+// This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
+// history.
+//
+// This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
+// or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
+// <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
+// You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
+// licenses.
+
//! keysinterface provides keys into rust-lightning and defines some useful enums which describe
//! spendable on-chain outputs which the user owns and is responsible for using just as any other
//! on-chain output which is theirs.
use util::ser::{Writeable, Writer, Readable};
use ln::chan_utils;
-use ln::chan_utils::{TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, LocalCommitmentTransaction};
+use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, LocalCommitmentTransaction, PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys};
use ln::msgs;
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
///
/// To derive the remote_revocation_pubkey provided here (which is used in the witness
/// script generation), you must pass the remote revocation_basepoint (which appears in the
- /// call to ChannelKeys::set_remote_channel_pubkeys) and the provided per_commitment point
+ /// call to ChannelKeys::on_accept) and the provided per_commitment point
/// to chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key.
///
/// The witness script which is hashed and included in the output script_pubkey may be
}
}
-/// A trait to describe an object which can get user secrets and key material.
-pub trait KeysInterface: Send + Sync {
- /// A type which implements ChannelKeys which will be returned by get_channel_keys.
- type ChanKeySigner : ChannelKeys;
-
- /// Get node secret key (aka node_id or network_key)
- fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey;
- /// Get destination redeemScript to encumber static protocol exit points.
- fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script;
- /// Get shutdown_pubkey to use as PublicKey at channel closure
- fn get_shutdown_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey;
- /// Get a new set of ChannelKeys for per-channel secrets. These MUST be unique even if you
- /// restarted with some stale data!
- fn get_channel_keys(&self, inbound: bool, channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> Self::ChanKeySigner;
- /// Get a secret and PRNG seed for construting an onion packet
- fn get_onion_rand(&self) -> (SecretKey, [u8; 32]);
- /// Get a unique temporary channel id. Channels will be referred to by this until the funding
- /// transaction is created, at which point they will use the outpoint in the funding
- /// transaction.
- fn get_channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32];
-}
-
/// Set of lightning keys needed to operate a channel as described in BOLT 3.
///
/// Signing services could be implemented on a hardware wallet. In this case,
// TODO: We should remove Clone by instead requesting a new ChannelKeys copy when we create
// ChannelMonitors instead of expecting to clone the one out of the Channel into the monitors.
pub trait ChannelKeys : Send+Clone {
- /// Gets the private key for the anchor tx
- fn funding_key<'a>(&'a self) -> &'a SecretKey;
- /// Gets the local secret key for blinded revocation pubkey
- fn revocation_base_key<'a>(&'a self) -> &'a SecretKey;
- /// Gets the local secret key used in the to_remote output of remote commitment tx (ie the
- /// output to us in transactions our counterparty broadcasts).
- /// Also as part of obscured commitment number.
- fn payment_key<'a>(&'a self) -> &'a SecretKey;
- /// Gets the local secret key used in HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout txn and to_local output
- fn delayed_payment_base_key<'a>(&'a self) -> &'a SecretKey;
- /// Gets the local htlc secret key used in commitment tx htlc outputs
- fn htlc_base_key<'a>(&'a self) -> &'a SecretKey;
- /// Gets the commitment seed
- fn commitment_seed<'a>(&'a self) -> &'a [u8; 32];
+ /// Gets the per-commitment point for a specific commitment number
+ ///
+ /// Note that the commitment number starts at (1 << 48) - 1 and counts backwards.
+ fn get_per_commitment_point<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, idx: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> PublicKey;
+ /// Gets the commitment secret for a specific commitment number as part of the revocation process
+ ///
+ /// An external signer implementation should error here if the commitment was already signed
+ /// and should refuse to sign it in the future.
+ ///
+ /// May be called more than once for the same index.
+ ///
+ /// Note that the commitment number starts at (1 << 48) - 1 and counts backwards.
+ /// TODO: return a Result so we can signal a validation error
+ fn release_commitment_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32];
/// Gets the local channel public keys and basepoints
- fn pubkeys<'a>(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelPublicKeys;
+ fn pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys;
/// Gets arbitrary identifiers describing the set of keys which are provided back to you in
/// some SpendableOutputDescriptor types. These should be sufficient to identify this
/// ChannelKeys object uniquely and lookup or re-derive its keys.
// TODO: Document the things someone using this interface should enforce before signing.
// TODO: Add more input vars to enable better checking (preferably removing commitment_tx and
// making the callee generate it via some util function we expose)!
- fn sign_remote_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, feerate_per_kw: u64, commitment_tx: &Transaction, keys: &TxCreationKeys, htlcs: &[&HTLCOutputInCommitment], to_self_delay: u16, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()>;
+ fn sign_remote_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, feerate_per_kw: u32, commitment_tx: &Transaction, keys: &PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys, htlcs: &[&HTLCOutputInCommitment], secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()>;
/// Create a signature for a local commitment transaction. This will only ever be called with
/// the same local_commitment_tx (or a copy thereof), though there are currently no guarantees
/// that it will not be called multiple times.
+ /// An external signer implementation should check that the commitment has not been revoked.
//
// TODO: Document the things someone using this interface should enforce before signing.
// TODO: Add more input vars to enable better checking (preferably removing commitment_tx and
/// transactions which will be broadcasted later, after the channel has moved on to a newer
/// state. Thus, needs its own method as sign_local_commitment may enforce that we only ever
/// get called once.
- #[cfg(test)]
+ #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
fn unsafe_sign_local_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, local_commitment_tx: &LocalCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
/// Create a signature for each HTLC transaction spending a local commitment transaction.
/// (implying they were considered dust at the time the commitment transaction was negotiated),
/// a corresponding None should be included in the return value. All other positions in the
/// return value must contain a signature.
- fn sign_local_commitment_htlc_transactions<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, local_commitment_tx: &LocalCommitmentTransaction, local_csv: u16, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Option<Signature>>, ()>;
+ fn sign_local_commitment_htlc_transactions<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, local_commitment_tx: &LocalCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Option<Signature>>, ()>;
/// Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending an HTLC or commitment
/// transaction output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
/// htlc holds HTLC elements (hash, timelock) if the output being spent is a HTLC output, thus
/// changing the format of the witness script (which is committed to in the BIP 143
/// signatures).
- ///
- /// on_remote_tx_csv is the relative lock-time that that our counterparty would have to set on
- /// their transaction were they to spend the same output. It is included in the witness script
- /// and thus committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
- fn sign_justice_transaction<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, htlc: &Option<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, on_remote_tx_csv: u16, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
+ fn sign_justice_transaction<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, htlc: &Option<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
/// Create a signature for a claiming transaction for a HTLC output on a remote commitment
/// transaction, either offered or received.
/// protocol.
fn sign_channel_announcement<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
- /// Set the remote channel basepoints. This is done immediately on incoming channels
- /// and as soon as the channel is accepted on outgoing channels.
+ /// Set the remote channel basepoints and remote/local to_self_delay.
+ /// This is done immediately on incoming channels and as soon as the channel is accepted on outgoing channels.
+ ///
+ /// We bind local_to_self_delay late here for API convenience.
///
/// Will be called before any signatures are applied.
- fn set_remote_channel_pubkeys(&mut self, channel_points: &ChannelPublicKeys);
+ fn on_accept(&mut self, channel_points: &ChannelPublicKeys, remote_to_self_delay: u16, local_to_self_delay: u16);
+}
+
+/// A trait to describe an object which can get user secrets and key material.
+pub trait KeysInterface: Send + Sync {
+ /// A type which implements ChannelKeys which will be returned by get_channel_keys.
+ type ChanKeySigner : ChannelKeys;
+
+ /// Get node secret key (aka node_id or network_key)
+ fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey;
+ /// Get destination redeemScript to encumber static protocol exit points.
+ fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script;
+ /// Get shutdown_pubkey to use as PublicKey at channel closure
+ fn get_shutdown_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey;
+ /// Get a new set of ChannelKeys for per-channel secrets. These MUST be unique even if you
+ /// restarted with some stale data!
+ fn get_channel_keys(&self, inbound: bool, channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> Self::ChanKeySigner;
+ /// Gets a unique, cryptographically-secure, random 32 byte value. This is used for encrypting
+ /// onion packets and for temporary channel IDs. There is no requirement that these be
+ /// persisted anywhere, though they must be unique across restarts.
+ fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32];
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone)]
+/// Holds late-bound channel data.
+/// This data is available after the channel is known to be accepted, either
+/// when receiving an open_channel for an inbound channel or when
+/// receiving accept_channel for an outbound channel.
+struct AcceptedChannelData {
+ /// Remote public keys and base points
+ remote_channel_pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
+ /// The to_self_delay value specified by our counterparty and applied on locally-broadcastable
+ /// transactions, ie the amount of time that we have to wait to recover our funds if we
+ /// broadcast a transaction. You'll likely want to pass this to the
+ /// ln::chan_utils::build*_transaction functions when signing local transactions.
+ remote_to_self_delay: u16,
+ /// The to_self_delay value specified by us and applied on transactions broadcastable
+ /// by our counterparty, ie the amount of time that they have to wait to recover their funds
+ /// if they broadcast a transaction.
+ local_to_self_delay: u16,
}
#[derive(Clone)]
/// A simple implementation of ChannelKeys that just keeps the private keys in memory.
pub struct InMemoryChannelKeys {
/// Private key of anchor tx
- funding_key: SecretKey,
+ pub funding_key: SecretKey,
/// Local secret key for blinded revocation pubkey
- revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
+ pub revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
/// Local secret key used for our balance in remote-broadcasted commitment transactions
- payment_key: SecretKey,
+ pub payment_key: SecretKey,
/// Local secret key used in HTLC tx
- delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey,
+ pub delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey,
/// Local htlc secret key used in commitment tx htlc outputs
- htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
+ pub htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
/// Commitment seed
- commitment_seed: [u8; 32],
+ pub commitment_seed: [u8; 32],
/// Local public keys and basepoints
pub(crate) local_channel_pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
- /// Remote public keys and base points
- pub(crate) remote_channel_pubkeys: Option<ChannelPublicKeys>,
+ /// Remote public keys and remote/local to_self_delay, populated on channel acceptance
+ accepted_channel_data: Option<AcceptedChannelData>,
/// The total value of this channel
channel_value_satoshis: u64,
/// Key derivation parameters
commitment_seed,
channel_value_satoshis,
local_channel_pubkeys,
- remote_channel_pubkeys: None,
+ accepted_channel_data: None,
key_derivation_params,
}
}
}
}
- fn remote_pubkeys<'a>(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelPublicKeys { self.remote_channel_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap() }
+ /// Remote pubkeys.
+ /// Will panic if on_accept wasn't called.
+ pub fn remote_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys { &self.accepted_channel_data.as_ref().unwrap().remote_channel_pubkeys }
+
+ /// The to_self_delay value specified by our counterparty and applied on locally-broadcastable
+ /// transactions, ie the amount of time that we have to wait to recover our funds if we
+ /// broadcast a transaction. You'll likely want to pass this to the
+ /// ln::chan_utils::build*_transaction functions when signing local transactions.
+ /// Will panic if on_accept wasn't called.
+ pub fn remote_to_self_delay(&self) -> u16 { self.accepted_channel_data.as_ref().unwrap().remote_to_self_delay }
+
+ /// The to_self_delay value specified by us and applied on transactions broadcastable
+ /// by our counterparty, ie the amount of time that they have to wait to recover their funds
+ /// if they broadcast a transaction.
+ /// Will panic if on_accept wasn't called.
+ pub fn local_to_self_delay(&self) -> u16 { self.accepted_channel_data.as_ref().unwrap().local_to_self_delay }
}
impl ChannelKeys for InMemoryChannelKeys {
- fn funding_key(&self) -> &SecretKey { &self.funding_key }
- fn revocation_base_key(&self) -> &SecretKey { &self.revocation_base_key }
- fn payment_key(&self) -> &SecretKey { &self.payment_key }
- fn delayed_payment_base_key(&self) -> &SecretKey { &self.delayed_payment_base_key }
- fn htlc_base_key(&self) -> &SecretKey { &self.htlc_base_key }
- fn commitment_seed(&self) -> &[u8; 32] { &self.commitment_seed }
- fn pubkeys<'a>(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelPublicKeys { &self.local_channel_pubkeys }
+ fn get_per_commitment_point<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, idx: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> PublicKey {
+ let commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&self.commitment_seed, idx)).unwrap();
+ PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &commitment_secret)
+ }
+
+ fn release_commitment_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
+ chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&self.commitment_seed, idx)
+ }
+
+ fn pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys { &self.local_channel_pubkeys }
fn key_derivation_params(&self) -> (u64, u64) { self.key_derivation_params }
- fn sign_remote_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, feerate_per_kw: u64, commitment_tx: &Transaction, keys: &TxCreationKeys, htlcs: &[&HTLCOutputInCommitment], to_self_delay: u16, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()> {
+ fn sign_remote_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, feerate_per_kw: u32, commitment_tx: &Transaction, pre_keys: &PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys, htlcs: &[&HTLCOutputInCommitment], secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()> {
if commitment_tx.input.len() != 1 { return Err(()); }
+ let keys = pre_keys.trust_key_derivation();
let funding_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &self.funding_key);
- let remote_channel_pubkeys = self.remote_channel_pubkeys.as_ref().expect("must set remote channel pubkeys before signing");
- let channel_funding_redeemscript = make_funding_redeemscript(&funding_pubkey, &remote_channel_pubkeys.funding_pubkey);
+ let accepted_data = self.accepted_channel_data.as_ref().expect("must accept before signing");
+ let channel_funding_redeemscript = make_funding_redeemscript(&funding_pubkey, &accepted_data.remote_channel_pubkeys.funding_pubkey);
let commitment_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&commitment_tx).sighash_all(&commitment_tx.input[0], &channel_funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
let commitment_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&commitment_sighash, &self.funding_key);
let mut htlc_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs.len());
for ref htlc in htlcs {
if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
- let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, feerate_per_kw, to_self_delay, htlc, &keys.a_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
+ let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, feerate_per_kw, accepted_data.local_to_self_delay, htlc, &keys.a_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]);
let our_htlc_key = match chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &keys.per_commitment_point, &self.htlc_base_key) {
fn sign_local_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, local_commitment_tx: &LocalCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
let funding_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &self.funding_key);
- let remote_channel_pubkeys = self.remote_channel_pubkeys.as_ref().expect("must set remote channel pubkeys before signing");
- let channel_funding_redeemscript = make_funding_redeemscript(&funding_pubkey, &remote_channel_pubkeys.funding_pubkey);
+ let remote_channel_data = self.accepted_channel_data.as_ref().expect("must accept before signing");
+ let channel_funding_redeemscript = make_funding_redeemscript(&funding_pubkey, &remote_channel_data.remote_channel_pubkeys.funding_pubkey);
Ok(local_commitment_tx.get_local_sig(&self.funding_key, &channel_funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, secp_ctx))
}
- #[cfg(test)]
+ #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
fn unsafe_sign_local_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, local_commitment_tx: &LocalCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
let funding_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &self.funding_key);
- let remote_channel_pubkeys = self.remote_channel_pubkeys.as_ref().expect("must set remote channel pubkeys before signing");
+ let remote_channel_pubkeys = &self.accepted_channel_data.as_ref().expect("must accept before signing").remote_channel_pubkeys;
let channel_funding_redeemscript = make_funding_redeemscript(&funding_pubkey, &remote_channel_pubkeys.funding_pubkey);
Ok(local_commitment_tx.get_local_sig(&self.funding_key, &channel_funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, secp_ctx))
}
- fn sign_local_commitment_htlc_transactions<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, local_commitment_tx: &LocalCommitmentTransaction, local_csv: u16, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Option<Signature>>, ()> {
+ fn sign_local_commitment_htlc_transactions<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, local_commitment_tx: &LocalCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Option<Signature>>, ()> {
+ let local_csv = self.accepted_channel_data.as_ref().unwrap().remote_to_self_delay;
local_commitment_tx.get_htlc_sigs(&self.htlc_base_key, local_csv, secp_ctx)
}
- fn sign_justice_transaction<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, htlc: &Option<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, on_remote_tx_csv: u16, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
+ fn sign_justice_transaction<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, htlc: &Option<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
let revocation_key = match chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &self.revocation_base_key) {
Ok(revocation_key) => revocation_key,
Err(_) => return Err(())
Ok(remote_delayedpubkey) => remote_delayedpubkey,
Err(_) => return Err(())
};
- chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, on_remote_tx_csv, &remote_delayedpubkey)
+ chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.local_to_self_delay(), &remote_delayedpubkey)
};
let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&justice_tx);
let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&justice_tx.input[input], &witness_script, amount)[..]);
if closing_tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { return Err(()); }
if closing_tx.output.len() > 2 { return Err(()); }
- let remote_channel_pubkeys = self.remote_channel_pubkeys.as_ref().expect("must set remote channel pubkeys before signing");
let funding_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &self.funding_key);
- let channel_funding_redeemscript = make_funding_redeemscript(&funding_pubkey, &remote_channel_pubkeys.funding_pubkey);
+ let remote_channel_data = self.accepted_channel_data.as_ref().expect("must accept before signing");
+ let channel_funding_redeemscript = make_funding_redeemscript(&funding_pubkey, &remote_channel_data.remote_channel_pubkeys.funding_pubkey);
let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(closing_tx)
.sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &channel_funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
Ok(secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.funding_key))
}
- fn set_remote_channel_pubkeys(&mut self, channel_pubkeys: &ChannelPublicKeys) {
- assert!(self.remote_channel_pubkeys.is_none(), "Already set remote channel pubkeys");
- self.remote_channel_pubkeys = Some(channel_pubkeys.clone());
+ fn on_accept(&mut self, channel_pubkeys: &ChannelPublicKeys, remote_to_self_delay: u16, local_to_self_delay: u16) {
+ assert!(self.accepted_channel_data.is_none(), "Already accepted");
+ self.accepted_channel_data = Some(AcceptedChannelData {
+ remote_channel_pubkeys: channel_pubkeys.clone(),
+ remote_to_self_delay,
+ local_to_self_delay,
+ });
}
}
+impl_writeable!(AcceptedChannelData, 0,
+ { remote_channel_pubkeys, remote_to_self_delay, local_to_self_delay });
+
impl Writeable for InMemoryChannelKeys {
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
self.funding_key.write(writer)?;
self.delayed_payment_base_key.write(writer)?;
self.htlc_base_key.write(writer)?;
self.commitment_seed.write(writer)?;
- self.remote_channel_pubkeys.write(writer)?;
+ self.accepted_channel_data.write(writer)?;
self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
self.key_derivation_params.0.write(writer)?;
self.key_derivation_params.1.write(writer)?;
let delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
let htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
let commitment_seed = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let remote_channel_pubkeys = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let remote_channel_data = Readable::read(reader)?;
let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
let local_channel_pubkeys =
commitment_seed,
channel_value_satoshis,
local_channel_pubkeys,
- remote_channel_pubkeys,
+ accepted_channel_data: remote_channel_data,
key_derivation_params: (params_1, params_2),
})
}
shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
channel_master_key: ExtendedPrivKey,
channel_child_index: AtomicUsize,
- session_master_key: ExtendedPrivKey,
- session_child_index: AtomicUsize,
- channel_id_master_key: ExtendedPrivKey,
- channel_id_child_index: AtomicUsize,
+ rand_bytes_master_key: ExtendedPrivKey,
+ rand_bytes_child_index: AtomicUsize,
seed: [u8; 32],
starting_time_secs: u64,
impl KeysManager {
/// Constructs a KeysManager from a 32-byte seed. If the seed is in some way biased (eg your
- /// RNG is busted) this may panic (but more importantly, you will possibly lose funds).
+ /// CSRNG is busted) this may panic (but more importantly, you will possibly lose funds).
/// starting_time isn't strictly required to actually be a time, but it must absolutely,
/// without a doubt, be unique to this instance. ie if you start multiple times with the same
/// seed, starting_time must be unique to each run. Thus, the easiest way to achieve this is to
/// Note that until the 0.1 release there is no guarantee of backward compatibility between
/// versions. Once the library is more fully supported, the docs will be updated to include a
/// detailed description of the guarantee.
- pub fn new(seed: &[u8; 32], network: Network, starting_time_secs: u64, starting_time_nanos: u32) -> KeysManager {
+ pub fn new(seed: &[u8; 32], network: Network, starting_time_secs: u64, starting_time_nanos: u32) -> Self {
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
match ExtendedPrivKey::new_master(network.clone(), seed) {
Ok(master_key) => {
Err(_) => panic!("Your RNG is busted"),
};
let channel_master_key = master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(3).unwrap()).expect("Your RNG is busted");
- let session_master_key = master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(4).unwrap()).expect("Your RNG is busted");
- let channel_id_master_key = master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(5).unwrap()).expect("Your RNG is busted");
+ let rand_bytes_master_key = master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(4).unwrap()).expect("Your RNG is busted");
KeysManager {
secp_ctx,
shutdown_pubkey,
channel_master_key,
channel_child_index: AtomicUsize::new(0),
- session_master_key,
- session_child_index: AtomicUsize::new(0),
- channel_id_master_key,
- channel_id_child_index: AtomicUsize::new(0),
+ rand_bytes_master_key,
+ rand_bytes_child_index: AtomicUsize::new(0),
seed: *seed,
starting_time_secs,
self.derive_channel_keys(channel_value_satoshis, ix_and_nanos, self.starting_time_secs)
}
- fn get_onion_rand(&self) -> (SecretKey, [u8; 32]) {
- let mut sha = self.derive_unique_start();
-
- let child_ix = self.session_child_index.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
- let child_privkey = self.session_master_key.ckd_priv(&self.secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(child_ix as u32).expect("key space exhausted")).expect("Your RNG is busted");
- sha.input(&child_privkey.private_key.key[..]);
-
- let mut rng_seed = sha.clone();
- // Not exactly the most ideal construction, but the second value will get fed into
- // ChaCha so it is another step harder to break.
- rng_seed.input(b"RNG Seed Salt");
- sha.input(b"Session Key Salt");
- (SecretKey::from_slice(&Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()).expect("Your RNG is busted"),
- Sha256::from_engine(rng_seed).into_inner())
- }
-
- fn get_channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
+ fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
let mut sha = self.derive_unique_start();
- let child_ix = self.channel_id_child_index.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
- let child_privkey = self.channel_id_master_key.ckd_priv(&self.secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(child_ix as u32).expect("key space exhausted")).expect("Your RNG is busted");
+ let child_ix = self.rand_bytes_child_index.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
+ let child_privkey = self.rand_bytes_master_key.ckd_priv(&self.secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(child_ix as u32).expect("key space exhausted")).expect("Your RNG is busted");
sha.input(&child_privkey.private_key.key[..]);
+ sha.input(b"Unique Secure Random Bytes Salt");
Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
}
}