// licenses.
use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
-use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
-use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
-use bitcoin::util::sighash;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf, Builder};
+use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
+use bitcoin::sighash;
+use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use crate::sign::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
use crate::events::ClosureReason;
use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
-use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
+use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
use crate::util::logger::Logger;
use crate::util::errors::APIError;
use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
use crate::io;
use crate::prelude::*;
use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
+use core::convert::TryInto;
use core::ops::Deref;
#[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
use crate::sync::Mutex;
-use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
+use super::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationBasepoint};
+
#[cfg(test)]
pub struct ChannelValueStat {
pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
SP::Target: SignerProvider,
- <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer: ChannelSigner,
+ <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: ChannelSigner,
{
pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
match self {
latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
- holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
+ holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
- destination_script: Script,
+ destination_script: ScriptBuf,
// Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
// generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
#[cfg(not(test))]
closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
+ /// If we remove an HTLC (or fee update), commit, and receive our counterparty's
+ /// `revoke_and_ack`, we remove all knowledge of said HTLC (or fee update). However, the latest
+ /// local commitment transaction that we can broadcast still contains the HTLC (or old fee)
+ /// until we receive a further `commitment_signed`. Thus we are not eligible for initiating the
+ /// `closing_signed` negotiation if we're expecting a counterparty `commitment_signed`.
+ ///
+ /// To ensure we don't send a `closing_signed` too early, we track this state here, waiting
+ /// until we see a `commitment_signed` before doing so.
+ ///
+ /// We don't bother to persist this - we anticipate this state won't last longer than a few
+ /// milliseconds, so any accidental force-closes here should be exceedingly rare.
+ expecting_peer_commitment_signed: bool,
+
/// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
- counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
+ counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ScriptBuf>,
commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
/// Returns the holder signer for this channel.
#[cfg(test)]
- pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> {
+ pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner> {
return &self.holder_signer
}
self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
}
+ /// Returns the height in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
+ pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmation_height(&self) -> Option<u32> {
+ let conf_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height;
+ if conf_height > 0 {
+ Some(conf_height)
+ } else {
+ None
+ }
+ }
+
/// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
- ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep);
- feerate_per_kw as u64 * multiplier
+ ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep) as u64;
+ feerate_per_kw.saturating_mul(multiplier)
},
MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
}
/// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
/// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
/// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
- pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
+ pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
}
context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
};
let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
- if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
+ if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
}
let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
- if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
+ if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
SP::Target: SignerProvider,
- <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
+ <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
{
fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
{
- // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
- // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
- // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
- // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust. This doesn't
- // apply to channels supporting anchor outputs since HTLC transactions are pre-signed with a
- // zero fee, so their fee is no longer considered to determine dust limits.
- if !channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
- let upper_limit =
- fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MaxAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee) as u64;
- if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
- }
- }
-
let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee
} else {
}
#[inline]
- fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
+ fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
// The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
// is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
// outside of those situations will fail.
let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
- debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner()));
+ debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).to_byte_array()));
log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
match htlc.state {
/// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
- ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, ChannelError>
+ ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>, ChannelError>
where
L::Target: Logger
{
let outcome = match check_preimage {
None => fail_reason.into(),
Some(payment_preimage) => {
- let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
+ let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
}
let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
- log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
+ log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
- if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
+ if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()) {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
}
if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
};
self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
+ self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = false;
// Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
// build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
// Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
+ let expecting_peer_commitment_signed = &mut self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed;
// We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
}
+ *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
false
} else { true }
});
if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
+ *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
}
if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
+ self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
},
FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
}
Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
- let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
- // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
- // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
- // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
- if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
+ // Check that we won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
+ if !self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
-> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
{
+ // If we're waiting on a monitor persistence, that implies we're also waiting to send some
+ // message to our counterparty (probably a `revoke_and_ack`). In such a case, we shouldn't
+ // initiate `closing_signed` negotiation until we're clear of all pending messages. Note
+ // that closing_negotiation_ready checks this case (as well as a few others).
if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
return Ok((None, None, None));
}
return Ok((None, None, None));
}
+ // If we're waiting on a counterparty `commitment_signed` to clear some updates from our
+ // local commitment transaction, we can't yet initiate `closing_signed` negotiation.
+ if self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed {
+ return Ok((None, None, None));
+ }
+
let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
- return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
+ return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
}
if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
- return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
+ return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
}
} else {
self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
}
#[cfg(test)]
- pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> {
+ pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner> {
&self.context.holder_signer
}
log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
- log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
+ log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
}
}
}
}
- let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
+ let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
Ok(script) => script,
Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
};
last_sent_closing_fee: None,
pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
+ expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
closing_fee_limits: None,
target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
- revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
+ revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
payment_point: keys.payment_point,
- delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
- htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
+ delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
+ htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
first_per_commitment_point,
channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
- revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
+ revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.revocation_basepoint),
payment_point: msg.payment_point,
- delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
- htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
+ delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
+ htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.htlc_basepoint)
};
self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
- revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
+ revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.revocation_basepoint),
payment_point: msg.payment_point,
- delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
- htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
+ delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
+ htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.htlc_basepoint)
};
if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
}
}
- let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
+ let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
Ok(script) => script,
Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
};
last_sent_closing_fee: None,
pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
+ expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
closing_fee_limits: None,
target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
- revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
+ revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
payment_point: keys.payment_point,
- delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
- htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
+ delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
+ htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
first_per_commitment_point,
shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
- ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>), (Self, ChannelError)>
+ ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (Self, ChannelError)>
where
L::Target: Logger
{
}
const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
-const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
+const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
(0, FailRelay),
self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
- let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
- // TODO (taproot|arik): Introduce serialization distinction for non-ECDSA signers.
- self.context.holder_signer.as_ecdsa().expect("Only ECDSA signers may be serialized").write(&mut key_data)?;
- assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
- assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
- (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
- writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
-
// Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
// deserialized from that format.
match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
last_sent_closing_fee: None,
pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
+ expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
closing_fee_limits: None,
target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
mod tests {
use std::cmp;
use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
- use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{ScriptBuf, Builder};
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
- use hex;
use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
- use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
+ use crate::ln::channel_keys::{RevocationKey, RevocationBasepoint};
+use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
- use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
+ use crate::ln::channel::{ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
- use crate::ln::chan_utils;
- use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
+ use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
use crate::chain::BestBlock;
use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
+ use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
- use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
- use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
+ use bitcoin::address::{WitnessProgram, WitnessVersion};
use crate::prelude::*;
struct TestFeeEstimator {
"MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
}
- #[test]
- fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
- // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
- // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
- let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
- let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
- assert!(Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::check_remote_fee(
- &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), &bounded_fee_estimator,
- u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
- }
-
struct Keys {
signer: InMemorySigner,
}
}
impl SignerProvider for Keys {
- type Signer = InMemorySigner;
+ type EcdsaSigner = InMemorySigner;
+ #[cfg(taproot)]
+ type TaprootSigner = InMemorySigner;
fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
self.signer.channel_keys_id()
}
- fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
+ fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::EcdsaSigner {
self.signer.clone()
}
- fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
+ fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::EcdsaSigner, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
- fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
+ fn get_destination_script(&self, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Result<ScriptBuf, ()> {
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
- let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
- Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
+ Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(channel_monitor_claim_key_hash).into_script())
}
fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
- let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
}
}
#[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
- PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
+ PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
}
#[test]
fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
- let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
- ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
+ let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script = ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(
+ &WitnessProgram::new(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap(),
+ ).unwrap();
let seed = [42; 32];
let network = Network::Testnet;
// Node A --> Node B: funding created
let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
- let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
+ let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
}]};
let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
htlc_id: 0,
amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
- payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).to_byte_array()),
cltv_expiry: 300000000,
state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
});
node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
htlc_id: 1,
amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
- payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).to_byte_array()),
cltv_expiry: 200000000,
state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
- session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+ session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
},
// Node A --> Node B: funding created
let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
- let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
+ let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
}]};
let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
// Node A --> Node B: funding created
let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
- let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
+ let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
}]};
let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
#[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
#[test]
fn outbound_commitment_test() {
- use bitcoin::util::sighash;
+ use bitcoin::sighash;
use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
- use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
+ use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, EcdsaChannelSigner};
use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
+ use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint};
use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
use crate::util::logger::Logger;
use crate::sync::Arc;
+ use core::str::FromStr;
+ use hex::DisplayHex;
// Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
&secp_ctx,
- SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
- SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
- SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
- SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
- SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
// These aren't set in the test vectors:
[0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
);
assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
- hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
+ <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
- let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
+ let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_str("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
- revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+ revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()),
payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
- delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
- htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
+ delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13")),
+ htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"))
};
chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
- hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
+ <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
- hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
+ <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
- hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key().serialize()[..],
+ <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
// We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
// derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
// build_commitment_transaction.
let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
- let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
- let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
- log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
+ log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction).as_hex());
assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
$({
- let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
})*
chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
);
let holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
+ assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
- assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
+ assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
// ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
let mut htlc_counterparty_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter();
$({
log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
- let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
let mut htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
- assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
+ assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
if !htlc.offered {
for i in 0..5 {
- let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
+ let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).to_byte_array());
if out == htlc.payment_hash {
preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
}
let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
assert_eq!(htlc.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
- let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ let signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
assert_eq!(signature, htlc_holder_sig, "htlc sig");
let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
htlc_tx.input[0].witness = trusted_tx.build_htlc_input_witness($htlc_idx, htlc_counterparty_sig, &htlc_holder_sig, &preimage);
- log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&htlc_tx)));
- assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..], hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
+ log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", serialize(&htlc_tx).as_hex());
+ assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
})*
assert!(htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().is_none());
} }
payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
};
- out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
+ out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
out
});
chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
};
- out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
+ out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
out
});
chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
skimmed_fee_msat: None,
};
- out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
+ out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
out
});
chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
skimmed_fee_msat: None,
};
- out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
+ out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
out
});
chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
};
- out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
+ out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
out
});
payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
};
- out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
+ out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
out
});
chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
skimmed_fee_msat: None,
};
- out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
+ out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
out
});
chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
skimmed_fee_msat: None,
};
- out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
+ out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
out
});
// Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
let mut seed = [0; 32];
- seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
+ seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
- hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
+ <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
- seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
+ seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
- hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
+ <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
- hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
+ <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
- hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
+ <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
- seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
+ seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
- hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
+ <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
}
-
+
#[test]
fn test_key_derivation() {
// Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
- let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
- assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
- assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
-
- assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
- hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
- SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
- assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
- hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(base_point), &per_commitment_point).to_public_key().serialize()[..],
+ <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
- SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
}
#[test]
let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
let tx = Transaction {
version: 1,
- lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
+ lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
input: Vec::new(),
output: vec
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff