HTLC output is removed only when the matching
+       /// preimage is provided, or when the value to holder is restored.
+       ///
+       /// NOTE: all the relevant preimages will be provided, but there may also be additional
+       /// irrelevant or duplicate preimages.
+       fn validate_holder_commitment(&self, holder_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), ()>;
        /// Gets the holder's channel public keys and basepoints
        fn pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys;
        /// Gets an arbitrary identifier describing the set of keys which are provided back to you in
@@ -240,9 +247,16 @@ pub trait BaseSign {
        ///
        /// Policy checks should be implemented in this function, including checking the amount
        /// sent to us and checking the HTLCs.
+       ///
+       /// The preimages of outgoing HTLCs that were fulfilled since the last commitment are provided.
+       /// A validating signer should ensure that an HTLC output is removed only when the matching
+       /// preimage is provided, or when the value to holder is restored.
+       ///
+       /// NOTE: all the relevant preimages will be provided, but there may also be additional
+       /// irrelevant or duplicate preimages.
        //
        // TODO: Document the things someone using this interface should enforce before signing.
-       fn sign_counterparty_commitment(&self, commitment_tx: &CommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()>;
+       fn sign_counterparty_commitment(&self, commitment_tx: &CommitmentTransaction, preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()>;
        /// Validate the counterparty's revocation.
        ///
        /// This is required in order for the signer to make sure that the state has moved
@@ -332,13 +346,17 @@ pub trait BaseSign {
        /// chosen to forgo their output as dust.
        fn sign_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
 
-       /// Signs a channel announcement message with our funding key, proving it comes from one
-       /// of the channel participants.
+       /// Signs a channel announcement message with our funding key and our node secret key (aka
+       /// node_id or network_key), proving it comes from one of the channel participants.
+       ///
+       /// The first returned signature should be from our node secret key, the second from our
+       /// funding key.
        ///
        /// Note that if this fails or is rejected, the channel will not be publicly announced and
        /// our counterparty may (though likely will not) close the channel on us for violating the
        /// protocol.
-       fn sign_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
+       fn sign_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>)
+               -> Result<(Signature, Signature), ()>;
 
        /// Set the counterparty static channel data, including basepoints,
        /// counterparty_selected/holder_selected_contest_delay and funding outpoint.
@@ -433,6 +451,8 @@ pub struct InMemorySigner {
        pub commitment_seed: [u8; 32],
        /// Holder public keys and basepoints
        pub(crate) holder_channel_pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
+       /// Private key of our node secret, used for signing channel announcements
+       node_secret: SecretKey,
        /// Counterparty public keys and counterparty/holder selected_contest_delay, populated on channel acceptance
        channel_parameters: Option<ChannelTransactionParameters>,
        /// The total value of this channel
@@ -445,6 +465,7 @@ impl InMemorySigner {
        /// Create a new InMemorySigner
        pub fn new<C: Signing>(
                secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>,
+               node_secret: SecretKey,
                funding_key: SecretKey,
                revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
                payment_key: SecretKey,
@@ -464,6 +485,7 @@ impl InMemorySigner {
                        delayed_payment_base_key,
                        htlc_base_key,
                        commitment_seed,
+                       node_secret,
                        channel_value_satoshis,
                        holder_channel_pubkeys,
                        channel_parameters: None,
@@ -601,14 +623,14 @@ impl BaseSign for InMemorySigner {
                chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&self.commitment_seed, idx)
        }
 
-       fn validate_holder_commitment(&self, _holder_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction) -> Result<(), ()> {
+       fn validate_holder_commitment(&self, _holder_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, _preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), ()> {
                Ok(())
        }
 
        fn pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys { &self.holder_channel_pubkeys }
        fn channel_keys_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] { self.channel_keys_id }
 
-       fn sign_counterparty_commitment(&self, commitment_tx: &CommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()> {
+       fn sign_counterparty_commitment(&self, commitment_tx: &CommitmentTransaction, _preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()> {
                let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
                let keys = trusted_tx.keys();
 
@@ -706,9 +728,10 @@ impl BaseSign for InMemorySigner {
                Ok(closing_tx.trust().sign(&self.funding_key, &channel_funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, secp_ctx))
        }
 
-       fn sign_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
+       fn sign_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>)
+       -> Result<(Signature, Signature), ()> {
                let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]);
-               Ok(secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.funding_key))
+               Ok((secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.node_secret), secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.funding_key)))
        }
 
        fn ready_channel(&mut self, channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters) {
@@ -743,8 +766,8 @@ impl Writeable for InMemorySigner {
        }
 }
 
-impl Readable for InMemorySigner {
-       fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+impl ReadableArgs<SecretKey> for InMemorySigner {
+       fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, node_secret: SecretKey) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
                let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
 
                let funding_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
@@ -770,6 +793,7 @@ impl Readable for InMemorySigner {
                        payment_key,
                        delayed_payment_base_key,
                        htlc_base_key,
+                       node_secret,
                        commitment_seed,
                        channel_value_satoshis,
                        holder_channel_pubkeys,
@@ -923,6 +947,7 @@ impl KeysManager {
 
                InMemorySigner::new(
                        &self.secp_ctx,
+                       self.node_secret,
                        funding_key,
                        revocation_base_key,
                        payment_key,
@@ -1105,7 +1130,7 @@ impl KeysInterface for KeysManager {
        }
 
        fn read_chan_signer(&self, reader: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> {
-               InMemorySigner::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(reader))
+               InMemorySigner::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(reader), self.get_node_secret())
        }
 
        fn sign_invoice(&self, hrp_bytes: &[u8], invoice_data: &[u5]) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> {