/// Allows us to keep track of all of the revocation secrets of counterarties in just 50*32 bytes
/// or so.
#[derive(Clone)]
-pub(super) struct CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
+pub(crate) struct CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
}
}
impl CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
- pub(super) fn new() -> Self {
+ pub(crate) fn new() -> Self {
Self { old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49], }
}
48
}
- pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
+ pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
//TODO This can be optimized?
let mut min = 1 << 48;
for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
res
}
- pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), ()> {
+ pub(crate) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), ()> {
let pos = Self::place_secret(idx);
for i in 0..pos {
let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
}
/// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
- pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
+ pub(crate) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
return Some(Self::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
/// Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation key from its constituent parts.
///
+/// Only the cheating participant owns a valid witness to propagate a revoked
+/// commitment transaction, thus per_commitment_secret always come from cheater
+/// and revocation_base_secret always come from punisher, which is the broadcaster
+/// of the transaction spending with this key knowledge.
+///
/// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
/// generated (ie our own).
-pub fn derive_private_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_secret: &SecretKey, revocation_base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, SecpError> {
- let revocation_base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &revocation_base_secret);
+pub fn derive_private_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_secret: &SecretKey, countersignatory_revocation_base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, SecpError> {
+ let countersignatory_revocation_base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &countersignatory_revocation_base_secret);
let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
- sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
+ sha.input(&countersignatory_revocation_base_point.serialize());
sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
- sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
+ sha.input(&countersignatory_revocation_base_point.serialize());
Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
};
- // Only the transaction broadcaster owns a valid witness to propagate
- // a revoked commitment transaction, thus per_commitment_secret always
- // come from broadcaster and revocation_base_secret always come
- // from countersignatory of the transaction.
- let mut countersignatory_contrib = revocation_base_secret.clone();
+ let mut countersignatory_contrib = countersignatory_revocation_base_secret.clone();
countersignatory_contrib.mul_assign(&rev_append_commit_hash_key)?;
let mut broadcaster_contrib = per_commitment_secret.clone();
broadcaster_contrib.mul_assign(&commit_append_rev_hash_key)?;
/// the public equivalend of derive_private_revocation_key - using only public keys to derive a
/// public key instead of private keys.
///
+/// Only the cheating participant owns a valid witness to propagate a revoked
+/// commitment transaction, thus per_commitment_point always come from cheater
+/// and revocation_base_point always come from punisher, which is the broadcaster
+/// of the transaction spending with this key knowledge.
+///
/// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
/// generated (ie our own).
-pub fn derive_public_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, revocation_base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, SecpError> {
+pub fn derive_public_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey,
countersignatory_revocation_base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, SecpError> {
let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
- sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
+ sha.input(&countersignatory_revocation_base_point.serialize());
sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
- sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
+ sha.input(&countersignatory_revocation_base_point.serialize());
Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
};
- // Only the transaction broadcaster owns a valid witness to propagate
- // a revoked commitment transaction, thus per_commitment_point always
- // come from broadcaster and revocation_base_point always come
- // from countersignatory of the transaction.
- let mut countersignatory_contrib = revocation_base_point.clone();
+ let mut countersignatory_contrib = countersignatory_revocation_base_point.clone();
countersignatory_contrib.mul_assign(&secp_ctx, &rev_append_commit_hash_key)?;
let mut broadcaster_contrib = per_commitment_point.clone();
broadcaster_contrib.mul_assign(&secp_ctx, &commit_append_rev_hash_key)?;
pub struct TxCreationKeys {
/// The broadcaster's per-commitment public key which was used to derive the other keys.
pub per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
- /// The broadcaster's revocation key which is used to allow the broadcaster of the commitment
+ /// The revocation key which is used to allow the broadcaster of the commitment
/// transaction to provide their counterparty the ability to punish them if they broadcast
/// an old state.
pub revocation_key: PublicKey,
/// Countersignatory's HTLC Key
pub countersignatory_htlc_key: PublicKey,
/// Broadcaster's Payment Key (which isn't allowed to be spent from for some delay)
- pub delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
+ pub broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
}
impl_writeable!(TxCreationKeys, 33*6,
- { per_commitment_point, revocation_key, broadcaster_htlc_key, countersignatory_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key });
+ { per_commitment_point, revocation_key, broadcaster_htlc_key, countersignatory_htlc_key, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key });
/// The per-commitment point and a set of pre-calculated public keys used for transaction creation
/// in the signer.
/// counterparty to create a secret which the counterparty can reveal to revoke previous
/// states.
pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
- /// The public key which receives our immediately spendable primary channel balance in
- /// remote-broadcasted commitment transactions. This key is static across every commitment
- /// transaction.
+ /// The public key on which the non-broadcaster (ie the countersignatory) receives an immediately
+ /// spendable primary channel balance on the broadcaster's commitment transaction. This key is
+ /// static across every commitment transaction.
pub payment_point: PublicKey,
/// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment payment
/// public key which receives non-HTLC-encumbered funds which are only available for spending
revocation_key: derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &countersignatory_revocation_base)?,
broadcaster_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &broadcaster_htlc_base)?,
countersignatory_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &countersignatory_htlc_base)?,
- delayed_payment_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &broadcaster_delayed_payment_base)?,
+ broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &broadcaster_delayed_payment_base)?,
})
}
}
/// A script either spendable by the revocation
-/// key or the delayed_payment_key and satisfying the relative-locktime OP_CSV constrain.
-/// Encumbering a `to_local` output on a commitment transaction or 2nd-stage HTLC transactions.
-pub fn get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key: &PublicKey, contest_delay: u16, delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
+/// key or the broadcaster_delayed_payment_key and satisfying the relative-locktime OP_CSV constrain.
+/// Encumbering a `to_holder` output on a commitment transaction or 2nd-stage HTLC transactions.
+pub fn get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key: &PublicKey, contest_delay: u16, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
.push_slice(&revocation_key.serialize())
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
.push_int(contest_delay as i64)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
- .push_slice(&delayed_payment_key.serialize())
+ .push_slice(&broadcaster_delayed_payment_key.serialize())
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
.into_script()
/// Whether the HTLC was "offered" (ie outbound in relation to this commitment transaction).
/// Note that this is not the same as whether it is ountbound *from us*. To determine that you
/// need to compare this value to whether the commitment transaction in question is that of
- /// the remote party or our own.
+ /// the counterparty or our own.
pub offered: bool,
/// The value, in msat, of the HTLC. The value as it appears in the commitment transaction is
/// this divided by 1000.
}
}
-/// note here that 'revocation_key' is generated using countersignatory_revocation_basepoint and broadcaster's
-/// commitment secret. 'htlc' does *not* need to have its previous_output_index filled.
+/// Gets the witness redeemscript for an HTLC output in a commitment transaction. Note that htlc
+/// does not need to have its previous_output_index filled.
#[inline]
pub fn get_htlc_redeemscript(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Script {
get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key)
}
/// panics if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none()!
-pub fn build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash: &Txid, feerate_per_kw: u32, contest_delay: u16, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Transaction {
+pub fn build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash: &Txid, feerate_per_kw: u32, contest_delay: u16, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Transaction {
let mut txins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
txins.push(TxIn {
previous_output: OutPoint {
let mut txouts: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
txouts.push(TxOut {
- script_pubkey: get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key, contest_delay, delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(),
+ script_pubkey: get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key, contest_delay, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(),
value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 - total_fee //TODO: BOLT 3 does not specify if we should add amount_msat before dividing or if we should divide by 1000 before subtracting (as we do here)
});
}
#[derive(Clone)]
-/// We use this to track local commitment transactions and put off signing them until we are ready
+/// We use this to track holder commitment transactions and put off signing them until we are ready
/// to broadcast. This class can be used inside a signer implementation to generate a signature
/// given the relevant secret key.
-pub struct LocalCommitmentTransaction {
+pub struct HolderCommitmentTransaction {
// TODO: We should migrate away from providing the transaction, instead providing enough to
// allow the ChannelKeys to construct it from scratch. Luckily we already have HTLC data here,
// so we're probably most of the way there.
/// The commitment transaction itself, in unsigned form.
pub unsigned_tx: Transaction,
/// Our counterparty's signature for the transaction, above.
- pub their_sig: Signature,
+ pub counterparty_sig: Signature,
// Which order the signatures should go in when constructing the final commitment tx witness.
// The user should be able to reconstruc this themselves, so we don't bother to expose it.
- our_sig_first: bool,
- pub(crate) local_keys: TxCreationKeys,
+ holder_sig_first: bool,
+ pub(crate) keys: TxCreationKeys,
/// The feerate paid per 1000-weight-unit in this commitment transaction. This value is
/// controlled by the channel initiator.
pub feerate_per_kw: u32,
- /// The HTLCs and remote htlc signatures which were included in this commitment transaction.
+ /// The HTLCs and counterparty htlc signatures which were included in this commitment transaction.
///
/// Note that this includes all HTLCs, including ones which were considered dust and not
/// actually included in the transaction as it appears on-chain, but who's value is burned as
- /// fees and not included in the to_local or to_remote outputs.
+ /// fees and not included in the to_holder or to_counterparty outputs.
///
- /// The remote HTLC signatures in the second element will always be set for non-dust HTLCs, ie
+ /// The counterparty HTLC signatures in the second element will always be set for non-dust HTLCs, ie
/// those for which transaction_output_index.is_some().
pub per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)>,
}
-impl LocalCommitmentTransaction {
+impl HolderCommitmentTransaction {
#[cfg(test)]
pub fn dummy() -> Self {
let dummy_input = TxIn {
output: Vec::new(),
lock_time: 0,
},
- their_sig: dummy_sig,
- our_sig_first: false,
- local_keys: TxCreationKeys {
+ counterparty_sig: dummy_sig,
+ holder_sig_first: false,
+ keys: TxCreationKeys {
per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
broadcaster_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
countersignatory_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
- delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
+ broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
},
feerate_per_kw: 0,
per_htlc: Vec::new()
}
}
- /// Generate a new LocalCommitmentTransaction based on a raw commitment transaction,
- /// remote signature and both parties keys.
+ /// Generate a new HolderCommitmentTransaction based on a raw commitment transaction,
+ /// counterparty signature and both parties keys.
///
/// The unsigned transaction outputs must be consistent with htlc_data. This function
/// only checks that the shape and amounts are consistent, but does not check the scriptPubkey.
- pub fn new_missing_local_sig(unsigned_tx: Transaction, their_sig: Signature, our_funding_key: &PublicKey, their_funding_key: &PublicKey, local_keys: TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u32, htlc_data: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)>) -> LocalCommitmentTransaction {
+ pub fn new_missing_holder_sig(unsigned_tx: Transaction, counterparty_sig: Signature, holder_funding_key: &PublicKey, counterparty_funding_key: &PublicKey, keys: TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u32, htlc_data: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)>) -> HolderCommitmentTransaction {
if unsigned_tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("Tried to store a commitment transaction that had input count != 1!"); }
if unsigned_tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { panic!("Tried to store a signed commitment transaction?"); }
Self {
unsigned_tx,
- their_sig,
- our_sig_first: our_funding_key.serialize()[..] < their_funding_key.serialize()[..],
- local_keys,
+ counterparty_sig,
+ holder_sig_first: holder_funding_key.serialize()[..] < counterparty_funding_key.serialize()[..],
+ keys,
feerate_per_kw,
per_htlc: htlc_data,
}
/// The pre-calculated transaction creation public keys.
/// An external validating signer should not trust these keys.
pub fn trust_key_derivation(&self) -> &TxCreationKeys {
- &self.local_keys
+ &self.keys
}
- /// Get the txid of the local commitment transaction contained in this
- /// LocalCommitmentTransaction
+ /// Get the txid of the holder commitment transaction contained in this
+ /// HolderCommitmentTransaction
pub fn txid(&self) -> Txid {
self.unsigned_tx.txid()
}
- /// Gets our signature for the contained commitment transaction given our funding private key.
+ /// Gets holder signature for the contained commitment transaction given holder funding private key.
///
/// Funding key is your key included in the 2-2 funding_outpoint lock. Should be provided
/// by your ChannelKeys.
/// Funding redeemscript is script locking funding_outpoint. This is the mutlsig script
/// between your own funding key and your counterparty's. Currently, this is provided in
- /// ChannelKeys::sign_local_commitment() calls directly.
+ /// ChannelKeys::sign_holder_commitment() calls directly.
/// Channel value is amount locked in funding_outpoint.
- pub fn get_local_sig<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, funding_key: &SecretKey, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Signature {
+ pub fn get_holder_sig<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, funding_key: &SecretKey, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Signature {
let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&self.unsigned_tx)
.signature_hash(0, funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, funding_key)
}
- pub(crate) fn add_local_sig(&self, funding_redeemscript: &Script, our_sig: Signature) -> Transaction {
+ pub(crate) fn add_holder_sig(&self, funding_redeemscript: &Script, holder_sig: Signature) -> Transaction {
let mut tx = self.unsigned_tx.clone();
// First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element.
tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
- if self.our_sig_first {
- tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- tx.input[0].witness.push(self.their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ if self.holder_sig_first {
+ tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ tx.input[0].witness.push(self.counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
} else {
- tx.input[0].witness.push(self.their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ tx.input[0].witness.push(self.counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
}
tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
/// The returned Vec has one entry for each HTLC, and in the same order. For HTLCs which were
/// considered dust and not included, a None entry exists, for all others a signature is
/// included.
- pub fn get_htlc_sigs<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, local_csv: u16, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Option<Signature>>, ()> {
+ pub fn get_htlc_sigs<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, counterparty_selected_contest_delay: u16, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Option<Signature>>, ()> {
let txid = self.txid();
let mut ret = Vec::with_capacity(self.per_htlc.len());
- let our_htlc_key = derive_private_key(secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.per_commitment_point, htlc_base_key).map_err(|_| ())?;
+ let holder_htlc_key = derive_private_key(secp_ctx, &self.keys.per_commitment_point, htlc_base_key).map_err(|_| ())?;
for this_htlc in self.per_htlc.iter() {
if this_htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
- let htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, self.feerate_per_kw, local_csv, &this_htlc.0, &self.local_keys.delayed_payment_key, &self.local_keys.revocation_key);
+ let htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, self.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_selected_contest_delay, &this_htlc.0, &self.keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &self.keys.revocation_key);
- let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc.0, &self.local_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &self.local_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &self.local_keys.revocation_key);
+ let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc.0, &self.keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &self.keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &self.keys.revocation_key);
let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, this_htlc.0.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]);
- ret.push(Some(secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &our_htlc_key)));
+ ret.push(Some(secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &holder_htlc_key)));
} else {
ret.push(None);
}
Ok(ret)
}
- /// Gets a signed HTLC transaction given a preimage (for !htlc.offered) and the local HTLC transaction signature.
- pub(crate) fn get_signed_htlc_tx(&self, htlc_index: usize, signature: &Signature, preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, local_csv: u16) -> Transaction {
+ /// Gets a signed HTLC transaction given a preimage (for !htlc.offered) and the holder HTLC transaction signature.
+ pub(crate) fn get_signed_htlc_tx(&self, htlc_index: usize, signature: &Signature, preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, counterparty_selected_contest_delay: u16) -> Transaction {
let txid = self.txid();
let this_htlc = &self.per_htlc[htlc_index];
assert!(this_htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some());
// Further, we should never be provided the preimage for an HTLC-Timeout transaction.
if this_htlc.0.offered && preimage.is_some() { unreachable!(); }
- let mut htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, self.feerate_per_kw, local_csv, &this_htlc.0, &self.local_keys.delayed_payment_key, &self.local_keys.revocation_key);
- // Channel should have checked that we have a remote signature for this HTLC at
+ let mut htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, self.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_selected_contest_delay, &this_htlc.0, &self.keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &self.keys.revocation_key);
+ // Channel should have checked that we have a counterparty signature for this HTLC at
// creation, and we should have a sensible htlc transaction:
assert!(this_htlc.1.is_some());
- let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc.0, &self.local_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &self.local_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &self.local_keys.revocation_key);
+ let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc.0, &self.keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &self.keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &self.keys.revocation_key);
// First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element.
htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
htlc_tx
}
}
-impl PartialEq for LocalCommitmentTransaction {
+impl PartialEq for HolderCommitmentTransaction {
// We dont care whether we are signed in equality comparison
fn eq(&self, o: &Self) -> bool {
self.txid() == o.txid()
}
}
-impl Writeable for LocalCommitmentTransaction {
+impl Writeable for HolderCommitmentTransaction {
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
if let Err(e) = self.unsigned_tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) {
match e {
encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
- _ => panic!("local tx must have been well-formed!"),
+ _ => panic!("holder tx must have been well-formed!"),
}
}
- self.their_sig.write(writer)?;
- self.our_sig_first.write(writer)?;
- self.local_keys.write(writer)?;
+ self.counterparty_sig.write(writer)?;
+ self.holder_sig_first.write(writer)?;
+ self.keys.write(writer)?;
self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_htlc.len() as u64))?;
for &(ref htlc, ref sig) in self.per_htlc.iter() {
Ok(())
}
}
-impl Readable for LocalCommitmentTransaction {
+impl Readable for HolderCommitmentTransaction {
fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
let unsigned_tx = match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) {
Ok(tx) => tx,
_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
},
};
- let their_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let our_sig_first = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let local_keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let counterparty_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let holder_sig_first = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let mut per_htlc = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)>()));
}
Ok(Self {
unsigned_tx,
- their_sig,
- our_sig_first,
- local_keys,
+ counterparty_sig,
+ holder_sig_first,
+ keys,
feerate_per_kw,
per_htlc,
})
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff