+// This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
+// history.
+//
+// This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
+// or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
+// <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
+// You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
+// licenses.
+
+//! Various utilities for building scripts and deriving keys related to channels. These are
+//! largely of interest for those implementing chain::keysinterface::ChannelKeys message signing
+//! by hand.
+
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
-use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,OutPoint,Transaction};
+use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,OutPoint,Transaction, SigHashType};
+use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{Decodable, Encodable};
+use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
+use bitcoin::util::bip143;
+
+use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
+use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
+use bitcoin::hashes::ripemd160::Hash as Ripemd160;
+use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, PubkeyHash};
+
+use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
+use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
+use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable, Writer, WriterWriteAdaptor};
+use util::byte_utils;
-use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
-use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
-use bitcoin_hashes::ripemd160::Hash as Ripemd160;
-use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
-use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::Error as SecpError;
+use bitcoin::secp256k1;
-use ln::channelmanager::PaymentHash;
+use std::{cmp, mem};
-use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
-use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
-use secp256k1;
+const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
-pub const HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 703;
-pub const HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 663;
+pub(super) const HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 703;
+pub(super) const HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 663;
+
+#[derive(PartialEq)]
+pub(crate) enum HTLCType {
+ AcceptedHTLC,
+ OfferedHTLC
+}
+
+impl HTLCType {
+ /// Check if a given tx witnessScript len matchs one of a pre-signed HTLC
+ pub(crate) fn scriptlen_to_htlctype(witness_script_len: usize) -> Option<HTLCType> {
+ if witness_script_len == 133 {
+ Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC)
+ } else if witness_script_len >= 136 && witness_script_len <= 139 {
+ Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC)
+ } else {
+ None
+ }
+ }
+}
// Various functions for key derivation and transaction creation for use within channels. Primarily
// used in Channel and ChannelMonitor.
-pub fn build_commitment_secret(commitment_seed: [u8; 32], idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
- let mut res: [u8; 32] = commitment_seed;
+/// Build the commitment secret from the seed and the commitment number
+pub fn build_commitment_secret(commitment_seed: &[u8; 32], idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
+ let mut res: [u8; 32] = commitment_seed.clone();
for i in 0..48 {
let bitpos = 47 - i;
if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
res
}
-pub fn derive_private_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, secp256k1::Error> {
+/// Implements the per-commitment secret storage scheme from
+/// [BOLT 3](https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/dcbf8583976df087c79c3ce0b535311212e6812d/03-transactions.md#efficient-per-commitment-secret-storage).
+///
+/// Allows us to keep track of all of the revocation secrets of counterarties in just 50*32 bytes
+/// or so.
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub(crate) struct CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
+ old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
+}
+
+impl PartialEq for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
+ fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
+ for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
+ if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
+ return false
+ }
+ }
+ true
+ }
+}
+
+impl CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
+ pub(crate) fn new() -> Self {
+ Self { old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49], }
+ }
+
+ #[inline]
+ fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
+ for i in 0..48 {
+ if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
+ return i
+ }
+ }
+ 48
+ }
+
+ pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
+ //TODO This can be optimized?
+ let mut min = 1 << 48;
+ for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
+ if idx < min {
+ min = idx;
+ }
+ }
+ min
+ }
+
+ #[inline]
+ pub(super) fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
+ let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
+ for i in 0..bits {
+ let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
+ if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
+ res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
+ res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
+ }
+ }
+ res
+ }
+
+ pub(crate) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), ()> {
+ let pos = Self::place_secret(idx);
+ for i in 0..pos {
+ let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
+ if Self::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
+ return Err(());
+ }
+ }
+ if self.get_min_seen_secret() <= idx {
+ return Ok(());
+ }
+ self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
+ pub(crate) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
+ for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
+ if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
+ return Some(Self::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
+ }
+ }
+ assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
+ None
+ }
+}
+
+impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
+ writer.write_all(secret)?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
+ fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
+ for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
+ *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ }
+
+ Ok(Self { old_secrets })
+ }
+}
+
+/// Derives a per-commitment-transaction private key (eg an htlc key or delayed_payment key)
+/// from the base secret and the per_commitment_point.
+///
+/// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
+/// generated (ie our own).
+pub fn derive_private_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, SecpError> {
let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
sha.input(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret).serialize());
Ok(key)
}
-pub fn derive_public_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error> {
+/// Derives a per-commitment-transaction public key (eg an htlc key or a delayed_payment key)
+/// from the base point and the per_commitment_key. This is the public equivalent of
+/// derive_private_key - using only public keys to derive a public key instead of private keys.
+///
+/// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
+/// generated (ie our own).
+pub fn derive_public_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, SecpError> {
let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
sha.input(&base_point.serialize());
base_point.combine(&hashkey)
}
-/// Derives a revocation key from its constituent parts
-pub fn derive_private_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_secret: &SecretKey, revocation_base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, secp256k1::Error> {
- let revocation_base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &revocation_base_secret);
+/// Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation key from its constituent parts.
+///
+/// Only the cheating participant owns a valid witness to propagate a revoked
+/// commitment transaction, thus per_commitment_secret always come from cheater
+/// and revocation_base_secret always come from punisher, which is the broadcaster
+/// of the transaction spending with this key knowledge.
+///
+/// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
+/// generated (ie our own).
+pub fn derive_private_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_secret: &SecretKey, countersignatory_revocation_base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, SecpError> {
+ let countersignatory_revocation_base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &countersignatory_revocation_base_secret);
let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
- sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
+ sha.input(&countersignatory_revocation_base_point.serialize());
sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
- sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
+ sha.input(&countersignatory_revocation_base_point.serialize());
Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
};
- let mut part_a = revocation_base_secret.clone();
- part_a.mul_assign(&rev_append_commit_hash_key)?;
- let mut part_b = per_commitment_secret.clone();
- part_b.mul_assign(&commit_append_rev_hash_key)?;
- part_a.add_assign(&part_b[..])?;
- Ok(part_a)
+ let mut countersignatory_contrib = countersignatory_revocation_base_secret.clone();
+ countersignatory_contrib.mul_assign(&rev_append_commit_hash_key)?;
+ let mut broadcaster_contrib = per_commitment_secret.clone();
+ broadcaster_contrib.mul_assign(&commit_append_rev_hash_key)?;
+ countersignatory_contrib.add_assign(&broadcaster_contrib[..])?;
+ Ok(countersignatory_contrib)
}
-pub fn derive_public_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, revocation_base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error> {
+/// Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation public key from its constituent parts. This is
+/// the public equivalend of derive_private_revocation_key - using only public keys to derive a
+/// public key instead of private keys.
+///
+/// Only the cheating participant owns a valid witness to propagate a revoked
+/// commitment transaction, thus per_commitment_point always come from cheater
+/// and revocation_base_point always come from punisher, which is the broadcaster
+/// of the transaction spending with this key knowledge.
+///
+/// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
+/// generated (ie our own).
+pub fn derive_public_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, countersignatory_revocation_base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, SecpError> {
let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
- sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
+ sha.input(&countersignatory_revocation_base_point.serialize());
sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
- sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
+ sha.input(&countersignatory_revocation_base_point.serialize());
Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
};
- let mut part_a = revocation_base_point.clone();
- part_a.mul_assign(&secp_ctx, &rev_append_commit_hash_key)?;
- let mut part_b = per_commitment_point.clone();
- part_b.mul_assign(&secp_ctx, &commit_append_rev_hash_key)?;
- part_a.combine(&part_b)
+ let mut countersignatory_contrib = countersignatory_revocation_base_point.clone();
+ countersignatory_contrib.mul_assign(&secp_ctx, &rev_append_commit_hash_key)?;
+ let mut broadcaster_contrib = per_commitment_point.clone();
+ broadcaster_contrib.mul_assign(&secp_ctx, &commit_append_rev_hash_key)?;
+ countersignatory_contrib.combine(&broadcaster_contrib)
}
+/// The set of public keys which are used in the creation of one commitment transaction.
+/// These are derived from the channel base keys and per-commitment data.
+///
+/// A broadcaster key is provided from potential broadcaster of the computed transaction.
+/// A countersignatory key is coming from a protocol participant unable to broadcast the
+/// transaction.
+///
+/// These keys are assumed to be good, either because the code derived them from
+/// channel basepoints via the new function, or they were obtained via
+/// PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys.trust_key_derivation because we trusted the source of the
+/// pre-calculated keys.
+#[derive(PartialEq, Clone)]
pub struct TxCreationKeys {
+ /// The broadcaster's per-commitment public key which was used to derive the other keys.
pub per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
+ /// The revocation key which is used to allow the broadcaster of the commitment
+ /// transaction to provide their counterparty the ability to punish them if they broadcast
+ /// an old state.
pub revocation_key: PublicKey,
- pub a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
- pub b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
- pub a_delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
- pub b_payment_key: PublicKey,
+ /// Broadcaster's HTLC Key
+ pub broadcaster_htlc_key: PublicKey,
+ /// Countersignatory's HTLC Key
+ pub countersignatory_htlc_key: PublicKey,
+ /// Broadcaster's Payment Key (which isn't allowed to be spent from for some delay)
+ pub broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
+}
+impl_writeable!(TxCreationKeys, 33*6,
+ { per_commitment_point, revocation_key, broadcaster_htlc_key, countersignatory_htlc_key, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key });
+
+/// The per-commitment point and a set of pre-calculated public keys used for transaction creation
+/// in the signer.
+/// The pre-calculated keys are an optimization, because ChannelKeys has enough
+/// information to re-derive them.
+pub struct PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys(TxCreationKeys);
+
+impl PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys {
+ /// Create a new PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys from TxCreationKeys
+ pub fn new(keys: TxCreationKeys) -> Self {
+ PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys(keys)
+ }
+
+ /// The pre-calculated transaction creation public keys.
+ /// An external validating signer should not trust these keys.
+ pub fn trust_key_derivation(&self) -> &TxCreationKeys {
+ &self.0
+ }
+
+ /// The transaction per-commitment point
+ pub fn per_commitment_point(&self) -> &PublicKey {
+ &self.0.per_commitment_point
+ }
}
+/// One counterparty's public keys which do not change over the life of a channel.
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+pub struct ChannelPublicKeys {
+ /// The public key which is used to sign all commitment transactions, as it appears in the
+ /// on-chain channel lock-in 2-of-2 multisig output.
+ pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
+ /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_revocation_key) to derive per-commitment
+ /// revocation keys. This is combined with the per-commitment-secret generated by the
+ /// counterparty to create a secret which the counterparty can reveal to revoke previous
+ /// states.
+ pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
+ /// The public key on which the non-broadcaster (ie the countersignatory) receives an immediately
+ /// spendable primary channel balance on the broadcaster's commitment transaction. This key is
+ /// static across every commitment transaction.
+ pub payment_point: PublicKey,
+ /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment payment
+ /// public key which receives non-HTLC-encumbered funds which are only available for spending
+ /// after some delay (or can be claimed via the revocation path).
+ pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
+ /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment public key
+ /// which is used to encumber HTLC-in-flight outputs.
+ pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
+}
+
+impl_writeable!(ChannelPublicKeys, 33*5, {
+ funding_pubkey,
+ revocation_basepoint,
+ payment_point,
+ delayed_payment_basepoint,
+ htlc_basepoint
+});
+
+
impl TxCreationKeys {
- pub fn new<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, a_delayed_payment_base: &PublicKey, a_htlc_base: &PublicKey, b_revocation_base: &PublicKey, b_payment_base: &PublicKey, b_htlc_base: &PublicKey) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, secp256k1::Error> {
+ /// Create a new TxCreationKeys from channel base points and the per-commitment point
+ pub fn derive_new<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, broadcaster_delayed_payment_base: &PublicKey, broadcaster_htlc_base: &PublicKey, countersignatory_revocation_base: &PublicKey, countersignatory_htlc_base: &PublicKey) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, SecpError> {
Ok(TxCreationKeys {
per_commitment_point: per_commitment_point.clone(),
- revocation_key: derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &b_revocation_base)?,
- a_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &a_htlc_base)?,
- b_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &b_htlc_base)?,
- a_delayed_payment_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &a_delayed_payment_base)?,
- b_payment_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &b_payment_base)?,
+ revocation_key: derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &countersignatory_revocation_base)?,
+ broadcaster_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &broadcaster_htlc_base)?,
+ countersignatory_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &countersignatory_htlc_base)?,
+ broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &broadcaster_delayed_payment_base)?,
})
}
}
-/// Gets the "to_local" output redeemscript, ie the script which is time-locked or spendable by
-/// the revocation key
-pub fn get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key: &PublicKey, to_self_delay: u16, delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
+/// A script either spendable by the revocation
+/// key or the broadcaster_delayed_payment_key and satisfying the relative-locktime OP_CSV constrain.
+/// Encumbering a `to_holder` output on a commitment transaction or 2nd-stage HTLC transactions.
+pub fn get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key: &PublicKey, contest_delay: u16, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
.push_slice(&revocation_key.serialize())
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
- .push_int(to_self_delay as i64)
+ .push_int(contest_delay as i64)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
- .push_slice(&delayed_payment_key.serialize())
+ .push_slice(&broadcaster_delayed_payment_key.serialize())
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
.into_script()
}
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+/// Information about an HTLC as it appears in a commitment transaction
pub struct HTLCOutputInCommitment {
+ /// Whether the HTLC was "offered" (ie outbound in relation to this commitment transaction).
+ /// Note that this is not the same as whether it is ountbound *from us*. To determine that you
+ /// need to compare this value to whether the commitment transaction in question is that of
+ /// the counterparty or our own.
pub offered: bool,
+ /// The value, in msat, of the HTLC. The value as it appears in the commitment transaction is
+ /// this divided by 1000.
pub amount_msat: u64,
+ /// The CLTV lock-time at which this HTLC expires.
pub cltv_expiry: u32,
+ /// The hash of the preimage which unlocks this HTLC.
pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
+ /// The position within the commitment transactions' outputs. This may be None if the value is
+ /// below the dust limit (in which case no output appears in the commitment transaction and the
+ /// value is spent to additional transaction fees).
pub transaction_output_index: Option<u32>,
}
+impl_writeable!(HTLCOutputInCommitment, 1 + 8 + 4 + 32 + 5, {
+ offered,
+ amount_msat,
+ cltv_expiry,
+ payment_hash,
+ transaction_output_index
+});
+
#[inline]
-pub fn get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, a_htlc_key: &PublicKey, b_htlc_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
+pub(crate) fn get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, broadcaster_htlc_key: &PublicKey, countersignatory_htlc_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
let payment_hash160 = Ripemd160::hash(&htlc.payment_hash.0[..]).into_inner();
if htlc.offered {
Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
- .push_slice(&Hash160::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
+ .push_slice(&PubkeyHash::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
- .push_slice(&b_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
+ .push_slice(&countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE)
.push_int(32)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
.push_int(2)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
- .push_slice(&a_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
+ .push_slice(&broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
.push_int(2)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
} else {
Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
- .push_slice(&Hash160::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
+ .push_slice(&PubkeyHash::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
- .push_slice(&b_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
+ .push_slice(&countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE)
.push_int(32)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY)
.push_int(2)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
- .push_slice(&a_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
+ .push_slice(&broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
.push_int(2)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
}
}
-/// note here that 'a_revocation_key' is generated using b_revocation_basepoint and a's
-/// commitment secret. 'htlc' does *not* need to have its previous_output_index filled.
+/// Gets the witness redeemscript for an HTLC output in a commitment transaction. Note that htlc
+/// does not need to have its previous_output_index filled.
#[inline]
pub fn get_htlc_redeemscript(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Script {
- get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &keys.a_htlc_key, &keys.b_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key)
+ get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key)
+}
+
+/// Gets the redeemscript for a funding output from the two funding public keys.
+/// Note that the order of funding public keys does not matter.
+pub fn make_funding_redeemscript(broadcaster: &PublicKey, countersignatory: &PublicKey) -> Script {
+ let broadcaster_funding_key = broadcaster.serialize();
+ let countersignatory_funding_key = countersignatory.serialize();
+
+ let builder = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2);
+ if broadcaster_funding_key[..] < countersignatory_funding_key[..] {
+ builder.push_slice(&broadcaster_funding_key)
+ .push_slice(&countersignatory_funding_key)
+ } else {
+ builder.push_slice(&countersignatory_funding_key)
+ .push_slice(&broadcaster_funding_key)
+ }.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2).push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script()
}
/// panics if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none()!
-pub fn build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash: &Sha256dHash, feerate_per_kw: u64, to_self_delay: u16, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, a_delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Transaction {
+pub fn build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash: &Txid, feerate_per_kw: u32, contest_delay: u16, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Transaction {
let mut txins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
txins.push(TxIn {
previous_output: OutPoint {
});
let total_fee = if htlc.offered {
- feerate_per_kw * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000
+ feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000
} else {
- feerate_per_kw * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000
+ feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000
};
let mut txouts: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
txouts.push(TxOut {
- script_pubkey: get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key, to_self_delay, a_delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(),
+ script_pubkey: get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key, contest_delay, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(),
value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 - total_fee //TODO: BOLT 3 does not specify if we should add amount_msat before dividing or if we should divide by 1000 before subtracting (as we do here)
});
output: txouts,
}
}
+
+#[derive(Clone)]
+/// We use this to track holder commitment transactions and put off signing them until we are ready
+/// to broadcast. This class can be used inside a signer implementation to generate a signature
+/// given the relevant secret key.
+pub struct HolderCommitmentTransaction {
+ // TODO: We should migrate away from providing the transaction, instead providing enough to
+ // allow the ChannelKeys to construct it from scratch. Luckily we already have HTLC data here,
+ // so we're probably most of the way there.
+ /// The commitment transaction itself, in unsigned form.
+ pub unsigned_tx: Transaction,
+ /// Our counterparty's signature for the transaction, above.
+ pub counterparty_sig: Signature,
+ // Which order the signatures should go in when constructing the final commitment tx witness.
+ // The user should be able to reconstruc this themselves, so we don't bother to expose it.
+ holder_sig_first: bool,
+ pub(crate) keys: TxCreationKeys,
+ /// The feerate paid per 1000-weight-unit in this commitment transaction. This value is
+ /// controlled by the channel initiator.
+ pub feerate_per_kw: u32,
+ /// The HTLCs and counterparty htlc signatures which were included in this commitment transaction.
+ ///
+ /// Note that this includes all HTLCs, including ones which were considered dust and not
+ /// actually included in the transaction as it appears on-chain, but who's value is burned as
+ /// fees and not included in the to_holder or to_counterparty outputs.
+ ///
+ /// The counterparty HTLC signatures in the second element will always be set for non-dust HTLCs, ie
+ /// those for which transaction_output_index.is_some().
+ pub per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)>,
+}
+impl HolderCommitmentTransaction {
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub fn dummy() -> Self {
+ let dummy_input = TxIn {
+ previous_output: OutPoint {
+ txid: Default::default(),
+ vout: 0,
+ },
+ script_sig: Default::default(),
+ sequence: 0,
+ witness: vec![]
+ };
+ let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
+ let dummy_sig = Secp256k1::new().sign(&secp256k1::Message::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
+ Self {
+ unsigned_tx: Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ input: vec![dummy_input],
+ output: Vec::new(),
+ lock_time: 0,
+ },
+ counterparty_sig: dummy_sig,
+ holder_sig_first: false,
+ keys: TxCreationKeys {
+ per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
+ revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
+ broadcaster_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
+ countersignatory_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
+ broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
+ },
+ feerate_per_kw: 0,
+ per_htlc: Vec::new()
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Generate a new HolderCommitmentTransaction based on a raw commitment transaction,
+ /// counterparty signature and both parties keys.
+ ///
+ /// The unsigned transaction outputs must be consistent with htlc_data. This function
+ /// only checks that the shape and amounts are consistent, but does not check the scriptPubkey.
+ pub fn new_missing_holder_sig(unsigned_tx: Transaction, counterparty_sig: Signature, holder_funding_key: &PublicKey, counterparty_funding_key: &PublicKey, keys: TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u32, htlc_data: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)>) -> HolderCommitmentTransaction {
+ if unsigned_tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("Tried to store a commitment transaction that had input count != 1!"); }
+ if unsigned_tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { panic!("Tried to store a signed commitment transaction?"); }
+
+ for htlc in &htlc_data {
+ if let Some(index) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
+ let out = &unsigned_tx.output[index as usize];
+ if out.value != htlc.0.amount_msat / 1000 {
+ panic!("HTLC at index {} has incorrect amount", index);
+ }
+ if !out.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
+ panic!("HTLC at index {} doesn't have p2wsh scriptPubkey", index);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ Self {
+ unsigned_tx,
+ counterparty_sig,
+ holder_sig_first: holder_funding_key.serialize()[..] < counterparty_funding_key.serialize()[..],
+ keys,
+ feerate_per_kw,
+ per_htlc: htlc_data,
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// The pre-calculated transaction creation public keys.
+ /// An external validating signer should not trust these keys.
+ pub fn trust_key_derivation(&self) -> &TxCreationKeys {
+ &self.keys
+ }
+
+ /// Get the txid of the holder commitment transaction contained in this
+ /// HolderCommitmentTransaction
+ pub fn txid(&self) -> Txid {
+ self.unsigned_tx.txid()
+ }
+
+ /// Gets holder signature for the contained commitment transaction given holder funding private key.
+ ///
+ /// Funding key is your key included in the 2-2 funding_outpoint lock. Should be provided
+ /// by your ChannelKeys.
+ /// Funding redeemscript is script locking funding_outpoint. This is the mutlsig script
+ /// between your own funding key and your counterparty's. Currently, this is provided in
+ /// ChannelKeys::sign_holder_commitment() calls directly.
+ /// Channel value is amount locked in funding_outpoint.
+ pub fn get_holder_sig<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, funding_key: &SecretKey, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Signature {
+ let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&self.unsigned_tx)
+ .signature_hash(0, funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
+ secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, funding_key)
+ }
+
+ pub(crate) fn add_holder_sig(&self, funding_redeemscript: &Script, holder_sig: Signature) -> Transaction {
+ let mut tx = self.unsigned_tx.clone();
+ // First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element.
+ tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
+
+ if self.holder_sig_first {
+ tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ tx.input[0].witness.push(self.counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ } else {
+ tx.input[0].witness.push(self.counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ }
+ tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+ tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+
+ tx.input[0].witness.push(funding_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec());
+ tx
+ }
+
+ /// Get a signature for each HTLC which was included in the commitment transaction (ie for
+ /// which HTLCOutputInCommitment::transaction_output_index.is_some()).
+ ///
+ /// The returned Vec has one entry for each HTLC, and in the same order. For HTLCs which were
+ /// considered dust and not included, a None entry exists, for all others a signature is
+ /// included.
+ pub fn get_htlc_sigs<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, counterparty_selected_contest_delay: u16, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Option<Signature>>, ()> {
+ let txid = self.txid();
+ let mut ret = Vec::with_capacity(self.per_htlc.len());
+ let holder_htlc_key = derive_private_key(secp_ctx, &self.keys.per_commitment_point, htlc_base_key).map_err(|_| ())?;
+
+ for this_htlc in self.per_htlc.iter() {
+ if this_htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
+ let htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, self.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_selected_contest_delay, &this_htlc.0, &self.keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &self.keys.revocation_key);
+
+ let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc.0, &self.keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &self.keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &self.keys.revocation_key);
+
+ let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, this_htlc.0.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]);
+ ret.push(Some(secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &holder_htlc_key)));
+ } else {
+ ret.push(None);
+ }
+ }
+ Ok(ret)
+ }
+
+ /// Gets a signed HTLC transaction given a preimage (for !htlc.offered) and the holder HTLC transaction signature.
+ pub(crate) fn get_signed_htlc_tx(&self, htlc_index: usize, signature: &Signature, preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, counterparty_selected_contest_delay: u16) -> Transaction {
+ let txid = self.txid();
+ let this_htlc = &self.per_htlc[htlc_index];
+ assert!(this_htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some());
+ // if we don't have preimage for an HTLC-Success, we can't generate an HTLC transaction.
+ if !this_htlc.0.offered && preimage.is_none() { unreachable!(); }
+ // Further, we should never be provided the preimage for an HTLC-Timeout transaction.
+ if this_htlc.0.offered && preimage.is_some() { unreachable!(); }
+
+ let mut htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, self.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_selected_contest_delay, &this_htlc.0, &self.keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &self.keys.revocation_key);
+ // Channel should have checked that we have a counterparty signature for this HTLC at
+ // creation, and we should have a sensible htlc transaction:
+ assert!(this_htlc.1.is_some());
+
+ let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc.0, &self.keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &self.keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &self.keys.revocation_key);
+
+ // First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element.
+ htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
+
+ htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(this_htlc.1.unwrap().serialize_der().to_vec());
+ htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(signature.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ htlc_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+ htlc_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+
+ if this_htlc.0.offered {
+ // Due to BIP146 (MINIMALIF) this must be a zero-length element to relay.
+ htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
+ } else {
+ htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(preimage.unwrap().0.to_vec());
+ }
+
+ htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec());
+ htlc_tx
+ }
+}
+impl PartialEq for HolderCommitmentTransaction {
+ // We dont care whether we are signed in equality comparison
+ fn eq(&self, o: &Self) -> bool {
+ self.txid() == o.txid()
+ }
+}
+impl Writeable for HolderCommitmentTransaction {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ if let Err(e) = self.unsigned_tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) {
+ match e {
+ encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
+ _ => panic!("holder tx must have been well-formed!"),
+ }
+ }
+ self.counterparty_sig.write(writer)?;
+ self.holder_sig_first.write(writer)?;
+ self.keys.write(writer)?;
+ self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_htlc.len() as u64))?;
+ for &(ref htlc, ref sig) in self.per_htlc.iter() {
+ htlc.write(writer)?;
+ sig.write(writer)?;
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+impl Readable for HolderCommitmentTransaction {
+ fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ let unsigned_tx = match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) {
+ Ok(tx) => tx,
+ Err(e) => match e {
+ encode::Error::Io(ioe) => return Err(DecodeError::Io(ioe)),
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ },
+ };
+ let counterparty_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let holder_sig_first = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut per_htlc = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)>()));
+ for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
+ let htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let sigs = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ per_htlc.push((htlc, sigs));
+ }
+
+ if unsigned_tx.input.len() != 1 {
+ // Ensure tx didn't hit the 0-input ambiguity case.
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
+ }
+ Ok(Self {
+ unsigned_tx,
+ counterparty_sig,
+ holder_sig_first,
+ keys,
+ feerate_per_kw,
+ per_htlc,
+ })
+ }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+ use super::CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets;
+ use hex;
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
+ // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
+ let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
+ let mut monitor;
+
+ macro_rules! test_secrets {
+ () => {
+ let mut idx = 281474976710655;
+ for secret in secrets.iter() {
+ assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
+ idx -= 1;
+ }
+ assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
+ assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
+ };
+ }
+
+ {
+ // insert_secret correct sequence
+ monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
+ secrets.clear();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+ }
+
+ {
+ // insert_secret #1 incorrect
+ monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
+ secrets.clear();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
+ assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
+ }
+
+ {
+ // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
+ monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
+ secrets.clear();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
+ assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
+ }
+
+ {
+ // insert_secret #3 incorrect
+ monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
+ secrets.clear();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
+ assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
+ }
+
+ {
+ // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
+ monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
+ secrets.clear();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
+ assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
+ }
+
+ {
+ // insert_secret #5 incorrect
+ monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
+ secrets.clear();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
+ assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
+ }
+
+ {
+ // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
+ monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
+ secrets.clear();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
+ assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
+ }
+
+ {
+ // insert_secret #7 incorrect
+ monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
+ secrets.clear();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
+ assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
+ }
+
+ {
+ // insert_secret #8 incorrect
+ monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
+ secrets.clear();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+ test_secrets!();
+
+ secrets.push([0; 32]);
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
+ assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
+ }
+ }
+}