// You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
// licenses.
-//! Various utilities for building scripts and deriving keys related to channels. These are
+//! Various utilities for building scripts related to channels. These are
//! largely of interest for those implementing the traits on [`crate::sign`] by hand.
-use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
+use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf, Builder};
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
-use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,OutPoint,Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
-use bitcoin::util::sighash;
-use bitcoin::util::address::Payload;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,OutPoint,Transaction};
+use bitcoin::sighash;
+use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
+use bitcoin::address::Payload;
use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use bitcoin::hashes::ripemd160::Hash as Ripemd160;
-use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, PubkeyHash};
+use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, PubkeyHash, WPubkeyHash};
use crate::chain::chaininterface::fee_for_weight;
use crate::chain::package::WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT;
use crate::util::ser::{Readable, RequiredWrapper, Writeable, Writer};
use crate::util::transaction_utils;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey, Scalar};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature, Message};
-use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, secp256k1, Sequence, Witness};
+use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence, Witness};
use bitcoin::PublicKey as BitcoinPublicKey;
use crate::io;
-use crate::prelude::*;
use core::cmp;
use crate::ln::chan_utils;
use crate::util::transaction_utils::sort_outputs;
use core::ops::Deref;
use crate::chain;
use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
-use crate::util::crypto::{sign, sign_with_aux_rand};
+use crate::crypto::utils::{sign, sign_with_aux_rand};
+use super::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, DelayedPaymentKey, HtlcKey, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationKey, RevocationBasepoint};
+
+#[allow(unused_imports)]
+use crate::prelude::*;
/// Maximum number of one-way in-flight HTLC (protocol-level value).
pub const MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 483;
let bitpos = 47 - i;
if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
res[bitpos / 8] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
- res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
+ res = Sha256::hash(&res).to_byte_array();
}
}
res
}
/// Build a closing transaction
-pub fn build_closing_transaction(to_holder_value_sat: u64, to_counterparty_value_sat: u64, to_holder_script: Script, to_counterparty_script: Script, funding_outpoint: OutPoint) -> Transaction {
+pub fn build_closing_transaction(to_holder_value_sat: u64, to_counterparty_value_sat: u64, to_holder_script: ScriptBuf, to_counterparty_script: ScriptBuf, funding_outpoint: OutPoint) -> Transaction {
let txins = {
let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
ins.push(TxIn {
previous_output: funding_outpoint,
- script_sig: Script::new(),
+ script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(),
sequence: Sequence::MAX,
witness: Witness::new(),
});
Transaction {
version: 2,
- lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
+ lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
input: txins,
output: outputs,
}
let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
- res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
+ res = Sha256::hash(&res).to_byte_array();
}
}
res
let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
sha.input(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret).serialize());
- let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
+ let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).to_byte_array();
base_secret.clone().add_tweak(&Scalar::from_be_bytes(res).unwrap())
.expect("Addition only fails if the tweak is the inverse of the key. This is not possible when the tweak contains the hash of the key.")
}
-/// Derives a per-commitment-transaction public key (eg an htlc key or a delayed_payment key)
-/// from the base point and the per_commitment_key. This is the public equivalent of
-/// derive_private_key - using only public keys to derive a public key instead of private keys.
-pub fn derive_public_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_point: &PublicKey) -> PublicKey {
- let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
- sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
- sha.input(&base_point.serialize());
- let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
-
- let hashkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx,
- &SecretKey::from_slice(&res).expect("Hashes should always be valid keys unless SHA-256 is broken"));
- base_point.combine(&hashkey)
- .expect("Addition only fails if the tweak is the inverse of the key. This is not possible when the tweak contains the hash of the key.")
-}
-
/// Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation key from its constituent parts.
///
/// Only the cheating participant owns a valid witness to propagate a revoked
sha.input(&countersignatory_revocation_base_point.serialize());
sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
- Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
+ Sha256::from_engine(sha).to_byte_array()
};
let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
sha.input(&countersignatory_revocation_base_point.serialize());
- Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
+ Sha256::from_engine(sha).to_byte_array()
};
let countersignatory_contrib = countersignatory_revocation_base_secret.clone().mul_tweak(&Scalar::from_be_bytes(rev_append_commit_hash_key).unwrap())
.expect("Addition only fails if the tweak is the inverse of the key. This is not possible when the tweak commits to the key.")
}
-/// Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation public key from its constituent parts. This is
-/// the public equivalend of derive_private_revocation_key - using only public keys to derive a
-/// public key instead of private keys.
-///
-/// Only the cheating participant owns a valid witness to propagate a revoked
-/// commitment transaction, thus per_commitment_point always come from cheater
-/// and revocation_base_point always come from punisher, which is the broadcaster
-/// of the transaction spending with this key knowledge.
-///
-/// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
-/// generated (ie our own).
-pub fn derive_public_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>,
- per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, countersignatory_revocation_base_point: &PublicKey)
--> PublicKey {
- let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
- let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
- sha.input(&countersignatory_revocation_base_point.serialize());
- sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
-
- Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
- };
- let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
- let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
- sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
- sha.input(&countersignatory_revocation_base_point.serialize());
-
- Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
- };
-
- let countersignatory_contrib = countersignatory_revocation_base_point.clone().mul_tweak(&secp_ctx, &Scalar::from_be_bytes(rev_append_commit_hash_key).unwrap())
- .expect("Multiplying a valid public key by a hash is expected to never fail per secp256k1 docs");
- let broadcaster_contrib = per_commitment_point.clone().mul_tweak(&secp_ctx, &Scalar::from_be_bytes(commit_append_rev_hash_key).unwrap())
- .expect("Multiplying a valid public key by a hash is expected to never fail per secp256k1 docs");
- countersignatory_contrib.combine(&broadcaster_contrib)
- .expect("Addition only fails if the tweak is the inverse of the key. This is not possible when the tweak commits to the key.")
-}
-
/// The set of public keys which are used in the creation of one commitment transaction.
/// These are derived from the channel base keys and per-commitment data.
///
/// channel basepoints via the new function, or they were obtained via
/// CommitmentTransaction.trust().keys() because we trusted the source of the
/// pre-calculated keys.
-#[derive(PartialEq, Eq, Clone)]
+#[derive(PartialEq, Eq, Clone, Debug)]
pub struct TxCreationKeys {
/// The broadcaster's per-commitment public key which was used to derive the other keys.
pub per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
/// The revocation key which is used to allow the broadcaster of the commitment
/// transaction to provide their counterparty the ability to punish them if they broadcast
/// an old state.
- pub revocation_key: PublicKey,
+ pub revocation_key: RevocationKey,
/// Broadcaster's HTLC Key
- pub broadcaster_htlc_key: PublicKey,
+ pub broadcaster_htlc_key: HtlcKey,
/// Countersignatory's HTLC Key
- pub countersignatory_htlc_key: PublicKey,
+ pub countersignatory_htlc_key: HtlcKey,
/// Broadcaster's Payment Key (which isn't allowed to be spent from for some delay)
- pub broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
+ pub broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: DelayedPaymentKey,
}
impl_writeable_tlv_based!(TxCreationKeys, {
});
/// One counterparty's public keys which do not change over the life of a channel.
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ChannelPublicKeys {
/// The public key which is used to sign all commitment transactions, as it appears in the
/// on-chain channel lock-in 2-of-2 multisig output.
/// revocation keys. This is combined with the per-commitment-secret generated by the
/// counterparty to create a secret which the counterparty can reveal to revoke previous
/// states.
- pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
+ pub revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint,
/// The public key on which the non-broadcaster (ie the countersignatory) receives an immediately
/// spendable primary channel balance on the broadcaster's commitment transaction. This key is
/// static across every commitment transaction.
/// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment payment
/// public key which receives non-HTLC-encumbered funds which are only available for spending
/// after some delay (or can be claimed via the revocation path).
- pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
+ pub delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint,
/// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment public key
/// which is used to encumber HTLC-in-flight outputs.
- pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
+ pub htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint,
}
impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelPublicKeys, {
impl TxCreationKeys {
/// Create per-state keys from channel base points and the per-commitment point.
/// Key set is asymmetric and can't be used as part of counter-signatory set of transactions.
- pub fn derive_new<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, broadcaster_delayed_payment_base: &PublicKey, broadcaster_htlc_base: &PublicKey, countersignatory_revocation_base: &PublicKey, countersignatory_htlc_base: &PublicKey) -> TxCreationKeys {
+ pub fn derive_new<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, broadcaster_delayed_payment_base: &DelayedPaymentBasepoint, broadcaster_htlc_base: &HtlcBasepoint, countersignatory_revocation_base: &RevocationBasepoint, countersignatory_htlc_base: &HtlcBasepoint) -> TxCreationKeys {
TxCreationKeys {
per_commitment_point: per_commitment_point.clone(),
- revocation_key: derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &countersignatory_revocation_base),
- broadcaster_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &broadcaster_htlc_base),
- countersignatory_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &countersignatory_htlc_base),
- broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &broadcaster_delayed_payment_base),
+ revocation_key: RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &countersignatory_revocation_base, &per_commitment_point),
+ broadcaster_htlc_key: HtlcKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &broadcaster_htlc_base, &per_commitment_point),
+ countersignatory_htlc_key: HtlcKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &countersignatory_htlc_base, &per_commitment_point),
+ broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: DelayedPaymentKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &broadcaster_delayed_payment_base, &per_commitment_point),
}
}
}
/// The maximum length of a script returned by get_revokeable_redeemscript.
-// Calculated as 6 bytes of opcodes, 1 byte push plus 2 bytes for contest_delay, and two public
-// keys of 33 bytes (+ 1 push).
-pub const REVOKEABLE_REDEEMSCRIPT_MAX_LENGTH: usize = 6 + 3 + 34*2;
+// Calculated as 6 bytes of opcodes, 1 byte push plus 3 bytes for contest_delay, and two public
+// keys of 33 bytes (+ 1 push). Generally, pushes are only 2 bytes (for values below 0x7fff, i.e.
+// around 7 months), however, a 7 month contest delay shouldn't result in being unable to reclaim
+// on-chain funds.
+pub const REVOKEABLE_REDEEMSCRIPT_MAX_LENGTH: usize = 6 + 4 + 34*2;
/// A script either spendable by the revocation
/// key or the broadcaster_delayed_payment_key and satisfying the relative-locktime OP_CSV constrain.
/// Encumbering a `to_holder` output on a commitment transaction or 2nd-stage HTLC transactions.
-pub fn get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key: &PublicKey, contest_delay: u16, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
+pub fn get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key: &RevocationKey, contest_delay: u16, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: &DelayedPaymentKey) -> ScriptBuf {
let res = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
- .push_slice(&revocation_key.serialize())
+ .push_slice(&revocation_key.to_public_key().serialize())
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
.push_int(contest_delay as i64)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
- .push_slice(&broadcaster_delayed_payment_key.serialize())
+ .push_slice(&broadcaster_delayed_payment_key.to_public_key().serialize())
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
.into_script();
res
}
+/// Returns the script for the counterparty's output on a holder's commitment transaction based on
+/// the channel type.
+pub fn get_counterparty_payment_script(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures, payment_key: &PublicKey) -> ScriptBuf {
+ if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
+ get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript(payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh()
+ } else {
+ ScriptBuf::new_v0_p2wpkh(&WPubkeyHash::hash(&payment_key.serialize()))
+ }
+}
+
/// Information about an HTLC as it appears in a commitment transaction
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct HTLCOutputInCommitment {
});
#[inline]
-pub(crate) fn get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures, broadcaster_htlc_key: &PublicKey, countersignatory_htlc_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
- let payment_hash160 = Ripemd160::hash(&htlc.payment_hash.0[..]).into_inner();
+pub(crate) fn get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures, broadcaster_htlc_key: &HtlcKey, countersignatory_htlc_key: &HtlcKey, revocation_key: &RevocationKey) -> ScriptBuf {
+ let payment_hash160 = Ripemd160::hash(&htlc.payment_hash.0[..]).to_byte_array();
if htlc.offered {
let mut bldr = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
- .push_slice(&PubkeyHash::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
+ .push_slice(PubkeyHash::hash(&revocation_key.to_public_key().serialize()))
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
- .push_slice(&countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
+ .push_slice(&countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize())
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE)
.push_int(32)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
.push_int(2)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
- .push_slice(&broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
+ .push_slice(&broadcaster_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize())
.push_int(2)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
} else {
let mut bldr = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
- .push_slice(&PubkeyHash::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
+ .push_slice(&PubkeyHash::hash(&revocation_key.to_public_key().serialize()))
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
- .push_slice(&countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
+ .push_slice(&countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize())
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE)
.push_int(32)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY)
.push_int(2)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
- .push_slice(&broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
+ .push_slice(&broadcaster_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize())
.push_int(2)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
/// Gets the witness redeemscript for an HTLC output in a commitment transaction. Note that htlc
/// does not need to have its previous_output_index filled.
#[inline]
-pub fn get_htlc_redeemscript(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Script {
+pub fn get_htlc_redeemscript(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> ScriptBuf {
get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, channel_type_features, &keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key)
}
/// Gets the redeemscript for a funding output from the two funding public keys.
/// Note that the order of funding public keys does not matter.
-pub fn make_funding_redeemscript(broadcaster: &PublicKey, countersignatory: &PublicKey) -> Script {
+pub fn make_funding_redeemscript(broadcaster: &PublicKey, countersignatory: &PublicKey) -> ScriptBuf {
let broadcaster_funding_key = broadcaster.serialize();
let countersignatory_funding_key = countersignatory.serialize();
make_funding_redeemscript_from_slices(&broadcaster_funding_key, &countersignatory_funding_key)
}
-pub(crate) fn make_funding_redeemscript_from_slices(broadcaster_funding_key: &[u8], countersignatory_funding_key: &[u8]) -> Script {
+pub(crate) fn make_funding_redeemscript_from_slices(broadcaster_funding_key: &[u8; 33], countersignatory_funding_key: &[u8; 33]) -> ScriptBuf {
let builder = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2);
if broadcaster_funding_key[..] < countersignatory_funding_key[..] {
builder.push_slice(broadcaster_funding_key)
///
/// Panics if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() (as such HTLCs do not appear in the
/// commitment transaction).
-pub fn build_htlc_transaction(commitment_txid: &Txid, feerate_per_kw: u32, contest_delay: u16, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Transaction {
+pub fn build_htlc_transaction(commitment_txid: &Txid, feerate_per_kw: u32, contest_delay: u16, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: &DelayedPaymentKey, revocation_key: &RevocationKey) -> Transaction {
let mut txins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
txins.push(build_htlc_input(commitment_txid, htlc, channel_type_features));
Transaction {
version: 2,
- lock_time: PackedLockTime(if htlc.offered { htlc.cltv_expiry } else { 0 }),
+ lock_time: LockTime::from_consensus(if htlc.offered { htlc.cltv_expiry } else { 0 }),
input: txins,
output: txouts,
}
txid: commitment_txid.clone(),
vout: htlc.transaction_output_index.expect("Can't build an HTLC transaction for a dust output"),
},
- script_sig: Script::new(),
+ script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(),
sequence: Sequence(if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 1 } else { 0 }),
witness: Witness::new(),
}
}
pub(crate) fn build_htlc_output(
- feerate_per_kw: u32, contest_delay: u16, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey
+ feerate_per_kw: u32, contest_delay: u16, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: &DelayedPaymentKey, revocation_key: &RevocationKey
) -> TxOut {
let weight = if htlc.offered {
htlc_timeout_tx_weight(channel_type_features)
/// Gets the witnessScript for the to_remote output when anchors are enabled.
#[inline]
-pub fn get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript(payment_point: &PublicKey) -> Script {
+pub fn get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript(payment_point: &PublicKey) -> ScriptBuf {
Builder::new()
- .push_slice(&payment_point.serialize()[..])
+ .push_slice(payment_point.serialize())
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY)
.push_int(1)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
/// <>
/// (empty vector required to satisfy compliance with MINIMALIF-standard rule)
#[inline]
-pub fn get_anchor_redeemscript(funding_pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Script {
- Builder::new().push_slice(&funding_pubkey.serialize()[..])
+pub fn get_anchor_redeemscript(funding_pubkey: &PublicKey) -> ScriptBuf {
+ Builder::new().push_slice(funding_pubkey.serialize())
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IFDUP)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_NOTIF)
///
/// Normally, this is converted to the broadcaster/countersignatory-organized DirectedChannelTransactionParameters
/// before use, via the as_holder_broadcastable and as_counterparty_broadcastable functions.
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ChannelTransactionParameters {
/// Holder public keys
pub holder_pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
}
/// Late-bound per-channel counterparty data used to build transactions.
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
/// Counter-party public keys
pub pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
self.counterparty_parameters.is_some() && self.funding_outpoint.is_some()
}
+ /// Whether the channel supports zero-fee HTLC transaction anchors.
+ pub(crate) fn supports_anchors(&self) -> bool {
+ self.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx()
+ }
+
/// Convert the holder/counterparty parameters to broadcaster/countersignatory-organized parameters,
/// given that the holder is the broadcaster.
///
impl<'a> DirectedChannelTransactionParameters<'a> {
/// Get the channel pubkeys for the broadcaster
- pub fn broadcaster_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
+ pub fn broadcaster_pubkeys(&self) -> &'a ChannelPublicKeys {
if self.holder_is_broadcaster {
&self.inner.holder_pubkeys
} else {
}
/// Get the channel pubkeys for the countersignatory
- pub fn countersignatory_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
+ pub fn countersignatory_pubkeys(&self) -> &'a ChannelPublicKeys {
if self.holder_is_broadcaster {
&self.inner.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
} else {
}
/// Whether to use anchors for this channel
- pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
+ pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> &'a ChannelTypeFeatures {
&self.inner.channel_type_features
}
}
/// Information needed to build and sign a holder's commitment transaction.
///
/// The transaction is only signed once we are ready to broadcast.
-#[derive(Clone)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
pub struct HolderCommitmentTransaction {
inner: CommitmentTransaction,
/// Our counterparty's signature for the transaction
let keys = TxCreationKeys {
per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
- revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
- broadcaster_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
- countersignatory_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
- broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
+ revocation_key: RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(dummy_key), &dummy_key),
+ broadcaster_htlc_key: HtlcKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &HtlcBasepoint::from(dummy_key), &dummy_key),
+ countersignatory_htlc_key: HtlcKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &HtlcBasepoint::from(dummy_key), &dummy_key),
+ broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: DelayedPaymentKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(dummy_key), &dummy_key),
};
let channel_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
funding_pubkey: dummy_key.clone(),
- revocation_basepoint: dummy_key.clone(),
+ revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(dummy_key),
payment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
- delayed_payment_basepoint: dummy_key.clone(),
- htlc_basepoint: dummy_key.clone()
+ delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(dummy_key.clone()),
+ htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(dummy_key.clone())
};
let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
holder_pubkeys: channel_pubkeys.clone(),
}
/// A pre-built Bitcoin commitment transaction and its txid.
-#[derive(Clone)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
pub struct BuiltCommitmentTransaction {
/// The commitment transaction
pub transaction: Transaction,
pub struct ClosingTransaction {
to_holder_value_sat: u64,
to_counterparty_value_sat: u64,
- to_holder_script: Script,
- to_counterparty_script: Script,
+ to_holder_script: ScriptBuf,
+ to_counterparty_script: ScriptBuf,
built: Transaction,
}
pub fn new(
to_holder_value_sat: u64,
to_counterparty_value_sat: u64,
- to_holder_script: Script,
- to_counterparty_script: Script,
+ to_holder_script: ScriptBuf,
+ to_counterparty_script: ScriptBuf,
funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
) -> Self {
let built = build_closing_transaction(
impl<'a> TrustedClosingTransaction<'a> {
/// The pre-built Bitcoin commitment transaction
- pub fn built_transaction(&self) -> &Transaction {
+ pub fn built_transaction(&self) -> &'a Transaction {
&self.inner.built
}
///
/// This class can be used inside a signer implementation to generate a signature given the relevant
/// secret key.
-#[derive(Clone)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
pub struct CommitmentTransaction {
commitment_number: u64,
to_broadcaster_value_sat: u64,
fn make_transaction(obscured_commitment_transaction_number: u64, txins: Vec<TxIn>, outputs: Vec<TxOut>) -> Transaction {
Transaction {
version: 2,
- lock_time: PackedLockTime(((0x20 as u32) << 8 * 3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number & 0xffffffu64) as u32)),
+ lock_time: LockTime::from_consensus(((0x20 as u32) << 8 * 3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number & 0xffffffu64) as u32)),
input: txins,
output: outputs,
}
let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
ins.push(TxIn {
previous_output: channel_parameters.funding_outpoint(),
- script_sig: Script::new(),
+ script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(),
sequence: Sequence(((0x80 as u32) << 8 * 3)
| ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number >> 3 * 8) as u32)),
witness: Witness::new(),
self.commitment_number
}
+ /// The per commitment point used by the broadcaster.
+ pub fn per_commitment_point(&self) -> PublicKey {
+ self.keys.per_commitment_point
+ }
+
/// The value to be sent to the broadcaster
pub fn to_broadcaster_value_sat(&self) -> u64 {
self.to_broadcaster_value_sat
}
/// The pre-built Bitcoin commitment transaction
- pub fn built_transaction(&self) -> &BuiltCommitmentTransaction {
+ pub fn built_transaction(&self) -> &'a BuiltCommitmentTransaction {
&self.inner.built
}
/// The pre-calculated transaction creation public keys.
- pub fn keys(&self) -> &TxCreationKeys {
+ pub fn keys(&self) -> &'a TxCreationKeys {
&self.inner.keys
}
/// Should anchors be used.
- pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
+ pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> &'a ChannelTypeFeatures {
&self.inner.channel_type_features
}
Ok(ret)
}
- /// Gets a signed HTLC transaction given a preimage (for !htlc.offered) and the holder HTLC transaction signature.
- pub(crate) fn get_signed_htlc_tx(&self, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, htlc_index: usize, counterparty_signature: &Signature, signature: &Signature, preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Transaction {
- let inner = self.inner;
- let keys = &inner.keys;
- let txid = inner.built.txid;
- let this_htlc = &inner.htlcs[htlc_index];
+ /// Builds the second-level holder HTLC transaction for the HTLC with index `htlc_index`.
+ pub(crate) fn build_unsigned_htlc_tx(
+ &self, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, htlc_index: usize,
+ preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>,
+ ) -> Transaction {
+ let keys = &self.inner.keys;
+ let this_htlc = &self.inner.htlcs[htlc_index];
assert!(this_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some());
// if we don't have preimage for an HTLC-Success, we can't generate an HTLC transaction.
if !this_htlc.offered && preimage.is_none() { unreachable!(); }
// Further, we should never be provided the preimage for an HTLC-Timeout transaction.
if this_htlc.offered && preimage.is_some() { unreachable!(); }
- let mut htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, inner.feerate_per_kw, channel_parameters.contest_delay(), &this_htlc, &self.channel_type_features, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
+ build_htlc_transaction(
+ &self.inner.built.txid, self.inner.feerate_per_kw, channel_parameters.contest_delay(), &this_htlc,
+ &self.channel_type_features, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key
+ )
+ }
- let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc, &self.channel_type_features, &keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key);
- htlc_tx.input[0].witness = chan_utils::build_htlc_input_witness(
- signature, counterparty_signature, preimage, &htlc_redeemscript, &self.channel_type_features,
+ /// Builds the witness required to spend the input for the HTLC with index `htlc_index` in a
+ /// second-level holder HTLC transaction.
+ pub(crate) fn build_htlc_input_witness(
+ &self, htlc_index: usize, counterparty_signature: &Signature, signature: &Signature,
+ preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>
+ ) -> Witness {
+ let keys = &self.inner.keys;
+ let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(
+ &self.inner.htlcs[htlc_index], &self.channel_type_features, &keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
+ &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key
);
- htlc_tx
+ chan_utils::build_htlc_input_witness(
+ signature, counterparty_signature, preimage, &htlc_redeemscript, &self.channel_type_features,
+ )
}
/// Returns the index of the revokeable output, i.e. the `to_local` output sending funds to
/// The built transaction will allow fee bumping with RBF, and this method takes
/// `feerate_per_kw` as an input such that multiple copies of a justice transaction at different
/// fee rates may be built.
- pub fn build_to_local_justice_tx(&self, feerate_per_kw: u64, destination_script: Script)
+ pub fn build_to_local_justice_tx(&self, feerate_per_kw: u64, destination_script: ScriptBuf)
-> Result<Transaction, ()> {
let output_idx = self.revokeable_output_index().ok_or(())?;
let input = vec![TxIn {
txid: self.trust().txid(),
vout: output_idx as u32,
},
- script_sig: Script::new(),
+ script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(),
sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
witness: Witness::new(),
}];
}];
let mut justice_tx = Transaction {
version: 2,
- lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
+ lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
input,
output,
};
- let weight = justice_tx.weight() as u64 + WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT;
+ let weight = justice_tx.weight().to_wu() + WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT;
let fee = fee_for_weight(feerate_per_kw as u32, weight);
justice_tx.output[0].value = value.checked_sub(fee).ok_or(())?;
Ok(justice_tx)
sha.input(&countersignatory_payment_basepoint.serialize());
sha.input(&broadcaster_payment_basepoint.serialize());
}
- let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
+ let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).to_byte_array();
((res[26] as u64) << 5 * 8)
| ((res[27] as u64) << 4 * 8)
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, ChannelPublicKeys};
- use crate::{hex, chain};
- use crate::prelude::*;
+ use crate::chain;
use crate::ln::chan_utils::{get_htlc_redeemscript, get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript, CommitmentTransaction, TxCreationKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey, Secp256k1};
use crate::util::test_utils;
use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, SignerProvider};
- use bitcoin::{Network, Txid, Script};
+ use bitcoin::{Network, Txid, ScriptBuf};
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
+ use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
- use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
- use bitcoin::util::address::Payload;
+ use bitcoin::address::Payload;
use bitcoin::PublicKey as BitcoinPublicKey;
use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
+ #[allow(unused_imports)]
+ use crate::prelude::*;
+
struct TestCommitmentTxBuilder {
commitment_number: u64,
holder_funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
let signer = keys_provider.derive_channel_signer(3000, keys_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, 1_000_000, 0));
let counterparty_signer = keys_provider.derive_channel_signer(3000, keys_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, 1_000_000, 1));
let delayed_payment_base = &signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
- let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
let htlc_basepoint = &signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
let holder_pubkeys = signer.pubkeys();
assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 3);
assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[0].script_pubkey, get_htlc_redeemscript(&received_htlc, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), &keys).to_v0_p2wsh());
assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[1].script_pubkey, get_htlc_redeemscript(&offered_htlc, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), &keys).to_v0_p2wsh());
- assert_eq!(get_htlc_redeemscript(&received_htlc, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), &keys).to_v0_p2wsh().to_hex(),
+ assert_eq!(get_htlc_redeemscript(&received_htlc, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), &keys).to_v0_p2wsh().to_hex_string(),
"0020e43a7c068553003fe68fcae424fb7b28ec5ce48cd8b6744b3945631389bad2fb");
- assert_eq!(get_htlc_redeemscript(&offered_htlc, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), &keys).to_v0_p2wsh().to_hex(),
+ assert_eq!(get_htlc_redeemscript(&offered_htlc, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), &keys).to_v0_p2wsh().to_hex_string(),
"0020215d61bba56b19e9eadb6107f5a85d7f99c40f65992443f69229c290165bc00d");
// Generate broadcaster output and received and offered HTLC outputs, with anchors
assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 5);
assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[2].script_pubkey, get_htlc_redeemscript(&received_htlc, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), &keys).to_v0_p2wsh());
assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[3].script_pubkey, get_htlc_redeemscript(&offered_htlc, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), &keys).to_v0_p2wsh());
- assert_eq!(get_htlc_redeemscript(&received_htlc, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), &keys).to_v0_p2wsh().to_hex(),
+ assert_eq!(get_htlc_redeemscript(&received_htlc, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), &keys).to_v0_p2wsh().to_hex_string(),
"0020b70d0649c72b38756885c7a30908d912a7898dd5d79457a7280b8e9a20f3f2bc");
- assert_eq!(get_htlc_redeemscript(&offered_htlc, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), &keys).to_v0_p2wsh().to_hex(),
+ assert_eq!(get_htlc_redeemscript(&offered_htlc, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), &keys).to_v0_p2wsh().to_hex_string(),
"002087a3faeb1950a469c0e2db4a79b093a41b9526e5a6fc6ef5cb949bde3be379c7");
}
// Revokeable output not present (our balance is dust)
let tx = builder.build(0, 2000);
assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 1);
- assert!(tx.trust().build_to_local_justice_tx(253, Script::new()).is_err());
+ assert!(tx.trust().build_to_local_justice_tx(253, ScriptBuf::new()).is_err());
// Revokeable output present
let tx = builder.build(1000, 2000);
assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 2);
// Too high feerate
- assert!(tx.trust().build_to_local_justice_tx(100_000, Script::new()).is_err());
+ assert!(tx.trust().build_to_local_justice_tx(100_000, ScriptBuf::new()).is_err());
// Generate a random public key for destination script
let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(
- &hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100")
+ &<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100")
.unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
let pubkey_hash = BitcoinPublicKey::new(
PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(), &secret_key)).wpubkey_hash().unwrap();
- let destination_script = Script::new_v0_p2wpkh(&pubkey_hash);
+ let destination_script = ScriptBuf::new_v0_p2wpkh(&pubkey_hash);
let justice_tx = tx.trust().build_to_local_justice_tx(253, destination_script.clone()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(justice_tx.input.len(), 1);
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
}
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
}
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
}
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
}
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
}
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
}
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
}
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
}
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
}
}
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff