use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
-use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
+use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
use bitcoin::secp256k1;
-use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
-use ln::PaymentPreimage;
-use ln::chan_utils::{ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction};
-use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, BroadcasterInterface, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
-use chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER};
-use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface};
-use chain::package::PackageTemplate;
-use util::logger::Logger;
-use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, VecWriter};
-use util::byte_utils;
-
-use io;
-use prelude::*;
+use crate::chain::keysinterface::{BaseSign, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
+use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
+use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
+#[cfg(anchors)]
+use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
+use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction};
+#[cfg(anchors)]
+use crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget;
+use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, BroadcasterInterface, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
+use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER};
+use crate::chain::keysinterface::Sign;
+#[cfg(anchors)]
+use crate::chain::package::PackageSolvingData;
+use crate::chain::package::PackageTemplate;
+use crate::util::logger::Logger;
+use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, VecWriter};
+
+use crate::io;
+use crate::prelude::*;
use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
use core::cmp;
use core::ops::Deref;
use core::mem::replace;
+#[cfg(anchors)]
+use core::mem::swap;
+use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
/// transaction causing it.
///
/// Used to determine when the on-chain event can be considered safe from a chain reorganization.
-#[derive(PartialEq)]
+#[derive(PartialEq, Eq)]
struct OnchainEventEntry {
txid: Txid,
height: u32,
+ block_hash: Option<BlockHash>, // Added as optional, will be filled in for any entry generated on 0.0.113 or after
event: OnchainEvent,
}
/// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
/// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
-#[derive(PartialEq)]
+#[derive(PartialEq, Eq)]
enum OnchainEvent {
/// Outpoint under claim process by our own tx, once this one get enough confirmations, we remove it from
/// bump-txn candidate buffer.
Claim {
- claim_request: Txid,
+ package_id: PackageID,
},
/// Claim tx aggregate multiple claimable outpoints. One of the outpoint may be claimed by a counterparty party tx.
/// In this case, we need to drop the outpoint and regenerate a new claim tx. By safety, we keep tracking
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
(0, self.txid, required),
+ (1, self.block_hash, option),
(2, self.height, required),
(4, self.event, required),
});
impl MaybeReadable for OnchainEventEntry {
fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
- let mut txid = Default::default();
+ let mut txid = Txid::all_zeros();
let mut height = 0;
+ let mut block_hash = None;
let mut event = None;
read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
(0, txid, required),
+ (1, block_hash, option),
(2, height, required),
(4, event, ignorable),
});
if let Some(ev) = event {
- Ok(Some(Self { txid, height, event: ev }))
+ Ok(Some(Self { txid, height, block_hash, event: ev }))
} else {
Ok(None)
}
impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OnchainEvent,
(0, Claim) => {
- (0, claim_request, required),
+ (0, package_id, required),
},
(1, ContentiousOutpoint) => {
(0, package, required),
}
}
+#[cfg(anchors)]
+/// The claim commonly referred to as the pre-signed second-stage HTLC transaction.
+pub(crate) struct ExternalHTLCClaim {
+ pub(crate) commitment_txid: Txid,
+ pub(crate) per_commitment_number: u64,
+ pub(crate) htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment,
+ pub(crate) preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
+ pub(crate) counterparty_sig: Signature,
+}
+
+// Represents the different types of claims for which events are yielded externally to satisfy said
+// claims.
+#[cfg(anchors)]
+pub(crate) enum ClaimEvent {
+ /// Event yielded to signal that the commitment transaction fee must be bumped to claim any
+ /// encumbered funds and proceed to HTLC resolution, if any HTLCs exist.
+ BumpCommitment {
+ package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: u32,
+ commitment_tx: Transaction,
+ anchor_output_idx: u32,
+ },
+ /// Event yielded to signal that the commitment transaction has confirmed and its HTLCs must be
+ /// resolved by broadcasting a transaction with sufficient fee to claim them.
+ BumpHTLC {
+ target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: u32,
+ htlcs: Vec<ExternalHTLCClaim>,
+ },
+}
+
+/// Represents the different ways an output can be claimed (i.e., spent to an address under our
+/// control) onchain.
+pub(crate) enum OnchainClaim {
+ /// A finalized transaction pending confirmation spending the output to claim.
+ Tx(Transaction),
+ #[cfg(anchors)]
+ /// An event yielded externally to signal additional inputs must be added to a transaction
+ /// pending confirmation spending the output to claim.
+ Event(ClaimEvent),
+}
+
+/// An internal identifier to track pending package claims within the `OnchainTxHandler`.
+type PackageID = [u8; 32];
/// OnchainTxHandler receives claiming requests, aggregates them if it's sound, broadcast and
/// do RBF bumping if possible.
// us and is immutable until all outpoint of the claimable set are post-anti-reorg-delay solved.
// Entry is cache of elements need to generate a bumped claiming transaction (see ClaimTxBumpMaterial)
#[cfg(test)] // Used in functional_test to verify sanitization
- pub(crate) pending_claim_requests: HashMap<Txid, PackageTemplate>,
+ pub(crate) pending_claim_requests: HashMap<PackageID, PackageTemplate>,
#[cfg(not(test))]
- pending_claim_requests: HashMap<Txid, PackageTemplate>,
+ pending_claim_requests: HashMap<PackageID, PackageTemplate>,
+ #[cfg(anchors)]
+ pending_claim_events: HashMap<PackageID, ClaimEvent>,
// Used to link outpoints claimed in a connected block to a pending claim request.
// Key is outpoint than monitor parsing has detected we have keys/scripts to claim
// post-anti-reorg-delay solved, confirmaiton_block is used to erase entry if
// block with output gets disconnected.
#[cfg(test)] // Used in functional_test to verify sanitization
- pub claimable_outpoints: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, (Txid, u32)>,
+ pub claimable_outpoints: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, (PackageID, u32)>,
#[cfg(not(test))]
- claimable_outpoints: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, (Txid, u32)>,
+ claimable_outpoints: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, (PackageID, u32)>,
locktimed_packages: BTreeMap<u32, Vec<PackageTemplate>>,
(key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_claim_requests.len() as u64))?;
+ writer.write_all(&(self.pending_claim_requests.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
for (ref ancestor_claim_txid, request) in self.pending_claim_requests.iter() {
ancestor_claim_txid.write(writer)?;
request.write(writer)?;
}
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
+ writer.write_all(&(self.claimable_outpoints.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
for (ref outp, ref claim_and_height) in self.claimable_outpoints.iter() {
outp.write(writer)?;
claim_and_height.0.write(writer)?;
claim_and_height.1.write(writer)?;
}
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.locktimed_packages.len() as u64))?;
+ writer.write_all(&(self.locktimed_packages.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
for (ref locktime, ref packages) in self.locktimed_packages.iter() {
locktime.write(writer)?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(packages.len() as u64))?;
+ writer.write_all(&(packages.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
for ref package in packages.iter() {
package.write(writer)?;
}
}
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
+ writer.write_all(&(self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
for ref entry in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
entry.write(writer)?;
}
}
}
-impl<'a, K: KeysInterface> ReadableArgs<&'a K> for OnchainTxHandler<K::Signer> {
- fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_manager: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+impl<'a, 'b, ES: EntropySource, SP: SignerProvider> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u64, [u8; 32])> for OnchainTxHandler<SP::Signer> {
+ fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u64, [u8; 32])) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ let entropy_source = args.0;
+ let signer_provider = args.1;
+ let channel_value_satoshis = args.2;
+ let channel_keys_id = args.3;
+
let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
let channel_parameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ // Read the serialized signer bytes, but don't deserialize them, as we'll obtain our signer
+ // by re-deriving the private key material.
let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut keys_data = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE));
- while keys_data.len() != keys_len as usize {
+ let mut bytes_read = 0;
+ while bytes_read != keys_len as usize {
// Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
let mut data = [0; 1024];
- let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.len())];
+ let bytes_to_read = cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - bytes_read);
+ let read_slice = &mut data[0..bytes_to_read];
reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
- keys_data.extend_from_slice(read_slice);
+ bytes_read += bytes_to_read;
}
- let signer = keys_manager.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
+
+ let mut signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
+ signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
let pending_claim_requests_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let mut pending_claim_requests = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_claim_requests_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
read_tlv_fields!(reader, {});
let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
+ secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
Ok(OnchainTxHandler {
destination_script,
locktimed_packages,
pending_claim_requests,
onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf,
+ #[cfg(anchors)]
+ pending_claim_events: HashMap::new(),
secp_ctx,
})
}
claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
locktimed_packages: BTreeMap::new(),
onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec::new(),
+ #[cfg(anchors)]
+ pending_claim_events: HashMap::new(),
secp_ctx,
}
self.holder_commitment.to_broadcaster_value_sat()
}
- /// Lightning security model (i.e being able to redeem/timeout HTLC or penalize coutnerparty onchain) lays on the assumption of claim transactions getting confirmed before timelock expiration
- /// (CSV or CLTV following cases). In case of high-fee spikes, claim tx may stuck in the mempool, so you need to bump its feerate quickly using Replace-By-Fee or Child-Pay-For-Parent.
- /// Panics if there are signing errors, because signing operations in reaction to on-chain events
- /// are not expected to fail, and if they do, we may lose funds.
- fn generate_claim_tx<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, cur_height: u32, cached_request: &PackageTemplate, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L) -> Option<(Option<u32>, u64, Transaction)>
+ #[cfg(anchors)]
+ pub(crate) fn get_and_clear_pending_claim_events(&mut self) -> Vec<ClaimEvent> {
+ let mut ret = HashMap::new();
+ swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_claim_events);
+ ret.into_iter().map(|(_, event)| event).collect::<Vec<_>>()
+ }
+
+ /// Lightning security model (i.e being able to redeem/timeout HTLC or penalize counterparty
+ /// onchain) lays on the assumption of claim transactions getting confirmed before timelock
+ /// expiration (CSV or CLTV following cases). In case of high-fee spikes, claim tx may get stuck
+ /// in the mempool, so you need to bump its feerate quickly using Replace-By-Fee or
+ /// Child-Pay-For-Parent.
+ ///
+ /// Panics if there are signing errors, because signing operations in reaction to on-chain
+ /// events are not expected to fail, and if they do, we may lose funds.
+ fn generate_claim<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, cur_height: u32, cached_request: &PackageTemplate, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L) -> Option<(Option<u32>, u64, OnchainClaim)>
where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
{
- if cached_request.outpoints().len() == 0 { return None } // But don't prune pending claiming request yet, we may have to resurrect HTLCs
+ let request_outpoints = cached_request.outpoints();
+ if request_outpoints.is_empty() {
+ // Don't prune pending claiming request yet, we may have to resurrect HTLCs. Untractable
+ // packages cannot be aggregated and will never be split, so we cannot end up with an
+ // empty claim.
+ debug_assert!(cached_request.is_malleable());
+ return None;
+ }
+ // If we've seen transaction inclusion in the chain for all outpoints in our request, we
+ // don't need to continue generating more claims. We'll keep tracking the request to fully
+ // remove it once it reaches the confirmation threshold, or to generate a new claim if the
+ // transaction is reorged out.
+ let mut all_inputs_have_confirmed_spend = true;
+ for outpoint in &request_outpoints {
+ if let Some(first_claim_txid_height) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(outpoint) {
+ // We check for outpoint spends within claims individually rather than as a set
+ // since requests can have outpoints split off.
+ if !self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter()
+ .any(|event_entry| if let OnchainEvent::Claim { package_id } = event_entry.event {
+ first_claim_txid_height.0 == package_id
+ } else {
+ // The onchain event is not a claim, keep seeking until we find one.
+ false
+ })
+ {
+ // Either we had no `OnchainEvent::Claim`, or we did but none matched the
+ // outpoint's registered spend.
+ all_inputs_have_confirmed_spend = false;
+ }
+ } else {
+ // The request's outpoint spend does not exist yet.
+ all_inputs_have_confirmed_spend = false;
+ }
+ }
+ if all_inputs_have_confirmed_spend {
+ return None;
+ }
// Compute new height timer to decide when we need to regenerate a new bumped version of the claim tx (if we
// didn't receive confirmation of it before, or not enough reorg-safe depth on top of it).
let new_timer = Some(cached_request.get_height_timer(cur_height));
if cached_request.is_malleable() {
- let predicted_weight = cached_request.package_weight(&self.destination_script, self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
- if let Some((output_value, new_feerate)) =
- cached_request.compute_package_output(predicted_weight, self.destination_script.dust_value().as_sat(), fee_estimator, logger) {
+ #[cfg(anchors)]
+ { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
+ if cached_request.requires_external_funding() {
+ let target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight = cached_request
+ .compute_package_feerate(fee_estimator, ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority);
+ if let Some(htlcs) = cached_request.construct_malleable_package_with_external_funding(self) {
+ return Some((
+ new_timer,
+ target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight as u64,
+ OnchainClaim::Event(ClaimEvent::BumpHTLC {
+ target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
+ htlcs,
+ }),
+ ));
+ } else {
+ return None;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ let predicted_weight = cached_request.package_weight(&self.destination_script);
+ if let Some((output_value, new_feerate)) = cached_request.compute_package_output(
+ predicted_weight, self.destination_script.dust_value().to_sat(), fee_estimator, logger,
+ ) {
assert!(new_feerate != 0);
- let transaction = cached_request.finalize_package(self, output_value, self.destination_script.clone(), logger).unwrap();
+ let transaction = cached_request.finalize_malleable_package(self, output_value, self.destination_script.clone(), logger).unwrap();
log_trace!(logger, "...with timer {} and feerate {}", new_timer.unwrap(), new_feerate);
assert!(predicted_weight >= transaction.weight());
- return Some((new_timer, new_feerate, transaction))
+ return Some((new_timer, new_feerate, OnchainClaim::Tx(transaction)));
}
} else {
- // Note: Currently, amounts of holder outputs spending witnesses aren't used
- // as we can't malleate spending package to increase their feerate. This
- // should change with the remaining anchor output patchset.
- if let Some(transaction) = cached_request.finalize_package(self, 0, self.destination_script.clone(), logger) {
- return Some((None, 0, transaction));
+ // Untractable packages cannot have their fees bumped through Replace-By-Fee. Some
+ // packages may support fee bumping through Child-Pays-For-Parent, indicated by those
+ // which require external funding.
+ #[cfg(not(anchors))]
+ let inputs = cached_request.inputs();
+ #[cfg(anchors)]
+ let mut inputs = cached_request.inputs();
+ debug_assert_eq!(inputs.len(), 1);
+ let tx = match cached_request.finalize_untractable_package(self, logger) {
+ Some(tx) => tx,
+ None => return None,
+ };
+ if !cached_request.requires_external_funding() {
+ return Some((None, 0, OnchainClaim::Tx(tx)));
}
+ #[cfg(anchors)]
+ return inputs.find_map(|input| match input {
+ // Commitment inputs with anchors support are the only untractable inputs supported
+ // thus far that require external funding.
+ PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(..) => {
+ debug_assert_eq!(tx.txid(), self.holder_commitment.trust().txid(),
+ "Holder commitment transaction mismatch");
+ // We'll locate an anchor output we can spend within the commitment transaction.
+ let funding_pubkey = &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys.funding_pubkey;
+ match chan_utils::get_anchor_output(&tx, funding_pubkey) {
+ // An anchor output was found, so we should yield a funding event externally.
+ Some((idx, _)) => {
+ // TODO: Use a lower confirmation target when both our and the
+ // counterparty's latest commitment don't have any HTLCs present.
+ let conf_target = ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority;
+ let package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight = cached_request
+ .compute_package_feerate(fee_estimator, conf_target);
+ Some((
+ new_timer,
+ package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight as u64,
+ OnchainClaim::Event(ClaimEvent::BumpCommitment {
+ package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
+ commitment_tx: tx.clone(),
+ anchor_output_idx: idx,
+ }),
+ ))
+ },
+ // An anchor output was not found. There's nothing we can do other than
+ // attempt to broadcast the transaction with its current fee rate and hope
+ // it confirms. This is essentially the same behavior as a commitment
+ // transaction without anchor outputs.
+ None => Some((None, 0, OnchainClaim::Tx(tx.clone()))),
+ }
+ },
+ _ => {
+ debug_assert!(false, "Only HolderFundingOutput inputs should be untractable and require external funding");
+ None
+ },
+ })
}
None
}
/// Upon channelmonitor.block_connected(..) or upon provision of a preimage on the forward link
/// for this channel, provide new relevant on-chain transactions and/or new claim requests.
- /// Formerly this was named `block_connected`, but it is now also used for claiming an HTLC output
- /// if we receive a preimage after force-close.
- /// `conf_height` represents the height at which the transactions in `txn_matched` were
- /// confirmed. This does not need to equal the current blockchain tip height, which should be
- /// provided via `cur_height`, however it must never be higher than `cur_height`.
- pub(crate) fn update_claims_view<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], requests: Vec<PackageTemplate>, conf_height: u32, cur_height: u32, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
- where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
- F::Target: FeeEstimator,
- L::Target: Logger,
+ /// Together with `update_claims_view_from_matched_txn` this used to be named
+ /// `block_connected`, but it is now also used for claiming an HTLC output if we receive a
+ /// preimage after force-close.
+ ///
+ /// `conf_height` represents the height at which the request was generated. This
+ /// does not need to equal the current blockchain tip height, which should be provided via
+ /// `cur_height`, however it must never be higher than `cur_height`.
+ pub(crate) fn update_claims_view_from_requests<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
+ &mut self, requests: Vec<PackageTemplate>, conf_height: u32, cur_height: u32,
+ broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
+ ) where
+ B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
+ F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+ L::Target: Logger,
{
- log_debug!(logger, "Updating claims view at height {} with {} matched transactions in block {} and {} claim requests", cur_height, txn_matched.len(), conf_height, requests.len());
+ log_debug!(logger, "Updating claims view at height {} with {} claim requests", cur_height, requests.len());
let mut preprocessed_requests = Vec::with_capacity(requests.len());
let mut aggregated_request = None;
// Generate claim transactions and track them to bump if necessary at
// height timer expiration (i.e in how many blocks we're going to take action).
for mut req in preprocessed_requests {
- if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, tx)) = self.generate_claim_tx(cur_height, &req, &*fee_estimator, &*logger) {
+ if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, claim)) = self.generate_claim(cur_height, &req, &*fee_estimator, &*logger) {
req.set_timer(new_timer);
req.set_feerate(new_feerate);
- let txid = tx.txid();
+ let package_id = match claim {
+ OnchainClaim::Tx(tx) => {
+ log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
+ broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
+ tx.txid().into_inner()
+ },
+ #[cfg(anchors)]
+ OnchainClaim::Event(claim_event) => {
+ log_info!(logger, "Yielding onchain event to spend inputs {:?}", req.outpoints());
+ let package_id = match claim_event {
+ ClaimEvent::BumpCommitment { ref commitment_tx, .. } => commitment_tx.txid().into_inner(),
+ ClaimEvent::BumpHTLC { ref htlcs, .. } => {
+ // Use the same construction as a lightning channel id to generate
+ // the package id for this request based on the first HTLC. It
+ // doesn't matter what we use as long as it's unique per request.
+ let mut package_id = [0; 32];
+ package_id[..].copy_from_slice(&htlcs[0].commitment_txid[..]);
+ let htlc_output_index = htlcs[0].htlc.transaction_output_index.unwrap();
+ package_id[30] ^= ((htlc_output_index >> 8) & 0xff) as u8;
+ package_id[31] ^= ((htlc_output_index >> 0) & 0xff) as u8;
+ package_id
+ },
+ };
+ self.pending_claim_events.insert(package_id, claim_event);
+ package_id
+ },
+ };
for k in req.outpoints() {
log_info!(logger, "Registering claiming request for {}:{}", k.txid, k.vout);
- self.claimable_outpoints.insert(k.clone(), (txid, conf_height));
+ self.claimable_outpoints.insert(k.clone(), (package_id, conf_height));
}
- self.pending_claim_requests.insert(txid, req);
- log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
- broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
+ self.pending_claim_requests.insert(package_id, req);
}
}
+ }
+ /// Upon channelmonitor.block_connected(..) or upon provision of a preimage on the forward link
+ /// for this channel, provide new relevant on-chain transactions and/or new claim requests.
+ /// Together with `update_claims_view_from_requests` this used to be named `block_connected`,
+ /// but it is now also used for claiming an HTLC output if we receive a preimage after force-close.
+ ///
+ /// `conf_height` represents the height at which the transactions in `txn_matched` were
+ /// confirmed. This does not need to equal the current blockchain tip height, which should be
+ /// provided via `cur_height`, however it must never be higher than `cur_height`.
+ pub(crate) fn update_claims_view_from_matched_txn<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
+ &mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], conf_height: u32, conf_hash: BlockHash,
+ cur_height: u32, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
+ ) where
+ B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
+ F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+ L::Target: Logger,
+ {
+ log_debug!(logger, "Updating claims view at height {} with {} matched transactions in block {}", cur_height, txn_matched.len(), conf_height);
let mut bump_candidates = HashMap::new();
for tx in txn_matched {
// Scan all input to verify is one of the outpoint spent is of interest for us
//... we need to verify equality between transaction outpoints and claim request
// outpoints to know if transaction is the original claim or a bumped one issued
// by us.
- let mut set_equality = true;
- if request.outpoints().len() != tx.input.len() {
- set_equality = false;
- } else {
- for (claim_inp, tx_inp) in request.outpoints().iter().zip(tx.input.iter()) {
- if **claim_inp != tx_inp.previous_output {
- set_equality = false;
- }
+ let mut are_sets_equal = true;
+ let mut tx_inputs = tx.input.iter().map(|input| &input.previous_output).collect::<Vec<_>>();
+ tx_inputs.sort_unstable();
+ for request_input in request.outpoints() {
+ if tx_inputs.binary_search(&request_input).is_err() {
+ are_sets_equal = false;
+ break;
}
}
let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
txid: tx.txid(),
height: conf_height,
- event: OnchainEvent::Claim { claim_request: first_claim_txid_height.0.clone() }
+ block_hash: Some(conf_hash),
+ event: OnchainEvent::Claim { package_id: first_claim_txid_height.0 }
};
if !self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.contains(&entry) {
self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
// If this is our transaction (or our counterparty spent all the outputs
// before we could anyway with same inputs order than us), wait for
// ANTI_REORG_DELAY and clean the RBF tracking map.
- if set_equality {
+ if are_sets_equal {
clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay!();
} else { // If false, generate new claim request with update outpoint set
let mut at_least_one_drop = false;
let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
txid: tx.txid(),
height: conf_height,
+ block_hash: Some(conf_hash),
event: OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { package },
};
if !self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.contains(&entry) {
for entry in onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf {
if entry.has_reached_confirmation_threshold(cur_height) {
match entry.event {
- OnchainEvent::Claim { claim_request } => {
+ OnchainEvent::Claim { package_id } => {
// We may remove a whole set of claim outpoints here, as these one may have
// been aggregated in a single tx and claimed so atomically
- if let Some(request) = self.pending_claim_requests.remove(&claim_request) {
+ if let Some(request) = self.pending_claim_requests.remove(&package_id) {
for outpoint in request.outpoints() {
- log_debug!(logger, "Removing claim tracking for {} due to maturation of claim tx {}.", outpoint, claim_request);
+ log_debug!(logger, "Removing claim tracking for {} due to maturation of claim package {}.",
+ outpoint, log_bytes!(package_id));
self.claimable_outpoints.remove(&outpoint);
+ #[cfg(anchors)]
+ self.pending_claim_events.remove(&package_id);
}
}
},
// Build, bump and rebroadcast tx accordingly
log_trace!(logger, "Bumping {} candidates", bump_candidates.len());
for (first_claim_txid, request) in bump_candidates.iter() {
- if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_tx)) = self.generate_claim_tx(cur_height, &request, &*fee_estimator, &*logger) {
- log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting RBF-bumped onchain {}", log_tx!(bump_tx));
- broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&bump_tx);
+ if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_claim)) = self.generate_claim(cur_height, &request, &*fee_estimator, &*logger) {
+ match bump_claim {
+ OnchainClaim::Tx(bump_tx) => {
+ log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting RBF-bumped onchain {}", log_tx!(bump_tx));
+ broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&bump_tx);
+ },
+ #[cfg(anchors)]
+ OnchainClaim::Event(claim_event) => {
+ log_info!(logger, "Yielding RBF-bumped onchain event to spend inputs {:?}", request.outpoints());
+ self.pending_claim_events.insert(*first_claim_txid, claim_event);
+ },
+ }
if let Some(request) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(first_claim_txid) {
request.set_timer(new_timer);
request.set_feerate(new_feerate);
self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
}
}
- for (_, request) in bump_candidates.iter_mut() {
- if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_tx)) = self.generate_claim_tx(height, &request, fee_estimator, &&*logger) {
+ for (_first_claim_txid_height, request) in bump_candidates.iter_mut() {
+ if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_claim)) = self.generate_claim(height, &request, fee_estimator, &&*logger) {
request.set_timer(new_timer);
request.set_feerate(new_feerate);
- log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting onchain {}", log_tx!(bump_tx));
- broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&bump_tx);
+ match bump_claim {
+ OnchainClaim::Tx(bump_tx) => {
+ log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting onchain {}", log_tx!(bump_tx));
+ broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&bump_tx);
+ },
+ #[cfg(anchors)]
+ OnchainClaim::Event(claim_event) => {
+ log_info!(logger, "Yielding onchain event after reorg to spend inputs {:?}", request.outpoints());
+ self.pending_claim_events.insert(_first_claim_txid_height.0, claim_event);
+ },
+ }
}
}
for (ancestor_claim_txid, request) in bump_candidates.drain() {
}
}
- pub(crate) fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
- let mut txids: Vec<Txid> = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
+ pub(crate) fn is_output_spend_pending(&self, outpoint: &BitcoinOutPoint) -> bool {
+ self.claimable_outpoints.get(outpoint).is_some()
+ }
+
+ pub(crate) fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
+ let mut txids: Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
.iter()
- .map(|entry| entry.txid)
+ .map(|entry| (entry.txid, entry.block_hash))
.collect();
- txids.sort_unstable();
+ txids.sort_unstable_by_key(|(txid, _)| *txid);
txids.dedup();
txids
}
htlc_tx
}
+ #[cfg(anchors)]
+ pub(crate) fn generate_external_htlc_claim(
+ &self, outp: &::bitcoin::OutPoint, preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>
+ ) -> Option<ExternalHTLCClaim> {
+ let find_htlc = |holder_commitment: &HolderCommitmentTransaction| -> Option<ExternalHTLCClaim> {
+ let trusted_tx = holder_commitment.trust();
+ if outp.txid != trusted_tx.txid() {
+ return None;
+ }
+ trusted_tx.htlcs().iter().enumerate()
+ .find(|(_, htlc)| if let Some(output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
+ output_index == outp.vout
+ } else {
+ false
+ })
+ .map(|(htlc_idx, htlc)| {
+ let counterparty_htlc_sig = holder_commitment.counterparty_htlc_sigs[htlc_idx];
+ ExternalHTLCClaim {
+ commitment_txid: trusted_tx.txid(),
+ per_commitment_number: trusted_tx.commitment_number(),
+ htlc: htlc.clone(),
+ preimage: *preimage,
+ counterparty_sig: counterparty_htlc_sig,
+ }
+ })
+ };
+ // Check if the HTLC spends from the current holder commitment or the previous one otherwise.
+ find_htlc(&self.holder_commitment)
+ .or_else(|| self.prev_holder_commitment.as_ref().map(|c| find_htlc(c)).flatten())
+ }
+
pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
}
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff