// licenses.
//! Various utilities for building scripts and deriving keys related to channels. These are
-//! largely of interest for those implementing chain::keysinterface::ChannelKeys message signing
-//! by hand.
+//! largely of interest for those implementing the traits on [`crate::sign`] by hand.
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
-use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,OutPoint,Transaction, SigHashType};
-use bitcoin::util::bip143;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,OutPoint,Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
+use bitcoin::util::sighash;
+use bitcoin::util::address::Payload;
use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use bitcoin::hashes::ripemd160::Hash as Ripemd160;
use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, PubkeyHash};
-use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
-use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
-use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable, Writer, MAX_BUF_SIZE};
-use util::byte_utils;
-
-use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature, Message};
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::Error as SecpError;
-use bitcoin::secp256k1;
-
-use std::cmp;
-use ln::chan_utils;
-use util::transaction_utils::sort_outputs;
-use ln::channel::INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER;
-use std::io::Read;
-use std::ops::Deref;
-use chain;
-
-const HTLC_OUTPUT_IN_COMMITMENT_SIZE: usize = 1 + 8 + 4 + 32 + 5;
-
-pub(crate) const MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 483;
-
-// This checks that the buffer size is greater than the maximum possible size for serialized HTLCS
-const _EXCESS_BUFFER_SIZE: usize = MAX_BUF_SIZE - MAX_HTLCS as usize * HTLC_OUTPUT_IN_COMMITMENT_SIZE;
+use crate::sign::EntropySource;
+use crate::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
+use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
+use crate::util::ser::{Readable, RequiredWrapper, Writeable, Writer};
+use crate::util::transaction_utils;
+
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey, Scalar};
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature, Message};
+use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, secp256k1, Sequence, Witness};
+use bitcoin::PublicKey as BitcoinPublicKey;
+
+use crate::io;
+use crate::prelude::*;
+use core::cmp;
+use crate::ln::chan_utils;
+use crate::util::transaction_utils::sort_outputs;
+use crate::ln::channel::{INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI};
+use core::ops::Deref;
+use crate::chain;
+use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
+use crate::util::crypto::{sign, sign_with_aux_rand};
+
+/// Maximum number of one-way in-flight HTLC (protocol-level value).
+pub const MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 483;
+/// The weight of a BIP141 witnessScript for a BOLT3's "offered HTLC output" on a commitment transaction, non-anchor variant.
+pub const OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT: usize = 133;
+/// The weight of a BIP141 witnessScript for a BOLT3's "offered HTLC output" on a commitment transaction, anchor variant.
+pub const OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT_ANCHORS: usize = 136;
+
+/// The weight of a BIP141 witnessScript for a BOLT3's "received HTLC output" can vary in function of its CLTV argument value.
+/// We define a range that encompasses both its non-anchors and anchors variants.
+pub(crate) const MIN_ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT: usize = 136;
+/// The weight of a BIP141 witnessScript for a BOLT3's "received HTLC output" can vary in function of its CLTV argument value.
+/// We define a range that encompasses both its non-anchors and anchors variants.
+/// This is the maximum post-anchor value.
+pub const MAX_ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT: usize = 143;
+
+/// The upper bound weight of an anchor input.
+pub const ANCHOR_INPUT_WITNESS_WEIGHT: u64 = 116;
+/// The upper bound weight of an HTLC timeout input from a commitment transaction with anchor
+/// outputs.
+pub const HTLC_TIMEOUT_INPUT_ANCHOR_WITNESS_WEIGHT: u64 = 288;
+/// The upper bound weight of an HTLC success input from a commitment transaction with anchor
+/// outputs.
+pub const HTLC_SUCCESS_INPUT_ANCHOR_WITNESS_WEIGHT: u64 = 327;
+
+/// Gets the weight for an HTLC-Success transaction.
+#[inline]
+pub fn htlc_success_tx_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
+ const HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 703;
+ const HTLC_SUCCESS_ANCHOR_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 706;
+ if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { HTLC_SUCCESS_ANCHOR_TX_WEIGHT } else { HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT }
+}
-pub(super) const HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 703;
-pub(super) const HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 663;
+/// Gets the weight for an HTLC-Timeout transaction.
+#[inline]
+pub fn htlc_timeout_tx_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
+ const HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 663;
+ const HTLC_TIMEOUT_ANCHOR_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 666;
+ if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { HTLC_TIMEOUT_ANCHOR_TX_WEIGHT } else { HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT }
+}
-#[derive(PartialEq)]
-pub(crate) enum HTLCType {
- AcceptedHTLC,
- OfferedHTLC
+/// Describes the type of HTLC claim as determined by analyzing the witness.
+#[derive(PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum HTLCClaim {
+ /// Claims an offered output on a commitment transaction through the timeout path.
+ OfferedTimeout,
+ /// Claims an offered output on a commitment transaction through the success path.
+ OfferedPreimage,
+ /// Claims an accepted output on a commitment transaction through the timeout path.
+ AcceptedTimeout,
+ /// Claims an accepted output on a commitment transaction through the success path.
+ AcceptedPreimage,
+ /// Claims an offered/accepted output on a commitment transaction through the revocation path.
+ Revocation,
}
-impl HTLCType {
- /// Check if a given tx witnessScript len matchs one of a pre-signed HTLC
- pub(crate) fn scriptlen_to_htlctype(witness_script_len: usize) -> Option<HTLCType> {
- if witness_script_len == 133 {
- Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC)
- } else if witness_script_len >= 136 && witness_script_len <= 139 {
- Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC)
+impl HTLCClaim {
+ /// Check if a given input witness attempts to claim a HTLC.
+ pub fn from_witness(witness: &Witness) -> Option<Self> {
+ debug_assert_eq!(OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT_ANCHORS, MIN_ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ if witness.len() < 2 {
+ return None;
+ }
+ let witness_script = witness.last().unwrap();
+ let second_to_last = witness.second_to_last().unwrap();
+ if witness_script.len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT {
+ if witness.len() == 3 && second_to_last.len() == 33 {
+ // <revocation sig> <revocationpubkey> <witness_script>
+ Some(Self::Revocation)
+ } else if witness.len() == 3 && second_to_last.len() == 32 {
+ // <remotehtlcsig> <payment_preimage> <witness_script>
+ Some(Self::OfferedPreimage)
+ } else if witness.len() == 5 && second_to_last.len() == 0 {
+ // 0 <remotehtlcsig> <localhtlcsig> <> <witness_script>
+ Some(Self::OfferedTimeout)
+ } else {
+ None
+ }
+ } else if witness_script.len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT_ANCHORS {
+ // It's possible for the weight of `offered_htlc_script` and `accepted_htlc_script` to
+ // match so we check for both here.
+ if witness.len() == 3 && second_to_last.len() == 33 {
+ // <revocation sig> <revocationpubkey> <witness_script>
+ Some(Self::Revocation)
+ } else if witness.len() == 3 && second_to_last.len() == 32 {
+ // <remotehtlcsig> <payment_preimage> <witness_script>
+ Some(Self::OfferedPreimage)
+ } else if witness.len() == 5 && second_to_last.len() == 0 {
+ // 0 <remotehtlcsig> <localhtlcsig> <> <witness_script>
+ Some(Self::OfferedTimeout)
+ } else if witness.len() == 3 && second_to_last.len() == 0 {
+ // <remotehtlcsig> <> <witness_script>
+ Some(Self::AcceptedTimeout)
+ } else if witness.len() == 5 && second_to_last.len() == 32 {
+ // 0 <remotehtlcsig> <localhtlcsig> <payment_preimage> <witness_script>
+ Some(Self::AcceptedPreimage)
+ } else {
+ None
+ }
+ } else if witness_script.len() > MIN_ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT &&
+ witness_script.len() <= MAX_ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT {
+ // Handle remaining range of ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
+ if witness.len() == 3 && second_to_last.len() == 33 {
+ // <revocation sig> <revocationpubkey> <witness_script>
+ Some(Self::Revocation)
+ } else if witness.len() == 3 && second_to_last.len() == 0 {
+ // <remotehtlcsig> <> <witness_script>
+ Some(Self::AcceptedTimeout)
+ } else if witness.len() == 5 && second_to_last.len() == 32 {
+ // 0 <remotehtlcsig> <localhtlcsig> <payment_preimage> <witness_script>
+ Some(Self::AcceptedPreimage)
+ } else {
+ None
+ }
} else {
None
}
res
}
+/// Build a closing transaction
+pub fn build_closing_transaction(to_holder_value_sat: u64, to_counterparty_value_sat: u64, to_holder_script: Script, to_counterparty_script: Script, funding_outpoint: OutPoint) -> Transaction {
+ let txins = {
+ let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
+ ins.push(TxIn {
+ previous_output: funding_outpoint,
+ script_sig: Script::new(),
+ sequence: Sequence::MAX,
+ witness: Witness::new(),
+ });
+ ins
+ };
+
+ let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, ())> = Vec::new();
+
+ if to_counterparty_value_sat > 0 {
+ txouts.push((TxOut {
+ script_pubkey: to_counterparty_script,
+ value: to_counterparty_value_sat
+ }, ()));
+ }
+
+ if to_holder_value_sat > 0 {
+ txouts.push((TxOut {
+ script_pubkey: to_holder_script,
+ value: to_holder_value_sat
+ }, ()));
+ }
+
+ transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |_, _| { cmp::Ordering::Equal }); // Ordering doesnt matter if they used our pubkey...
+
+ let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
+ for out in txouts.drain(..) {
+ outputs.push(out.0);
+ }
+
+ Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
+ input: txins,
+ output: outputs,
+ }
+}
+
/// Implements the per-commitment secret storage scheme from
-/// [BOLT 3](https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/dcbf8583976df087c79c3ce0b535311212e6812d/03-transactions.md#efficient-per-commitment-secret-storage).
+/// [BOLT 3](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/dcbf8583976df087c79c3ce0b535311212e6812d/03-transactions.md#efficient-per-commitment-secret-storage).
///
-/// Allows us to keep track of all of the revocation secrets of counterarties in just 50*32 bytes
+/// Allows us to keep track of all of the revocation secrets of our counterparty in just 50*32 bytes
/// or so.
#[derive(Clone)]
-pub(crate) struct CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
+pub struct CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
}
+impl Eq for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {}
impl PartialEq for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
}
impl CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
- pub(crate) fn new() -> Self {
+ /// Creates a new empty `CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets` structure.
+ pub fn new() -> Self {
Self { old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49], }
}
48
}
- pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
+ /// Returns the minimum index of all stored secrets. Note that indexes start
+ /// at 1 << 48 and get decremented by one for each new secret.
+ pub fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
//TODO This can be optimized?
let mut min = 1 << 48;
for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
res
}
- pub(crate) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), ()> {
+ /// Inserts the `secret` at `idx`. Returns `Ok(())` if the secret
+ /// was generated in accordance with BOLT 3 and is consistent with previous secrets.
+ pub fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), ()> {
let pos = Self::place_secret(idx);
for i in 0..pos {
let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
Ok(())
}
- /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
- pub(crate) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
+ /// Returns the secret at `idx`.
+ /// Returns `None` if `idx` is < [`CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::get_min_seen_secret`].
+ pub fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
return Some(Self::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
}
impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
writer.write_all(secret)?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
+ writer.write_all(&idx.to_be_bytes())?;
}
+ write_tlv_fields!(writer, {});
Ok(())
}
}
impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
- fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
*secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
*idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
}
-
+ read_tlv_fields!(reader, {});
Ok(Self { old_secrets })
}
}
/// Derives a per-commitment-transaction private key (eg an htlc key or delayed_payment key)
/// from the base secret and the per_commitment_point.
-///
-/// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
-/// generated (ie our own).
-pub fn derive_private_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, SecpError> {
+pub fn derive_private_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_secret: &SecretKey) -> SecretKey {
let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
sha.input(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret).serialize());
let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
- let mut key = base_secret.clone();
- key.add_assign(&res)?;
- Ok(key)
+ base_secret.clone().add_tweak(&Scalar::from_be_bytes(res).unwrap())
+ .expect("Addition only fails if the tweak is the inverse of the key. This is not possible when the tweak contains the hash of the key.")
}
/// Derives a per-commitment-transaction public key (eg an htlc key or a delayed_payment key)
/// from the base point and the per_commitment_key. This is the public equivalent of
/// derive_private_key - using only public keys to derive a public key instead of private keys.
-///
-/// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
-/// generated (ie our own).
-pub fn derive_public_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, SecpError> {
+pub fn derive_public_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_point: &PublicKey) -> PublicKey {
let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
sha.input(&base_point.serialize());
let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
- let hashkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&res)?);
+ let hashkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx,
+ &SecretKey::from_slice(&res).expect("Hashes should always be valid keys unless SHA-256 is broken"));
base_point.combine(&hashkey)
+ .expect("Addition only fails if the tweak is the inverse of the key. This is not possible when the tweak contains the hash of the key.")
}
/// Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation key from its constituent parts.
///
-/// Only the cheating participant owns a valid witness to propagate a revoked
+/// Only the cheating participant owns a valid witness to propagate a revoked
/// commitment transaction, thus per_commitment_secret always come from cheater
/// and revocation_base_secret always come from punisher, which is the broadcaster
/// of the transaction spending with this key knowledge.
-///
-/// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
-/// generated (ie our own).
-pub fn derive_private_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_secret: &SecretKey, countersignatory_revocation_base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, SecpError> {
+pub fn derive_private_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>,
+ per_commitment_secret: &SecretKey, countersignatory_revocation_base_secret: &SecretKey)
+-> SecretKey {
let countersignatory_revocation_base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &countersignatory_revocation_base_secret);
let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
};
- let mut countersignatory_contrib = countersignatory_revocation_base_secret.clone();
- countersignatory_contrib.mul_assign(&rev_append_commit_hash_key)?;
- let mut broadcaster_contrib = per_commitment_secret.clone();
- broadcaster_contrib.mul_assign(&commit_append_rev_hash_key)?;
- countersignatory_contrib.add_assign(&broadcaster_contrib[..])?;
- Ok(countersignatory_contrib)
+ let countersignatory_contrib = countersignatory_revocation_base_secret.clone().mul_tweak(&Scalar::from_be_bytes(rev_append_commit_hash_key).unwrap())
+ .expect("Multiplying a secret key by a hash is expected to never fail per secp256k1 docs");
+ let broadcaster_contrib = per_commitment_secret.clone().mul_tweak(&Scalar::from_be_bytes(commit_append_rev_hash_key).unwrap())
+ .expect("Multiplying a secret key by a hash is expected to never fail per secp256k1 docs");
+ countersignatory_contrib.add_tweak(&Scalar::from_be_bytes(broadcaster_contrib.secret_bytes()).unwrap())
+ .expect("Addition only fails if the tweak is the inverse of the key. This is not possible when the tweak commits to the key.")
}
/// Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation public key from its constituent parts. This is
/// the public equivalend of derive_private_revocation_key - using only public keys to derive a
/// public key instead of private keys.
///
-/// Only the cheating participant owns a valid witness to propagate a revoked
+/// Only the cheating participant owns a valid witness to propagate a revoked
/// commitment transaction, thus per_commitment_point always come from cheater
/// and revocation_base_point always come from punisher, which is the broadcaster
/// of the transaction spending with this key knowledge.
///
/// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
/// generated (ie our own).
-pub fn derive_public_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, countersignatory_revocation_base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, SecpError> {
+pub fn derive_public_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>,
+ per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, countersignatory_revocation_base_point: &PublicKey)
+-> PublicKey {
let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
sha.input(&countersignatory_revocation_base_point.serialize());
Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
};
- let mut countersignatory_contrib = countersignatory_revocation_base_point.clone();
- countersignatory_contrib.mul_assign(&secp_ctx, &rev_append_commit_hash_key)?;
- let mut broadcaster_contrib = per_commitment_point.clone();
- broadcaster_contrib.mul_assign(&secp_ctx, &commit_append_rev_hash_key)?;
+ let countersignatory_contrib = countersignatory_revocation_base_point.clone().mul_tweak(&secp_ctx, &Scalar::from_be_bytes(rev_append_commit_hash_key).unwrap())
+ .expect("Multiplying a valid public key by a hash is expected to never fail per secp256k1 docs");
+ let broadcaster_contrib = per_commitment_point.clone().mul_tweak(&secp_ctx, &Scalar::from_be_bytes(commit_append_rev_hash_key).unwrap())
+ .expect("Multiplying a valid public key by a hash is expected to never fail per secp256k1 docs");
countersignatory_contrib.combine(&broadcaster_contrib)
+ .expect("Addition only fails if the tweak is the inverse of the key. This is not possible when the tweak commits to the key.")
}
/// The set of public keys which are used in the creation of one commitment transaction.
/// channel basepoints via the new function, or they were obtained via
/// CommitmentTransaction.trust().keys() because we trusted the source of the
/// pre-calculated keys.
-#[derive(PartialEq, Clone)]
+#[derive(PartialEq, Eq, Clone)]
pub struct TxCreationKeys {
/// The broadcaster's per-commitment public key which was used to derive the other keys.
pub per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
/// Broadcaster's Payment Key (which isn't allowed to be spent from for some delay)
pub broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
}
-impl_writeable!(TxCreationKeys, 33*6,
- { per_commitment_point, revocation_key, broadcaster_htlc_key, countersignatory_htlc_key, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key });
+
+impl_writeable_tlv_based!(TxCreationKeys, {
+ (0, per_commitment_point, required),
+ (2, revocation_key, required),
+ (4, broadcaster_htlc_key, required),
+ (6, countersignatory_htlc_key, required),
+ (8, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, required),
+});
/// One counterparty's public keys which do not change over the life of a channel.
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ChannelPublicKeys {
/// The public key which is used to sign all commitment transactions, as it appears in the
/// on-chain channel lock-in 2-of-2 multisig output.
pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
}
-impl_writeable!(ChannelPublicKeys, 33*5, {
- funding_pubkey,
- revocation_basepoint,
- payment_point,
- delayed_payment_basepoint,
- htlc_basepoint
+impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelPublicKeys, {
+ (0, funding_pubkey, required),
+ (2, revocation_basepoint, required),
+ (4, payment_point, required),
+ (6, delayed_payment_basepoint, required),
+ (8, htlc_basepoint, required),
});
-
impl TxCreationKeys {
/// Create per-state keys from channel base points and the per-commitment point.
/// Key set is asymmetric and can't be used as part of counter-signatory set of transactions.
- pub fn derive_new<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, broadcaster_delayed_payment_base: &PublicKey, broadcaster_htlc_base: &PublicKey, countersignatory_revocation_base: &PublicKey, countersignatory_htlc_base: &PublicKey) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, SecpError> {
- Ok(TxCreationKeys {
+ pub fn derive_new<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, broadcaster_delayed_payment_base: &PublicKey, broadcaster_htlc_base: &PublicKey, countersignatory_revocation_base: &PublicKey, countersignatory_htlc_base: &PublicKey) -> TxCreationKeys {
+ TxCreationKeys {
per_commitment_point: per_commitment_point.clone(),
- revocation_key: derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &countersignatory_revocation_base)?,
- broadcaster_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &broadcaster_htlc_base)?,
- countersignatory_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &countersignatory_htlc_base)?,
- broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &broadcaster_delayed_payment_base)?,
- })
+ revocation_key: derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &countersignatory_revocation_base),
+ broadcaster_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &broadcaster_htlc_base),
+ countersignatory_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &countersignatory_htlc_base),
+ broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &broadcaster_delayed_payment_base),
+ }
}
/// Generate per-state keys from channel static keys.
/// Key set is asymmetric and can't be used as part of counter-signatory set of transactions.
- pub fn from_channel_static_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, broadcaster_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, countersignatory_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, SecpError> {
+ pub fn from_channel_static_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, broadcaster_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, countersignatory_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> TxCreationKeys {
TxCreationKeys::derive_new(
&secp_ctx,
&per_commitment_point,
}
}
+/// The maximum length of a script returned by get_revokeable_redeemscript.
+// Calculated as 6 bytes of opcodes, 1 byte push plus 2 bytes for contest_delay, and two public
+// keys of 33 bytes (+ 1 push).
+pub const REVOKEABLE_REDEEMSCRIPT_MAX_LENGTH: usize = 6 + 3 + 34*2;
+
/// A script either spendable by the revocation
/// key or the broadcaster_delayed_payment_key and satisfying the relative-locktime OP_CSV constrain.
/// Encumbering a `to_holder` output on a commitment transaction or 2nd-stage HTLC transactions.
pub fn get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key: &PublicKey, contest_delay: u16, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
- Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
+ let res = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
.push_slice(&revocation_key.serialize())
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
.push_int(contest_delay as i64)
.push_slice(&broadcaster_delayed_payment_key.serialize())
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
- .into_script()
+ .into_script();
+ debug_assert!(res.len() <= REVOKEABLE_REDEEMSCRIPT_MAX_LENGTH);
+ res
}
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
/// Information about an HTLC as it appears in a commitment transaction
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct HTLCOutputInCommitment {
/// Whether the HTLC was "offered" (ie outbound in relation to this commitment transaction).
/// Note that this is not the same as whether it is ountbound *from us*. To determine that you
pub transaction_output_index: Option<u32>,
}
-impl_writeable!(HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLC_OUTPUT_IN_COMMITMENT_SIZE, {
- offered,
- amount_msat,
- cltv_expiry,
- payment_hash,
- transaction_output_index
+impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCOutputInCommitment, {
+ (0, offered, required),
+ (2, amount_msat, required),
+ (4, cltv_expiry, required),
+ (6, payment_hash, required),
+ (8, transaction_output_index, option),
});
#[inline]
-pub(crate) fn get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, broadcaster_htlc_key: &PublicKey, countersignatory_htlc_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
+pub(crate) fn get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures, broadcaster_htlc_key: &PublicKey, countersignatory_htlc_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
let payment_hash160 = Ripemd160::hash(&htlc.payment_hash.0[..]).into_inner();
if htlc.offered {
- Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
+ let mut bldr = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
.push_slice(&PubkeyHash::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
.push_slice(&payment_hash160)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
- .into_script()
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF);
+ if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
+ bldr = bldr.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_1)
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP);
+ }
+ bldr.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
+ .into_script()
} else {
- Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
+ let mut bldr = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
.push_slice(&PubkeyHash::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CLTV)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
- .into_script()
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF);
+ if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
+ bldr = bldr.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_1)
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP);
+ }
+ bldr.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
+ .into_script()
}
}
/// Gets the witness redeemscript for an HTLC output in a commitment transaction. Note that htlc
/// does not need to have its previous_output_index filled.
#[inline]
-pub fn get_htlc_redeemscript(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Script {
- get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key)
+pub fn get_htlc_redeemscript(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Script {
+ get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, channel_type_features, &keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key)
}
/// Gets the redeemscript for a funding output from the two funding public keys.
let broadcaster_funding_key = broadcaster.serialize();
let countersignatory_funding_key = countersignatory.serialize();
+ make_funding_redeemscript_from_slices(&broadcaster_funding_key, &countersignatory_funding_key)
+}
+
+pub(crate) fn make_funding_redeemscript_from_slices(broadcaster_funding_key: &[u8], countersignatory_funding_key: &[u8]) -> Script {
let builder = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2);
if broadcaster_funding_key[..] < countersignatory_funding_key[..] {
- builder.push_slice(&broadcaster_funding_key)
- .push_slice(&countersignatory_funding_key)
+ builder.push_slice(broadcaster_funding_key)
+ .push_slice(countersignatory_funding_key)
} else {
- builder.push_slice(&countersignatory_funding_key)
- .push_slice(&broadcaster_funding_key)
+ builder.push_slice(countersignatory_funding_key)
+ .push_slice(broadcaster_funding_key)
}.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2).push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script()
}
-/// panics if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none()!
-pub fn build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash: &Txid, feerate_per_kw: u32, contest_delay: u16, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Transaction {
+/// Builds an unsigned HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transaction from the given channel and HTLC
+/// parameters. This is used by [`TrustedCommitmentTransaction::get_htlc_sigs`] to fetch the
+/// transaction which needs signing, and can be used to construct an HTLC transaction which is
+/// broadcastable given a counterparty HTLC signature.
+///
+/// Panics if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() (as such HTLCs do not appear in the
+/// commitment transaction).
+pub fn build_htlc_transaction(commitment_txid: &Txid, feerate_per_kw: u32, contest_delay: u16, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Transaction {
let mut txins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
- txins.push(TxIn {
+ txins.push(build_htlc_input(commitment_txid, htlc, channel_type_features));
+
+ let mut txouts: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
+ txouts.push(build_htlc_output(
+ feerate_per_kw, contest_delay, htlc, channel_type_features,
+ broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, revocation_key
+ ));
+
+ Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: PackedLockTime(if htlc.offered { htlc.cltv_expiry } else { 0 }),
+ input: txins,
+ output: txouts,
+ }
+}
+
+pub(crate) fn build_htlc_input(commitment_txid: &Txid, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> TxIn {
+ TxIn {
previous_output: OutPoint {
- txid: prev_hash.clone(),
+ txid: commitment_txid.clone(),
vout: htlc.transaction_output_index.expect("Can't build an HTLC transaction for a dust output"),
},
script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: 0,
- witness: Vec::new(),
- });
+ sequence: Sequence(if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 1 } else { 0 }),
+ witness: Witness::new(),
+ }
+}
- let total_fee = if htlc.offered {
- feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000
- } else {
- feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000
- };
+pub(crate) fn build_htlc_output(
+ feerate_per_kw: u32, contest_delay: u16, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey
+) -> TxOut {
+ let weight = if htlc.offered {
+ htlc_timeout_tx_weight(channel_type_features)
+ } else {
+ htlc_success_tx_weight(channel_type_features)
+ };
+ let output_value = if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() && !channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx() {
+ htlc.amount_msat / 1000
+ } else {
+ let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * weight / 1000;
+ htlc.amount_msat / 1000 - total_fee
+ };
- let mut txouts: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
- txouts.push(TxOut {
+ TxOut {
script_pubkey: get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key, contest_delay, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(),
- value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 - total_fee //TODO: BOLT 3 does not specify if we should add amount_msat before dividing or if we should divide by 1000 before subtracting (as we do here)
- });
+ value: output_value,
+ }
+}
- Transaction {
- version: 2,
- lock_time: if htlc.offered { htlc.cltv_expiry } else { 0 },
- input: txins,
- output: txouts,
+/// Returns the witness required to satisfy and spend a HTLC input.
+pub fn build_htlc_input_witness(
+ local_sig: &Signature, remote_sig: &Signature, preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>,
+ redeem_script: &Script, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
+) -> Witness {
+ let remote_sighash_type = if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
+ EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay
+ } else {
+ EcdsaSighashType::All
+ };
+
+ let mut witness = Witness::new();
+ // First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element.
+ witness.push(vec![]);
+ witness.push_bitcoin_signature(&remote_sig.serialize_der(), remote_sighash_type);
+ witness.push_bitcoin_signature(&local_sig.serialize_der(), EcdsaSighashType::All);
+ if let Some(preimage) = preimage {
+ witness.push(preimage.0.to_vec());
+ } else {
+ // Due to BIP146 (MINIMALIF) this must be a zero-length element to relay.
+ witness.push(vec![]);
+ }
+ witness.push(redeem_script.to_bytes());
+ witness
+}
+
+/// Pre-anchors channel type features did not use to get serialized in the following six structs:
+/// — [`ChannelTransactionParameters`]
+/// — [`CommitmentTransaction`]
+/// — [`CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput`]
+/// — [`CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput`]
+/// — [`HolderHTLCOutput`]
+/// — [`HolderFundingOutput`]
+///
+/// To ensure a forwards-compatible serialization, we use odd TLV fields. However, if new features
+/// are used that could break security, where old signers should be prevented from handling the
+/// serialized data, an optional even-field TLV will be used as a stand-in to break compatibility.
+///
+/// This method determines whether or not that option needs to be set based on the chanenl type
+/// features, and returns it.
+///
+/// [`CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput`]: crate::chain::package::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput
+/// [`CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput`]: crate::chain::package::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput
+/// [`HolderHTLCOutput`]: crate::chain::package::HolderHTLCOutput
+/// [`HolderFundingOutput`]: crate::chain::package::HolderFundingOutput
+pub(crate) fn legacy_deserialization_prevention_marker_for_channel_type_features(features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> Option<()> {
+ let mut legacy_version_bit_set = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
+ legacy_version_bit_set.set_scid_privacy_required();
+ legacy_version_bit_set.set_zero_conf_required();
+
+ if features.is_subset(&legacy_version_bit_set) {
+ None
+ } else {
+ Some(())
}
}
+/// Gets the witnessScript for the to_remote output when anchors are enabled.
+#[inline]
+pub fn get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript(payment_point: &PublicKey) -> Script {
+ Builder::new()
+ .push_slice(&payment_point.serialize()[..])
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY)
+ .push_int(1)
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
+ .into_script()
+}
+
+/// Gets the witnessScript for an anchor output from the funding public key.
+/// The witness in the spending input must be:
+/// <BIP 143 funding_signature>
+/// After 16 blocks of confirmation, an alternative satisfying witness could be:
+/// <>
+/// (empty vector required to satisfy compliance with MINIMALIF-standard rule)
+#[inline]
+pub fn get_anchor_redeemscript(funding_pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Script {
+ Builder::new().push_slice(&funding_pubkey.serialize()[..])
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IFDUP)
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_NOTIF)
+ .push_int(16)
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
+ .into_script()
+}
+
+/// Locates the output with an anchor script paying to `funding_pubkey` within `commitment_tx`.
+pub(crate) fn get_anchor_output<'a>(commitment_tx: &'a Transaction, funding_pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Option<(u32, &'a TxOut)> {
+ let anchor_script = chan_utils::get_anchor_redeemscript(funding_pubkey).to_v0_p2wsh();
+ commitment_tx.output.iter().enumerate()
+ .find(|(_, txout)| txout.script_pubkey == anchor_script)
+ .map(|(idx, txout)| (idx as u32, txout))
+}
+
+/// Returns the witness required to satisfy and spend an anchor input.
+pub fn build_anchor_input_witness(funding_key: &PublicKey, funding_sig: &Signature) -> Witness {
+ let anchor_redeem_script = chan_utils::get_anchor_redeemscript(funding_key);
+ let mut ret = Witness::new();
+ ret.push_bitcoin_signature(&funding_sig.serialize_der(), EcdsaSighashType::All);
+ ret.push(anchor_redeem_script.as_bytes());
+ ret
+}
+
/// Per-channel data used to build transactions in conjunction with the per-commitment data (CommitmentTransaction).
/// The fields are organized by holder/counterparty.
///
/// Normally, this is converted to the broadcaster/countersignatory-organized DirectedChannelTransactionParameters
/// before use, via the as_holder_broadcastable and as_counterparty_broadcastable functions.
-#[derive(Clone)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ChannelTransactionParameters {
/// Holder public keys
pub holder_pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
pub counterparty_parameters: Option<CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters>,
/// The late-bound funding outpoint
pub funding_outpoint: Option<chain::transaction::OutPoint>,
+ /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open. For old objects where this field
+ /// wasn't serialized, it will default to static_remote_key at deserialization.
+ pub channel_type_features: ChannelTypeFeatures
}
/// Late-bound per-channel counterparty data used to build transactions.
-#[derive(Clone)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
/// Counter-party public keys
pub pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
}
}
-impl_writeable!(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, 0, {
- pubkeys,
- selected_contest_delay
+impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, {
+ (0, pubkeys, required),
+ (2, selected_contest_delay, required),
});
-impl_writeable!(ChannelTransactionParameters, 0, {
- holder_pubkeys,
- holder_selected_contest_delay,
- is_outbound_from_holder,
- counterparty_parameters,
- funding_outpoint
-});
+impl Writeable for ChannelTransactionParameters {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
+ let legacy_deserialization_prevention_marker = legacy_deserialization_prevention_marker_for_channel_type_features(&self.channel_type_features);
+ write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
+ (0, self.holder_pubkeys, required),
+ (2, self.holder_selected_contest_delay, required),
+ (4, self.is_outbound_from_holder, required),
+ (6, self.counterparty_parameters, option),
+ (8, self.funding_outpoint, option),
+ (10, legacy_deserialization_prevention_marker, option),
+ (11, self.channel_type_features, required),
+ });
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+impl Readable for ChannelTransactionParameters {
+ fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ let mut holder_pubkeys = RequiredWrapper(None);
+ let mut holder_selected_contest_delay = RequiredWrapper(None);
+ let mut is_outbound_from_holder = RequiredWrapper(None);
+ let mut counterparty_parameters = None;
+ let mut funding_outpoint = None;
+ let mut _legacy_deserialization_prevention_marker: Option<()> = None;
+ let mut channel_type_features = None;
+
+ read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
+ (0, holder_pubkeys, required),
+ (2, holder_selected_contest_delay, required),
+ (4, is_outbound_from_holder, required),
+ (6, counterparty_parameters, option),
+ (8, funding_outpoint, option),
+ (10, _legacy_deserialization_prevention_marker, option),
+ (11, channel_type_features, option),
+ });
+
+ let mut additional_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
+ additional_features.set_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
+ chain::package::verify_channel_type_features(&channel_type_features, Some(&additional_features))?;
+
+ Ok(Self {
+ holder_pubkeys: holder_pubkeys.0.unwrap(),
+ holder_selected_contest_delay: holder_selected_contest_delay.0.unwrap(),
+ is_outbound_from_holder: is_outbound_from_holder.0.unwrap(),
+ counterparty_parameters,
+ funding_outpoint,
+ channel_type_features: channel_type_features.unwrap_or(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key())
+ })
+ }
+}
/// Static channel fields used to build transactions given per-commitment fields, organized by
/// broadcaster/countersignatory.
pub fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
self.inner.funding_outpoint.unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint()
}
+
+ /// Whether to use anchors for this channel
+ pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
+ &self.inner.channel_type_features
+ }
}
/// Information needed to build and sign a holder's commitment transaction.
fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target { &self.inner }
}
+impl Eq for HolderCommitmentTransaction {}
impl PartialEq for HolderCommitmentTransaction {
// We dont care whether we are signed in equality comparison
fn eq(&self, o: &Self) -> bool {
}
}
-impl_writeable!(HolderCommitmentTransaction, 0, {
- inner, counterparty_sig, counterparty_htlc_sigs, holder_sig_first
+impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HolderCommitmentTransaction, {
+ (0, inner, required),
+ (2, counterparty_sig, required),
+ (4, holder_sig_first, required),
+ (6, counterparty_htlc_sigs, vec_type),
});
impl HolderCommitmentTransaction {
#[cfg(test)]
- pub fn dummy() -> Self {
+ pub fn dummy(htlcs: &mut Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())>) -> Self {
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
- let dummy_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&secp256k1::Message::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
+ let dummy_sig = sign(&secp_ctx, &secp256k1::Message::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
let keys = TxCreationKeys {
per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
holder_selected_contest_delay: 0,
is_outbound_from_holder: false,
counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters { pubkeys: channel_pubkeys.clone(), selected_contest_delay: 0 }),
- funding_outpoint: Some(chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: Default::default(), index: 0 })
+ funding_outpoint: Some(chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: Txid::all_zeros(), index: 0 }),
+ channel_type_features: ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(),
};
- let mut htlcs_with_aux: Vec<(_, ())> = Vec::new();
- let inner = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(0, 0, 0, keys, 0, &mut htlcs_with_aux, &channel_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable());
+ let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
+ for _ in 0..htlcs.len() {
+ counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(dummy_sig);
+ }
+ let inner = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(0, 0, 0, dummy_key.clone(), dummy_key.clone(), keys, 0, htlcs, &channel_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable());
+ htlcs.sort_by_key(|htlc| htlc.0.transaction_output_index);
HolderCommitmentTransaction {
inner,
counterparty_sig: dummy_sig,
- counterparty_htlc_sigs: Vec::new(),
+ counterparty_htlc_sigs,
holder_sig_first: false
}
}
tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
if self.holder_sig_first {
- tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- tx.input[0].witness.push(self.counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ tx.input[0].witness.push_bitcoin_signature(&holder_sig.serialize_der(), EcdsaSighashType::All);
+ tx.input[0].witness.push_bitcoin_signature(&self.counterparty_sig.serialize_der(), EcdsaSighashType::All);
} else {
- tx.input[0].witness.push(self.counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ tx.input[0].witness.push_bitcoin_signature(&self.counterparty_sig.serialize_der(), EcdsaSighashType::All);
+ tx.input[0].witness.push_bitcoin_signature(&holder_sig.serialize_der(), EcdsaSighashType::All);
}
- tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
- tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
tx.input[0].witness.push(funding_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec());
tx
pub txid: Txid,
}
-impl_writeable!(BuiltCommitmentTransaction, 0, { transaction, txid });
+impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BuiltCommitmentTransaction, {
+ (0, transaction, required),
+ (2, txid, required),
+});
impl BuiltCommitmentTransaction {
/// Get the SIGHASH_ALL sighash value of the transaction.
///
/// This can be used to verify a signature.
pub fn get_sighash_all(&self, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> Message {
- let sighash = &bip143::SigHashCache::new(&self.transaction).signature_hash(0, funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..];
+ let sighash = &sighash::SighashCache::new(&self.transaction).segwit_signature_hash(0, funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..];
+ hash_to_message!(sighash)
+ }
+
+ /// Signs the counterparty's commitment transaction.
+ pub fn sign_counterparty_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, funding_key: &SecretKey, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Signature {
+ let sighash = self.get_sighash_all(funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis);
+ sign(secp_ctx, &sighash, funding_key)
+ }
+
+ /// Signs the holder commitment transaction because we are about to broadcast it.
+ pub fn sign_holder_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing, ES: Deref>(
+ &self, funding_key: &SecretKey, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
+ entropy_source: &ES, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>
+ ) -> Signature where ES::Target: EntropySource {
+ let sighash = self.get_sighash_all(funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis);
+ sign_with_aux_rand(secp_ctx, &sighash, funding_key, entropy_source)
+ }
+}
+
+/// This class tracks the per-transaction information needed to build a closing transaction and will
+/// actually build it and sign.
+///
+/// This class can be used inside a signer implementation to generate a signature given the relevant
+/// secret key.
+#[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct ClosingTransaction {
+ to_holder_value_sat: u64,
+ to_counterparty_value_sat: u64,
+ to_holder_script: Script,
+ to_counterparty_script: Script,
+ built: Transaction,
+}
+
+impl ClosingTransaction {
+ /// Construct an object of the class
+ pub fn new(
+ to_holder_value_sat: u64,
+ to_counterparty_value_sat: u64,
+ to_holder_script: Script,
+ to_counterparty_script: Script,
+ funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
+ ) -> Self {
+ let built = build_closing_transaction(
+ to_holder_value_sat, to_counterparty_value_sat,
+ to_holder_script.clone(), to_counterparty_script.clone(),
+ funding_outpoint
+ );
+ ClosingTransaction {
+ to_holder_value_sat,
+ to_counterparty_value_sat,
+ to_holder_script,
+ to_counterparty_script,
+ built
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Trust our pre-built transaction.
+ ///
+ /// Applies a wrapper which allows access to the transaction.
+ ///
+ /// This should only be used if you fully trust the builder of this object. It should not
+ /// be used by an external signer - instead use the verify function.
+ pub fn trust(&self) -> TrustedClosingTransaction {
+ TrustedClosingTransaction { inner: self }
+ }
+
+ /// Verify our pre-built transaction.
+ ///
+ /// Applies a wrapper which allows access to the transaction.
+ ///
+ /// An external validating signer must call this method before signing
+ /// or using the built transaction.
+ pub fn verify(&self, funding_outpoint: OutPoint) -> Result<TrustedClosingTransaction, ()> {
+ let built = build_closing_transaction(
+ self.to_holder_value_sat, self.to_counterparty_value_sat,
+ self.to_holder_script.clone(), self.to_counterparty_script.clone(),
+ funding_outpoint
+ );
+ if self.built != built {
+ return Err(())
+ }
+ Ok(TrustedClosingTransaction { inner: self })
+ }
+
+ /// The value to be sent to the holder, or zero if the output will be omitted
+ pub fn to_holder_value_sat(&self) -> u64 {
+ self.to_holder_value_sat
+ }
+
+ /// The value to be sent to the counterparty, or zero if the output will be omitted
+ pub fn to_counterparty_value_sat(&self) -> u64 {
+ self.to_counterparty_value_sat
+ }
+
+ /// The destination of the holder's output
+ pub fn to_holder_script(&self) -> &Script {
+ &self.to_holder_script
+ }
+
+ /// The destination of the counterparty's output
+ pub fn to_counterparty_script(&self) -> &Script {
+ &self.to_counterparty_script
+ }
+}
+
+/// A wrapper on ClosingTransaction indicating that the built bitcoin
+/// transaction is trusted.
+///
+/// See trust() and verify() functions on CommitmentTransaction.
+///
+/// This structure implements Deref.
+pub struct TrustedClosingTransaction<'a> {
+ inner: &'a ClosingTransaction,
+}
+
+impl<'a> Deref for TrustedClosingTransaction<'a> {
+ type Target = ClosingTransaction;
+
+ fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target { self.inner }
+}
+
+impl<'a> TrustedClosingTransaction<'a> {
+ /// The pre-built Bitcoin commitment transaction
+ pub fn built_transaction(&self) -> &Transaction {
+ &self.inner.built
+ }
+
+ /// Get the SIGHASH_ALL sighash value of the transaction.
+ ///
+ /// This can be used to verify a signature.
+ pub fn get_sighash_all(&self, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> Message {
+ let sighash = &sighash::SighashCache::new(&self.inner.built).segwit_signature_hash(0, funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..];
hash_to_message!(sighash)
}
/// because we are about to broadcast a holder transaction.
pub fn sign<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, funding_key: &SecretKey, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Signature {
let sighash = self.get_sighash_all(funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis);
- secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, funding_key)
+ sign(secp_ctx, &sighash, funding_key)
}
}
-/// This class tracks the per-transaction information needed to build a commitment transaction and to
+/// This class tracks the per-transaction information needed to build a commitment transaction and will
/// actually build it and sign. It is used for holder transactions that we sign only when needed
/// and for transactions we sign for the counterparty.
///
to_countersignatory_value_sat: u64,
feerate_per_kw: u32,
htlcs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>,
+ // Note that on upgrades, some features of existing outputs may be missed.
+ channel_type_features: ChannelTypeFeatures,
// A cache of the parties' pubkeys required to construct the transaction, see doc for trust()
keys: TxCreationKeys,
// For access to the pre-built transaction, see doc for trust()
built: BuiltCommitmentTransaction,
}
+impl Eq for CommitmentTransaction {}
impl PartialEq for CommitmentTransaction {
fn eq(&self, o: &Self) -> bool {
let eq = self.commitment_number == o.commitment_number &&
self.to_countersignatory_value_sat == o.to_countersignatory_value_sat &&
self.feerate_per_kw == o.feerate_per_kw &&
self.htlcs == o.htlcs &&
+ self.channel_type_features == o.channel_type_features &&
self.keys == o.keys;
if eq {
debug_assert_eq!(self.built.transaction, o.built.transaction);
}
}
-/// (C-not exported) as users never need to call this directly
-impl Writeable for Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment> {
- #[inline]
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- (self.len() as u16).write(w)?;
- for e in self.iter() {
- e.write(w)?;
- }
+impl Writeable for CommitmentTransaction {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
+ let legacy_deserialization_prevention_marker = legacy_deserialization_prevention_marker_for_channel_type_features(&self.channel_type_features);
+ write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
+ (0, self.commitment_number, required),
+ (2, self.to_broadcaster_value_sat, required),
+ (4, self.to_countersignatory_value_sat, required),
+ (6, self.feerate_per_kw, required),
+ (8, self.keys, required),
+ (10, self.built, required),
+ (12, self.htlcs, vec_type),
+ (14, legacy_deserialization_prevention_marker, option),
+ (15, self.channel_type_features, required),
+ });
Ok(())
}
}
-/// (C-not exported) as users never need to call this directly
-impl Readable for Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment> {
- #[inline]
- fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- let len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
- let byte_size = (len as usize)
- .checked_mul(HTLC_OUTPUT_IN_COMMITMENT_SIZE)
- .ok_or(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor)?;
- if byte_size > MAX_BUF_SIZE {
- return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor);
- }
- let mut ret = Vec::with_capacity(len as usize);
- for _ in 0..len { ret.push(HTLCOutputInCommitment::read(r)?); }
- Ok(ret)
+impl Readable for CommitmentTransaction {
+ fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ let mut commitment_number = RequiredWrapper(None);
+ let mut to_broadcaster_value_sat = RequiredWrapper(None);
+ let mut to_countersignatory_value_sat = RequiredWrapper(None);
+ let mut feerate_per_kw = RequiredWrapper(None);
+ let mut keys = RequiredWrapper(None);
+ let mut built = RequiredWrapper(None);
+ _init_tlv_field_var!(htlcs, vec_type);
+ let mut _legacy_deserialization_prevention_marker: Option<()> = None;
+ let mut channel_type_features = None;
+
+ read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
+ (0, commitment_number, required),
+ (2, to_broadcaster_value_sat, required),
+ (4, to_countersignatory_value_sat, required),
+ (6, feerate_per_kw, required),
+ (8, keys, required),
+ (10, built, required),
+ (12, htlcs, vec_type),
+ (14, _legacy_deserialization_prevention_marker, option),
+ (15, channel_type_features, option),
+ });
+
+ let mut additional_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
+ additional_features.set_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
+ chain::package::verify_channel_type_features(&channel_type_features, Some(&additional_features))?;
+
+ Ok(Self {
+ commitment_number: commitment_number.0.unwrap(),
+ to_broadcaster_value_sat: to_broadcaster_value_sat.0.unwrap(),
+ to_countersignatory_value_sat: to_countersignatory_value_sat.0.unwrap(),
+ feerate_per_kw: feerate_per_kw.0.unwrap(),
+ keys: keys.0.unwrap(),
+ built: built.0.unwrap(),
+ htlcs: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlcs, vec_type),
+ channel_type_features: channel_type_features.unwrap_or(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key())
+ })
}
}
-impl_writeable!(CommitmentTransaction, 0, {
- commitment_number,
- to_broadcaster_value_sat,
- to_countersignatory_value_sat,
- feerate_per_kw,
- htlcs,
- keys,
- built
-});
-
impl CommitmentTransaction {
/// Construct an object of the class while assigning transaction output indices to HTLCs.
///
///
/// Only include HTLCs that are above the dust limit for the channel.
///
- /// (C-not exported) due to the generic though we likely should expose a version without
- pub fn new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data<T>(commitment_number: u64, to_broadcaster_value_sat: u64, to_countersignatory_value_sat: u64, keys: TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u32, htlcs_with_aux: &mut Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, T)>, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters) -> CommitmentTransaction {
+ /// This is not exported to bindings users due to the generic though we likely should expose a version without
+ pub fn new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data<T>(commitment_number: u64, to_broadcaster_value_sat: u64, to_countersignatory_value_sat: u64, broadcaster_funding_key: PublicKey, countersignatory_funding_key: PublicKey, keys: TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u32, htlcs_with_aux: &mut Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, T)>, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters) -> CommitmentTransaction {
// Sort outputs and populate output indices while keeping track of the auxiliary data
- let (outputs, htlcs) = Self::internal_build_outputs(&keys, to_broadcaster_value_sat, to_countersignatory_value_sat, htlcs_with_aux, channel_parameters).unwrap();
+ let (outputs, htlcs) = Self::internal_build_outputs(&keys, to_broadcaster_value_sat, to_countersignatory_value_sat, htlcs_with_aux, channel_parameters, &broadcaster_funding_key, &countersignatory_funding_key).unwrap();
let (obscured_commitment_transaction_number, txins) = Self::internal_build_inputs(commitment_number, channel_parameters);
let transaction = Self::make_transaction(obscured_commitment_transaction_number, txins, outputs);
to_countersignatory_value_sat,
feerate_per_kw,
htlcs,
+ channel_type_features: channel_parameters.channel_type_features().clone(),
keys,
built: BuiltCommitmentTransaction {
transaction,
}
}
- fn internal_rebuild_transaction(&self, keys: &TxCreationKeys, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters) -> Result<BuiltCommitmentTransaction, ()> {
+ /// Use non-zero fee anchors
+ ///
+ /// This is not exported to bindings users due to move, and also not likely to be useful for binding users
+ pub fn with_non_zero_fee_anchors(mut self) -> Self {
+ self.channel_type_features.set_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
+ self
+ }
+
+ fn internal_rebuild_transaction(&self, keys: &TxCreationKeys, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, broadcaster_funding_key: &PublicKey, countersignatory_funding_key: &PublicKey) -> Result<BuiltCommitmentTransaction, ()> {
let (obscured_commitment_transaction_number, txins) = Self::internal_build_inputs(self.commitment_number, channel_parameters);
let mut htlcs_with_aux = self.htlcs.iter().map(|h| (h.clone(), ())).collect();
- let (outputs, _) = Self::internal_build_outputs(keys, self.to_broadcaster_value_sat, self.to_countersignatory_value_sat, &mut htlcs_with_aux, channel_parameters)?;
+ let (outputs, _) = Self::internal_build_outputs(keys, self.to_broadcaster_value_sat, self.to_countersignatory_value_sat, &mut htlcs_with_aux, channel_parameters, broadcaster_funding_key, countersignatory_funding_key)?;
let transaction = Self::make_transaction(obscured_commitment_transaction_number, txins, outputs);
let txid = transaction.txid();
fn make_transaction(obscured_commitment_transaction_number: u64, txins: Vec<TxIn>, outputs: Vec<TxOut>) -> Transaction {
Transaction {
version: 2,
- lock_time: ((0x20 as u32) << 8 * 3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number & 0xffffffu64) as u32),
+ lock_time: PackedLockTime(((0x20 as u32) << 8 * 3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number & 0xffffffu64) as u32)),
input: txins,
output: outputs,
}
// - initial sorting of outputs / HTLCs in the constructor, in which case T is auxiliary data the
// caller needs to have sorted together with the HTLCs so it can keep track of the output index
// - building of a bitcoin transaction during a verify() call, in which case T is just ()
- fn internal_build_outputs<T>(keys: &TxCreationKeys, to_broadcaster_value_sat: u64, to_countersignatory_value_sat: u64, htlcs_with_aux: &mut Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, T)>, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters) -> Result<(Vec<TxOut>, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>), ()> {
+ fn internal_build_outputs<T>(keys: &TxCreationKeys, to_broadcaster_value_sat: u64, to_countersignatory_value_sat: u64, htlcs_with_aux: &mut Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, T)>, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, broadcaster_funding_key: &PublicKey, countersignatory_funding_key: &PublicKey) -> Result<(Vec<TxOut>, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>), ()> {
let countersignatory_pubkeys = channel_parameters.countersignatory_pubkeys();
let contest_delay = channel_parameters.contest_delay();
let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, Option<&mut HTLCOutputInCommitment>)> = Vec::new();
if to_countersignatory_value_sat > 0 {
- let script = script_for_p2wpkh(&countersignatory_pubkeys.payment_point);
+ let script = if channel_parameters.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
+ get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript(&countersignatory_pubkeys.payment_point).to_v0_p2wsh()
+ } else {
+ Payload::p2wpkh(&BitcoinPublicKey::new(countersignatory_pubkeys.payment_point)).unwrap().script_pubkey()
+ };
txouts.push((
TxOut {
script_pubkey: script.clone(),
));
}
+ if channel_parameters.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
+ if to_broadcaster_value_sat > 0 || !htlcs_with_aux.is_empty() {
+ let anchor_script = get_anchor_redeemscript(broadcaster_funding_key);
+ txouts.push((
+ TxOut {
+ script_pubkey: anchor_script.to_v0_p2wsh(),
+ value: ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI,
+ },
+ None,
+ ));
+ }
+
+ if to_countersignatory_value_sat > 0 || !htlcs_with_aux.is_empty() {
+ let anchor_script = get_anchor_redeemscript(countersignatory_funding_key);
+ txouts.push((
+ TxOut {
+ script_pubkey: anchor_script.to_v0_p2wsh(),
+ value: ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI,
+ },
+ None,
+ ));
+ }
+ }
+
let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_with_aux.len());
for (htlc, _) in htlcs_with_aux {
- let script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
+ let script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &channel_parameters.channel_type_features(), &keys);
let txout = TxOut {
script_pubkey: script.to_v0_p2wsh(),
value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
if let &Some(ref b_htlcout) = b {
a_htlcout.cltv_expiry.cmp(&b_htlcout.cltv_expiry)
// Note that due to hash collisions, we have to have a fallback comparison
- // here for fuzztarget mode (otherwise at least chanmon_fail_consistency
+ // here for fuzzing mode (otherwise at least chanmon_fail_consistency
// may fail)!
.then(a_htlcout.payment_hash.0.cmp(&b_htlcout.payment_hash.0))
// For non-HTLC outputs, if they're copying our SPK we don't really care if we
ins.push(TxIn {
previous_output: channel_parameters.funding_outpoint(),
script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: ((0x80 as u32) << 8 * 3)
- | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number >> 3 * 8) as u32),
- witness: Vec::new(),
+ sequence: Sequence(((0x80 as u32) << 8 * 3)
+ | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number >> 3 * 8) as u32)),
+ witness: Witness::new(),
});
ins
};
/// which were included in this commitment transaction in output order.
/// The transaction index is always populated.
///
- /// (C-not exported) as we cannot currently convert Vec references to/from C, though we should
+ /// This is not exported to bindings users as we cannot currently convert Vec references to/from C, though we should
/// expose a less effecient version which creates a Vec of references in the future.
pub fn htlcs(&self) -> &Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment> {
&self.htlcs
/// Applies a wrapper which allows access to these fields.
///
/// This should only be used if you fully trust the builder of this object. It should not
- /// be used by an external signer - instead use the verify function.
+ /// be used by an external signer - instead use the verify function.
pub fn trust(&self) -> TrustedCommitmentTransaction {
TrustedCommitmentTransaction { inner: self }
}
pub fn verify<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, broadcaster_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, countersignatory_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<TrustedCommitmentTransaction, ()> {
// This is the only field of the key cache that we trust
let per_commitment_point = self.keys.per_commitment_point;
- let keys = TxCreationKeys::from_channel_static_keys(&per_commitment_point, broadcaster_keys, countersignatory_keys, secp_ctx).unwrap();
+ let keys = TxCreationKeys::from_channel_static_keys(&per_commitment_point, broadcaster_keys, countersignatory_keys, secp_ctx);
if keys != self.keys {
return Err(());
}
- let tx = self.internal_rebuild_transaction(&keys, channel_parameters)?;
+ let tx = self.internal_rebuild_transaction(&keys, channel_parameters, &broadcaster_keys.funding_pubkey, &countersignatory_keys.funding_pubkey)?;
if self.built.transaction != tx.transaction || self.built.txid != tx.txid {
return Err(());
}
&self.inner.keys
}
+ /// Should anchors be used.
+ pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
+ &self.inner.channel_type_features
+ }
+
/// Get a signature for each HTLC which was included in the commitment transaction (ie for
/// which HTLCOutputInCommitment::transaction_output_index.is_some()).
///
/// The returned Vec has one entry for each HTLC, and in the same order.
- pub fn get_htlc_sigs<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Signature>, ()> {
+ ///
+ /// This function is only valid in the holder commitment context, it always uses EcdsaSighashType::All.
+ pub fn get_htlc_sigs<T: secp256k1::Signing, ES: Deref>(
+ &self, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters,
+ entropy_source: &ES, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>,
+ ) -> Result<Vec<Signature>, ()> where ES::Target: EntropySource {
let inner = self.inner;
let keys = &inner.keys;
let txid = inner.built.txid;
let mut ret = Vec::with_capacity(inner.htlcs.len());
- let holder_htlc_key = derive_private_key(secp_ctx, &inner.keys.per_commitment_point, htlc_base_key).map_err(|_| ())?;
+ let holder_htlc_key = derive_private_key(secp_ctx, &inner.keys.per_commitment_point, htlc_base_key);
for this_htlc in inner.htlcs.iter() {
assert!(this_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some());
- let htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, inner.feerate_per_kw, channel_parameters.contest_delay(), &this_htlc, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
+ let htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, inner.feerate_per_kw, channel_parameters.contest_delay(), &this_htlc, &self.channel_type_features, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
- let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc, &keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key);
+ let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc, &self.channel_type_features, &keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key);
- let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, this_htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]);
- ret.push(secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &holder_htlc_key));
+ let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, this_htlc.amount_msat / 1000, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..]);
+ ret.push(sign_with_aux_rand(secp_ctx, &sighash, &holder_htlc_key, entropy_source));
}
Ok(ret)
}
// Further, we should never be provided the preimage for an HTLC-Timeout transaction.
if this_htlc.offered && preimage.is_some() { unreachable!(); }
- let mut htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, inner.feerate_per_kw, channel_parameters.contest_delay(), &this_htlc, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
-
- let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc, &keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key);
-
- // First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element.
- htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
-
- htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_signature.serialize_der().to_vec());
- htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(signature.serialize_der().to_vec());
- htlc_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
- htlc_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+ let mut htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, inner.feerate_per_kw, channel_parameters.contest_delay(), &this_htlc, &self.channel_type_features, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
- if this_htlc.offered {
- // Due to BIP146 (MINIMALIF) this must be a zero-length element to relay.
- htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
- } else {
- htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(preimage.unwrap().0.to_vec());
- }
+ let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc, &self.channel_type_features, &keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key);
- htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec());
+ htlc_tx.input[0].witness = chan_utils::build_htlc_input_witness(
+ signature, counterparty_signature, preimage, &htlc_redeemscript, &self.channel_type_features,
+ );
htlc_tx
}
}
-/// Get the transaction number obscure factor
+/// Commitment transaction numbers which appear in the transactions themselves are XOR'd with a
+/// shared secret first. This prevents on-chain observers from discovering how many commitment
+/// transactions occurred in a channel before it was closed.
+///
+/// This function gets the shared secret from relevant channel public keys and can be used to
+/// "decrypt" the commitment transaction number given a commitment transaction on-chain.
pub fn get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(
broadcaster_payment_basepoint: &PublicKey,
countersignatory_payment_basepoint: &PublicKey,
| ((res[31] as u64) << 0 * 8)
}
-fn script_for_p2wpkh(key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
- Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
- .push_slice(&WPubkeyHash::hash(&key.serialize())[..])
- .into_script()
-}
-
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets;
- use hex;
+ use crate::{hex, chain};
+ use crate::prelude::*;
+ use crate::ln::chan_utils::{get_htlc_redeemscript, get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript, CommitmentTransaction, TxCreationKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
+ use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey, Secp256k1};
+ use crate::util::test_utils;
+ use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, SignerProvider};
+ use bitcoin::{Network, Txid};
+ use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
+ use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
+ use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
+ use bitcoin::util::address::Payload;
+ use bitcoin::PublicKey as BitcoinPublicKey;
+ use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_anchors() {
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+
+ let seed = [42; 32];
+ let network = Network::Testnet;
+ let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
+ let signer = keys_provider.derive_channel_signer(3000, keys_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, 1_000_000, 0));
+ let counterparty_signer = keys_provider.derive_channel_signer(3000, keys_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, 1_000_000, 1));
+ let delayed_payment_base = &signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
+ let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
+ let htlc_basepoint = &signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
+ let holder_pubkeys = signer.pubkeys();
+ let counterparty_pubkeys = counterparty_signer.pubkeys();
+ let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
+ let mut channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
+ holder_pubkeys: holder_pubkeys.clone(),
+ holder_selected_contest_delay: 0,
+ is_outbound_from_holder: false,
+ counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters { pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(), selected_contest_delay: 0 }),
+ funding_outpoint: Some(chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: Txid::all_zeros(), index: 0 }),
+ channel_type_features: ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(),
+ };
+
+ let mut htlcs_with_aux: Vec<(_, ())> = Vec::new();
+
+ // Generate broadcaster and counterparty outputs
+ let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
+ 0, 1000, 2000,
+ holder_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
+ counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
+ keys.clone(), 1,
+ &mut htlcs_with_aux, &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable()
+ );
+ assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 2);
+ assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[1].script_pubkey, Payload::p2wpkh(&BitcoinPublicKey::new(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point)).unwrap().script_pubkey());
+
+ // Generate broadcaster and counterparty outputs as well as two anchors
+ channel_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
+ let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
+ 0, 1000, 2000,
+ holder_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
+ counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
+ keys.clone(), 1,
+ &mut htlcs_with_aux, &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable()
+ );
+ assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 4);
+ assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[3].script_pubkey, get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript(&counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point).to_v0_p2wsh());
+
+ // Generate broadcaster output and anchor
+ let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
+ 0, 3000, 0,
+ holder_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
+ counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
+ keys.clone(), 1,
+ &mut htlcs_with_aux, &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable()
+ );
+ assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 2);
+
+ // Generate counterparty output and anchor
+ let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
+ 0, 0, 3000,
+ holder_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
+ counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
+ keys.clone(), 1,
+ &mut htlcs_with_aux, &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable()
+ );
+ assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 2);
+
+ let received_htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
+ offered: false,
+ amount_msat: 400000,
+ cltv_expiry: 100,
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash([42; 32]),
+ transaction_output_index: None,
+ };
+
+ let offered_htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
+ offered: true,
+ amount_msat: 600000,
+ cltv_expiry: 100,
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
+ transaction_output_index: None,
+ };
+
+ // Generate broadcaster output and received and offered HTLC outputs, w/o anchors
+ channel_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
+ let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
+ 0, 3000, 0,
+ holder_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
+ counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
+ keys.clone(), 1,
+ &mut vec![(received_htlc.clone(), ()), (offered_htlc.clone(), ())],
+ &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable()
+ );
+ assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 3);
+ assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[0].script_pubkey, get_htlc_redeemscript(&received_htlc, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), &keys).to_v0_p2wsh());
+ assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[1].script_pubkey, get_htlc_redeemscript(&offered_htlc, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), &keys).to_v0_p2wsh());
+ assert_eq!(get_htlc_redeemscript(&received_htlc, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), &keys).to_v0_p2wsh().to_hex(),
+ "0020e43a7c068553003fe68fcae424fb7b28ec5ce48cd8b6744b3945631389bad2fb");
+ assert_eq!(get_htlc_redeemscript(&offered_htlc, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), &keys).to_v0_p2wsh().to_hex(),
+ "0020215d61bba56b19e9eadb6107f5a85d7f99c40f65992443f69229c290165bc00d");
+
+ // Generate broadcaster output and received and offered HTLC outputs, with anchors
+ channel_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
+ let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
+ 0, 3000, 0,
+ holder_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
+ counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
+ keys.clone(), 1,
+ &mut vec![(received_htlc.clone(), ()), (offered_htlc.clone(), ())],
+ &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable()
+ );
+ assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 5);
+ assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[2].script_pubkey, get_htlc_redeemscript(&received_htlc, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), &keys).to_v0_p2wsh());
+ assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[3].script_pubkey, get_htlc_redeemscript(&offered_htlc, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), &keys).to_v0_p2wsh());
+ assert_eq!(get_htlc_redeemscript(&received_htlc, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), &keys).to_v0_p2wsh().to_hex(),
+ "0020b70d0649c72b38756885c7a30908d912a7898dd5d79457a7280b8e9a20f3f2bc");
+ assert_eq!(get_htlc_redeemscript(&offered_htlc, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), &keys).to_v0_p2wsh().to_hex(),
+ "002087a3faeb1950a469c0e2db4a79b093a41b9526e5a6fc6ef5cb949bde3be379c7");
+ }
#[test]
fn test_per_commitment_storage() {