use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use ln::chan_utils;
-use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, LocalCommitmentTransaction, PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys};
+use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys};
use ln::msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement;
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
/// using chan_utils::derive_public_key and only the delayed_payment_basepoint which appears in
/// ChannelKeys::pubkeys().
///
- /// To derive the counterparty_revocation_pubkey provided here (which is used in the witness
+ /// To derive the revocation_pubkey provided here (which is used in the witness
/// script generation), you must pass the counterparty revocation_basepoint (which appears in the
/// call to ChannelKeys::on_accept) and the provided per_commitment point
/// to chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key.
/// The channel keys state used to proceed to derivation of signing key. Must
/// be pass to KeysInterface::derive_channel_keys.
key_derivation_params: (u64, u64),
- /// The counterparty_revocation_pubkey used to derive witnessScript
- counterparty_revocation_pubkey: PublicKey
+ /// The revocation_pubkey used to derive witnessScript
+ revocation_pubkey: PublicKey
},
/// An output to a P2WPKH, spendable exclusively by our payment key (ie the private key which
/// corresponds to the public key in ChannelKeys::pubkeys().payment_point).
outpoint.write(writer)?;
output.write(writer)?;
},
- &SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH { ref outpoint, ref per_commitment_point, ref to_self_delay, ref output, ref key_derivation_params, ref counterparty_revocation_pubkey } => {
+ &SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH { ref outpoint, ref per_commitment_point, ref to_self_delay, ref output, ref key_derivation_params, ref revocation_pubkey } => {
1u8.write(writer)?;
outpoint.write(writer)?;
per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
output.write(writer)?;
key_derivation_params.0.write(writer)?;
key_derivation_params.1.write(writer)?;
- counterparty_revocation_pubkey.write(writer)?;
+ revocation_pubkey.write(writer)?;
},
&SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutputCounterpartyPayment { ref outpoint, ref output, ref key_derivation_params } => {
2u8.write(writer)?;
to_self_delay: Readable::read(reader)?,
output: Readable::read(reader)?,
key_derivation_params: (Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?),
- counterparty_revocation_pubkey: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ revocation_pubkey: Readable::read(reader)?,
}),
2u8 => Ok(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutputCounterpartyPayment {
outpoint: Readable::read(reader)?,
//
// TODO: Document the things someone using this interface should enforce before signing.
// TODO: Add more input vars to enable better checking (preferably removing commitment_tx and
- fn sign_holder_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, holder_commitment_tx: &LocalCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
+ fn sign_holder_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, holder_commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
/// Same as sign_holder_commitment, but exists only for tests to get access to holder commitment
/// transactions which will be broadcasted later, after the channel has moved on to a newer
/// state. Thus, needs its own method as sign_holder_commitment may enforce that we only ever
/// get called once.
#[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
- fn unsafe_sign_holder_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, holder_commitment_tx: &LocalCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
+ fn unsafe_sign_holder_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, holder_commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
/// Create a signature for each HTLC transaction spending a holder's commitment transaction.
///
/// (implying they were considered dust at the time the commitment transaction was negotiated),
/// a corresponding None should be included in the return value. All other positions in the
/// return value must contain a signature.
- fn sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, holder_commitment_tx: &LocalCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Option<Signature>>, ()>;
+ fn sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, holder_commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Option<Signature>>, ()>;
/// Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending an HTLC or commitment
/// transaction output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
Ok((commitment_sig, htlc_sigs))
}
- fn sign_holder_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, holder_commitment_tx: &LocalCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
+ fn sign_holder_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, holder_commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
let funding_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &self.funding_key);
let counterparty_channel_data = self.accepted_channel_data.as_ref().expect("must accept before signing");
let channel_funding_redeemscript = make_funding_redeemscript(&funding_pubkey, &counterparty_channel_data.counterparty_channel_pubkeys.funding_pubkey);
- Ok(holder_commitment_tx.get_local_sig(&self.funding_key, &channel_funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, secp_ctx))
+ Ok(holder_commitment_tx.get_holder_sig(&self.funding_key, &channel_funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, secp_ctx))
}
#[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
- fn unsafe_sign_holder_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, holder_commitment_tx: &LocalCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
+ fn unsafe_sign_holder_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, holder_commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
let funding_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &self.funding_key);
let counterparty_channel_pubkeys = &self.accepted_channel_data.as_ref().expect("must accept before signing").counterparty_channel_pubkeys;
let channel_funding_redeemscript = make_funding_redeemscript(&funding_pubkey, &counterparty_channel_pubkeys.funding_pubkey);
- Ok(holder_commitment_tx.get_local_sig(&self.funding_key, &channel_funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, secp_ctx))
+ Ok(holder_commitment_tx.get_holder_sig(&self.funding_key, &channel_funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, secp_ctx))
}
- fn sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, holder_commitment_tx: &LocalCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Option<Signature>>, ()> {
+ fn sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, holder_commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Option<Signature>>, ()> {
let counterparty_selected_contest_delay = self.accepted_channel_data.as_ref().unwrap().counterparty_selected_contest_delay;
holder_commitment_tx.get_htlc_sigs(&self.htlc_base_key, counterparty_selected_contest_delay, secp_ctx)
}