let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
- let mut channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
- &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
- &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
- &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
- funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
- obscure_factor,
- holder_commitment_tx);
+ let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
+ &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
+ &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
+ &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
+ funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
+ obscure_factor,
+ holder_commitment_tx);
channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
- let mut channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
- &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
- &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
- &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
- funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
- obscure_factor,
- holder_commitment_tx);
+ let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
+ &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
+ &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
+ &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
+ funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
+ obscure_factor,
+ holder_commitment_tx);
channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
// Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
// to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
// channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
- self.channel_value_satoshis * 9 / 10,
+ self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis)
);
signature = res.0;
htlc_signatures = res.1;
- log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} with redeemscript {} -> {}",
+ log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {}",
+ encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
&counterparty_commitment_txid,
encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]));
/// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
/// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
/// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
- pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<OutPoint>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) {
+ pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) {
assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
// We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
_ => {}
}
}
- let funding_txo = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
+ let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
// If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
// returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
// we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
// monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
// See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
- Some(funding_txo.clone())
+ self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
+ Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
+ update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
+ updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
+ }))
} else { None }
} else { None };
self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
self.update_time_counter += 1;
- self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
- (funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
- update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
- updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
- }, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
+ (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
}
}