// licenses.
//! Various utilities for building scripts and deriving keys related to channels. These are
-//! largely of interest for those implementing chain::keysinterface::Sign message signing by hand.
+//! largely of interest for those implementing the traits on [`chain::keysinterface`] by hand.
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,OutPoint,Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
use bitcoin::util::sighash;
+use bitcoin::util::address::Payload;
use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use bitcoin::hashes::ripemd160::Hash as Ripemd160;
use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, PubkeyHash};
-use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
-use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
-use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable, Writer};
-use util::{byte_utils, transaction_utils};
+use crate::chain::keysinterface::EntropySource;
+use crate::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
+use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
+use crate::util::ser::{Readable, Writeable, Writer};
+use crate::util::transaction_utils;
-use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey, Scalar};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature, Message};
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::Error as SecpError;
use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, secp256k1, Sequence, Witness};
+use bitcoin::PublicKey as BitcoinPublicKey;
-use io;
-use prelude::*;
+use crate::io;
+use crate::prelude::*;
use core::cmp;
-use ln::chan_utils;
-use util::transaction_utils::sort_outputs;
-use ln::channel::{INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI};
+use crate::ln::chan_utils;
+use crate::util::transaction_utils::sort_outputs;
+use crate::ln::channel::{INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI};
use core::ops::Deref;
-use chain;
-use util::crypto::sign;
-
-pub(crate) const MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 483;
-pub(crate) const OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT: usize = 133;
-pub(crate) const OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT_ANCHORS: usize = 136;
-// The weight of `accepted_htlc_script` can vary in function of its CLTV argument value. We define a
-// range that encompasses both its non-anchors and anchors variants.
+use crate::chain;
+use crate::util::crypto::{sign, sign_with_aux_rand};
+
+/// Maximum number of one-way in-flight HTLC (protocol-level value).
+pub const MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 483;
+/// The weight of a BIP141 witnessScript for a BOLT3's "offered HTLC output" on a commitment transaction, non-anchor variant.
+pub const OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT: usize = 133;
+/// The weight of a BIP141 witnessScript for a BOLT3's "offered HTLC output" on a commitment transaction, anchor variant.
+pub const OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT_ANCHORS: usize = 136;
+
+/// The weight of a BIP141 witnessScript for a BOLT3's "received HTLC output" can vary in function of its CLTV argument value.
+/// We define a range that encompasses both its non-anchors and anchors variants.
pub(crate) const MIN_ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT: usize = 136;
-pub(crate) const MAX_ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT: usize = 143;
+/// The weight of a BIP141 witnessScript for a BOLT3's "received HTLC output" can vary in function of its CLTV argument value.
+/// We define a range that encompasses both its non-anchors and anchors variants.
+/// This is the maximum post-anchor value.
+pub const MAX_ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT: usize = 143;
/// Gets the weight for an HTLC-Success transaction.
#[inline]
if opt_anchors { HTLC_TIMEOUT_ANCHOR_TX_WEIGHT } else { HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT }
}
+/// Describes the type of HTLC claim as determined by analyzing the witness.
#[derive(PartialEq, Eq)]
-pub(crate) enum HTLCClaim {
+pub enum HTLCClaim {
+ /// Claims an offered output on a commitment transaction through the timeout path.
OfferedTimeout,
+ /// Claims an offered output on a commitment transaction through the success path.
OfferedPreimage,
+ /// Claims an accepted output on a commitment transaction through the timeout path.
AcceptedTimeout,
+ /// Claims an accepted output on a commitment transaction through the success path.
AcceptedPreimage,
+ /// Claims an offered/accepted output on a commitment transaction through the revocation path.
Revocation,
}
impl HTLCClaim {
/// Check if a given input witness attempts to claim a HTLC.
- pub(crate) fn from_witness(witness: &Witness) -> Option<Self> {
+ pub fn from_witness(witness: &Witness) -> Option<Self> {
debug_assert_eq!(OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT_ANCHORS, MIN_ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
if witness.len() < 2 {
return None;
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
writer.write_all(secret)?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
+ writer.write_all(&idx.to_be_bytes())?;
}
write_tlv_fields!(writer, {});
Ok(())
/// Derives a per-commitment-transaction private key (eg an htlc key or delayed_payment key)
/// from the base secret and the per_commitment_point.
-///
-/// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
-/// generated (ie our own).
-pub fn derive_private_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, SecpError> {
+pub fn derive_private_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_secret: &SecretKey) -> SecretKey {
let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
sha.input(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret).serialize());
let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
base_secret.clone().add_tweak(&Scalar::from_be_bytes(res).unwrap())
+ .expect("Addition only fails if the tweak is the inverse of the key. This is not possible when the tweak contains the hash of the key.")
}
/// Derives a per-commitment-transaction public key (eg an htlc key or a delayed_payment key)
/// from the base point and the per_commitment_key. This is the public equivalent of
/// derive_private_key - using only public keys to derive a public key instead of private keys.
-///
-/// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
-/// generated (ie our own).
-pub fn derive_public_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, SecpError> {
+pub fn derive_public_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_point: &PublicKey) -> PublicKey {
let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
sha.input(&base_point.serialize());
let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
- let hashkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&res)?);
+ let hashkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx,
+ &SecretKey::from_slice(&res).expect("Hashes should always be valid keys unless SHA-256 is broken"));
base_point.combine(&hashkey)
+ .expect("Addition only fails if the tweak is the inverse of the key. This is not possible when the tweak contains the hash of the key.")
}
/// Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation key from its constituent parts.
/// commitment transaction, thus per_commitment_secret always come from cheater
/// and revocation_base_secret always come from punisher, which is the broadcaster
/// of the transaction spending with this key knowledge.
-///
-/// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
-/// generated (ie our own).
-pub fn derive_private_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_secret: &SecretKey, countersignatory_revocation_base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, SecpError> {
+pub fn derive_private_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>,
+ per_commitment_secret: &SecretKey, countersignatory_revocation_base_secret: &SecretKey)
+-> SecretKey {
let countersignatory_revocation_base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &countersignatory_revocation_base_secret);
let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
};
- let countersignatory_contrib = countersignatory_revocation_base_secret.clone().mul_tweak(&Scalar::from_be_bytes(rev_append_commit_hash_key).unwrap())?;
- let broadcaster_contrib = per_commitment_secret.clone().mul_tweak(&Scalar::from_be_bytes(commit_append_rev_hash_key).unwrap())?;
+ let countersignatory_contrib = countersignatory_revocation_base_secret.clone().mul_tweak(&Scalar::from_be_bytes(rev_append_commit_hash_key).unwrap())
+ .expect("Multiplying a secret key by a hash is expected to never fail per secp256k1 docs");
+ let broadcaster_contrib = per_commitment_secret.clone().mul_tweak(&Scalar::from_be_bytes(commit_append_rev_hash_key).unwrap())
+ .expect("Multiplying a secret key by a hash is expected to never fail per secp256k1 docs");
countersignatory_contrib.add_tweak(&Scalar::from_be_bytes(broadcaster_contrib.secret_bytes()).unwrap())
+ .expect("Addition only fails if the tweak is the inverse of the key. This is not possible when the tweak commits to the key.")
}
/// Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation public key from its constituent parts. This is
///
/// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
/// generated (ie our own).
-pub fn derive_public_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, countersignatory_revocation_base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, SecpError> {
+pub fn derive_public_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>,
+ per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, countersignatory_revocation_base_point: &PublicKey)
+-> PublicKey {
let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
sha.input(&countersignatory_revocation_base_point.serialize());
Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
};
- let countersignatory_contrib = countersignatory_revocation_base_point.clone().mul_tweak(&secp_ctx, &Scalar::from_be_bytes(rev_append_commit_hash_key).unwrap())?;
- let broadcaster_contrib = per_commitment_point.clone().mul_tweak(&secp_ctx, &Scalar::from_be_bytes(commit_append_rev_hash_key).unwrap())?;
+ let countersignatory_contrib = countersignatory_revocation_base_point.clone().mul_tweak(&secp_ctx, &Scalar::from_be_bytes(rev_append_commit_hash_key).unwrap())
+ .expect("Multiplying a valid public key by a hash is expected to never fail per secp256k1 docs");
+ let broadcaster_contrib = per_commitment_point.clone().mul_tweak(&secp_ctx, &Scalar::from_be_bytes(commit_append_rev_hash_key).unwrap())
+ .expect("Multiplying a valid public key by a hash is expected to never fail per secp256k1 docs");
countersignatory_contrib.combine(&broadcaster_contrib)
+ .expect("Addition only fails if the tweak is the inverse of the key. This is not possible when the tweak commits to the key.")
}
/// The set of public keys which are used in the creation of one commitment transaction.
});
/// One counterparty's public keys which do not change over the life of a channel.
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ChannelPublicKeys {
/// The public key which is used to sign all commitment transactions, as it appears in the
/// on-chain channel lock-in 2-of-2 multisig output.
impl TxCreationKeys {
/// Create per-state keys from channel base points and the per-commitment point.
/// Key set is asymmetric and can't be used as part of counter-signatory set of transactions.
- pub fn derive_new<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, broadcaster_delayed_payment_base: &PublicKey, broadcaster_htlc_base: &PublicKey, countersignatory_revocation_base: &PublicKey, countersignatory_htlc_base: &PublicKey) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, SecpError> {
- Ok(TxCreationKeys {
+ pub fn derive_new<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, broadcaster_delayed_payment_base: &PublicKey, broadcaster_htlc_base: &PublicKey, countersignatory_revocation_base: &PublicKey, countersignatory_htlc_base: &PublicKey) -> TxCreationKeys {
+ TxCreationKeys {
per_commitment_point: per_commitment_point.clone(),
- revocation_key: derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &countersignatory_revocation_base)?,
- broadcaster_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &broadcaster_htlc_base)?,
- countersignatory_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &countersignatory_htlc_base)?,
- broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &broadcaster_delayed_payment_base)?,
- })
+ revocation_key: derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &countersignatory_revocation_base),
+ broadcaster_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &broadcaster_htlc_base),
+ countersignatory_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &countersignatory_htlc_base),
+ broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &broadcaster_delayed_payment_base),
+ }
}
/// Generate per-state keys from channel static keys.
/// Key set is asymmetric and can't be used as part of counter-signatory set of transactions.
- pub fn from_channel_static_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, broadcaster_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, countersignatory_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, SecpError> {
+ pub fn from_channel_static_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, broadcaster_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, countersignatory_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> TxCreationKeys {
TxCreationKeys::derive_new(
&secp_ctx,
&per_commitment_point,
let broadcaster_funding_key = broadcaster.serialize();
let countersignatory_funding_key = countersignatory.serialize();
+ make_funding_redeemscript_from_slices(&broadcaster_funding_key, &countersignatory_funding_key)
+}
+
+pub(crate) fn make_funding_redeemscript_from_slices(broadcaster_funding_key: &[u8], countersignatory_funding_key: &[u8]) -> Script {
let builder = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2);
if broadcaster_funding_key[..] < countersignatory_funding_key[..] {
- builder.push_slice(&broadcaster_funding_key)
- .push_slice(&countersignatory_funding_key)
+ builder.push_slice(broadcaster_funding_key)
+ .push_slice(countersignatory_funding_key)
} else {
- builder.push_slice(&countersignatory_funding_key)
- .push_slice(&broadcaster_funding_key)
+ builder.push_slice(countersignatory_funding_key)
+ .push_slice(broadcaster_funding_key)
}.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2).push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script()
}
///
/// Panics if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() (as such HTLCs do not appear in the
/// commitment transaction).
-pub fn build_htlc_transaction(commitment_txid: &Txid, feerate_per_kw: u32, contest_delay: u16, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, opt_anchors: bool, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Transaction {
+pub fn build_htlc_transaction(commitment_txid: &Txid, feerate_per_kw: u32, contest_delay: u16, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, opt_anchors: bool, use_non_zero_fee_anchors: bool, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Transaction {
let mut txins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
- txins.push(TxIn {
+ txins.push(build_htlc_input(commitment_txid, htlc, opt_anchors));
+
+ let mut txouts: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
+ txouts.push(build_htlc_output(
+ feerate_per_kw, contest_delay, htlc, opt_anchors, use_non_zero_fee_anchors,
+ broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, revocation_key
+ ));
+
+ Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: PackedLockTime(if htlc.offered { htlc.cltv_expiry } else { 0 }),
+ input: txins,
+ output: txouts,
+ }
+}
+
+pub(crate) fn build_htlc_input(commitment_txid: &Txid, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, opt_anchors: bool) -> TxIn {
+ TxIn {
previous_output: OutPoint {
txid: commitment_txid.clone(),
vout: htlc.transaction_output_index.expect("Can't build an HTLC transaction for a dust output"),
script_sig: Script::new(),
sequence: Sequence(if opt_anchors { 1 } else { 0 }),
witness: Witness::new(),
- });
+ }
+}
+pub(crate) fn build_htlc_output(
+ feerate_per_kw: u32, contest_delay: u16, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, opt_anchors: bool,
+ use_non_zero_fee_anchors: bool, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey
+) -> TxOut {
let weight = if htlc.offered {
htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors)
} else {
htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors)
};
- let output_value = if opt_anchors {
+ let output_value = if opt_anchors && !use_non_zero_fee_anchors {
htlc.amount_msat / 1000
} else {
let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * weight / 1000;
htlc.amount_msat / 1000 - total_fee
};
- let mut txouts: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
- txouts.push(TxOut {
+ TxOut {
script_pubkey: get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key, contest_delay, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(),
value: output_value,
- });
+ }
+}
- Transaction {
- version: 2,
- lock_time: PackedLockTime(if htlc.offered { htlc.cltv_expiry } else { 0 }),
- input: txins,
- output: txouts,
+/// Returns the witness required to satisfy and spend a HTLC input.
+pub fn build_htlc_input_witness(
+ local_sig: &Signature, remote_sig: &Signature, preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>,
+ redeem_script: &Script, opt_anchors: bool,
+) -> Witness {
+ let remote_sighash_type = if opt_anchors {
+ EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay
+ } else {
+ EcdsaSighashType::All
+ };
+
+ let mut witness = Witness::new();
+ // First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element.
+ witness.push(vec![]);
+ witness.push_bitcoin_signature(&remote_sig.serialize_der(), remote_sighash_type);
+ witness.push_bitcoin_signature(&local_sig.serialize_der(), EcdsaSighashType::All);
+ if let Some(preimage) = preimage {
+ witness.push(preimage.0.to_vec());
+ } else {
+ // Due to BIP146 (MINIMALIF) this must be a zero-length element to relay.
+ witness.push(vec![]);
}
+ witness.push(redeem_script.to_bytes());
+ witness
}
/// Gets the witnessScript for the to_remote output when anchors are enabled.
#[inline]
-pub(crate) fn get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript(payment_point: &PublicKey) -> Script {
+pub fn get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript(payment_point: &PublicKey) -> Script {
Builder::new()
.push_slice(&payment_point.serialize()[..])
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY)
.map(|(idx, txout)| (idx as u32, txout))
}
+/// Returns the witness required to satisfy and spend an anchor input.
+pub fn build_anchor_input_witness(funding_key: &PublicKey, funding_sig: &Signature) -> Witness {
+ let anchor_redeem_script = chan_utils::get_anchor_redeemscript(funding_key);
+ let mut ret = Witness::new();
+ ret.push_bitcoin_signature(&funding_sig.serialize_der(), EcdsaSighashType::All);
+ ret.push(anchor_redeem_script.as_bytes());
+ ret
+}
+
/// Per-channel data used to build transactions in conjunction with the per-commitment data (CommitmentTransaction).
/// The fields are organized by holder/counterparty.
///
/// Normally, this is converted to the broadcaster/countersignatory-organized DirectedChannelTransactionParameters
/// before use, via the as_holder_broadcastable and as_counterparty_broadcastable functions.
-#[derive(Clone)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ChannelTransactionParameters {
/// Holder public keys
pub holder_pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
pub funding_outpoint: Option<chain::transaction::OutPoint>,
/// Are anchors (zero fee HTLC transaction variant) used for this channel. Boolean is
/// serialization backwards-compatible.
- pub opt_anchors: Option<()>
+ pub opt_anchors: Option<()>,
+ /// Are non-zero-fee anchors are enabled (used in conjuction with opt_anchors)
+ /// It is intended merely for backwards compatibility with signers that need it.
+ /// There is no support for this feature in LDK channel negotiation.
+ pub opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: Option<()>,
}
/// Late-bound per-channel counterparty data used to build transactions.
-#[derive(Clone)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
/// Counter-party public keys
pub pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
(6, counterparty_parameters, option),
(8, funding_outpoint, option),
(10, opt_anchors, option),
+ (12, opt_non_zero_fee_anchors, option),
});
/// Static channel fields used to build transactions given per-commitment fields, organized by
impl HolderCommitmentTransaction {
#[cfg(test)]
- pub fn dummy() -> Self {
+ pub fn dummy(htlcs: &mut Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())>) -> Self {
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
let dummy_sig = sign(&secp_ctx, &secp256k1::Message::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
is_outbound_from_holder: false,
counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters { pubkeys: channel_pubkeys.clone(), selected_contest_delay: 0 }),
funding_outpoint: Some(chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: Txid::all_zeros(), index: 0 }),
- opt_anchors: None
+ opt_anchors: None,
+ opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None,
};
- let mut htlcs_with_aux: Vec<(_, ())> = Vec::new();
- let inner = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(0, 0, 0, false, dummy_key.clone(), dummy_key.clone(), keys, 0, &mut htlcs_with_aux, &channel_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable());
+ let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
+ for _ in 0..htlcs.len() {
+ counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(dummy_sig);
+ }
+ let inner = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(0, 0, 0, false, dummy_key.clone(), dummy_key.clone(), keys, 0, htlcs, &channel_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable());
+ htlcs.sort_by_key(|htlc| htlc.0.transaction_output_index);
HolderCommitmentTransaction {
inner,
counterparty_sig: dummy_sig,
- counterparty_htlc_sigs: Vec::new(),
+ counterparty_htlc_sigs,
holder_sig_first: false
}
}
// First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element.
let mut tx = self.inner.built.transaction.clone();
tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
- let mut ser_holder_sig = holder_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
- ser_holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
- let mut ser_cp_sig = self.counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
- ser_cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
if self.holder_sig_first {
- tx.input[0].witness.push(ser_holder_sig);
- tx.input[0].witness.push(ser_cp_sig);
+ tx.input[0].witness.push_bitcoin_signature(&holder_sig.serialize_der(), EcdsaSighashType::All);
+ tx.input[0].witness.push_bitcoin_signature(&self.counterparty_sig.serialize_der(), EcdsaSighashType::All);
} else {
- tx.input[0].witness.push(ser_cp_sig);
- tx.input[0].witness.push(ser_holder_sig);
+ tx.input[0].witness.push_bitcoin_signature(&self.counterparty_sig.serialize_der(), EcdsaSighashType::All);
+ tx.input[0].witness.push_bitcoin_signature(&holder_sig.serialize_der(), EcdsaSighashType::All);
}
tx.input[0].witness.push(funding_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec());
hash_to_message!(sighash)
}
- /// Sign a transaction, either because we are counter-signing the counterparty's transaction or
- /// because we are about to broadcast a holder transaction.
- pub fn sign<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, funding_key: &SecretKey, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Signature {
+ /// Signs the counterparty's commitment transaction.
+ pub fn sign_counterparty_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, funding_key: &SecretKey, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Signature {
let sighash = self.get_sighash_all(funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis);
sign(secp_ctx, &sighash, funding_key)
}
+
+ /// Signs the holder commitment transaction because we are about to broadcast it.
+ pub fn sign_holder_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing, ES: Deref>(
+ &self, funding_key: &SecretKey, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
+ entropy_source: &ES, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>
+ ) -> Signature where ES::Target: EntropySource {
+ let sighash = self.get_sighash_all(funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis);
+ sign_with_aux_rand(secp_ctx, &sighash, funding_key, entropy_source)
+ }
}
/// This class tracks the per-transaction information needed to build a closing transaction and will
htlcs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>,
// A boolean that is serialization backwards-compatible
opt_anchors: Option<()>,
+ // Whether non-zero-fee anchors should be used
+ opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: Option<()>,
// A cache of the parties' pubkeys required to construct the transaction, see doc for trust()
keys: TxCreationKeys,
// For access to the pre-built transaction, see doc for trust()
(10, built, required),
(12, htlcs, vec_type),
(14, opt_anchors, option),
+ (16, opt_non_zero_fee_anchors, option),
});
impl CommitmentTransaction {
///
/// Only include HTLCs that are above the dust limit for the channel.
///
- /// (C-not exported) due to the generic though we likely should expose a version without
+ /// This is not exported to bindings users due to the generic though we likely should expose a version without
pub fn new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data<T>(commitment_number: u64, to_broadcaster_value_sat: u64, to_countersignatory_value_sat: u64, opt_anchors: bool, broadcaster_funding_key: PublicKey, countersignatory_funding_key: PublicKey, keys: TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u32, htlcs_with_aux: &mut Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, T)>, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters) -> CommitmentTransaction {
// Sort outputs and populate output indices while keeping track of the auxiliary data
let (outputs, htlcs) = Self::internal_build_outputs(&keys, to_broadcaster_value_sat, to_countersignatory_value_sat, htlcs_with_aux, channel_parameters, opt_anchors, &broadcaster_funding_key, &countersignatory_funding_key).unwrap();
transaction,
txid
},
+ opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None,
}
}
+ /// Use non-zero fee anchors
+ ///
+ /// This is not exported to bindings users due to move, and also not likely to be useful for binding users
+ pub fn with_non_zero_fee_anchors(mut self) -> Self {
+ self.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors = Some(());
+ self
+ }
+
fn internal_rebuild_transaction(&self, keys: &TxCreationKeys, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, broadcaster_funding_key: &PublicKey, countersignatory_funding_key: &PublicKey) -> Result<BuiltCommitmentTransaction, ()> {
let (obscured_commitment_transaction_number, txins) = Self::internal_build_inputs(self.commitment_number, channel_parameters);
let script = if opt_anchors {
get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript(&countersignatory_pubkeys.payment_point).to_v0_p2wsh()
} else {
- get_p2wpkh_redeemscript(&countersignatory_pubkeys.payment_point)
+ Payload::p2wpkh(&BitcoinPublicKey::new(countersignatory_pubkeys.payment_point)).unwrap().script_pubkey()
};
txouts.push((
TxOut {
/// which were included in this commitment transaction in output order.
/// The transaction index is always populated.
///
- /// (C-not exported) as we cannot currently convert Vec references to/from C, though we should
+ /// This is not exported to bindings users as we cannot currently convert Vec references to/from C, though we should
/// expose a less effecient version which creates a Vec of references in the future.
pub fn htlcs(&self) -> &Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment> {
&self.htlcs
pub fn verify<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, broadcaster_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, countersignatory_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<TrustedCommitmentTransaction, ()> {
// This is the only field of the key cache that we trust
let per_commitment_point = self.keys.per_commitment_point;
- let keys = TxCreationKeys::from_channel_static_keys(&per_commitment_point, broadcaster_keys, countersignatory_keys, secp_ctx).unwrap();
+ let keys = TxCreationKeys::from_channel_static_keys(&per_commitment_point, broadcaster_keys, countersignatory_keys, secp_ctx);
if keys != self.keys {
return Err(());
}
/// The returned Vec has one entry for each HTLC, and in the same order.
///
/// This function is only valid in the holder commitment context, it always uses EcdsaSighashType::All.
- pub fn get_htlc_sigs<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Signature>, ()> {
+ pub fn get_htlc_sigs<T: secp256k1::Signing, ES: Deref>(
+ &self, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters,
+ entropy_source: &ES, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>,
+ ) -> Result<Vec<Signature>, ()> where ES::Target: EntropySource {
let inner = self.inner;
let keys = &inner.keys;
let txid = inner.built.txid;
let mut ret = Vec::with_capacity(inner.htlcs.len());
- let holder_htlc_key = derive_private_key(secp_ctx, &inner.keys.per_commitment_point, htlc_base_key).map_err(|_| ())?;
+ let holder_htlc_key = derive_private_key(secp_ctx, &inner.keys.per_commitment_point, htlc_base_key);
for this_htlc in inner.htlcs.iter() {
assert!(this_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some());
- let htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, inner.feerate_per_kw, channel_parameters.contest_delay(), &this_htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
+ let htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, inner.feerate_per_kw, channel_parameters.contest_delay(), &this_htlc, self.opt_anchors(), self.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors.is_some(), &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key);
let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, this_htlc.amount_msat / 1000, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..]);
- ret.push(sign(secp_ctx, &sighash, &holder_htlc_key));
+ ret.push(sign_with_aux_rand(secp_ctx, &sighash, &holder_htlc_key, entropy_source));
}
Ok(ret)
}
// Further, we should never be provided the preimage for an HTLC-Timeout transaction.
if this_htlc.offered && preimage.is_some() { unreachable!(); }
- let mut htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, inner.feerate_per_kw, channel_parameters.contest_delay(), &this_htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
+ let mut htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, inner.feerate_per_kw, channel_parameters.contest_delay(), &this_htlc, self.opt_anchors(), self.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors.is_some(), &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key);
- let sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
-
- // First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element.
- htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
-
- let mut cp_sig_ser = counterparty_signature.serialize_der().to_vec();
- cp_sig_ser.push(sighashtype as u8);
- htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig_ser);
- let mut holder_sig_ser = signature.serialize_der().to_vec();
- holder_sig_ser.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
- htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig_ser);
-
- if this_htlc.offered {
- // Due to BIP146 (MINIMALIF) this must be a zero-length element to relay.
- htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
- } else {
- htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(preimage.unwrap().0.to_vec());
- }
-
- htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec());
+ htlc_tx.input[0].witness = chan_utils::build_htlc_input_witness(
+ signature, counterparty_signature, preimage, &htlc_redeemscript, self.opt_anchors(),
+ );
htlc_tx
}
}
| ((res[31] as u64) << 0 * 8)
}
-fn get_p2wpkh_redeemscript(key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
- Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
- .push_slice(&WPubkeyHash::hash(&key.serialize())[..])
- .into_script()
-}
-
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets;
- use ::{hex, chain};
- use prelude::*;
- use ln::chan_utils::{get_htlc_redeemscript, get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript, get_p2wpkh_redeemscript, CommitmentTransaction, TxCreationKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
+ use crate::{hex, chain};
+ use crate::prelude::*;
+ use crate::ln::chan_utils::{get_htlc_redeemscript, get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript, CommitmentTransaction, TxCreationKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey, Secp256k1};
- use util::test_utils;
- use chain::keysinterface::{KeysInterface, BaseSign};
+ use crate::util::test_utils;
+ use crate::chain::keysinterface::{ChannelSigner, SignerProvider};
use bitcoin::{Network, Txid};
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
- use ln::PaymentHash;
+ use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
+ use bitcoin::util::address::Payload;
+ use bitcoin::PublicKey as BitcoinPublicKey;
#[test]
fn test_anchors() {
let seed = [42; 32];
let network = Network::Testnet;
let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
- let signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(false, 3000);
- let counterparty_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(false, 3000);
+ let signer = keys_provider.derive_channel_signer(3000, keys_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, 1_000_000, 0));
+ let counterparty_signer = keys_provider.derive_channel_signer(3000, keys_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, 1_000_000, 1));
let delayed_payment_base = &signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
let htlc_basepoint = &signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
let holder_pubkeys = signer.pubkeys();
let counterparty_pubkeys = counterparty_signer.pubkeys();
- let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
+ let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
let mut channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
holder_pubkeys: holder_pubkeys.clone(),
holder_selected_contest_delay: 0,
is_outbound_from_holder: false,
counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters { pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(), selected_contest_delay: 0 }),
funding_outpoint: Some(chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: Txid::all_zeros(), index: 0 }),
- opt_anchors: None
+ opt_anchors: None,
+ opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None,
};
let mut htlcs_with_aux: Vec<(_, ())> = Vec::new();
&mut htlcs_with_aux, &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable()
);
assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 2);
- assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[1].script_pubkey, get_p2wpkh_redeemscript(&counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point));
+ assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[1].script_pubkey, Payload::p2wpkh(&BitcoinPublicKey::new(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point)).unwrap().script_pubkey());
// Generate broadcaster and counterparty outputs as well as two anchors
let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[0].script_pubkey, get_htlc_redeemscript(&received_htlc, false, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh());
assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[1].script_pubkey, get_htlc_redeemscript(&offered_htlc, false, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh());
assert_eq!(get_htlc_redeemscript(&received_htlc, false, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh().to_hex(),
- "002085cf52e41ba7c099a39df504e7b61f6de122971ceb53b06731876eaeb85e8dc5");
+ "0020e43a7c068553003fe68fcae424fb7b28ec5ce48cd8b6744b3945631389bad2fb");
assert_eq!(get_htlc_redeemscript(&offered_htlc, false, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh().to_hex(),
- "002049f0736bb335c61a04d2623a24df878a7592a3c51fa7258d41b2c85318265e73");
+ "0020215d61bba56b19e9eadb6107f5a85d7f99c40f65992443f69229c290165bc00d");
// Generate broadcaster output and received and offered HTLC outputs, with anchors
channel_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[2].script_pubkey, get_htlc_redeemscript(&received_htlc, true, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh());
assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[3].script_pubkey, get_htlc_redeemscript(&offered_htlc, true, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh());
assert_eq!(get_htlc_redeemscript(&received_htlc, true, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh().to_hex(),
- "002067114123af3f95405bae4fd930fc95de03e3c86baaee8b2dd29b43dd26cf613c");
+ "0020b70d0649c72b38756885c7a30908d912a7898dd5d79457a7280b8e9a20f3f2bc");
assert_eq!(get_htlc_redeemscript(&offered_htlc, true, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh().to_hex(),
- "0020a06e3b0d4fcf704f2b9c41e16a70099e39989466c3142b8573a1154542f28f57");
+ "002087a3faeb1950a469c0e2db4a79b093a41b9526e5a6fc6ef5cb949bde3be379c7");
}
#[test]
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff