use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
-use ln::PaymentPreimage;
-use ln::chan_utils::{TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
-use ln::chan_utils;
-use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
-use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, MIN_RELAY_FEE_SAT_PER_1000_WEIGHT};
-use chain::keysinterface::Sign;
-use chain::onchaintx::OnchainTxHandler;
-use util::byte_utils;
-use util::logger::Logger;
-use util::ser::{Readable, Writer, Writeable};
-
-use io;
-use prelude::*;
+use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
+use crate::ln::chan_utils::{TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
+use crate::ln::chan_utils;
+use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
+use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, MIN_RELAY_FEE_SAT_PER_1000_WEIGHT};
+use crate::chain::keysinterface::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
+#[cfg(anchors)]
+use crate::chain::onchaintx::ExternalHTLCClaim;
+use crate::chain::onchaintx::OnchainTxHandler;
+use crate::util::logger::Logger;
+use crate::util::ser::{Readable, Writer, Writeable};
+
+use crate::io;
+use crate::prelude::*;
use core::cmp;
+#[cfg(anchors)]
+use core::convert::TryInto;
use core::mem;
use core::ops::Deref;
use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, Witness};
counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
preimage: PaymentPreimage,
- htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment
+ htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment,
+ opt_anchors: Option<()>,
}
impl CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput {
- pub(crate) fn build(per_commitment_point: PublicKey, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey, counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey, preimage: PaymentPreimage, htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> Self {
+ pub(crate) fn build(per_commitment_point: PublicKey, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey, counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey, preimage: PaymentPreimage, htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment, opt_anchors: bool) -> Self {
CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput {
per_commitment_point,
counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
counterparty_htlc_base_key,
preimage,
- htlc
+ htlc,
+ opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
}
}
+
+ fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
+ self.opt_anchors.is_some()
+ }
}
impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput, {
(4, counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
(6, preimage, required),
(8, htlc, required),
+ (10, opt_anchors, option),
});
/// A struct to describe a HTLC output on a counterparty commitment transaction.
per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
- htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment
+ htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment,
+ opt_anchors: Option<()>,
}
impl CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput {
- pub(crate) fn build(per_commitment_point: PublicKey, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey, counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey, htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> Self {
+ pub(crate) fn build(per_commitment_point: PublicKey, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey, counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey, htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment, opt_anchors: bool) -> Self {
CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput {
per_commitment_point,
counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
counterparty_htlc_base_key,
- htlc
+ htlc,
+ opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
}
}
+
+ fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
+ self.opt_anchors.is_some()
+ }
}
impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput, {
(2, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
(4, counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
(6, htlc, required),
+ (8, opt_anchors, option),
});
/// A struct to describe a HTLC output on holder commitment transaction.
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub(crate) struct HolderHTLCOutput {
preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
- amount: u64,
+ amount_msat: u64,
/// Defaults to 0 for HTLC-Success transactions, which have no expiry
cltv_expiry: u32,
+ opt_anchors: Option<()>,
}
impl HolderHTLCOutput {
- pub(crate) fn build_offered(amount: u64, cltv_expiry: u32) -> Self {
+ pub(crate) fn build_offered(amount_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, opt_anchors: bool) -> Self {
HolderHTLCOutput {
preimage: None,
- amount,
+ amount_msat,
cltv_expiry,
+ opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None } ,
}
}
- pub(crate) fn build_accepted(preimage: PaymentPreimage, amount: u64) -> Self {
+ pub(crate) fn build_accepted(preimage: PaymentPreimage, amount_msat: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> Self {
HolderHTLCOutput {
preimage: Some(preimage),
- amount,
+ amount_msat,
cltv_expiry: 0,
+ opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None } ,
}
}
+
+ fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
+ self.opt_anchors.is_some()
+ }
}
impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HolderHTLCOutput, {
- (0, amount, required),
+ (0, amount_msat, required),
(2, cltv_expiry, required),
- (4, preimage, option)
+ (4, preimage, option),
+ (6, opt_anchors, option)
});
/// A struct to describe the channel output on the funding transaction.
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub(crate) struct HolderFundingOutput {
funding_redeemscript: Script,
+ funding_amount: Option<u64>,
+ opt_anchors: Option<()>,
}
+
impl HolderFundingOutput {
- pub(crate) fn build(funding_redeemscript: Script) -> Self {
+ pub(crate) fn build(funding_redeemscript: Script, funding_amount: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> Self {
HolderFundingOutput {
funding_redeemscript,
+ funding_amount: Some(funding_amount),
+ opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
}
}
+
+ fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
+ self.opt_anchors.is_some()
+ }
}
impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HolderFundingOutput, {
(0, funding_redeemscript, required),
+ (2, opt_anchors, option),
+ (3, funding_amount, option),
});
/// A wrapper encapsulating all in-protocol differing outputs types.
impl PackageSolvingData {
fn amount(&self) -> u64 {
let amt = match self {
- PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(ref outp) => { outp.amount },
- PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => { outp.amount },
- PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => { outp.htlc.amount_msat / 1000 },
- PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => { outp.htlc.amount_msat / 1000 },
- // Note: Currently, amounts of holder outputs spending witnesses aren't used
- // as we can't malleate spending package to increase their feerate. This
- // should change with the remaining anchor output patchset.
- PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(..) => { unreachable!() },
- PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(..) => { unreachable!() },
+ PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(ref outp) => outp.amount,
+ PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => outp.amount,
+ PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => outp.htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+ PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => outp.htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+ PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(ref outp) => {
+ debug_assert!(outp.opt_anchors());
+ outp.amount_msat / 1000
+ },
+ PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(ref outp) => {
+ debug_assert!(outp.opt_anchors());
+ outp.funding_amount.unwrap()
+ }
};
amt
}
- fn weight(&self, opt_anchors: bool) -> usize {
- let weight = match self {
- PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(ref outp) => { outp.weight as usize },
- PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => { outp.weight as usize },
- PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(..) => { weight_offered_htlc(opt_anchors) as usize },
- PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(..) => { weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors) as usize },
- // Note: Currently, weights of holder outputs spending witnesses aren't used
- // as we can't malleate spending package to increase their feerate. This
- // should change with the remaining anchor output patchset.
- PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(..) => { unreachable!() },
- PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(..) => { unreachable!() },
- };
- weight
+ fn weight(&self) -> usize {
+ match self {
+ PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(ref outp) => outp.weight as usize,
+ PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => outp.weight as usize,
+ PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => weight_offered_htlc(outp.opt_anchors()) as usize,
+ PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => weight_received_htlc(outp.opt_anchors()) as usize,
+ PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(ref outp) => {
+ debug_assert!(outp.opt_anchors());
+ if outp.preimage.is_none() {
+ weight_offered_htlc(true) as usize
+ } else {
+ weight_received_htlc(true) as usize
+ }
+ },
+ // Since HolderFundingOutput maps to an untractable package that is already signed, its
+ // weight can be determined from the transaction itself.
+ PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(..) => unreachable!(),
+ }
}
fn is_compatible(&self, input: &PackageSolvingData) -> bool {
match self {
_ => { mem::discriminant(self) == mem::discriminant(&input) }
}
}
- fn finalize_input<Signer: Sign>(&self, bumped_tx: &mut Transaction, i: usize, onchain_handler: &mut OnchainTxHandler<Signer>) -> bool {
+ fn finalize_input<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(&self, bumped_tx: &mut Transaction, i: usize, onchain_handler: &mut OnchainTxHandler<Signer>) -> bool {
match self {
PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(ref outp) => {
- if let Ok(chan_keys) = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&onchain_handler.secp_ctx, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &outp.counterparty_htlc_base_key, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint) {
- let witness_script = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&chan_keys.revocation_key, outp.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &chan_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key);
- //TODO: should we panic on signer failure ?
- if let Ok(sig) = onchain_handler.signer.sign_justice_revoked_output(&bumped_tx, i, outp.amount, &outp.per_commitment_key, &onchain_handler.secp_ctx) {
- let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
- ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
- bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(ser_sig);
- bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec!(1));
- bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
- } else { return false; }
- }
+ let chan_keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&onchain_handler.secp_ctx, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &outp.counterparty_htlc_base_key, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint);
+ let witness_script = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&chan_keys.revocation_key, outp.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &chan_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key);
+ //TODO: should we panic on signer failure ?
+ if let Ok(sig) = onchain_handler.signer.sign_justice_revoked_output(&bumped_tx, i, outp.amount, &outp.per_commitment_key, &onchain_handler.secp_ctx) {
+ let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
+ ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
+ bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(ser_sig);
+ bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec!(1));
+ bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
+ } else { return false; }
},
PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => {
- if let Ok(chan_keys) = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&onchain_handler.secp_ctx, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &outp.counterparty_htlc_base_key, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint) {
- let witness_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&outp.htlc, onchain_handler.opt_anchors(), &chan_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &chan_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &chan_keys.revocation_key);
- //TODO: should we panic on signer failure ?
- if let Ok(sig) = onchain_handler.signer.sign_justice_revoked_htlc(&bumped_tx, i, outp.amount, &outp.per_commitment_key, &outp.htlc, &onchain_handler.secp_ctx) {
- let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
- ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
- bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(ser_sig);
- bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(chan_keys.revocation_key.clone().serialize().to_vec());
- bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
- } else { return false; }
- }
+ let chan_keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&onchain_handler.secp_ctx, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &outp.counterparty_htlc_base_key, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint);
+ let witness_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&outp.htlc, onchain_handler.opt_anchors(), &chan_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &chan_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &chan_keys.revocation_key);
+ //TODO: should we panic on signer failure ?
+ if let Ok(sig) = onchain_handler.signer.sign_justice_revoked_htlc(&bumped_tx, i, outp.amount, &outp.per_commitment_key, &outp.htlc, &onchain_handler.secp_ctx) {
+ let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
+ ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
+ bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(ser_sig);
+ bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(chan_keys.revocation_key.clone().serialize().to_vec());
+ bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
+ } else { return false; }
},
PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => {
- if let Ok(chan_keys) = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&onchain_handler.secp_ctx, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &outp.counterparty_htlc_base_key, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint) {
- let witness_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&outp.htlc, onchain_handler.opt_anchors(), &chan_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &chan_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &chan_keys.revocation_key);
-
- if let Ok(sig) = onchain_handler.signer.sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(&bumped_tx, i, &outp.htlc.amount_msat / 1000, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.htlc, &onchain_handler.secp_ctx) {
- let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
- ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
- bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(ser_sig);
- bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(outp.preimage.0.to_vec());
- bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
- }
+ let chan_keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&onchain_handler.secp_ctx, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &outp.counterparty_htlc_base_key, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint);
+ let witness_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&outp.htlc, onchain_handler.opt_anchors(), &chan_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &chan_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &chan_keys.revocation_key);
+
+ if let Ok(sig) = onchain_handler.signer.sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(&bumped_tx, i, &outp.htlc.amount_msat / 1000, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.htlc, &onchain_handler.secp_ctx) {
+ let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
+ ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
+ bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(ser_sig);
+ bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(outp.preimage.0.to_vec());
+ bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
}
},
PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => {
- if let Ok(chan_keys) = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&onchain_handler.secp_ctx, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &outp.counterparty_htlc_base_key, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint) {
- let witness_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&outp.htlc, onchain_handler.opt_anchors(), &chan_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &chan_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &chan_keys.revocation_key);
-
- bumped_tx.lock_time = PackedLockTime(outp.htlc.cltv_expiry); // Right now we don't aggregate time-locked transaction, if we do we should set lock_time before to avoid breaking hash computation
- if let Ok(sig) = onchain_handler.signer.sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(&bumped_tx, i, &outp.htlc.amount_msat / 1000, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.htlc, &onchain_handler.secp_ctx) {
- let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
- ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
- bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(ser_sig);
- // Due to BIP146 (MINIMALIF) this must be a zero-length element to relay.
- bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec![]);
- bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
- }
+ let chan_keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&onchain_handler.secp_ctx, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &outp.counterparty_htlc_base_key, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint);
+ let witness_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&outp.htlc, onchain_handler.opt_anchors(), &chan_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &chan_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &chan_keys.revocation_key);
+
+ if let Ok(sig) = onchain_handler.signer.sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(&bumped_tx, i, &outp.htlc.amount_msat / 1000, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.htlc, &onchain_handler.secp_ctx) {
+ let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
+ ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
+ bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(ser_sig);
+ // Due to BIP146 (MINIMALIF) this must be a zero-length element to relay.
+ bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec![]);
+ bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
}
},
_ => { panic!("API Error!"); }
}
true
}
- fn get_finalized_tx<Signer: Sign>(&self, outpoint: &BitcoinOutPoint, onchain_handler: &mut OnchainTxHandler<Signer>) -> Option<Transaction> {
+ fn get_finalized_tx<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(&self, outpoint: &BitcoinOutPoint, onchain_handler: &mut OnchainTxHandler<Signer>) -> Option<Transaction> {
match self {
- PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(ref outp) => { return onchain_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(outpoint, &outp.preimage); }
- PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(ref outp) => { return Some(onchain_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&outp.funding_redeemscript)); }
+ PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(ref outp) => {
+ debug_assert!(!outp.opt_anchors());
+ return onchain_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(outpoint, &outp.preimage);
+ }
+ PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(ref outp) => {
+ return Some(onchain_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&outp.funding_redeemscript));
+ }
_ => { panic!("API Error!"); }
}
}
- fn absolute_tx_timelock(&self, output_conf_height: u32) -> u32 {
- // Get the absolute timelock at which this output can be spent given the height at which
- // this output was confirmed. We use `output_conf_height + 1` as a safe default as we can
- // be confirmed in the next block and transactions with time lock `current_height + 1`
- // always propagate.
+ fn absolute_tx_timelock(&self, current_height: u32) -> u32 {
+ // We use `current_height` as our default locktime to discourage fee sniping and because
+ // transactions with it always propagate.
let absolute_timelock = match self {
- PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(_) => output_conf_height + 1,
- PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(_) => output_conf_height + 1,
- PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(_) => output_conf_height + 1,
- PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => cmp::max(outp.htlc.cltv_expiry, output_conf_height + 1),
- PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(ref outp) => cmp::max(outp.cltv_expiry, output_conf_height + 1),
- PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(_) => output_conf_height + 1,
+ PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(_) => current_height,
+ PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(_) => current_height,
+ PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(_) => current_height,
+ PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => cmp::max(outp.htlc.cltv_expiry, current_height),
+ // HTLC timeout/success transactions rely on a fixed timelock due to the counterparty's
+ // signature.
+ PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(ref outp) => {
+ if outp.preimage.is_some() {
+ debug_assert_eq!(outp.cltv_expiry, 0);
+ }
+ outp.cltv_expiry
+ },
+ PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(_) => current_height,
};
absolute_timelock
}
feerate_previous: u64,
// Cache of next height at which fee-bumping and rebroadcast will be attempted. In
// the future, we might abstract it to an observed mempool fluctuation.
- height_timer: Option<u32>,
+ height_timer: u32,
// Confirmation height of the claimed outputs set transaction. In case of reorg reaching
// it, we wipe out and forget the package.
height_original: u32,
pub(crate) fn aggregable(&self) -> bool {
self.aggregable
}
+ pub(crate) fn previous_feerate(&self) -> u64 {
+ self.feerate_previous
+ }
pub(crate) fn set_feerate(&mut self, new_feerate: u64) {
self.feerate_previous = new_feerate;
}
- pub(crate) fn timer(&self) -> Option<u32> {
- if let Some(ref timer) = self.height_timer {
- return Some(*timer);
- }
- None
+ pub(crate) fn timer(&self) -> u32 {
+ self.height_timer
}
- pub(crate) fn set_timer(&mut self, new_timer: Option<u32>) {
+ pub(crate) fn set_timer(&mut self, new_timer: u32) {
self.height_timer = new_timer;
}
pub(crate) fn outpoints(&self) -> Vec<&BitcoinOutPoint> {
self.inputs.iter().map(|(o, _)| o).collect()
}
+ pub(crate) fn inputs(&self) -> impl ExactSizeIterator<Item = &PackageSolvingData> {
+ self.inputs.iter().map(|(_, i)| i)
+ }
pub(crate) fn split_package(&mut self, split_outp: &BitcoinOutPoint) -> Option<PackageTemplate> {
match self.malleability {
PackageMalleability::Malleable => {
}
/// Gets the amount of all outptus being spent by this package, only valid for malleable
/// packages.
- fn package_amount(&self) -> u64 {
+ pub(crate) fn package_amount(&self) -> u64 {
let mut amounts = 0;
for (_, outp) in self.inputs.iter() {
amounts += outp.amount();
}
amounts
}
- pub(crate) fn package_timelock(&self) -> u32 {
- self.inputs.iter().map(|(_, outp)| outp.absolute_tx_timelock(self.height_original))
- .max().expect("There must always be at least one output to spend in a PackageTemplate")
+ pub(crate) fn package_locktime(&self, current_height: u32) -> u32 {
+ let locktime = self.inputs.iter().map(|(_, outp)| outp.absolute_tx_timelock(current_height))
+ .max().expect("There must always be at least one output to spend in a PackageTemplate");
+
+ // If we ever try to aggregate a `HolderHTLCOutput`s with another output type, we'll likely
+ // end up with an incorrect transaction locktime since the counterparty has included it in
+ // its HTLC signature. This should never happen unless we decide to aggregate outputs across
+ // different channel commitments.
+ #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
+ if self.inputs.iter().any(|(_, outp)|
+ if let PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(outp) = outp {
+ outp.preimage.is_some()
+ } else {
+ false
+ }
+ ) {
+ debug_assert_eq!(locktime, 0);
+ };
+ for timeout_htlc_expiry in self.inputs.iter().filter_map(|(_, outp)|
+ if let PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(outp) = outp {
+ if outp.preimage.is_none() {
+ Some(outp.cltv_expiry)
+ } else { None }
+ } else { None }
+ ) {
+ debug_assert_eq!(locktime, timeout_htlc_expiry);
+ }
+ }
+
+ locktime
}
- pub(crate) fn package_weight(&self, destination_script: &Script, opt_anchors: bool) -> usize {
+ pub(crate) fn package_weight(&self, destination_script: &Script) -> usize {
let mut inputs_weight = 0;
let mut witnesses_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
for (_, outp) in self.inputs.iter() {
// previous_out_point: 36 bytes ; var_int: 1 byte ; sequence: 4 bytes
inputs_weight += 41 * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR;
- witnesses_weight += outp.weight(opt_anchors);
+ witnesses_weight += outp.weight();
}
// version: 4 bytes ; count_tx_in: 1 byte ; count_tx_out: 1 byte ; lock_time: 4 bytes
let transaction_weight = 10 * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR;
let output_weight = (8 + 1 + destination_script.len()) * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR;
inputs_weight + witnesses_weight + transaction_weight + output_weight
}
- pub(crate) fn finalize_package<L: Deref, Signer: Sign>(&self, onchain_handler: &mut OnchainTxHandler<Signer>, value: u64, destination_script: Script, logger: &L) -> Option<Transaction>
- where L::Target: Logger,
- {
- match self.malleability {
- PackageMalleability::Malleable => {
- let mut bumped_tx = Transaction {
- version: 2,
- lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
- input: vec![],
- output: vec![TxOut {
- script_pubkey: destination_script,
- value,
- }],
- };
- for (outpoint, _) in self.inputs.iter() {
- bumped_tx.input.push(TxIn {
- previous_output: *outpoint,
- script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
- witness: Witness::new(),
+ #[cfg(anchors)]
+ pub(crate) fn construct_malleable_package_with_external_funding<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(
+ &self, onchain_handler: &mut OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
+ ) -> Option<Vec<ExternalHTLCClaim>> {
+ debug_assert!(self.requires_external_funding());
+ let mut htlcs: Option<Vec<ExternalHTLCClaim>> = None;
+ for (previous_output, input) in &self.inputs {
+ match input {
+ PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(ref outp) => {
+ debug_assert!(outp.opt_anchors());
+ onchain_handler.generate_external_htlc_claim(&previous_output, &outp.preimage).map(|htlc| {
+ htlcs.get_or_insert_with(|| Vec::with_capacity(self.inputs.len())).push(htlc);
});
}
- for (i, (outpoint, out)) in self.inputs.iter().enumerate() {
- log_debug!(logger, "Adding claiming input for outpoint {}:{}", outpoint.txid, outpoint.vout);
- if !out.finalize_input(&mut bumped_tx, i, onchain_handler) { return None; }
- }
- log_debug!(logger, "Finalized transaction {} ready to broadcast", bumped_tx.txid());
- return Some(bumped_tx);
- },
- PackageMalleability::Untractable => {
- debug_assert_eq!(value, 0, "value is ignored for non-malleable packages, should be zero to ensure callsites are correct");
- if let Some((outpoint, outp)) = self.inputs.first() {
- if let Some(final_tx) = outp.get_finalized_tx(outpoint, onchain_handler) {
- log_debug!(logger, "Adding claiming input for outpoint {}:{}", outpoint.txid, outpoint.vout);
- log_debug!(logger, "Finalized transaction {} ready to broadcast", final_tx.txid());
- return Some(final_tx);
- }
- return None;
- } else { panic!("API Error: Package must not be inputs empty"); }
- },
+ _ => debug_assert!(false, "Expected HolderHTLCOutputs to not be aggregated with other input types"),
+ }
}
+ htlcs
+ }
+ pub(crate) fn finalize_malleable_package<L: Deref, Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(
+ &self, current_height: u32, onchain_handler: &mut OnchainTxHandler<Signer>, value: u64,
+ destination_script: Script, logger: &L
+ ) -> Option<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
+ debug_assert!(self.is_malleable());
+ let mut bumped_tx = Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: PackedLockTime(self.package_locktime(current_height)),
+ input: vec![],
+ output: vec![TxOut {
+ script_pubkey: destination_script,
+ value,
+ }],
+ };
+ for (outpoint, _) in self.inputs.iter() {
+ bumped_tx.input.push(TxIn {
+ previous_output: *outpoint,
+ script_sig: Script::new(),
+ sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
+ witness: Witness::new(),
+ });
+ }
+ for (i, (outpoint, out)) in self.inputs.iter().enumerate() {
+ log_debug!(logger, "Adding claiming input for outpoint {}:{}", outpoint.txid, outpoint.vout);
+ if !out.finalize_input(&mut bumped_tx, i, onchain_handler) { return None; }
+ }
+ log_debug!(logger, "Finalized transaction {} ready to broadcast", bumped_tx.txid());
+ Some(bumped_tx)
+ }
+ pub(crate) fn finalize_untractable_package<L: Deref, Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(
+ &self, onchain_handler: &mut OnchainTxHandler<Signer>, logger: &L,
+ ) -> Option<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
+ debug_assert!(!self.is_malleable());
+ if let Some((outpoint, outp)) = self.inputs.first() {
+ if let Some(final_tx) = outp.get_finalized_tx(outpoint, onchain_handler) {
+ log_debug!(logger, "Adding claiming input for outpoint {}:{}", outpoint.txid, outpoint.vout);
+ log_debug!(logger, "Finalized transaction {} ready to broadcast", final_tx.txid());
+ return Some(final_tx);
+ }
+ return None;
+ } else { panic!("API Error: Package must not be inputs empty"); }
}
/// In LN, output claimed are time-sensitive, which means we have to spend them before reaching some timelock expiration. At in-channel
/// output detection, we generate a first version of a claim tx and associate to it a height timer. A height timer is an absolute block
/// Returns value in satoshis to be included as package outgoing output amount and feerate
/// which was used to generate the value. Will not return less than `dust_limit_sats` for the
/// value.
- pub(crate) fn compute_package_output<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&self, predicted_weight: usize, dust_limit_sats: u64, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L) -> Option<(u64, u64)>
- where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
- L::Target: Logger,
+ pub(crate) fn compute_package_output<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
+ &self, predicted_weight: usize, dust_limit_sats: u64, force_feerate_bump: bool,
+ fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L,
+ ) -> Option<(u64, u64)>
+ where
+ F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+ L::Target: Logger,
{
debug_assert!(self.malleability == PackageMalleability::Malleable, "The package output is fixed for non-malleable packages");
let input_amounts = self.package_amount();
assert!(dust_limit_sats as i64 > 0, "Output script must be broadcastable/have a 'real' dust limit.");
// If old feerate is 0, first iteration of this claim, use normal fee calculation
if self.feerate_previous != 0 {
- if let Some((new_fee, feerate)) = feerate_bump(predicted_weight, input_amounts, self.feerate_previous, fee_estimator, logger) {
+ if let Some((new_fee, feerate)) = feerate_bump(
+ predicted_weight, input_amounts, self.feerate_previous, force_feerate_bump,
+ fee_estimator, logger,
+ ) {
return Some((cmp::max(input_amounts as i64 - new_fee as i64, dust_limit_sats as i64) as u64, feerate));
}
} else {
}
None
}
+
+ #[cfg(anchors)]
+ /// Computes a feerate based on the given confirmation target. If a previous feerate was used,
+ /// the new feerate is below it, and `force_feerate_bump` is set, we'll use a 25% increase of
+ /// the previous feerate instead of the new feerate.
+ pub(crate) fn compute_package_feerate<F: Deref>(
+ &self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, conf_target: ConfirmationTarget,
+ force_feerate_bump: bool,
+ ) -> u32 where F::Target: FeeEstimator {
+ let feerate_estimate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(conf_target);
+ if self.feerate_previous != 0 {
+ // If old feerate inferior to actual one given back by Fee Estimator, use it to compute new fee...
+ if feerate_estimate as u64 > self.feerate_previous {
+ feerate_estimate
+ } else if !force_feerate_bump {
+ self.feerate_previous.try_into().unwrap_or(u32::max_value())
+ } else {
+ // ...else just increase the previous feerate by 25% (because that's a nice number)
+ (self.feerate_previous + (self.feerate_previous / 4)).try_into().unwrap_or(u32::max_value())
+ }
+ } else {
+ feerate_estimate
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Determines whether a package contains an input which must have additional external inputs
+ /// attached to help the spending transaction reach confirmation.
+ pub(crate) fn requires_external_funding(&self) -> bool {
+ self.inputs.iter().find(|input| match input.1 {
+ PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(ref outp) => outp.opt_anchors(),
+ PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(ref outp) => outp.opt_anchors(),
+ _ => false,
+ }).is_some()
+ }
+
pub (crate) fn build_package(txid: Txid, vout: u32, input_solving_data: PackageSolvingData, soonest_conf_deadline: u32, aggregable: bool, height_original: u32) -> Self {
let malleability = match input_solving_data {
- PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(..) => { PackageMalleability::Malleable },
- PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(..) => { PackageMalleability::Malleable },
- PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(..) => { PackageMalleability::Malleable },
- PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(..) => { PackageMalleability::Malleable },
- PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(..) => { PackageMalleability::Untractable },
- PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(..) => { PackageMalleability::Untractable },
+ PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(..) => PackageMalleability::Malleable,
+ PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(..) => PackageMalleability::Malleable,
+ PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(..) => PackageMalleability::Malleable,
+ PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(..) => PackageMalleability::Malleable,
+ PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(ref outp) => if outp.opt_anchors() {
+ PackageMalleability::Malleable
+ } else {
+ PackageMalleability::Untractable
+ },
+ PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(..) => PackageMalleability::Untractable,
};
let mut inputs = Vec::with_capacity(1);
inputs.push((BitcoinOutPoint { txid, vout }, input_solving_data));
soonest_conf_deadline,
aggregable,
feerate_previous: 0,
- height_timer: None,
+ height_timer: height_original,
height_original,
}
}
impl Writeable for PackageTemplate {
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.inputs.len() as u64))?;
+ writer.write_all(&(self.inputs.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
for (ref outpoint, ref rev_outp) in self.inputs.iter() {
outpoint.write(writer)?;
rev_outp.write(writer)?;
(0, self.soonest_conf_deadline, required),
(2, self.feerate_previous, required),
(4, self.height_original, required),
- (6, self.height_timer, option)
+ (6, self.height_timer, required)
});
Ok(())
}
PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(..) => { (PackageMalleability::Malleable, true) },
PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(..) => { (PackageMalleability::Malleable, true) },
PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(..) => { (PackageMalleability::Malleable, false) },
- PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(..) => { (PackageMalleability::Untractable, false) },
+ PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(ref outp) => if outp.opt_anchors() {
+ (PackageMalleability::Malleable, outp.preimage.is_some())
+ } else {
+ (PackageMalleability::Untractable, false)
+ },
PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(..) => { (PackageMalleability::Untractable, false) },
}
} else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); };
(4, height_original, required),
(6, height_timer, option),
});
+ if height_timer.is_none() {
+ height_timer = Some(height_original);
+ }
Ok(PackageTemplate {
inputs,
malleability,
soonest_conf_deadline,
aggregable,
feerate_previous,
- height_timer,
+ height_timer: height_timer.unwrap(),
height_original,
})
}
/// Attempt to propose a bumping fee for a transaction from its spent output's values and predicted
/// weight. If feerates proposed by the fee-estimator have been increasing since last fee-bumping
-/// attempt, use them. Otherwise, blindly bump the feerate by 25% of the previous feerate. We also
-/// verify that those bumping heuristics respect BIP125 rules 3) and 4) and if required adjust
-/// the new fee to meet the RBF policy requirement.
-fn feerate_bump<F: Deref, L: Deref>(predicted_weight: usize, input_amounts: u64, previous_feerate: u64, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L) -> Option<(u64, u64)>
- where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
- L::Target: Logger,
+/// attempt, use them. If `force_feerate_bump` is set, we bump the feerate by 25% of the previous
+/// feerate, or just use the previous feerate otherwise. If a feerate bump did happen, we also
+/// verify that those bumping heuristics respect BIP125 rules 3) and 4) and if required adjust the
+/// new fee to meet the RBF policy requirement.
+fn feerate_bump<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
+ predicted_weight: usize, input_amounts: u64, previous_feerate: u64, force_feerate_bump: bool,
+ fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L,
+) -> Option<(u64, u64)>
+where
+ F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+ L::Target: Logger,
{
// If old feerate inferior to actual one given back by Fee Estimator, use it to compute new fee...
- let new_fee = if let Some((new_fee, _)) = compute_fee_from_spent_amounts(input_amounts, predicted_weight, fee_estimator, logger) {
- let updated_feerate = new_fee / (predicted_weight as u64 * 1000);
- if updated_feerate > previous_feerate {
- new_fee
+ let (new_fee, new_feerate) = if let Some((new_fee, new_feerate)) = compute_fee_from_spent_amounts(input_amounts, predicted_weight, fee_estimator, logger) {
+ if new_feerate > previous_feerate {
+ (new_fee, new_feerate)
+ } else if !force_feerate_bump {
+ let previous_fee = previous_feerate * (predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
+ (previous_fee, previous_feerate)
} else {
// ...else just increase the previous feerate by 25% (because that's a nice number)
- let new_fee = previous_feerate * (predicted_weight as u64) / 750;
- if input_amounts <= new_fee {
+ let bumped_feerate = previous_feerate + (previous_feerate / 4);
+ let bumped_fee = bumped_feerate * (predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
+ if input_amounts <= bumped_fee {
log_warn!(logger, "Can't 25% bump new claiming tx, amount {} is too small", input_amounts);
return None;
}
- new_fee
+ (bumped_fee, bumped_feerate)
}
} else {
log_warn!(logger, "Can't new-estimation bump new claiming tx, amount {} is too small", input_amounts);
return None;
};
+ // Our feerates should never decrease. If it hasn't changed though, we just need to
+ // rebroadcast/re-sign the previous claim.
+ debug_assert!(new_feerate >= previous_feerate);
+ if new_feerate == previous_feerate {
+ return Some((new_fee, new_feerate));
+ }
+
let previous_fee = previous_feerate * (predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
let min_relay_fee = MIN_RELAY_FEE_SAT_PER_1000_WEIGHT * (predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
// BIP 125 Opt-in Full Replace-by-Fee Signaling
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
- use chain::package::{CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput, CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput, HolderHTLCOutput, PackageTemplate, PackageSolvingData, RevokedOutput, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT, weight_offered_htlc, weight_received_htlc};
- use chain::Txid;
- use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
- use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
+ use crate::chain::package::{CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput, CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput, HolderHTLCOutput, PackageTemplate, PackageSolvingData, RevokedOutput, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT, weight_offered_htlc, weight_received_htlc};
+ use crate::chain::Txid;
+ use crate::ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
+ use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR;
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
}
macro_rules! dumb_counterparty_output {
- ($secp_ctx: expr, $amt: expr) => {
+ ($secp_ctx: expr, $amt: expr, $opt_anchors: expr) => {
{
let dumb_scalar = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
let dumb_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&$secp_ctx, &dumb_scalar);
let hash = PaymentHash([1; 32]);
let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment { offered: true, amount_msat: $amt, cltv_expiry: 0, payment_hash: hash, transaction_output_index: None };
- PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(dumb_point, dumb_point, dumb_point, htlc))
+ PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(dumb_point, dumb_point, dumb_point, htlc, $opt_anchors))
}
}
}
macro_rules! dumb_counterparty_offered_output {
- ($secp_ctx: expr, $amt: expr) => {
+ ($secp_ctx: expr, $amt: expr, $opt_anchors: expr) => {
{
let dumb_scalar = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
let dumb_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&$secp_ctx, &dumb_scalar);
let hash = PaymentHash([1; 32]);
let preimage = PaymentPreimage([2;32]);
let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment { offered: false, amount_msat: $amt, cltv_expiry: 1000, payment_hash: hash, transaction_output_index: None };
- PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(dumb_point, dumb_point, dumb_point, preimage, htlc))
+ PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(dumb_point, dumb_point, dumb_point, preimage, htlc, $opt_anchors))
}
}
}
() => {
{
let preimage = PaymentPreimage([2;32]);
- PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(HolderHTLCOutput::build_accepted(preimage, 0))
+ PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(HolderHTLCOutput::build_accepted(preimage, 0, false))
}
}
}
let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let revk_outp = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
- let counterparty_outp = dumb_counterparty_output!(secp_ctx, 0);
+ let counterparty_outp = dumb_counterparty_output!(secp_ctx, 0, false);
let mut revoked_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, revk_outp, 1000, true, 100);
let counterparty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 1, counterparty_outp, 1000, true, 100);
let revk_outp = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
let mut package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, revk_outp, 1000, true, 100);
- let timer_none = package.timer();
- assert!(timer_none.is_none());
- package.set_timer(Some(100));
- if let Some(timer_some) = package.timer() {
- assert_eq!(timer_some, 100);
- } else { panic!() }
+ assert_eq!(package.timer(), 100);
+ package.set_timer(101);
+ assert_eq!(package.timer(), 101);
}
#[test]
fn test_package_amounts() {
let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let counterparty_outp = dumb_counterparty_output!(secp_ctx, 1_000_000);
+ let counterparty_outp = dumb_counterparty_output!(secp_ctx, 1_000_000, false);
let package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, counterparty_outp, 1000, true, 100);
assert_eq!(package.package_amount(), 1000);
{
let revk_outp = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
let package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, revk_outp, 0, true, 100);
- for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
- assert_eq!(package.package_weight(&Script::new(), opt_anchors), weight_sans_output + WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT as usize);
- }
+ assert_eq!(package.package_weight(&Script::new()), weight_sans_output + WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT as usize);
}
{
- let counterparty_outp = dumb_counterparty_output!(secp_ctx, 1_000_000);
- let package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, counterparty_outp, 1000, true, 100);
for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
- assert_eq!(package.package_weight(&Script::new(), opt_anchors), weight_sans_output + weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors) as usize);
+ let counterparty_outp = dumb_counterparty_output!(secp_ctx, 1_000_000, opt_anchors);
+ let package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, counterparty_outp, 1000, true, 100);
+ assert_eq!(package.package_weight(&Script::new()), weight_sans_output + weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors) as usize);
}
}
{
- let counterparty_outp = dumb_counterparty_offered_output!(secp_ctx, 1_000_000);
- let package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, counterparty_outp, 1000, true, 100);
for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
- assert_eq!(package.package_weight(&Script::new(), opt_anchors), weight_sans_output + weight_offered_htlc(opt_anchors) as usize);
+ let counterparty_outp = dumb_counterparty_offered_output!(secp_ctx, 1_000_000, opt_anchors);
+ let package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, counterparty_outp, 1000, true, 100);
+ assert_eq!(package.package_weight(&Script::new()), weight_sans_output + weight_offered_htlc(opt_anchors) as usize);
}
}
}
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff