use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
-use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,OutPoint,Transaction, SigHashType};
-use bitcoin::util::bip143;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,OutPoint,Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
+use bitcoin::util::sighash;
+use bitcoin::util::address::Payload;
use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use bitcoin::hashes::ripemd160::Hash as Ripemd160;
use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, PubkeyHash};
-use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
-use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
-use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable, Writer};
-use util::{byte_utils, transaction_utils};
+use crate::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
+use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
+use crate::util::ser::{Readable, Writeable, Writer};
+use crate::util::{byte_utils, transaction_utils};
-use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature, Message};
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::Error as SecpError;
-use bitcoin::secp256k1;
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey, Scalar};
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature, Message};
+use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, secp256k1, Sequence, Witness};
+use bitcoin::PublicKey as BitcoinPublicKey;
-use io;
-use prelude::*;
+use crate::io;
+use crate::prelude::*;
use core::cmp;
-use ln::chan_utils;
-use util::transaction_utils::sort_outputs;
-use ln::channel::{INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI};
+use crate::ln::chan_utils;
+use crate::util::transaction_utils::sort_outputs;
+use crate::ln::channel::{INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI};
use core::ops::Deref;
-use chain;
-use util::crypto::sign;
-
-pub(crate) const MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 483;
+use crate::chain;
+use crate::util::crypto::sign;
+
+/// Maximum number of one-way in-flight HTLC (protocol-level value).
+pub const MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 483;
+/// The weight of a BIP141 witnessScript for a BOLT3's "offered HTLC output" on a commitment transaction, non-anchor variant.
+pub const OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT: usize = 133;
+/// The weight of a BIP141 witnessScript for a BOLT3's "offered HTLC output" on a commitment transaction, anchor variant.
+pub const OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT_ANCHORS: usize = 136;
+
+/// The weight of a BIP141 witnessScript for a BOLT3's "received HTLC output" can vary in function of its CLTV argument value.
+/// We define a range that encompasses both its non-anchors and anchors variants.
+pub(crate) const MIN_ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT: usize = 136;
+/// The weight of a BIP141 witnessScript for a BOLT3's "received HTLC output" can vary in function of its CLTV argument value.
+/// We define a range that encompasses both its non-anchors and anchors variants.
+/// This is the maximum post-anchor value.
+pub const MAX_ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT: usize = 143;
/// Gets the weight for an HTLC-Success transaction.
#[inline]
if opt_anchors { HTLC_TIMEOUT_ANCHOR_TX_WEIGHT } else { HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT }
}
-#[derive(PartialEq)]
-pub(crate) enum HTLCType {
- AcceptedHTLC,
- OfferedHTLC
+/// Describes the type of HTLC claim as determined by analyzing the witness.
+#[derive(PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum HTLCClaim {
+ /// Claims an offered output on a commitment transaction through the timeout path.
+ OfferedTimeout,
+ /// Claims an offered output on a commitment transaction through the success path.
+ OfferedPreimage,
+ /// Claims an accepted output on a commitment transaction through the timeout path.
+ AcceptedTimeout,
+ /// Claims an accepted output on a commitment transaction through the success path.
+ AcceptedPreimage,
+ /// Claims an offered/accepted output on a commitment transaction through the revocation path.
+ Revocation,
}
-impl HTLCType {
- /// Check if a given tx witnessScript len matchs one of a pre-signed HTLC
- pub(crate) fn scriptlen_to_htlctype(witness_script_len: usize) -> Option<HTLCType> {
- if witness_script_len == 133 {
- Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC)
- } else if witness_script_len >= 136 && witness_script_len <= 139 {
- Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC)
+impl HTLCClaim {
+ /// Check if a given input witness attempts to claim a HTLC.
+ pub fn from_witness(witness: &Witness) -> Option<Self> {
+ debug_assert_eq!(OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT_ANCHORS, MIN_ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ if witness.len() < 2 {
+ return None;
+ }
+ let witness_script = witness.last().unwrap();
+ let second_to_last = witness.second_to_last().unwrap();
+ if witness_script.len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT {
+ if witness.len() == 3 && second_to_last.len() == 33 {
+ // <revocation sig> <revocationpubkey> <witness_script>
+ Some(Self::Revocation)
+ } else if witness.len() == 3 && second_to_last.len() == 32 {
+ // <remotehtlcsig> <payment_preimage> <witness_script>
+ Some(Self::OfferedPreimage)
+ } else if witness.len() == 5 && second_to_last.len() == 0 {
+ // 0 <remotehtlcsig> <localhtlcsig> <> <witness_script>
+ Some(Self::OfferedTimeout)
+ } else {
+ None
+ }
+ } else if witness_script.len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT_ANCHORS {
+ // It's possible for the weight of `offered_htlc_script` and `accepted_htlc_script` to
+ // match so we check for both here.
+ if witness.len() == 3 && second_to_last.len() == 33 {
+ // <revocation sig> <revocationpubkey> <witness_script>
+ Some(Self::Revocation)
+ } else if witness.len() == 3 && second_to_last.len() == 32 {
+ // <remotehtlcsig> <payment_preimage> <witness_script>
+ Some(Self::OfferedPreimage)
+ } else if witness.len() == 5 && second_to_last.len() == 0 {
+ // 0 <remotehtlcsig> <localhtlcsig> <> <witness_script>
+ Some(Self::OfferedTimeout)
+ } else if witness.len() == 3 && second_to_last.len() == 0 {
+ // <remotehtlcsig> <> <witness_script>
+ Some(Self::AcceptedTimeout)
+ } else if witness.len() == 5 && second_to_last.len() == 32 {
+ // 0 <remotehtlcsig> <localhtlcsig> <payment_preimage> <witness_script>
+ Some(Self::AcceptedPreimage)
+ } else {
+ None
+ }
+ } else if witness_script.len() > MIN_ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT &&
+ witness_script.len() <= MAX_ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT {
+ // Handle remaining range of ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
+ if witness.len() == 3 && second_to_last.len() == 33 {
+ // <revocation sig> <revocationpubkey> <witness_script>
+ Some(Self::Revocation)
+ } else if witness.len() == 3 && second_to_last.len() == 0 {
+ // <remotehtlcsig> <> <witness_script>
+ Some(Self::AcceptedTimeout)
+ } else if witness.len() == 5 && second_to_last.len() == 32 {
+ // 0 <remotehtlcsig> <localhtlcsig> <payment_preimage> <witness_script>
+ Some(Self::AcceptedPreimage)
+ } else {
+ None
+ }
} else {
None
}
ins.push(TxIn {
previous_output: funding_outpoint,
script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: 0xffffffff,
- witness: Vec::new(),
+ sequence: Sequence::MAX,
+ witness: Witness::new(),
});
ins
};
Transaction {
version: 2,
- lock_time: 0,
+ lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
input: txins,
output: outputs,
}
}
/// Implements the per-commitment secret storage scheme from
-/// [BOLT 3](https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/dcbf8583976df087c79c3ce0b535311212e6812d/03-transactions.md#efficient-per-commitment-secret-storage).
+/// [BOLT 3](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/dcbf8583976df087c79c3ce0b535311212e6812d/03-transactions.md#efficient-per-commitment-secret-storage).
///
/// Allows us to keep track of all of the revocation secrets of our counterparty in just 50*32 bytes
/// or so.
old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
}
+impl Eq for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {}
impl PartialEq for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
/// Derives a per-commitment-transaction private key (eg an htlc key or delayed_payment key)
/// from the base secret and the per_commitment_point.
-///
-/// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
-/// generated (ie our own).
-pub fn derive_private_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, SecpError> {
+pub fn derive_private_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_secret: &SecretKey) -> SecretKey {
let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
sha.input(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret).serialize());
let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
- let mut key = base_secret.clone();
- key.add_assign(&res)?;
- Ok(key)
+ base_secret.clone().add_tweak(&Scalar::from_be_bytes(res).unwrap())
+ .expect("Addition only fails if the tweak is the inverse of the key. This is not possible when the tweak contains the hash of the key.")
}
/// Derives a per-commitment-transaction public key (eg an htlc key or a delayed_payment key)
/// from the base point and the per_commitment_key. This is the public equivalent of
/// derive_private_key - using only public keys to derive a public key instead of private keys.
-///
-/// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
-/// generated (ie our own).
-pub fn derive_public_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, SecpError> {
+pub fn derive_public_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_point: &PublicKey) -> PublicKey {
let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
sha.input(&base_point.serialize());
let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
- let hashkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&res)?);
+ let hashkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx,
+ &SecretKey::from_slice(&res).expect("Hashes should always be valid keys unless SHA-256 is broken"));
base_point.combine(&hashkey)
+ .expect("Addition only fails if the tweak is the inverse of the key. This is not possible when the tweak contains the hash of the key.")
}
/// Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation key from its constituent parts.
///
-/// Only the cheating participant owns a valid witness to propagate a revoked
+/// Only the cheating participant owns a valid witness to propagate a revoked
/// commitment transaction, thus per_commitment_secret always come from cheater
/// and revocation_base_secret always come from punisher, which is the broadcaster
/// of the transaction spending with this key knowledge.
-///
-/// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
-/// generated (ie our own).
-pub fn derive_private_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_secret: &SecretKey, countersignatory_revocation_base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, SecpError> {
+pub fn derive_private_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>,
+ per_commitment_secret: &SecretKey, countersignatory_revocation_base_secret: &SecretKey)
+-> SecretKey {
let countersignatory_revocation_base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &countersignatory_revocation_base_secret);
let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
};
- let mut countersignatory_contrib = countersignatory_revocation_base_secret.clone();
- countersignatory_contrib.mul_assign(&rev_append_commit_hash_key)?;
- let mut broadcaster_contrib = per_commitment_secret.clone();
- broadcaster_contrib.mul_assign(&commit_append_rev_hash_key)?;
- countersignatory_contrib.add_assign(&broadcaster_contrib[..])?;
- Ok(countersignatory_contrib)
+ let countersignatory_contrib = countersignatory_revocation_base_secret.clone().mul_tweak(&Scalar::from_be_bytes(rev_append_commit_hash_key).unwrap())
+ .expect("Multiplying a secret key by a hash is expected to never fail per secp256k1 docs");
+ let broadcaster_contrib = per_commitment_secret.clone().mul_tweak(&Scalar::from_be_bytes(commit_append_rev_hash_key).unwrap())
+ .expect("Multiplying a secret key by a hash is expected to never fail per secp256k1 docs");
+ countersignatory_contrib.add_tweak(&Scalar::from_be_bytes(broadcaster_contrib.secret_bytes()).unwrap())
+ .expect("Addition only fails if the tweak is the inverse of the key. This is not possible when the tweak commits to the key.")
}
/// Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation public key from its constituent parts. This is
/// the public equivalend of derive_private_revocation_key - using only public keys to derive a
/// public key instead of private keys.
///
-/// Only the cheating participant owns a valid witness to propagate a revoked
+/// Only the cheating participant owns a valid witness to propagate a revoked
/// commitment transaction, thus per_commitment_point always come from cheater
/// and revocation_base_point always come from punisher, which is the broadcaster
/// of the transaction spending with this key knowledge.
///
/// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
/// generated (ie our own).
-pub fn derive_public_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, countersignatory_revocation_base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, SecpError> {
+pub fn derive_public_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>,
+ per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, countersignatory_revocation_base_point: &PublicKey)
+-> PublicKey {
let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
sha.input(&countersignatory_revocation_base_point.serialize());
Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
};
- let mut countersignatory_contrib = countersignatory_revocation_base_point.clone();
- countersignatory_contrib.mul_assign(&secp_ctx, &rev_append_commit_hash_key)?;
- let mut broadcaster_contrib = per_commitment_point.clone();
- broadcaster_contrib.mul_assign(&secp_ctx, &commit_append_rev_hash_key)?;
+ let countersignatory_contrib = countersignatory_revocation_base_point.clone().mul_tweak(&secp_ctx, &Scalar::from_be_bytes(rev_append_commit_hash_key).unwrap())
+ .expect("Multiplying a valid public key by a hash is expected to never fail per secp256k1 docs");
+ let broadcaster_contrib = per_commitment_point.clone().mul_tweak(&secp_ctx, &Scalar::from_be_bytes(commit_append_rev_hash_key).unwrap())
+ .expect("Multiplying a valid public key by a hash is expected to never fail per secp256k1 docs");
countersignatory_contrib.combine(&broadcaster_contrib)
+ .expect("Addition only fails if the tweak is the inverse of the key. This is not possible when the tweak commits to the key.")
}
/// The set of public keys which are used in the creation of one commitment transaction.
/// channel basepoints via the new function, or they were obtained via
/// CommitmentTransaction.trust().keys() because we trusted the source of the
/// pre-calculated keys.
-#[derive(PartialEq, Clone)]
+#[derive(PartialEq, Eq, Clone)]
pub struct TxCreationKeys {
/// The broadcaster's per-commitment public key which was used to derive the other keys.
pub per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
});
/// One counterparty's public keys which do not change over the life of a channel.
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ChannelPublicKeys {
/// The public key which is used to sign all commitment transactions, as it appears in the
/// on-chain channel lock-in 2-of-2 multisig output.
impl TxCreationKeys {
/// Create per-state keys from channel base points and the per-commitment point.
/// Key set is asymmetric and can't be used as part of counter-signatory set of transactions.
- pub fn derive_new<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, broadcaster_delayed_payment_base: &PublicKey, broadcaster_htlc_base: &PublicKey, countersignatory_revocation_base: &PublicKey, countersignatory_htlc_base: &PublicKey) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, SecpError> {
- Ok(TxCreationKeys {
+ pub fn derive_new<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, broadcaster_delayed_payment_base: &PublicKey, broadcaster_htlc_base: &PublicKey, countersignatory_revocation_base: &PublicKey, countersignatory_htlc_base: &PublicKey) -> TxCreationKeys {
+ TxCreationKeys {
per_commitment_point: per_commitment_point.clone(),
- revocation_key: derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &countersignatory_revocation_base)?,
- broadcaster_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &broadcaster_htlc_base)?,
- countersignatory_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &countersignatory_htlc_base)?,
- broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &broadcaster_delayed_payment_base)?,
- })
+ revocation_key: derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &countersignatory_revocation_base),
+ broadcaster_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &broadcaster_htlc_base),
+ countersignatory_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &countersignatory_htlc_base),
+ broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &broadcaster_delayed_payment_base),
+ }
}
/// Generate per-state keys from channel static keys.
/// Key set is asymmetric and can't be used as part of counter-signatory set of transactions.
- pub fn from_channel_static_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, broadcaster_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, countersignatory_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, SecpError> {
+ pub fn from_channel_static_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, broadcaster_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, countersignatory_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> TxCreationKeys {
TxCreationKeys::derive_new(
&secp_ctx,
&per_commitment_point,
res
}
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
/// Information about an HTLC as it appears in a commitment transaction
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct HTLCOutputInCommitment {
/// Whether the HTLC was "offered" (ie outbound in relation to this commitment transaction).
/// Note that this is not the same as whether it is ountbound *from us*. To determine that you
///
/// Panics if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() (as such HTLCs do not appear in the
/// commitment transaction).
-pub fn build_htlc_transaction(commitment_txid: &Txid, feerate_per_kw: u32, contest_delay: u16, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, opt_anchors: bool, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Transaction {
+pub fn build_htlc_transaction(commitment_txid: &Txid, feerate_per_kw: u32, contest_delay: u16, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, opt_anchors: bool, use_non_zero_fee_anchors: bool, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Transaction {
let mut txins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
txins.push(TxIn {
previous_output: OutPoint {
vout: htlc.transaction_output_index.expect("Can't build an HTLC transaction for a dust output"),
},
script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: if opt_anchors { 1 } else { 0 },
- witness: Vec::new(),
+ sequence: Sequence(if opt_anchors { 1 } else { 0 }),
+ witness: Witness::new(),
});
let weight = if htlc.offered {
} else {
htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors)
};
- let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * weight / 1000;
+ let output_value = if opt_anchors && !use_non_zero_fee_anchors {
+ htlc.amount_msat / 1000
+ } else {
+ let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * weight / 1000;
+ htlc.amount_msat / 1000 - total_fee
+ };
let mut txouts: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
txouts.push(TxOut {
script_pubkey: get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key, contest_delay, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(),
- value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 - total_fee //TODO: BOLT 3 does not specify if we should add amount_msat before dividing or if we should divide by 1000 before subtracting (as we do here)
+ value: output_value,
});
Transaction {
version: 2,
- lock_time: if htlc.offered { htlc.cltv_expiry } else { 0 },
+ lock_time: PackedLockTime(if htlc.offered { htlc.cltv_expiry } else { 0 }),
input: txins,
output: txouts,
}
/// Gets the witnessScript for the to_remote output when anchors are enabled.
#[inline]
-pub(crate) fn get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript(payment_point: &PublicKey) -> Script {
+pub fn get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript(payment_point: &PublicKey) -> Script {
Builder::new()
.push_slice(&payment_point.serialize()[..])
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY)
.into_script()
}
+#[cfg(anchors)]
+/// Locates the output with an anchor script paying to `funding_pubkey` within `commitment_tx`.
+pub(crate) fn get_anchor_output<'a>(commitment_tx: &'a Transaction, funding_pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Option<(u32, &'a TxOut)> {
+ let anchor_script = chan_utils::get_anchor_redeemscript(funding_pubkey).to_v0_p2wsh();
+ commitment_tx.output.iter().enumerate()
+ .find(|(_, txout)| txout.script_pubkey == anchor_script)
+ .map(|(idx, txout)| (idx as u32, txout))
+}
+
+/// Returns the witness required to satisfy and spend an anchor input.
+pub fn build_anchor_input_witness(funding_key: &PublicKey, funding_sig: &Signature) -> Witness {
+ let anchor_redeem_script = chan_utils::get_anchor_redeemscript(funding_key);
+ let mut funding_sig = funding_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
+ funding_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
+ Witness::from_vec(vec![funding_sig, anchor_redeem_script.to_bytes()])
+}
+
/// Per-channel data used to build transactions in conjunction with the per-commitment data (CommitmentTransaction).
/// The fields are organized by holder/counterparty.
///
pub counterparty_parameters: Option<CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters>,
/// The late-bound funding outpoint
pub funding_outpoint: Option<chain::transaction::OutPoint>,
- /// Are anchors used for this channel. Boolean is serialization backwards-compatible
- pub opt_anchors: Option<()>
+ /// Are anchors (zero fee HTLC transaction variant) used for this channel. Boolean is
+ /// serialization backwards-compatible.
+ pub opt_anchors: Option<()>,
+ /// Are non-zero-fee anchors are enabled (used in conjuction with opt_anchors)
+ /// It is intended merely for backwards compatibility with signers that need it.
+ /// There is no support for this feature in LDK channel negotiation.
+ pub opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: Option<()>,
}
/// Late-bound per-channel counterparty data used to build transactions.
(6, counterparty_parameters, option),
(8, funding_outpoint, option),
(10, opt_anchors, option),
+ (12, opt_non_zero_fee_anchors, option),
});
/// Static channel fields used to build transactions given per-commitment fields, organized by
fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target { &self.inner }
}
+impl Eq for HolderCommitmentTransaction {}
impl PartialEq for HolderCommitmentTransaction {
// We dont care whether we are signed in equality comparison
fn eq(&self, o: &Self) -> bool {
holder_selected_contest_delay: 0,
is_outbound_from_holder: false,
counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters { pubkeys: channel_pubkeys.clone(), selected_contest_delay: 0 }),
- funding_outpoint: Some(chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: Default::default(), index: 0 }),
- opt_anchors: None
+ funding_outpoint: Some(chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: Txid::all_zeros(), index: 0 }),
+ opt_anchors: None,
+ opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None,
};
let mut htlcs_with_aux: Vec<(_, ())> = Vec::new();
let inner = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(0, 0, 0, false, dummy_key.clone(), dummy_key.clone(), keys, 0, &mut htlcs_with_aux, &channel_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable());
// First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element.
let mut tx = self.inner.built.transaction.clone();
tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
+ let mut ser_holder_sig = holder_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
+ ser_holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
+ let mut ser_cp_sig = self.counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
+ ser_cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
if self.holder_sig_first {
- tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- tx.input[0].witness.push(self.counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ tx.input[0].witness.push(ser_holder_sig);
+ tx.input[0].witness.push(ser_cp_sig);
} else {
- tx.input[0].witness.push(self.counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ tx.input[0].witness.push(ser_cp_sig);
+ tx.input[0].witness.push(ser_holder_sig);
}
- tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
- tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
tx.input[0].witness.push(funding_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec());
tx
///
/// This can be used to verify a signature.
pub fn get_sighash_all(&self, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> Message {
- let sighash = &bip143::SigHashCache::new(&self.transaction).signature_hash(0, funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..];
+ let sighash = &sighash::SighashCache::new(&self.transaction).segwit_signature_hash(0, funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..];
hash_to_message!(sighash)
}
///
/// This class can be used inside a signer implementation to generate a signature given the relevant
/// secret key.
-#[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ClosingTransaction {
to_holder_value_sat: u64,
to_counterparty_value_sat: u64,
///
/// This can be used to verify a signature.
pub fn get_sighash_all(&self, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> Message {
- let sighash = &bip143::SigHashCache::new(&self.inner.built).signature_hash(0, funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..];
+ let sighash = &sighash::SighashCache::new(&self.inner.built).segwit_signature_hash(0, funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..];
hash_to_message!(sighash)
}
htlcs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>,
// A boolean that is serialization backwards-compatible
opt_anchors: Option<()>,
+ // Whether non-zero-fee anchors should be used
+ opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: Option<()>,
// A cache of the parties' pubkeys required to construct the transaction, see doc for trust()
keys: TxCreationKeys,
// For access to the pre-built transaction, see doc for trust()
built: BuiltCommitmentTransaction,
}
+impl Eq for CommitmentTransaction {}
impl PartialEq for CommitmentTransaction {
fn eq(&self, o: &Self) -> bool {
let eq = self.commitment_number == o.commitment_number &&
(10, built, required),
(12, htlcs, vec_type),
(14, opt_anchors, option),
+ (16, opt_non_zero_fee_anchors, option),
});
impl CommitmentTransaction {
transaction,
txid
},
+ opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None,
}
}
+ /// Use non-zero fee anchors
+ ///
+ /// (C-not exported) due to move, and also not likely to be useful for binding users
+ pub fn with_non_zero_fee_anchors(mut self) -> Self {
+ self.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors = Some(());
+ self
+ }
+
fn internal_rebuild_transaction(&self, keys: &TxCreationKeys, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, broadcaster_funding_key: &PublicKey, countersignatory_funding_key: &PublicKey) -> Result<BuiltCommitmentTransaction, ()> {
let (obscured_commitment_transaction_number, txins) = Self::internal_build_inputs(self.commitment_number, channel_parameters);
fn make_transaction(obscured_commitment_transaction_number: u64, txins: Vec<TxIn>, outputs: Vec<TxOut>) -> Transaction {
Transaction {
version: 2,
- lock_time: ((0x20 as u32) << 8 * 3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number & 0xffffffu64) as u32),
+ lock_time: PackedLockTime(((0x20 as u32) << 8 * 3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number & 0xffffffu64) as u32)),
input: txins,
output: outputs,
}
let script = if opt_anchors {
get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript(&countersignatory_pubkeys.payment_point).to_v0_p2wsh()
} else {
- get_p2wpkh_redeemscript(&countersignatory_pubkeys.payment_point)
+ Payload::p2wpkh(&BitcoinPublicKey::new(countersignatory_pubkeys.payment_point)).unwrap().script_pubkey()
};
txouts.push((
TxOut {
ins.push(TxIn {
previous_output: channel_parameters.funding_outpoint(),
script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: ((0x80 as u32) << 8 * 3)
- | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number >> 3 * 8) as u32),
- witness: Vec::new(),
+ sequence: Sequence(((0x80 as u32) << 8 * 3)
+ | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number >> 3 * 8) as u32)),
+ witness: Witness::new(),
});
ins
};
pub fn verify<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, broadcaster_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, countersignatory_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<TrustedCommitmentTransaction, ()> {
// This is the only field of the key cache that we trust
let per_commitment_point = self.keys.per_commitment_point;
- let keys = TxCreationKeys::from_channel_static_keys(&per_commitment_point, broadcaster_keys, countersignatory_keys, secp_ctx).unwrap();
+ let keys = TxCreationKeys::from_channel_static_keys(&per_commitment_point, broadcaster_keys, countersignatory_keys, secp_ctx);
if keys != self.keys {
return Err(());
}
///
/// The returned Vec has one entry for each HTLC, and in the same order.
///
- /// This function is only valid in the holder commitment context, it always uses SigHashType::All.
+ /// This function is only valid in the holder commitment context, it always uses EcdsaSighashType::All.
pub fn get_htlc_sigs<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Signature>, ()> {
let inner = self.inner;
let keys = &inner.keys;
let txid = inner.built.txid;
let mut ret = Vec::with_capacity(inner.htlcs.len());
- let holder_htlc_key = derive_private_key(secp_ctx, &inner.keys.per_commitment_point, htlc_base_key).map_err(|_| ())?;
+ let holder_htlc_key = derive_private_key(secp_ctx, &inner.keys.per_commitment_point, htlc_base_key);
for this_htlc in inner.htlcs.iter() {
assert!(this_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some());
- let htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, inner.feerate_per_kw, channel_parameters.contest_delay(), &this_htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
+ let htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, inner.feerate_per_kw, channel_parameters.contest_delay(), &this_htlc, self.opt_anchors(), self.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors.is_some(), &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key);
- let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, this_htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]);
+ let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, this_htlc.amount_msat / 1000, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..]);
ret.push(sign(secp_ctx, &sighash, &holder_htlc_key));
}
Ok(ret)
// Further, we should never be provided the preimage for an HTLC-Timeout transaction.
if this_htlc.offered && preimage.is_some() { unreachable!(); }
- let mut htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, inner.feerate_per_kw, channel_parameters.contest_delay(), &this_htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
+ let mut htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, inner.feerate_per_kw, channel_parameters.contest_delay(), &this_htlc, self.opt_anchors(), self.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors.is_some(), &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key);
- let sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { SigHashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { SigHashType::All };
+ let sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
// First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element.
htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
- htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_signature.serialize_der().to_vec());
- htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(signature.serialize_der().to_vec());
- htlc_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(sighashtype as u8);
- htlc_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+ let mut cp_sig_ser = counterparty_signature.serialize_der().to_vec();
+ cp_sig_ser.push(sighashtype as u8);
+ htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig_ser);
+ let mut holder_sig_ser = signature.serialize_der().to_vec();
+ holder_sig_ser.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
+ htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig_ser);
if this_htlc.offered {
// Due to BIP146 (MINIMALIF) this must be a zero-length element to relay.
| ((res[31] as u64) << 0 * 8)
}
-fn get_p2wpkh_redeemscript(key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
- Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
- .push_slice(&WPubkeyHash::hash(&key.serialize())[..])
- .into_script()
-}
-
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets;
- use ::{hex, chain};
- use prelude::*;
- use ln::chan_utils::{get_htlc_redeemscript, get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript, get_p2wpkh_redeemscript, CommitmentTransaction, TxCreationKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
+ use crate::{hex, chain};
+ use crate::prelude::*;
+ use crate::ln::chan_utils::{get_htlc_redeemscript, get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript, CommitmentTransaction, TxCreationKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey, Secp256k1};
- use util::test_utils;
- use chain::keysinterface::{KeysInterface, BaseSign};
- use bitcoin::Network;
- use ln::PaymentHash;
+ use crate::util::test_utils;
+ use crate::chain::keysinterface::{KeysInterface, BaseSign};
+ use bitcoin::{Network, Txid};
+ use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
+ use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
+ use bitcoin::util::address::Payload;
+ use bitcoin::PublicKey as BitcoinPublicKey;
#[test]
fn test_anchors() {
let htlc_basepoint = &signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
let holder_pubkeys = signer.pubkeys();
let counterparty_pubkeys = counterparty_signer.pubkeys();
- let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
+ let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
let mut channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
holder_pubkeys: holder_pubkeys.clone(),
holder_selected_contest_delay: 0,
is_outbound_from_holder: false,
counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters { pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(), selected_contest_delay: 0 }),
- funding_outpoint: Some(chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: Default::default(), index: 0 }),
- opt_anchors: None
+ funding_outpoint: Some(chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: Txid::all_zeros(), index: 0 }),
+ opt_anchors: None,
+ opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None,
};
let mut htlcs_with_aux: Vec<(_, ())> = Vec::new();
&mut htlcs_with_aux, &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable()
);
assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 2);
- assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[1].script_pubkey, get_p2wpkh_redeemscript(&counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point));
+ assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[1].script_pubkey, Payload::p2wpkh(&BitcoinPublicKey::new(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point)).unwrap().script_pubkey());
// Generate broadcaster and counterparty outputs as well as two anchors
let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(